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This thesis argues that theorising about the phantasmatic nature of binary gender, by 
commentators such as Judith Butler, provides fruitful openings for the formation of 
new metaphorical models for Divine-human relationship.  I am concerned with 
what it means, at the level of each specific human life, to be imago Dei, particularly 
as this relates to genders that are ambiguous, fluid or otherwise complex. Expanding 
the feminist theological rubric of ‗experience‘ to include the individual and the 
quotidian, I apply the qualitative research method of grounded theory to data 
gathered from transgendered people, to develop a methodology of silent waiting: 
Grounded Theology. I analyse the experiences of each of three narrators as imago 
Dei, and generate three metaphors with which to discuss the nature of both 
genderedness and the Divine: Thinness, or numinous insubstantiality; Proteanism, 
or ceaseless mutability; and Opacity, or transcendent unknowability.  I contend that 
a renunciation of attachment to binary gender is necessary for the establishment of 
justice for those rendered unintelligible by binary norms. I conclude that theologies 
that draw metaphorical models, whether androcentric or gynocentric, from binary 
gender alone are not wholly adequate either as descriptions of human gendered 
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SPECIALIST TERMINOLOGY DISCUSSED 
 
Introduction 
In writing this thesis, in which I claim that binary gender is but one metaphor 
among many possibilities to describe our experiences of genderedness, I find it 
necessary to deploy a number of unfamiliar word coinages. Some of these I have 
devised myself; others are adopted and adapted from existing usage. In this 
foreword, I discuss the use of pronouns in relation to a deconstruction of gender, 
explaining my decision to use a gender-neutral or ‗epicene‘ pronoun set throughout 
this text. I then outline the language I use for the Divine and the material, explain 
terms I deploy in relation to feminist theology specifically, and detail some of the 
issues around the terminologies of gender variance, and the language choices I make 
to describe gender variant people. 
 
Epicene Pronouns 
Epicene Pronoun Use Defined 
This thesis begins with a thought experiment: what if there were no gender binary? 
In order to think into existence a world in which binary gender roles have no 
meaning we might start with words to reconfigure the gender landscape. As part of 
this thought experiment therefore I propose to employ a set of gender-neutral or 
2 
‗epicene‘ pronouns in place of the binary of ‗she‘ and ‗he‘. Although a number of 
epicene options already exist in English—the ‗singular they‘; ‗s/he‘ or ‗he/she‘; the 
‗animate it‘; ‗one‘; and the ‗universal he‘—all are problematic1, with the last the most 
problematic of all. Feminist commentators have long since pointed out that this he is 
in no sense universal; ‗he‘ produces in the mind‘s eye the image of a binary-
compliant male, regardless of the intentions of the author2. Devoting a whole 
chapter of Grammar and Gender (1986, 190-216; see also Livia 2001, 134-159) to 
alternative epicene neologisms, Dennis Baron states that ‗in all more than 
eighty…have been proposed since the eighteenth century‘3 (ibid 190). It was not 
until the 1970s, however, that the epicene project became the concern of feminisms.  
 
                                                 
1 The use of ‗they/them/their/theirs‘ as singular pronoun works well when we are referring to a 
somewhat indeterminate or hypothetical third person, someone who may be a singular representative 
of a plurality. However, when applied to a singular person representing only self, the effect is clumsy 
and prone to ambiguity. The inclusive language options ‗s/he‘ or ‗he/she‘ fail on the grounds that they 
account only for binary-compliant people. The ‗animate it‘ is not an attractive option since it is 
heavily laden culturally with inanimacy. ‗One‘, like singular they, works well when the person in 
question is a singular representative of a plurality, more hypothetical than real, but the inherent 
ambiguity of singular they is not avoided when one is applied to a individual.  
2 A telling demonstration of this occurs in Ursula Le Guin‘s The Left Hand of Darkness (1992 [1969]) 
a science fiction novel which posits the existence of an alien race of gender-free beings. In describing 
these beings, Le Guin chose to use the universal he because, she said in a later essay, ‗I utterly refuse 
to mangle English by inventing a pronoun for ‗he/she‘…‗He‘ is the generic pronoun, damn it, in 
English‘ (1989, 15). By the late 1970s, however, she had come to recognise that this had been a 
mistake, since the effect of the generic he was to render all her supposedly gender-free characters 
incontrovertibly male (ibid, 16).  
3 It is clear from Baron‘s extensive review that the reasons for such coinages have varied over time.  
While seventeenth and eighteenth century neologisers had been concerned with logic and 
rationality, Victorian supporters of the epicene pronoun were moved more by issues of grammatical 
correctness and even commercial concerns: ‗since time is money, communications must be rapid as 
well as grammatically correct‘ (Baron 1986, 200).   
3 
Since feminist intentions are generally to create pronouns that undermine the 
universality of ‗he‘ by including ‗she‘, the binary construction of gender is not 
necessarily thereby problematised. Some recent neologisms, however, have been 
coined to allow for the expression of gender beyond the binary. A number of these 
have been taken up, at least as discussion points if not as actual used or even useable 
words, by gender-variant4 communities seeking words to express their non-binary 
gender choices5; the epicene pronoun ‗ze/hir‘ (see Table in footnote 5) has become 
somewhat normative in such circumstances.  
 
                                                 
4 Although I use the term ‗gender variant‘ from time to time, I do this recognising that it is a 
problematic term for someone arguing that binary gender is merely one metaphor among many, since 
variant implies some opposing norm against which to vary. Unfortunately, binary oppositions 
obtrude into this text no matter how I try to prevent them.  
5 Some contemporary epicene pronoun sets: 
Binary she/he her/his hers/his Her/himself 
Spivak e em eirs emself 
Spivak (alt) ey em eirs eirself 
Splat *e h* h*s h*self 
Ze/Sie Ze/sie hir hirs hirself 
Zie  zie zir zirs zirself 
(Spivak and Splat pronouns were developed for online gamers wanting to play non- or third-gender 
characters) 
 
All of these are serviceable systems for written communication, though not without problems when 
spoken. Splat pronouns, for example, are obviously inarticulable in speech. Transgender activist Nat 
Titman‘s online guide to epicene pronouns for gender-variant people (Titman [n.d.]) states that 
‗ze/hir‘ has gained popularity in the trans community. It is, for instance, Kate Bornstein‘s epicene set 
of choice in My Gender Workbook (1998) and is used routinely in gender-variant online forums 
(Titman [n.d.]). In spoken form ‗ze‘ (and ‗zie‘) are however problematic in that they have a tendency 
to sound like a comedic idea of a French speaker‘s English, asserts Titman. Likewise ‗hir/hirself‘ sound 
too much like ‗her/herself‘ to be successful in creating in the hearer‘s mind a gender-neutral image. 
The Spivak pronouns have none of these disadvantages, and after due consideration Titman declares 
these to be the most serviceable for gender-variant people, although in practice ze retains its 
popularity.  
4 
The main problem with such epicene pronouns as ‗zie/hir‘ from the point of view of 
this study is that, taken up by gender-variant communities alone they become 
markers of gender variance rather than universals, and so are not a substitute for but 
an addition to standard binary pronouns. Many commentators (e.g. Feinberg 1998; 
O'Keefe 1999; Wilchins 2002b; Dittman 2003; Pratt 2005) call for additional 
pronouns better to represent ‗richly gendered experiences and identities‘ (Scott-
Dixon 2006a, 26) but, as Alexander Pershai points out, this might serve only to mark 
a user out as different from the norm, and as subordinate in a hierarchy of 
acceptable gender options (2006, 48-49), thus forming one half of a binary 
opposition of normal/variant.  
 
Epicene Pronouns for This Thesis 
Seeking words to express non-binary gender in relation to all embodiments, I 
therefore turn to Marge Piercy‘s science fiction novel Woman on the Edge of Time 
(1979) and in particular, her epicene pronoun set based on the word ‗person‘—
person/per/pers/perself—which she deploys to create an unsettling sense of 
ambiguity6 around the inhabitants of the future utopian community of Mattapoisett. 
The strength of Piercy‘s creation, to which I return briefly in Chapter 1, is that it 
                                                 
6 Livia asserts that the value of such pronoun usage in fiction lies in that it obliges the reader ‗to 
grapple with the ideological motivation behind these terms‘, to ask why Piercy chooses to unsettle 
the binary in this way and thence to question our own gender certainties (2001, 138). At first meeting 
the reader is not sure whether a character is male, female or something else. Since the novel‘s point-
of-view character, Connie Ramos, is a women of the present who still sees people in binary terms, the 
sense of ambiguity never lasts long, but it is powerful enough to suggest exciting possibilities. 
5 
convincingly delineates a world in which sexual difference still exists—people are 
still born with sexed bodies—but socially-constructed gender roles have no meaning 
and cannot therefore render the sexed body unintelligible through its failure to 
conform.  
 
The Effects of Epicene Pronoun Use 
Of course the existence of epicene pronouns in a language is no absolute guarantee 
of gender-neutral thinking among the speakers of that language7.  Finnish has only 
one third-person singular pronoun form, hän. In an email correspondence with 
several Finnish speakers I asked the question:  
Does the absence of gender specificity mean that you keep an open 
mind on the person's gender until you have evidence to point to one 
gender or another—do you have a kind of ‗gender-free space‘ in your 
head?  
 
One respondent stated that she thought  
Finnish speakers…would be as ‗curious‘ as the speakers of any other 
language to know the person's…gender. It usually comes up soon, as 
his/her name is mentioned.  
 
This suggests that the gender-neutrality of the pronoun is compensated for in other 
ways, such as personal name or context, and that therefore a gender-free space in 
the Finnish psyche is not sustained. However a second respondent, bilingual in 
                                                 
7 Speaking of her native language Chinese, for example, an acquaintance opined that the existence of 
the apparently gender-free third person singular had done nothing to undermine the deeply 
patriarchal nature of Chinese society. Despite its appearance of gender neutrality, the pronoun is in 
fact effectively a universal he.  
6 
Swedish and Finnish, thought differently. Speaking particularly about reading the 
Bible, she stated:  
I realized when I gave it a thought…that maybe one of the reasons…I 
still have a very good relationship to religious language in Finnish 
could be the linguistic absence of that male God I was fighting so hard 
in Swedish…. Within the Finnish hän…I managed to find a Motherly 
God, or a Sisterly Holy Spirit, or a ReBirthing Christ, images life 
saving to me at the time…. When I…read feminist theologians and 
their struggle with a He and She…maybe one of the reasons I look so 
lightly upon that ‗fight‘…was I had access to a space in thought where 
I could try all these theories and make them match and make them 
mine—effortlessly, since it was already there within the structures of 
language?  
 
Though both correspondents attest to the highly patriarchal nature of Finnish 
culture, it is clear from the second response that a degree of gender-free thinking is 
possible as a result of the gender-neutral hän, particularly if one is already 
predisposed to think about gender issues. Thus I assert that an experiment with 
epicene pronouns is worthwhile in the context of this study. While Livia argues that 
‗It does not make sense to behave as though we are living in a nongendered utopia 
because we desire one‘ (2001, 37), I contend that, on the contrary, change can only 
come from imagining that existence be different and from acting out that imagining.  
 
Epicene Pronoun Use as Thought Experiment 
From this point onwards, therefore, person/per/pers/perself will be the only 
pronoun set to appear in this text outside of direct quotes. Person speaks to the 
erasure of gender but not the erasure of morphological differences, in a way that 
7 
aligns with my overall intentions and reflects my desire to render intelligible all 
genders, both within and outside the current binary, without creating a new divide 
of binaried/nonbinaried human beings, as I discuss in Chapter 1. Furthermore, since 
per sounds very similar to her, this might offset a tendency to read this epicene 
pronoun as merely an ersatz of the universal he, whilst being sufficiently different 
not to be unequivocally read as universal she. And, since we are without doubt all 
persons, person is an apposite epicene pronoun to deploy. It is my hope that the 
thought experiment of writing in gender neutral language will help somewhat to 
reconfigure the intelligibility of the gender landscape. 
 
GOD/DE-Language  
The term ‗GOD/DE‘ Explained 
Rather than ‗God‘, I use the term ‗GODDE‘, deploying this spelling to indicate that, 
while I conceive of Divinity in broadly monotheistic terms, I write both outside 
Christianity and outside feminist spiritualities‘ concepts of The Goddess. Throughout 
this study, however, I use not GODDE but ‗GOD/DE‘ to indicate that I am speaking 
both/either of my own conceptualising and/or the God/dess-concepts of other 
writers. This has proved more readable than my differentiating between those times 
when I am speaking of my ideas of GODDE and those times when I am speaking of 
others‘ God/dess(es). The word ‗God‘ appears in this text only in direct quotes.  
 
8 
Pronouns and GOD/DE 
An issue my second Finnish correspondent above also raises, of course, is that of 
pronouns for GOD/DE. Since central to my argument is an understanding that 
GOD/DE is utterly beyond our creaturely, idolatrous concerns with gender then, of 
course, no creaturely pronoun such as He, She or It is in any way appropriate. But I 
do not, therefore, chose to apply Piercy‘s epicene pronoun to the Divine and refer to 
GOD/DE as Person, for the simple reason that I wish to preserve a sense of 
GOD/DE‘s being no thing in the world of things. Since GOD/DE is not a material 
person, but One who transcends all matter, I instead employ a set of pronouns 
specific to ÆR8 alone, using the ligature ‗Æ‘ to represent ÆR as Creator and 
Sustainer conjointly of All matter in its entirety and of Each and Every material 
thing in its specificity. And in my deployment of capitalisation, I seek to signify that 
GOD/DE exceeds both my thinking and this text in infinite degree.  
 
In terms of pronunciation, Æ/ÆR retain some trace of the binary, since Æ, 
pronounced ay, sounds a little like he and ÆR, pronounced air, is similar to her. 
However, this is a better alternative, I assert, either than using existing human 
pronouns, or the not-uncommon practice of using ‗God‘ as a pronoun, as in this 
example: ‗God simply wants to reinstate God‘s people to full communion with God 
and this is what God tells God‘s people to do in such cases‘ (Tanner 2004, 49). This 
                                                 
8 Since coining this terminology in 2004, I have learned that an early work of science fiction/fantasy 
(Lindsay [1920], 172) uses the epicene ‗aer/aerself‘ (without ligature or capitalisation) to refer to 
third- or non-gender characters. 
9 
latter, I contend, produces inelegant and disharmonious language in which the 
repeated syllable God draws the reader/hearer‘s attention to it alone and away from 
the entirety of the text. Furthermore, when a proper name is repeated in this way, it 
creates a lack of grammatical cohesion since ‗it may be assumed to refer to another 
person with the same name‘ (Livia 2001, 42) in GOD/DE‘s case, creating a confusing 
impression of more than one GOD/DE entering the scene.  And in the coinage ÆR, 
the similarity of its sound to that of her might, like per, offset a tendency to read an 
ungendered GOD/DE-pronoun as an ersatz of a universal God-He. 
 
Other Theological Terminology 
The World 
I use the term ‗the World‘ to refer to all of material creation as distinct from 
GOD/DE who is all that is uncreated. I take this usage from George Fox‘s injunction 
to Quakers to ‗walk cheerfully over the World, answering that of God in every one 
[sic]‘ (Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in Britain 1995, 
19.32), where walking ‗over the World‘ means disregarding the material in favour of 
the spiritual. In Chapter 1, I discuss the importance of Fox‘s ‗that of God‘ to this text; 
here I assert the importance of walking cheerfully over the material, of asserting 




I use the term ‗dominology‘ in preference to alternatives such as ‗patriarchy‘, 
‗kyriarchy‘, ‗heteronormativity‘, etc, since it combines the essential characteristic of 
all these, which is their imposition of hierarchical structures of power-over9 in the 
World. The word dominology is taken from Catherine Keller‘s The Face of the Deep, 




I contend that issues of binary gender11 are similarly, although by no means 
homogeneously, treated across multiform western feminist, largely Anglo- 
American, theologies and spiritualities12, and it is this that I seek to convey in 
utilising a portmanteau term ‗thea/ologies‘ to indicate that it is these traditions of 
which I write. Here I am observing the convention that feminist theologies are 
largely concerned with feminist critique of an established religion (in theologies‘ 
Western modes most often, but not exclusively, Christianity), while the feminist 
Goddess spiritualities theorised by thealogy are focused on the (re)establishment of 
                                                 
9 The concept of power-over is taken from Starhawk‘s discussion of feminist (re)conceptualisations of 
power (1990, 9-10). 
10 Since this is a Kindle edition, references are to location rather than page numbers, in line with The 
Chicago Manual of Style recommended practice for eBooks (2010, 14.154). 
11 A detailed examination of the treatment of binary gender across feminist theologies and 
spiritualities is beyond the scope of this study. 
12 I concur with Jone Salomonsen‘s analysis that Goddess spirituality is ‗deeply rooted in European 
Protestantism and has arisen as a response to an increasing dissatisfaction with Christianity… [It] is 
not a new religion but a new reformation‘ (2002, 5). 
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matriarchal/matrifocal spiritual practices. Although thealogy is, strictly speaking, the 
academic study of Goddess spiritualities and not those spiritualities themselves, 
‗thea/ologies‘ as a term nevertheless constitutes a not unsuitable encapsulation of 
these diverse movements and traditions.  
 
‗Sibs‘ and ‗We‘ 
Throughout this thesis I refer to the rest of the human race as ‗sibs‘, or blood 
relations, in acknowledgement of our ultimate interrelatedness. Similarly, I use the 
convention employed by many feminist theorists and theologians (e.g. Butler 1990; 
McFague 1993; Mollenkott 2001; Hampson 2002; Muers 2004; Elliot 2010) of the 
personal and inclusive ‗we‘ rather than the impersonal ‗one‘ or, alternatively, 




Since the substance of my theologising is based upon interviews with transgender, 
or trans, people, it is appropriate to explain in some detail the specialist gender 
terminology I employ throughout this text. There is a popular media view of trans-
ness that tends to assume that all trans experience is transsexual, ‗that all 
transsexuals are male-to-female…, that all trans women want to achieve 
stereotypical femininity‘ (Serano 2007, 35), and that all transsexual people feel 
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‗trapped in the wrong body‘ (Bornstein 1995, 66). In reality, trans experience is vast 
and varied including, in addition to male-to-female people, people assigned-
female/affirmed-male (female-to-male) as well as people who feel both male and 
female and neither female nor male, and people who have chosen to engage with 
surgical and hormonal technologies at a variety of levels as well as people who have 
not, never will or have yet to decide.  
 
The notion of being born or trapped in the ‗wrong body‘ is seen as highly 
problematic by many; Sandy Stone, for example, views this status as something one 
has to claim, regardless of how one actually feels, in order successfully to access 
clinical treatment13 (2006, 231). The terms male-to-female (MTF) and female-to-
male (FTM) are not universally embraced, since some transsexuals ‗do not see this as 
a full representation of their experiences‘ (O'Keefe 1999, 103); for some, for example, 
the first component of the designation has no reality since they never felt like their 
assigned gender in the first place, so there never was a female from which to become 
male. Similarly ‗pre-op‘ and ‗post-op‘14 are increasingly seen as offensive (Serano 
2007, 32-33) in that they needlessly draw attention to aspects of people‘s physicality 
that should have no bearing on how we interact with one another. And Virginia 
                                                 
13 One of my narrators referred to this as the ‗conveyor belt‘ approach; clinicians, especially surgeons, 
put trans people onto the conveyor belt in the ‗wrong‘ body at one end and take them off at the other 
in the ‗right‘ body. 
14 The terminology of surgery is likewise a contested affair, being called variously sex reassignment 
surgery, gender reassignment surgery and sex confirmation surgery, among other nomenclatures 
(Walters 2003, 61). 
13 
Mollenkott notes that some transsexual people object to being ‗grouped together 
with transpeople, feeling that their unique experiences are erased by that grouping‘ 
(2001, 41), as the critiques of gender deconstruction by Julia Serano (2007) and 
Viviane Namaste (2000) in Chapter 1 highlight. 
 
In this text I avoid terminology that I know to be offensive and approach all other 
terminology with due care and respect. Tucker Lieberman observes, however, that a 
lack of unified vocabulary for transgender experiences makes the discussion of them 
problematic and comments ‗Probably a common language hasn‘t appeared yet 
because everyone‘s gender experience is unique‘ (2003, 109). Alexander Pershai 
(2006, 46) and Allen James (2002, 128) also note the difficulties inherent in ‗the lack 
of a fully descriptive terminology‘ (ibid) but, Pershai argues, attempts to standardise 
would impose ‗an artificial and unsatisfactory homogeneity‘ on the variety of trans 
experiences (2006, 46). While affirming that ultimately self-identification must be 
the basis for any terminology (Scott-Dixon 2006a, 15), Krista Scott-Dixon attempts 
this tentative definition of transgender as a category, as ‗a more or less adequate term 
that suggests many forms of crossing gender, whether in terms of behavior, self-
presentation or identity, or in terms of how such crossings are experienced or 
understood‘ (ibid 12). Kate Bornstein offers a very broad reading that includes in the 
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category ‗anyone who cares to admit their own gender ambiguities‘15 (1995, 98), 
while for Gary Bowen transgender refers to ‗someone who transcends traditional 
stereotypes of ―man‖ and ―woman‖‘ (1998, 63). Serano, however, dismisses the 
‗umbrella‘ of transgender as too suggestive of a commonality of experiences where 
there is none (2007, 26). Similarly, Namaste asserts that transgender serves to erase 
the specificities of experience within the different groups of transsexual, transvestite 
and transgendered (2000, 43). Serano however warns against a ‗glossary approach‘ to 
terminology that suggests that words for transgender experiences are ‗written in 
stone…[and] passed down from generation to generation‘ (2007, 23) and notes that 
as much as a term might be in regular use by some, it will still be contested by others 
(ibid 24).  
 
Genderqueer 
‗Genderqueer‘ is a relatively recent coinage adopted by people who seek actively to 
challenge gender norms and ‗taken-for-granted meanings about bodies and about 
gender‘ (Elliot 2010, 34) and, as such, arguably has different political/activist 
connotations from transgender. Wilchins defines genderqueer broadly and 
inclusively, stating that in a society ‗where femininity is feared and loathed‘ and 
                                                 
15 This, and other broad definitions, would include people like me who acknowledge the 
discontinuities in our gender experiences. However, I would by no means feel justified in claiming 
the name of transgender based on my own gender experiences, discontinuous though they 
undoubtedly are. 
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heterosexuality is compelled, all women and all gay people are genderqueer16 
(2002b, 11-12). However, in practice the genderqueer movement sees itself as a 
more radical category of people who define themselves outside the binary, ‗a gender 
for which we have no word in the English language‘ (Wyss 2006, 60), a position that 
brings with it its own exclusionary and hierarchical problematics (Bulldagger 2006, 
146; Elliot 2010, 34n33) for those who feel ‗not queer enough‘ (Shepard 2006, 318). 
 
Trans/genderqueer  
For the sake of brevity I use a portmanteau construction ‗trans/genderqueer‘ in this 
text to demarcate gender variant people. In linking these terms I do not seek, 
however, to suggest that the agendas of all trans and genderqueer communities are 
homogeneous, since they are not by any means, but rather, in the context of this 
thesis, to demonstrate that my chosen commentators self-identify as part of either 
set of communities. 
 
Cisgender/Cissexual 
‗Cisgender‘ and ‗cissexual‘ are neologisms gaining currency in trans/feminist 
debates17. The prefix ‗cis‘ is defined as ‗on the same side as‘; thus, cissexual/cisgender 
                                                 
16 As with transgender (see note 15 above), this broad definition does not, I think, entitle me to claim 
genderqueer as an identity. 
17 Scott-Dixon states that person prefers ‗non-trans‘ over cis since it makes trans the measure of the 
human and non-trans ‗the ones who don‘t quite measure up‘ (2006, 15). I, however, believe it to be a 
mistake to valorise one set of characteristics over another and define people by what they are not. 
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signifies having assigned and affirmed genders on the same side. Serano defines 
cissexuals as ‗people who are not transsexual and who have only ever experienced 
their subconscious and physical sexes as being aligned‘ (2007, 12) and ‗cissexism‘ as 
the belief that such an experience is more valid and authentic than that of a 
transsexual person. As trans has become an acceptable contraction for transgender, 
as discussed below, so has cis for cisgender  
 
My Choices 
Notwithstanding justifiable concerns about the erasure of specificity particularly 
with regard to transsexual experiences, and Serano‘s caution about a glossary 
approach, I utilise the term ‗transgender‘ as it is defined in a glossary from one of my 
narrators18, as a widely accepted term ‗for people [including transsexuals] who feel 
the gender they were assigned at birth does not match their perceived gender 
identity‘(A Glossary of Terms 2004). In line with this glossary, I use the contraction 
‗trans‘ when I refer to all transgender people and ‗transsexual‘ when I refer 
specifically to people who have chosen to engage with surgery to align their bodies 
with their affirmed gender, noting that for some, however, this is an invidious 
                                                 
18 I have chosen to use the term ‗narrators‘ to refer to the people I interviewed over the alternatives of 
‗interviewee‘ or ‗subject‘, since it assigns the active role to the one who narrates rather than to the 
one who conducts the interview. I discuss the thinking behind this decision in far greater detail later 
in Chapter 2. 
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distinction. In my definition, trans includes cross-dressers19, though in some 
definitions it does not.  
 
I have adopted from various internet forums the term ‗assigned‘ to refer to the 
designation a person was given in accordance with the State‘s judgement of sex at 
birth, based on genital morphology, and ‗affirmed‘ to refer to the gender a person 
asserts they are as a result of their own deeply-felt sense of gender affinity20, in those 
cases where a person affirms a clear distinction between these two.  
 
Despite Wilchins‘ broad definition, I use genderqueer to refer specifically to people 
who have chosen actively to challenge gender norms as a means of effecting societal 
more than personal change. The portmanteau trans/genderqueer therefore includes 
people who experience their gender trouble either/both personally or/and 
politically. Cis is my word of choice for referring to people whose sex and gender 
are, by and large, aligned with one or other binary option. Along with the epicene 
pronouns person/per and the other usages discussed above, this specialist 
                                                 
19 ‗Cross-dresser‘ is preferred over ‗transvestite‘ as the term to describe people who sometimes choose 
to dress as ‗the opposite sex‘. In some definitions, there is an assumption that cross-dressing includes, 
to a greater or lesser extent, an element of sexual pleasure. Based on evidence from a number of 
sources, including one of my narrators, I reject that assumption as a gross oversimplification of 
crosser-dressers‘ experiences. 
20 Serano (2007, 30) also uses ‗assigned‘ and sometimes ‗birth‘ for gender assigned according to genital 
morphology at birth, and ‗preferred‘, ‗identified‘ or ‗lived‘ for deeply felt sense of gender affinity, 
while Lesley Carter uses ‗born gender‘ and ‗felt gender‘ (2006, 53). ‗Birth gender‘ is a problematic 
concept, however, since many trans people know that they are born their affirmed gender however 
their assigned gender may have been judged. 
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terminology delineates some of the landscape of this thesis, beginning with a 




INTRODUCTION: THEOLOGISING AROUND THE 
COMPLEXITIES OF GENDER 
 
Introduction 
This thesis addresses the issue of how theorising about binary gender, its 
insubstantial and even, perhaps, fictitious nature, by constructivist commentators 
such as Monique Wittig, Judith Butler, Anne Fausto-Sterling and Kate Bornstein, 
might provide fruitful openings for the formation of new metaphorical models of the 
Divine-human relationship. In this project of theologising around the complexities 
of gender, I am particularly concerned with the ways in which the quotidian 
experiences of individual human beings are expressive of what the Quaker George 
Fox called ‗that of God in every one [sic]‘ (Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of 
Friends (Quakers) in Britain 1995, 19:32); of what it might mean, at the level of each 
specific human life, to express ‗that of GOD/DE‘ or to be imago Dei1; and what more 
‗of GOD/DE‘ we might know by addressing such experiences particularly as they 
relate to genders that are describable as variant, ambiguous, fluid, trans, queer or 
complex. In pursuit of this I have interviewed trans people, whose stories form the 
                                                 
1 I am aware that in some Christian theologies imago Dei is conceptualised as processual, something 
that is to be achieved by right relation to GOD/DE and that, therefore, can be failed to be achieved 
(e.g. Tanner 2010, 126; Turner 2008, 141).  In my usage, however, I conceive of the image and 
likeness of GOD/DE as something that exists in each human from the moment of creation, and is thus 
analogous to the Quaker concept of that of GOD/DE in every one. 
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heart of this text. From their words I have theologised around the some of the 
complexities of gender that have troubled me since childhood. 
 
This chapter begins with a description of my own ‗gender trouble‘ (cf Butler 1990), 
expanding this into a discussion of key features in recent work on deconstruction of 
gender, from which I conclude that it is necessary to consider that our attachment to 
binary gender, as merely one metaphorical model among many that might describe 
gendered experiences, may be misplaced. I contend that, in theological terms, we 
might justifiably regard binary gender as idolatrous, as much in thea/ological 
expressions of GOD/DE as She as in traditional theologies‘ insistence upon GOD/DE 
as He. Thus, I argue that a renunciation of our attachment to binary gender might 
prove both theologically fruitful and ethically important, despite feminist fears that 
an abandonment of the category ‗women‘ might restrict political action. Noting the 
problematisation of renunciation in thea/ologies, I nonetheless assert that arguments 
in its favour are strong and reclaim the notion of ‗decreation‘ in the work of 
philosopher/theologian Simone Weil as a powerful example of how we might 
revalue renunciatory practices in general. Furthermore, I contend that the 
decreation of gender in particular might be seen as an ethical and political necessity 
for the establishment of gender justice for those sibs rendered unintelligible2 by 
current binary norms. I conclude this chapter with a brief summary of the chapters 
                                                 
2 ‗Unintelligibility‘ is the concept Butler ascribes in Gender Trouble (1990) and after to the process by 
which those sibs with non-normative genders are denied access to what it means to be human by 
their failure to conform to binary gender norms. 
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to come that have resulted from this initial premise, that binary gender norms do 
not serve well either as descriptions of human gendered experiences or as accurate 
signposts to that of GOD/DE in the World. 
 
Personal Gender Background 
My mother was a frugal woman. Because of this, clothes circulated round per three 
children, regardless of our genders3, for as long as they remained wearable. Thus, for 
several years, my father‘s summer holiday photographs of us feature the same pair of 
khaki shorts, worn first by my older brother, then by me, and finally by my younger 
brother. Although I think it is true to say that my mother‘s recycling impetus had 
far more to do with getting the most possible wear out of any garment than it did 
with concepts of gender equality4, let alone gender trouble, it was certainly this 
practice that gave me my first glimpse of the instability of the binary.  
 
An incident from childhood sticks in my mind (although I have probably made 
some of it up in retrospect, as is common with childhood memories). I am at the 
primary school playing fields watching a football match; I think I am 7 or 8, and I 
am wearing the much-photographed khaki shorts and a pair of Clarks T-bar sandals, 
also inherited from my older brother, R. One at a time, a group of us are sliding 
                                                 
3 In truth, of course, this process was not unregarding of our genders, since dresses and skirts were 
never recycled to the boys. It was merely my gender, I realise with hindsight, that was unregarded. 
4 Having said that, my parents made a pretty good job of introducing gender equality into my 
upbringing and I am eternally grateful to them for it. So I forgive them for the toy oven one 
Christmas and thank them for the chemistry set the next. 
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down a blue-brick5 balustrade, landing clumsily in the sandy dirt at the bottom, 
racing up to the top and doing it all over again. It is a hot day and we are sweaty and 
dirty and loud. I think most of us are boys: for certain, my brother R is there, 
keeping an eye on me. Then one of the other children points to me and asks R: ‗Is 
that your brother or your sister?‘ The shorts, the sandals, the boisterous behaviour, 
that‘s all wrong for a girl, but R is calling me by a girl‘s name. I feign outrage that 
they should even think I might be a boy, but deep down I find it all rather 
entertaining. I feel as though I have got away with something a bit cheeky, 
dangerous and daring; secretly, I feel ever-so-slightly heroic. 
 
By my 20s, I presented as fairly androgynous. Some children in the street once asked 
me: ‗Oy mate, are you a boy or a girl?‘ I said: ‗What do you think?‘ They paused, 
looking over my short-back-and-sides, Doc Martens, tie and black suit trousers, then 
said: ‗You must be a boy, cos you‘re only wearing one earring‘. Again I had that 
sense of having accomplished something audacious and highly entertaining. But this 
was not in any way an attempt to lay claim to a trans identity. There was no sense in 
which I felt my assigned female gender did not belong to me, or I to it. I experienced 
nothing through my acts of largely sartorial rebellion that I would have designated 
‗gender trouble‘. Quite the reverse in fact; what I was feeling was gender 
                                                 
5 Blue brick is a typical and ubiquitous vernacular building material in that part of the English 
midlands known as the Black Country, where I grew up. 
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entertainment. I was playing ‗Knock Down Ginger‘6 on the binary‘s front door, 
demanding its attention and then running away chortling at its confusion and 
outrage. 
 
In another part of the same playground, however, I was and still am experiencing a 
great deal of gender trouble. While my assigned gender may not conflict with my 
gender experiences the way it might for someone who identifies as trans, I do not 
feel, and have not felt for most of my life, that I comfortably fit into the groups of 
‗girls‘ and ‗women‘. I do not read my experiences as typical of ‗women‘s‘ 
experiences; I do not feel my life to have a great deal in common with ‗women‘s‘ 
lives; I forever feel, often painfully, out of place in the company of ‗women‘. Which 
is not to say that I feel I belong with ‗men‘ either, for they are just as strange to me. I 
simply do not fit anywhere. Thus my experiments with gender-bending in my youth 
were only on one level about having fun. One another level I was entirely serious 
about wanting my gender to be questionable, confusing, ambiguous, strange and 
unreadable.  
 
Marge Piercy‘s utopian feminist science fiction novel Woman on the Edge of Time 
(1979) has had a profound effect on me in the 30 years since I first read it. I find per 
portrait of the future New England settlement of Mattapoisett utterly enthralling, 
                                                 
6 ‗Knock Down Ginger‘ is a game children play of summoning an (adult) victim by a knock or ring on 
their front door and then running away before the door is answered. Jeering at the offended 
householder from a safe distance often ensues. 
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particularly for the way in which gender is handled. Using the gender-neutral 
pronoun set ‗person/per/perself‘, as referenced in the Foreword, to mask the reader‘s 
preconceptions, Piercy describes a culture in which gender is the last thing on 
people‘s minds, while the whole panoply of human flourishing is the first. I wanted 
to live in Mattapoisett. I still do. 
 
Back in the mid-1970s, another science fiction author, James Tiptree Jr., was the 
subject of some gender speculation. Tiptree had been publishing short stories since 
the 60s and corresponded regularly and enthusiastically with fans and other authors, 
but never appeared in public. Though the stories were full of the typical tropes of 
action science fiction, Tiptree‘s portrayals of women characters were surprisingly 
well-rounded and sympathetic, even ‗feminist‘ in tone. However, commentators of 
both genders insisted that Tiptree must be male, because of the action, the abstract 
thought and the desire for women per stories expressed. Fellow author Robert 
Silverberg wrote: ‗there is to me something ineluctably masculine about Tiptree‘s 
writing‘ (Phillips 2006, 3), while feminist writer Joanna Russ asserted that Tiptree 
expressed ideas ‗that no woman could even think, or understand, let alone assent to‘ 
(ibid). But James Tiptree Jr. was a pseudonym; per real name was Alice B. Sheldon. 
 
Some forty years later, Ben Barres, professor of neurobiology at Stanford University, 
delivered a seminar at MIT about per recent discoveries in the field of cell biology. 
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The presentation was widely acclaimed, with one member of the audience 
commenting on how much more accomplished a researcher Barres was than per 
sister Barbara (Begley 2012, [n.p.]). But Barbara and Ben are the same person; 
assigned female at birth, Ben had transitioned to per affirmed gender over the course 
of ten years and was presenting that day, for the first time, as male.  
 
What these stories illustrate is the readiness with which we assign gender based on 
assumptions about behaviours, and behaviours based on assumptions about gender. 
Tiptree could only be male because of the way person wrote. Barbara Barre‘s work 
was automatically assumed to have been of a lower quality than Ben‘s because 
person was female. I must have been a boy because I only wore one earring. 
However, if the basis of these judgements, and others like them, is as prone to error 
as these examples demonstrate, how else might we decide what gender is and 
whence it comes? 
 
The issue of how women acquire femaleness is a primary concern in Western 
feminisms, in late twentieth century debates around essentialism. The critique of 
essentialism begins with Simone de Beauvoir‘s assertion that ―[o]ne is not born, but 
rather becomes, a woman‖ (1993, 281). Prior to this, femaleness had largely been 
defined as a natural, even GOD/DE-given, state, a transcultural and transhistorical 
essence thought usually, though not necessarily, to derive from women‘s biological 
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and psychological characteristics (Grosz 1995, 47). Although early feminists 
questioned the content of this female essence7, de Beauvoir‘s analysis questioned not 
simply its content but its very existence. To continue to theorise an unchanging and 
unchangeable natural essence for women is now seen to run counter to the aims of 
feminisms since it precludes any real possibility for women to overcome the 
differences that define their oppression as ‗natural‘; to argue for a fixed essence of 
‗woman‘ is to collude with and thus to reinforce the structures of dominology 
(Nicholson 1998, 293).  
 
Even with ‗essence‘ largely redefined as cultural and thus inessential, the sexed 
bodies that formed the bedrock of those cultural assumptions remained in the realm 
of the immutably natural, as prediscursively a-social and a-historical, even 
GOD/DE-given, facts of life. Cultural norms are emphatically not prediscursive and 
immutably natural since they change across time and place, allowing for women 
from one period or location to become women differently from those of another.  
However, biology is still destiny to the extent that physical, and especially genital, 
morphology dictates which set of cultural norms constitute our becoming. 
Furthermore that becoming remains largely situated within a binary construct of 
gender. 
 
                                                 
7 When Sojourner Truth made per famous speech demanding ‗Ain‘t I am woman?‘ (e.g. in Harrison, 
1990, p.201), for example, person challenged the definition of women as physically weak while 
unquestioningly accepting the category ‗woman‘ itself. 
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Since the 1990s, however, constructivist philosophers like Monique Wittig (1992) 
and Judith Butler (1990; 1993), scientists such as Alice Dreger (1998) and Anne 
Fausto-Sterling (2000; 2001), sociologists like Judith Lorber (2005) and Lucy 
Goodison (1990), and trans and genderqueer theorist-activists including Kate 
Bornstein (Bornstein 1995), Riki Wilchins (2002b; 2002d; 2002e; 2002a; 2002c; 
2004), Leslie Fienberg (1998) and Stephen Whittle (2006), as well as a growing 
output of collected analytical academic and personal testimonies (e.g. More and 
Whittle 1999; Nestle, Howell, and Wilchins 2002; O'Keefe and Fox 2003; Mattilda 
(a.k.a. Matt Bernstein Sycamore) 2006b; Scott-Dixon 2006b; Stryker and Whittle 
2006) repeatedly assert not only that gender is far more complex and more mutable 
than the binary allows for, but also that we cannot presume that dimorphic bodies, 
or any straightforward one-to-one mapping between ‗natural‘ sex and ‗cultural‘ 
gender, are a firm foundation for gender theorising.  
 
Constructivist Critique of Binary Gender 
Monique Wittig 
Although Judith Butler‘s work is probably the most prominent in critiques of binary 
sex and gender, Monique Wittig (1992) argued as early as 1978 that the category 
‗women‘ is constructed in relation to a compulsory heterosexuality, such that I 
become ‗woman‘ only inasmuch as I make my body available for heterosexual, 
procreational use. Asserting that we are forced to comply with compulsory 
28 
heterosexuality not only in our minds, in our cultural presentations, but also in our 
bodies, hitherto designated entirely and eternally natural (ibid, 9), Wittig concludes 
with the then startling statement that lesbians, since they refuse both mental and 
physical compulsion, are not women: ‗A lesbian has to be something else, a not-
woman, a not-man‘ (ibid, 13). Thus, person urges women to abstract themselves 
from patriarchal definitions (ibid, 11) and instead identify as lesbians (and men as 
gay (ibid, 30)), as outlaws who refuse outright to collude with the rules and 
conventions of compulsory heterosexuality (ibid, 40). 
 
Judith Butler 
Much of Wittig‘s analysis derives from per critique of psychoanalytic theory which, 
person argues, orders that ‗you-will-be-straight-or-you-will-not-be‘ (1992, 28). In 
Gender Trouble (1990), and per later reconsiderations and revisions of that work in 
Bodies That Matter (1993), Butler too offers a sustained critique of psychoanalysis8, 
the enforced heterosexuality it enacts, and the unintelligible, even unliveable bodies 
it thereby violently instates. Butler famously argues: ‗There is no gender identity 
behind the expression of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the 
very ―expressions‖ that are said to be its results‘ (1990, l.683). Human beings behave 
the way we do because we believe there to be a set of rules or norms that prescribe 
                                                 
8 Both Wittig and Butler assert that psychoanalytic theory has, from its outset, been constructed 
around assumptions that there are two genital morphologies only, that these exist only to facilitate 
procreative sex, that there is a direct one-to-one mapping between sexed body and gendered 
performance, and that any ‗deviation‘ from these norms is pathological.  
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and proscribe how bodies like ours should behave in order to be a gender. But these 
norms have power only because we capitulate to them, not once and for all but in a 
constant ‗stylized repetition of acts‘ (ibid, l.2366) that Butler calls performativity9. 
Behind these normative acts is nothing, no original patterning of gender, ‗nothing 
other than a parody of the idea of the natural and the original‘ (ibid, l.778). 
However, though the power behind the law of the norms is nothing more that a 
ruse (1993, 15), how we perform is not a matter of choice (ibid, 12-13); there is no 
definitive, eternally truthful, or evilly patriarchal, power behind the act, and yet we 
must keep acting (ibid, 9). Nevertheless, the very reiterative and citational nature of 
the norms does indicate that any notion of a perfect gender performance is 
unrealisable: ‗bodies never quite comply with the norms by which their 
materialization is impelled‘ (ibid, 2); and thus we become aware that there are 
fissures in gender performance that might be exploited for their transgressive 
potential. 
 
The power of gender norms derives in large part from the notion that there is an 
eternally natural, prediscursive body to which norms can be unequivocally attached. 
However, the apparently natural body is as much of a construct as is its subsequent 
cultural gendered performance (1990, l.2142). That which constitutes our 
understanding of ‗nature‘ can only exist within language and cannot, therefore, be 
                                                 
9 Butler is careful to insist that performativity should not be confused with performance: while the 
latter is theatrical, playful and singular, the former is forced upon us and shaped by ‗the forces of 
prohibition and taboo, with the threat of ostracism and even death‘ (1993, 95). 
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‗singular and prediscursive‘ (ibid, l.856); concepts of nature are culturally and 
historically determined and, thus, so is ‗natural‘ sex. Indeed gender norms, far from 
being produced by sexed bodies, in fact establish those bodies as their genders. If it is 
the norm that a female body must produce children, for example, those bodies that 
do not, regardless of their apparently ‗female‘ morphology will not be ‗intelligible‘ 
female bodies (ibid, l.569). The culturally-constituted heterosexual matrix Butler 
describes requires bodies to be in specific ways in order for them to be read as bodies 
that matter, as intelligibly human beings. The claim that sex is to nature as gender is 
to culture no longer has any meaning; sex ‗was always already gender, with the 
consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no 
distinction at all‘ (ibid, l.423). However, just because the gender norms that 
constitute bodies are ‗regulatory fictions‘ (ibid, l.798) and ‗phantasmatic‘ ruses (ibid, 
l.2371), Butler does not thus claim that bodies per se do not exist, but rather that 
there can be ‗no reference to a pure body which is not at the same time a further 
formulation of that body‘ (1993, 10). Bodies, with all their attendant pains and joys, 
do matter, and Butler‘s aim is not to erase them but rather ‗to force a radical 
rearticulation of what qualifies as bodies that matter, ways of living that count as 
―life‖, lives worth protecting, lives worth saving, lives worth grieving‘ (ibid, 16). 
 
In the very constructedness of the norms that govern our intelligibility, asserts 
Butler, lies the potential to subvert them, and thus to bring into being new forms of 
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intelligibility. The norms‘ power derives from reiteration, as discussed above, and by 
virtue of this ‗gaps and fissures are opened up‘; there is ‗that which escapes or 
exceeds the norm‘ (1993, 10). Every reiteration contains within it an inherent 
instability, a ‗space of ambivalence‘ (ibid, 124) in the arbitrary relations (1990, 
l.2376) between performance and reality, that might be worked to subvert its 
apparent stability. Although we cannot wholly escape from being implicated in 
dominological power structures, even as we oppose them, nevertheless we might 
attempt a ‗turning of power against itself to produce alternative modalities of 
power…, a difficult labor of forging a future from resources inevitably impure‘ 
(1993, 241).  
 
The ethical aim of Butler‘s project, the rearticulation what counts as a body that 
matters, is to ensure that the cultural configurations of sex and gender that are 
currently viewed as illegitimate and unintelligible might thus become culturally 
intelligible, both expanding the ambit of the human and ‗confounding the very 
binarism of sex, and exposing its fundamental unnaturalness‘ (1990, l.2487). The 
current position is sustained through cruelty and violence (ibid, l.181) and, 
furthermore, forces us into enacting violence upon ourselves (1993, 115) as we cut 
off bits of our gendered selves in order to fit the boxes, like Cinderella‘s Sister 
cutting off per heel to fit the glass slipper. Thus, the task of remaking gender to be 
less violent has no less a purpose, Butler contends, than the saving of lives, as ‗we 
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rethink the ideal morphological constraints upon the human such that those who 
fail to approximate the norm are not condemned to a death within life‘ (1990, l.185). 
This is not a one-off task however, since new forms of unintelligibility will 
constantly surface, but rather a permanent process of bringing the outside in, ‗a 
future horizon…in which the violence of exclusion is perpetually in the process of 
being overcome‘ (1993, 53). 
 
Butler acknowledges that per work might pose a problem to feminisms if, as 
theorists and activists, we hold that a stable gender identity, based on a definitive 
category of ‗women‘, is essential to successful political action. Person contends, 
however, that there might be as much to gain politically from disindentification 
(1993, 4), indeterminacy (1990, l.266) and incoherence (1993, 115) as from the 
reverse. At the very least, those options should be considered and examined, since it 
would appear that there is no ‗we‘ around which to unite that is not ‗tenuous or 
phantasmatic‘ (1990, l.2390). Feminisms cannot continue to cling, therefore, to any 
notion of ‗women‘ as an exclusive, coherent, and purely natural categorisation: ‗Our 
responsibility is not just for the purity of our souls, but for the shape of the 
collectively inhabited world‘, Butler argues (2005, 110). Since binary gender has no 
eternal, natural fixity, our only option is to renounce our attachment to it in favour 
of ‗the kinds of contestatory connections that might democratize‘ intelligibility 
(1993, 115) and to learn how to speak of gender as a site of permanently 
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irreconcilable incoherence. Thus we might come to see ‗what new shape of politics 
emerges when identity as a common ground no longer constrains the discourse on 
feminist politics‘ (1990, l.296).  
 
Scientific and Medical Analyses 
One of the ways in which bodies show themselves to be far more diverse than 
binary gender would have us believe, says Butler, is in the range of morphological 
differences brought together under the term ‗intersex‘, an umbrella term referring to 
a group of physical embodiments in which there is a variation from the normative 
assumption of congruence between gonads, chromosomes and genital morphology. 
An intersex person may have testes, XY chromosomes and female external genitalia, 
for example, or chromosomes that are neither XX nor XY, or any other of a number 
of chromosomal, gonadal and/or genital variations.  
 
Anne Fausto-Sterling asserts that in medical considerations of intersex, ‗the normal 
takes precedence over the natural‘ (2000, 8) and every variation that does not fit into 
the categorisation of ‗normal‘ is, even with the best and most humanitarian of 
intentions, pathologised, abjected and rendered unintelligible, regardless of its 
naturalness. Paying attention to intersex variations, currently perceived as ‗the 
strange, the incoherent, [and] that which ―falls outside‖‘ (Butler 1990, l.1915), 
provides us with a lens through which we might re-evaluate the ‗taken-for-granted 
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world of [binary] sexual categorization‘ (ibid). This view is supported by scientists 
like Fausto-Sterling and Alice Dreger, both of whom work in the field of intersex.  
 
In per historical analysis of the medical establishments‘ treatments of 
hermaphrodites10, bioethicist Dreger concurs that the designation of a sex to a body 
is a spatiotemporal phenomenon (1998, 9-10), and that the markers of sex, which 
include not only genital morphology but also things like timbre of voice (ibid, 87), 
quantity of facial hair (ibid, 105), and size of feet (ibid, 132), are differently 
interpreted in different times and locations. Medical decisions as to what constitutes 
a sexed body are always political and, in the case of hermaphrodites, were aimed at 
‗restor[ing] order in the laboratory, the surgical clinic, in marital beds, in military 
barracks, on the streets‘ (ibid, 154) by ensuring that same-sex relationships did not 
‗accidentally‘ become legitimised and that work roles were not occupied by the 
‗wrong‘ gender through an ‗error of sex‘ (ibid, 86). Medical agendas in the treatment 
of hermaphrodites were thus wholly focused on the maintenance of compulsory 
heterosexuality by increasingly rigidifying definitions of hermaphroditism so as to 
rule out as many ‗pseudo hermaphrodites‘ as possible. However, like Butler, Dreger 
asserts that intersex bodies call into question our binaried assumptions that one sex 
equals one gender, and ‗the questioned body forces us to ask what exactly it is—if 
anything—that makes the rest of us unquestionable‘ (ibid, 6).  
                                                 
10 Dreger is careful to note that person uses the term ‗hermaphrodite‘ in its historical context and that 
‗intersex‘ is now the preferred term (1998, 30-1) 
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Biologist Anne Fausto-Sterling asserts that ‗A body‘s sex is simply too complex‘ to 
support any simplistic binary labelling of Woman or Man (2000, 3). Like Butler and 
Dreger, Fausto-Sterling therefore concludes that the sexing of a body represents 
nothing eternally natural but rather reflects ‗components of our political, social, and 
moral struggles, literally embodied, incorporated into our very physiological being‘ 
(ibid, 5). And compulsory heterosexuality lies at the heart of contemporary agendas 
for the treatment of intersex people, as it did for nineteenth century hermaphrodites 
(ibid, 8), a policing of gender borders that results in unintelligibility for those who 
do not fit the binary11. Fausto-Sterling however argues that we stand at a unique 
point in history where we have both the theoretical understanding and the practical 
power to question whether, finally, there must be only two genders (ibid, 77). 
Person asserts: ‗If we choose, over a period of time, to let mixed-gender bodies and 
altered patterns of gender-related behavior become visible, we will have, willy-nilly, 
chosen to change the rules of cultural intelligibility‘ (ibid, 76).  
 
Trans and Genderqueer Analyses 
These theoretical perspectives so chime with the lived experiences of many 
trans/genderqueer people that some ask, even demand, a reconsideration of our 
                                                 
11 Sociologist of religion Lucy Goodison points out that a binary worldview is neither universal nor 
immutable: ‗Worldviews can come in triangular, fourfold, or a multitude of shapes and patterns‘ 
(1990, 36) and they can, and do, change over time (ibid, 54). What we believe to be GOD/DE-given 
immutables are in fact relatively arbitrary human constructs, but this only becomes clear when a 
symbolic system is put under pressure through constant challenges to its validity (ibid, 43). 
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attachment to binary gender. For many such people, activists and theorists, some 
notion of the importance of renouncing binary gender in the cause of gender justice 
is a political and ethical necessity (e.g. Bornstein 1995; Feinberg 1998; O'Keefe 1999; 
Mollenkott 2001; Nestle 2002; Wilchins 2002b; Pratt 2005), as is a belief that 
renunciation must come from the cis as well as the trans and genderqueer. Riki 
Wilchins is typical in per argument that a movement to disrupt binary gender is ‗the 
civil rights movement of our time‘ (2002b, 17) that promotes a revisioning of gender 
with massive transformative potential to remove inequality and violence (2002d, 
26); ‗if you‘re not part of the problem, you‘re not part of the solution‘ (2002e, 37)., 
Wilchins contends.  
 
Kate Bornstein argues that binary gender shares many of the characteristics of a cult, 
in that it vehemently defends its borders, demands purity of identity and 
unquestioning compliance of its adherents, and violently attacks its enemies (1995, 
103-107). Person asks that we renounce the cult in favour of a society ‗free from the 
constraints of non-consensual gender‘ (ibid, 111) by siding with the gender 
outsiders, or ‗standing with freaks‘ (ibid, 81), as allies and co-revolutionaries. The 
current dominological system relies on our collusion with it, person states (ibid, 
121), and justice will be won only when we refuse gender norms, ‗calling attention 




Leslie Feinberg similarly commends cis/trans alliances in the cause of ‗trans 
liberation‘, defined as ‗the right to choose12 between pink and blue tinted gender 
categories, as well as all the other hues of the palette‘ (1998, 1). Person 
acknowledges that cis people might find it challenging, and even dangerous, to stand 
up for trans/genderqueer sibs (ibid, 133-134); in this respect we need to renounce 
not only our attachment to gender norms but also to comfort and security. As 
genderqueer activist Nico Dacumos puts it: ‗people [must] step out of their safe 
houses…in order to get shit done‘ (2006, 36). 
 
Minnie Bruce Pratt also espouses the cause of trans liberation and addresses perself 
specifically to potential feminist allies, asserting that ‗woman‘ should not be a 
fortress that we have to defend, but a braided rope of lived experiences ‗that we use 
to pull down walls that imprison us at the borders‘ (2005, 184-185) and thus create 
an open landscape for all our gender peregrinations. Meanwhile, genderqueer 
activist-author Mattilda commends the practice of renouncing the gender status quo 
in order to challenge dominological power through an utter refusal to pass as cis 
(2006a, 9-10), declaring: ‗If we eliminate the pressure to pass, what delicious and 
devastating opportunities for transformation might we create?‘ (ibid, 19). Benjamin 
Shephard echoes this sentiment in per assertion that renouncing the norms of 
                                                 
12 Unless otherwise stated, all emphasis is as in the original text. 
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gender might create a ‗different kind of space [in which] to play‘ (2006, 335). For 
theologian Virginia Mollenkott such an omnigender13 space would signal a just 
society in which all genders are equally respected as being imago Dei (2001, 165). As 
another theologian, Susannah Cornwall, asserts, to continue to maintain ‗that every 
human being is exactly and ineluctably male or female‘ (2010, 13) when the 
embodied evidence is to the contrary neither adequately reflects GOD/DE nor 
engenders justice. 
 
Multiplying Gender Expressions Beyond the Binary 
Gender Schemas 
Many of these commentators posit schemas to illustrate the way in which various 
aspects or components of gender work together to construct our sense of gender 
identity, in order to reflect a sense that the sex/gender, nature/nurture model is too 
simplistic to illustrate fully the range of possible gender positions people are actually 
experiencing. Bornstein, for example, puts forward a schema consisting of: gender 
assignment at birth; one‘s ‗inner‘ sense of gender identity; the gender role(s) one 
adopts; and the gender that is attributed or assumed by onlookers (1995, 22-23). 
Feinberg‘s schema comprises the four aspects of ‗genitalia, sexual desire, gender 
expression, [and] identification with one sex or another‘ (1998, 99). Mollenkott‘s 
omnigender paradigm maintains a differentiation between sex and gender and is 
                                                 
13 ‗Omnigender‘ is Mollenkott‘s coinage for a new, non-hierarchical gender paradigm beyond the 
binary (2001, 3). 
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based on a five-aspect schema of sex identity, sex attribution, gender identity, 
gender attribution, and gender role (2001, 172). A more nuanced schema is 
presented by O‘Keefe, consisting of fifteen determining characteristics (1999, 31-35), 
resulting in a pan-identity model in which person details more than fifty gender 
identifications (ibid, 107-115).  
 
A traditional conceptualisation of gender variability, the gender spectrum, is 
sometimes invoked (e.g. Mollenkott 2001, 43), but increasingly called into question 
on the grounds that a spectrum of gender still presupposes the existence of two poles 
that anchor it and thus ‗turns out to be a spectrum of heterosexual norms‘ (Wilchins 
2002d, 30; see also Bornstein 1995, 115). O‘Keefe‘s notion of pan-identity is one way 
in which new non- or de-binaried gender paradigms might be envisaged through 
the combinations such multifaceted schemas offer. As Pratt asserts, the very many 
ways in which we express sex/gender will of necessity multiply gender expressions 
way beyond a simple binary choice (2005, 15). Fausto-Sterling therefore suggests 
that gender positions are not so much locations on a line strung between the two 
poles of Female and Male but rather moveable points mapped onto 
multidimensional space (2001, [n.p.]).  
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A New Gender Schema 
Elizabeth Grosz asserts that ‗new terms and different conceptual frameworks 
must…be devised to be able to talk of the body outside or in excess of binary pairs‘ 
(1994, 24). What follows is my construction of a new gender schema, a metaphorical 
redrawing of the boundaries of gender, that allows me to reconceptualise it in 
relation this thesis. In positing this schema I am in no way proposing to create a 
language for trans/genderqueer people14; the schema is simply a way of setting 
gender straight (or queer) in the context of this study. 
 
In per book Am I a Woman? religious scholar Cynthia Eller (2003) describes at 
length four ways that women recognise ourselves as intelligibly gendered female: 
because we look female; because we feel female; because we perform female; and 
because other people judge us to be female. This substantially mirrors Bornstein‘s 
schema above. From these two schemas I have developed terminology for discussing 
gender based on four ‗gender aspects‘. I abandon entirely any reference to sex, in 
line with the assertions of Butler, Wittig and others above. I also posit the 
overarching category of ‗metagender‘15 in order to explore the way in which the four 
                                                 
14 Since I assert the right of groups to name themselves, for me to attempt to create language on 
behalf of groups of which I am not a part would be presumptuous and arrogant. Furthermore, 
trans/genderqueer people already have well-developed and hotly debated terminologies for their lives 
and experiences, as discussed briefly in the Foreword. 
15 Since first presenting this schema at the 2006 FWSA (Feminist and Women's Studies Association) 
Conference (paper subsequently published as Godde and the Complexities of Gender (Barnsley 
2007b)), I have discovered that, as a result of the work of Philip Andrew Bernhardt-House (2003), the 
term ‗metagender‘ has acquired a quite different meaning in genderqueer communities from the one I 
have assigned it. Bernhardt-House defines ‗a metagender‘ as ‗someone who identifies neither as male 
41 
gender aspects work together to produce the something that we think we mean 
when we talk about our own or someone else‘s sex/gender.  
 
Gender Aspects: Looking Like a Gender  
‗Looks-like‘ or ‗l-gender‘16 replaces references to sex and the biological, eternally 
natural body. L-gender is as culturally determined as any other gender aspect, as 
discussed above. In early 21st century Britain the ‗gold standard‘ for assigning l-
gender at birth is external genital appearance. Birth l-gender is the assigned gender 
of the State as recorded on a birth certificate. It determines the gendered rights of a 
citizen under the law; until the Gender Recognition Act came into force in 2004 
there was no legal right in Great Britain to change birth certificate l-gender.  
 
Determination of l-gender, however, does not end at birth, as the sex testing of 
Olympic athletes (Warren, 2003) and the recent case of South African runner Caster 
Semenya (Sloop 2012) demonstrate. What we do with our bodies throughout our 
lives, for example using (or not using) them sexually for anything other than 
                                                                                                                                               
nor female, neither man nor woman, neither neuter nor feminine nor masculine‘ (ibid, 76) and ‗a 
conscientious objector in the war of the sexes‘ (ibid, 83). 
16 I choose the terminology l-gender in favour of a number of alternatives. Considered and rejected 
were: ‗biological‘ gender, since many trans (and other) people believe their sense of gender is dictated 
by the formation of their brains (Fausto-Sterling, 2000) and the brain is as much a part of biology as 
the genitals; ‗body‘ gender, for the same reason; and ‗genital‘ gender, because this excludes other 
physiological components that contribute to the determination of l-gender. 
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procreation (cf Wittig and Butler above17), or physically for activities not deemed 
appropriate to l-gender (e.g. ballet, weight-lifting), may officially, and unofficially 
through personal insult and attack, call l-gender into question.  
 
The term l-gender is apposite for talking about the embodiments of trans people, 
since is as applicable to speak of the affirmed l-gender of someone who takes 
hormones and/or has had surgery as it is to speak of the l-gender of one whose 
assigned and affirmed genders appear congruent. 
 
Gender Aspects: Feeling Like a Gender 
For Eller (2003, 40-65), to feel like a gender is to have the emotional behaviours of 
that gender, behaviours that are often described as innate, and deemed to be a 
product of ‗brain sex‘18, though they are as much a product of culture as any other 
gender behaviour. In this schema, however, ‗feels-like‘ or ‗f-gender‘ is concerned not 
with the emotions—these I believe are part of one‘s performs-like gender (see 
below)—but rather with what trans writer Deidre McCloskey calls ‗knowing what 
tribe you belong to‘ (2000, 176). F-gender is (possibly) that thing we mean when we 
                                                 
17 See also Feinberg (1998, 54), who argues that ‗leather people and nuns are their own gender‘ 
because of the transgressive ways in which they embody themselves. 
18 Debates around the validity of ‗brain sex‘ in relation to trans people‘s sense of themselves as a 
gender are hotly contested in trans circles (e.g. Fausto-Sterling 2000, 27-28, 116-119). For example, 
some find affirmation in the notion that they are trans because of an innate neurological 
configuration, while others contend that talk of ‗being born this way‘ offers ammunition to eugenicist 
opponents who would argue that trans can therefore be bred out of the population. A full 
consideration of such debates is, however, beyond the scope of this study. 
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talk about ‗self‘ or ‗identity‘. Many trans people talk of some kind of inward 
knowing of gender identity separate from physical appearance, either as the tribal 
identity McCloskey asserts, or as an utter absence of allegiance to one‘s assigned 
gender, a feeling of clearly knowing what one is not; Kate Bornstein, for example, 
describes how person ‗never did feel like a girl or a woman‘ but absolutely felt ‗not a 
boy or a man‘ (1995, 24). To some (e.g. Mollenkott 2001; Sheridan 2001; Conover 
2002; Schneider 2003; Tanis 2003; Tigert and Tirabassi 2004), this feeling is of a 
spiritual, GOD/DE-given nature19.  
 
Gender Aspects: Performing Like a Gender 
‗Performs-like‘20 or ‗p-gender‘ aligns closely with Butler‘s theories of performativity 
and citationality above. P-gender is what in other circumstances might simply be 
called ‗gender‘. It is the ‗drag‘ we do not necessarily choose but nonetheless put on—
the dress, the body-language, the emotional responses, etc.—to give ourselves the 
appearance of one of the two available options. Although I agree with Butler that 
every aspect of gender, be it ‗sex, gender, sexual practice…[or] desire‘ (1990, l.583) is 
performatively constructed through repeated citation of cultural norms, I have 
retained a separate category for performance in this schema in order to highlight its 
                                                 
19 For this reason I considered calling this ‗soul‘ or ‗spirit‘ gender, but rejected both on the grounds 
that they may be considered inappropriately ‗religious‘ by the very many trans people whom some 
branches of organised religion have treated very badly. 
20 I considered ‗drag‘ gender as a possible term for this category but finally rejected it because ‗drag‘ as 
a concept is fraught with negative associations for transsexual people particularly. I also considered 
and rejected ‗acts-like‘ because ‗a-gender‘ might be mistaken to mean genderless. 
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importance in an understanding of the fragility of gendered constructions. It 
signifies here that although gender appears to be ‗something that we are, gender is 
always a doing rather than a being‘ (Wilchins 2002b, 12).  
 
Gender Aspects: Judged as a Gender 
‗Judged-as‘ or ‗j-gender‘ is about how we respond to one another on the basis of our 
perceptions of people as ‗female‘ or male‘. This is not a passive act (Serano 2007, 
163), since we actively construct the gender of others by our tacit policing of gender 
norms through a mechanism of ‗call-and-response‘ (Wilchins 2002d, 24); we are as 
much ‗constituted-by-others‘ as ‗self-constituting‘ (Cornwall 2010, 92) Oftentimes 
this is a relatively consequence-free act, but for trans/genderqueer people especially 
it can have devastating results, when people insist ‗they know the truth of us better 
than we do‘ (Pratt 2005, 174). Through the judgements of others, one can be 
annihilated, ‗stripped down to nothing in someone‘s eyes‘ (ibid, 133). Trans people 
talk about ‗passing‘ (Mattilda (a.k.a. Matt Bernstein Sycamore) 2006a), when their j-
gender is convincing, and ‗being read‘ when it is not. Whether we issue a pass or a 
fail really matters (Cross 2006, 280); handing out the wrong judgement on someone 
can get them snubbed, insulted, arrested, beaten, even killed. Thus, Serano asserts: 
‗The most radical thing that any of us can do is to stop projecting our beliefs about 
gender onto other people‘s behaviours and bodies‘ (2007, 193). 
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Male and Female 
I use ‗female‘ and ‗male‘ in relation to gender aspects to indicate those sets of 
characteristics which are judged in specific times and places to indicate that a person 
belongs to one or the other of the two available options. This does not mean that I 
believe the terms have any ‗real‘ universal meaning. Thus, for example, if I describe 
myself as l-female, I mean only to indicate that I have certain physical 
characteristics which under the present circumstances in this country would get me 
classified as female at birth, without my subscribing to the belief that those 
characteristics ‗really‘ make me female.  
 
Metagender 
To indicate that all of the above work together, I coin the term metagender. In order 
to conform successfully to the dominological requirements of the metagender 
binary, the four aspects must be congruent. To convey congruence I use the 
capitalised terms ‗Woman‘ and ‗Man‘. When I write of someone being a Woman or a 
Man, I mean to indicate the metagender assumption that they have, so to speak, all 
their gender building blocks incontestably in the same metagender box. Deviation 
from the standards set for any of the four gender aspects will cause metagender to be 
questioned. Dominological metagender does not allow for any ambiguity; in terms of 
intelligibility, Woman and Man are the only available divisions.  
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In theory, all four aspects combine to define one‘s metagender; this I call ‗theoretical 
metagender‘. Theoretically, dominological metagender requires full aspect 
congruence. In practice, however, different ‗interest groups‘ habitually take one of 
the aspects to be metagender, valuing it over and above the other three as the 
defining characteristic of Woman or Man. This is the ‗dominant‘ gender aspect and 
the resultant metagender might be considered an ‗experiential‘ rather than 
theoretical metagender. With our experiential metagender, we either work to make 
one or more of the non-dominant gender aspects conform to the dominant, or 
ignore the non-dominant aspects and concentrate solely on the dominant. 
Dominology currently assigns experiential metagender by birth l-gender alone, 




Across the range of human experiences, gender aspects have different weights and 
prominences, allowing for quite an array of gender identities, even within the 
limiting paradigm of the binary. Some people however wholly reject the binary and 
experiment with alternative metagenders, for example the performance artist 
Genesis P-Orridge who envisions a state called ‗pandrogyny‘:  
We, as magickal, creative, soul builders are inherently empowered to 
truly decide which physical, sexual, or inspirationally creative 
components to include or discard in order to build whatever identity 
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or biological container we chose, no matter how bizarre or physically 
unlikely, or how socially uncomfortable or disliked (2002, [n.p.]). 
 
Even for those of us not experimenting with alternatives, metagender proves to be 
decidedly unstable, since few of us consistently do have all our gender building 
blocks in one box. As an example I offer my own story. Although I was assigned l-
female at birth and have undergone some supposedly archetypal l-female 
experiences, such as menstruation, breast cancer and onset of menopause, I am by 
choice both childless and celibate, conditions which make my ongoing l-female 
status somewhat questionable.  
 
As discussed above, I have never felt a particular affinity to ‗the tribe of women‘21. 
As I age, I feel increasingly not-f-female, but would by no means describe myself as 
f-male. However, for as long as I can remember I have apparently behaved 
somewhat like a p-boy/p-man. When I was a child this seemed to just happen, but as 
I grew up I deliberately adopted some p-male behaviour, even cross-dressing for a 
brief period in my twenties, as described above. Not surprisingly at that time people 
often judged me to be j-male (because I only wore one earring). I am even now quite 
often seen as j-male by casual observers, even though I am small, slight and have 
long hair, traits generally thought of as l-female. While my culturally dominant l-
gender has caused me to be assigned an experiential metagender of Female, I cannot 
                                                 
21 For me, the archetypal Women‘s tribal space of the hairdresser‘s painfully symbolises this feeling of 
abject inadequacy. Having presented this schema on numerous occasions, I have come to know that 
this pain is felt by very many of us and is by no means a trivial experience. 
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affirm categorically that I am a Woman; my metagender is a house built on sand 
and, though I may be called cis in the judgements of others, the best I can claim for 
myself is cis(ish).  
 
Nor is it now as it was when I was in my teens and twenties. My understanding of 
and, therefore, relationship to my metagender has changed as I have come to 
understand gender differently. Metagender is thus not the fixed, once-and-for-all 
designation dominology would have us believe but something that shifts over a 
lifetime, as trans activist Dragon Xcalibur describes: ‗I‘ve lived parts of my life as a 
straight woman, as a butch dyke, as a man—both straight and faggot. Each was and 
is important…, as I get older, I become stranger‘ (1998, 77).  
 
Purpose of the New Gender Schema 
The inflected terminology of this schema, in which gender as a category is never 
thought without a prefix to indicate which aspect is meant, allows me to conceive of 
a narrator‘s gender experiences, or ‗genderedness‘, in more nuanced terms than the 
binary permits. The description which results both illustrates more richly the nature 
of genderedness and attempts to destabilise the reader‘s preconceptions and 
perceptions of such experience. The gender schema is a useful tool for highlighting 
the complexities and even the absurdities of the binary. It is, of course, no more 
‗real‘ a description of genderedness than is the sex-is-nature/gender-is-nurture 
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paradigm. The boundary of each gender aspect, for example, is not fixed or 
impermeable such that the content of l-gender does not bleed into f-, or j- affect p- 
and so on, nor is a four-aspect schema the last word in redescribing gendered 
experience. Every schema is merely a metaphor which both partially describes and 
partially obscures certain types of human experiences. This schema, however, offers 
me the potential for different partial descriptions of genderedness, as I demonstrate 
in the portraits I offer of my narrators in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
 
Renouncing Binary Gender 
The Possibility of Gender Renunciation 
The above suggests that our attachment to binary gender is an attachment to a 
chimera, an ungraspable will-o-the-wisp that can never adequately describe the 
range of experiences of genderedness and, in attempting such, violently renders 
many of our sibs unintelligible. Perhaps then we would be better to heed the calls of 
these sibs and renounce our attachment to the norms. But even if we believe this to 
be desirable, is such a renunciation a viable proposition? Cynthia Eller believes not. 
Even after a sustained critique of the norms (2003), person nevertheless concludes 
that we cannot do without them on the grounds that ‗it would take some major 
genetic engineering or a really bizarre set of mutations to eliminate human sexual 
dimorphism‘ (ibid, 136). However, as we have seen, bodies are no more naturally 
binary than are the cultural norms we impose upon them; if nothing else, there is 
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more variation to genital morphology than the simply dimorphism of vagina and 
penis.  
 
More convincingly, theologian Mayra Rivera asserts that it is not that we cannot 
escape our dimorphic bodies but that we cannot transcend ‗the markings that 
history has left in us‘ (2007, 103); no matter how aware we may be of the 
constructedness of our gendered experiences, nevertheless those experiences 
continue to shape us. However, while we cannot bid the cruel World of binary 
gender goodbye, we can maintain a continuous critique of the structures of power 
and control that its norms exert over us. We should not, though, underestimate the 
difficulty of the task, in a climate where binary expectations are imposed even upon 
foetuses22 (Fine 2010, 192) and every shape has a gender23 (ibid, 224). As those who 
attempt gender-neutral parenting will attest (ibid, 217), everything around us will 
constantly undermine our attempts to detach ourselves from allegiance to our 
gender roots. The fact that the project is difficult does not, I suggest, absolve us from 
the responsibility to try, for the sake of justice for our otherwise unintelligible sibs. 
And Cornwall asserts that if renunciation of gender is to be considered a good, then 
the impetus must come not from the unintelligible themselves being asked to give 
                                                 
22 Fine cites research that suggests that both pre- and post-conception, parents express significant 
gender expectations for their unborn children; for example, ‗women who knew the sex of their 
unborn baby described the movements of sons and daughters differently‘, according to a study by 
sociologist Barbara Rothman (Fine 2010, 192). 
23 Small children will unhesitatingly assign a binary gender to two-dimensional shapes such as circles, 
squares and triangles, according to a study by developmental psychologist Beverly Fagot (Fine 2010, 
224).  
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up what they do not categorically have (2010, 101), but rather from the intelligibly 
gendered, as a ‗constructive, enriching and humanizing part of…ethical action done 
―for the others‖‘ (ibid, 102).  
 
Against Gender Renunciation 
For some trans people, however, the notion of deconstructing the binary means very 
little in the face of the day-to-day challenges of living with dignity and respect. Julia 
Serano (2007) and Viviane Namaste (2000), for example, are highly critical of gender 
deconstruction theories and assert that an academic focus on ‗shattering the gender 
binary‘ (Serano 2007, 359) has seriously undermined the cause of, specifically, 
transsexual people and their desire for a stable and secure gender home. Such 
critique argues that gender deconstruction privileges a specific set of ‗perceptions, 
interpretations and evaluations of other people‘s genders over the way those people 
understand themselves‘ (ibid) and thus advances a damaging, unjust academic 
agenda that valorises concepts such as fluidity, ambiguity, complexity and mutability 
and demonises fixity, simplicity and certainty, to an extent that materially affects 
the visibility and intelligibility of transsexual people (Namaste 2000, 271). However, 
these views seem to me to establish a dangerous binary opposition in which fixity 
can only be achieved at the expense of mutability and vice versa. The justifiable 
desire of some for a safe and stable home should not preclude others from fulfilling a 
52 
need for a wandering life, or indeed yet others from moving between stability and 
mutability.  
 
The Category ‗Women‘ as Experiential 
Feminist responses to the deconstruction of gender are numerous24. While many 
(e.g. Scott-Dixon 2006b; Whittle 2006; Elliot 2010) see the forging of links between 
feminist and trans theory as fruitful in theorising the demise of the binary‘s 
dominological power, some fear that to renounce our hold on the category of 
Women is to renounce the possibility of feminist politics altogether: ‗Is it not the 
very point of departure of feminist theorising that women are 
oppressed/exploited/discriminated/excluded by virtue of their being women?‘ 
(Gunnarson 2011, 24).  
 
Butler, as discussed above, commends the idea of embracing disidentification, 
indeterminacy and incoherence as politically fruitful positions but, even if we 
succeed in renouncing our attachment to the binary, the problem remains that 
existing gender structures continue to shape our lives and drive our theory and 
practice. Thus we need a way to conceptualise gender categories that speaks to their 
effect in the World without reification. A fruitful concept here is that of experiential 
                                                 
24 Feminist responses to transgender are equally numerous, Janice Raymond‘s The Transsexual 
Empire (1979) being possibly the most notoriously anti-trans. Since its publication, both pro- and 
anti-trans feminists have published widely. However, a review of such works is beyond the scope of 
this study. 
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metagender, or empirical gender (Salomonsen 2002, 13), which asserts that we are 
named Woman and Man as a result of our embodied experiences. Despite my deep 
misgivings around binary gender, I cannot deny that my experiences position me as 
a Woman. I may not feel with any certainty that I am a Woman, but the judgment 
of the norms forces an experiential metagender on me of necessity; ‗one is a 
woman…to the extent that one functions as one within the dominant heterosexual 
frame‘ (Butler 1990, l.75), in however faulty a fashion.  
 
For the purposes of political action, then, experience not essence becomes the 
category around which we might link arms25. As a Woman with concerns about 
experiences of genderedness, I join with fellow experiential Women and Men who 
have similar concerns, speaking of alliances and of banding together with others not 
only on the basis of shared experiences, but also around shared hopes, dreams, goals, 
viewpoints and concerns26. These can be as powerful a motivation for political action 
as shared experiences; experiences come from the past, but hopes and dreams might 
lead to Butler‘s future horizon in which the violence of exclusion is perpetually in 
the process of being overcome.  
                                                 
25 Acknowledging the value of experiential metagender as a concept around which to formulate social 
and political action chimes with the concept of ‗strategic essentialism‘ (Jones 200, 42-48), whereby we 
‗pragmatically [value] essentialisms‘ as necessary rallying points for action (ibid, 45), while 
maintaining ‗a healthy dose of constructivist suspicion‘ as to the real universality of any essentialist 
position (ibid, 47). 
26 It was in just such a spirit, in the Peace Movement in the 1980s, that pro-life Buddhist nuns and 
pro-choice secular feminists found common ground in their rejection of nuclear weapons and their 
desires for world peace, for example. 
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From the necessary point of view of theorising oppression, this is still possible based 
on the experiential binary categories; we can still write of an experiential Woman's 
right to choose, whilst at the same time questioning the reality of the category 
Woman. We can continue to research experiential Women's and Men‘s experiences 
in order to understand how those experiences reinforce dominology, but without 
subscribing to a view that binary gender is anything more than a metaphorical 
construct, just as we can look at the metaphorical constructs we have for GOD/DE 
and analyse their effects on the World, without actually believing those constructs 
to be really real. The effects are surely really real. 
 
Expanding the Boundaries of Imago Dei  
Binary Gender as Idolatry 
Wilchins observes that the problem with the binary gender system is not that we do 
not know it, but that we know it so well that we can envisage no alternative (2002b, 
13). Gender has become reified; that which is merely one metaphorical model for 
describing human experiences has become solidified into a thing, the thing, the real 
thing. And in theological terms, gender has become a thing that we identify both as 
GOD/DE-given and as expressive of the image of GOD/DE. While thea/ologies may 
have expanded the boundaries of imago Dei to include the ‗other‘ half of a binary 
pair, that imago still excludes all who are not intelligibly Female or Male. In this 
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respect then, I assert that it is justifiable to regard an attachment to binary gender 
norms as a form of idolatry27, in that it results in 
the confused reduction of God to, and identification of God with, a 
particular creaturely reality of whatever form…wherein the divine 
might be presumed to be grasped, limited, contained, comprehended 
in thought and speech…and so brought under our control (Boesel 
2010, 310).  
 
Binary gender norms, I contend, are just such a creaturely reality, created out of a 
wrongful assertion that gendered embodiments come in only two types, and 
maintained through performative re-citation. Instead of two closed boxes, there 
seems to be a vast and complex set of variations and, in accepting the argument that 
morphological variations are just that—variations, not pathological mistakes—I also 
accept that that the vast and complex variations in creation serve some function as 
demonstrative of the image and likeness of GOD/DE; ‗to be made male and female 
and to be made in God‘s image are not necessarily identical‘ (Cornwall 2010, 73). By 
engaging with these variations in human experiences of genderedness as imago Dei, 
we might understand a little more of the endlessly vast and complex mystery of 
GOD/DE.  This mystery is most certainly foreclosed by theologies that insist upon 
idolatrously naming GOD/DE only in the male gender. However, thea/ologies that 
insist upon the naming of GOD/DE as She, as the other half of a phantasmatic 
binary, are similarly problematic. 
 
                                                 
27 Cornwall asserts that attachment to binary gender is attachment to a ‗golden calf‘ (2010, 23, 84). 
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Thea/ologies and Women 
Elizabeth Johnson asserts that ‗pluriform speech‘ is a necessary requirement for a 
‗proper discourse about the mystery of God‘ (1992, 120). In search of such 
pluriformity, thea/ologies have sought to point to GOD/DE in ‗symbols shaped by 
women‘s reality‘ (ibid 112). That this has hugely expanded thea/ologies‘ stock of 
metaphors beyond the dominological Christianate God-the-Father is unarguable. 
However, there is a tendency in thea/ologies to conflate Women and mothers, such 
that Women‘s experiences are often described almost exclusively in terms of 
maternal experiences, often synecdochally expressed as a phenomenon I have called 
elsewhere ‗wombfulness‘ (Barnsley 2002, 3). Pamela Sue Anderson asserts that this 
creates the danger of a ‗new theology of women on the basis of the mother being 
fundamental to all other meanings‘ (2000, 111-112). In restricting theological access 
to the category Women only to those possessed of a womb, whether or not they 
have actually given birth, additional layers of hierarchy, exclusion, unintelligibility 
and idolatry are created and sustained. Wittig notes that the valorisation of a 
bioessentialist matriarchalist wombfulness ‗is no less heterosexual than patriarchy‘ 
since it still traps us in a binary system that defines Women as only those who have 
the capacity to give birth (1992, 10). Butler too warns against the idealisation of 
certain expressions of gender that a wombful feminist discourse supports, since this 
‗tends to reinforce precisely the binary, heterosexual framework that carves up 
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gender into masculine and feminine‘ (1990, l.1277; see also Goodison 1990, 11, 25; 
Tavris 1992, 92; Elliot 2010, 27).  
 
If the category Women remains uncritically accepted in thea/ologies, I contend that 
the idolatrous nature of the binary norms remains unchallenged. While ‗wombs, 
sisters, daughters, mothers, teens, crones, babies, tears, laughter and menstrual 
bleeding‘ (Browne 2010a, 148), and ‗mothering, breast feeding, birthing, pregnancy‘ 
(Lanzetta 2005, 57) may be honoured and celebrated, even divinised, the 
embodiments of our unintelligible sibs remain on the outside, un-honoured, 
uncelebrated, un-symbolised in/as either Women‘s or Men‘s experiences. It is 
therefore time to consider how a renunciation of our attachment to binary gender 
might fruitfully inform our thea/ologising. However, this first requires a 
consideration of the vexed relationship thea/ologies have with the concept of 
renunciation. 
 
Thea/ologies and Renunciation 
Thea/ological Critique of Renunciation 
Renunciation has been considered problematic to thea/ologies from their outset. In 
per groundbreaking article, The Human Situation, Valerie Saiving (1992 [1979]) 
asserts that when mainstream theologians talk about the human situation, they fail 
to take into account the differences between men and women. The main burden of 
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Saiving‘s argument (ibid, 26) is a critique of Reinhold Niebuhr‘s contention that ‗sin 
is the unjustified concern of the self for its own power and prestige‘. Women do not 
sin pridefully; rather they have ‗specifically feminine forms of sin…[that] are 
outgrowths of the basic feminine character‘ (ibid, 37). A list of extraordinarily 
stereotyped behaviours follows28, with the conclusion that women‘s sin is ‗in short 
underdevelopment or negation of the self‘ (ibid). In casting ‗the refusal to become 
selfless‘ as not merely bad for women, but wholly sinful (ibid, 41), Saiving thereby 
instates in thea/ologies a general and lasting tendency (e.g. Japinga 1999, 88; Bahr 
and Bahr 2001, 1235; Miles 2001, 87; Cooper 2003, 73-86; Slee 2003, 43-44; 
Mahoney and Pargament 2004, 482-485; Suchocki [1991], [n.p.]), whether directly 
attributed to per or not, to demonise renunciation as a damaging and masochistic 
form of servitude and valorise self-actualisation as women‘s highest purpose29 (e.g. 
Daly 1979, 377-378; Christ 1989, 322; Hampson 1990b, 123; Hampson 1990a, 221-
224; Loades 1990, 82; Amoah 1996, 254; Clack 1998, 200-201; Rector 2000, 87). 
Indeed, although Saiving casts self-renunciation as sinful, in other writings it often 
appears to be no sin at all, or at least not one for which the female sinner can be held 
responsible but, rather, one that is imposed upon per by the forces of sinful 
                                                 
28 These are ‗triviality, distractibility, and diffuseness; lack of an organizing centre or focus; 
dependence on others for one‘s own self-definition; tolerance at the expense of standards of 
excellence; inability to respect the boundaries of privacy; sentimentality, gossipy sociability, and 
mistrust of reason‘ (Saiving 1992 [1979], 37). While these might read as a clumsy catalogue of 
stereotypes, it must be remembered that Saiving is attempting to delineate a specifically female type 
of sinful behaviour here, in order to support per justifiable argument that mainstream theology has 
ignored the specifics of women‘s lived experiences. 
29 Sally Munt notes a similar tendency within Queer spirituality, noting that any move towards self-
renunciation is seen as antithetical to the ‗urge to build, emboss and protect the individual self‘ (2010, 
16). 
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dominology, as ‗women have been destructive of themselves and their potentialities‘ 
(Hampson 1990b, 123). Reconstructing selves and potentialities thus serves the 
overthrow of dominology and becomes thea/ologies‘ utmost good. 
 
Criticisms of Saiving and the anti-renunciation turn in thea/ologies include 
consideration of: its emphasis on sin as an individual rather than a corporate 
responsibility (e.g. Slee 2003, 43-44; Suchocki [1991], [n.p.]); its having 
misconceived the notion of pride as expressed by Niebuhr (Miles 2001, 87; Cooper 
2003, 33-72); and its failure to acknowledge that men too might suffer from lack of 
self (Bahr and Bahr 2001, 1247; Cooper 2003) or that women too might be prideful, 
and complicit in the structures of dominology (Miles 2001, 87). None of these, 
however, troubles the binary, and binary-gendered, opposition of pride and self-
renunciation, or substantially challenges the view of the latter‘s inefficacy as a 
fruitful and empowering experience regardless of gender, and none constitutes a 
revaluing of renunciation as a thea/ological good. 
 
Sarah Coakley‘s Work on Renunciation 
One marked exception to the above is Powers and Submissions by Sarah Coakley 
(2002). While noting from the outset that per work might be considered ‗outrightly 
offensive, disappointingly conventional, a sign of feminist ―false consciousness‖, or 
an apolitical retreat into introspective piety‘, person nevertheless argues that, far 
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from being inimical to feminist values, ‗an inalienable surrender (―submission‖) to 
God…must remain the secret ground of even feminist ―empowerment‖‘ (ibid, x). 
Furthermore, person asserts that the binary distinction, between submissive 
vulnerability on the one hand and liberative empowerment on the other, forces us 
into a false choice (ibid, xv), and contends that it is only in practising full submission 
to GOD/DE that any possibility of either social or personal liberation is possible 
(ibid, xx). Coakley emphasises the point that it is submission to GOD/DE alone that 
person is commending, arguing that, in respect of Worldly power, it is our 
responsibility both to understand its working and to take responsibility for our 
complicity in it (ibid, xviii): 
If our fundamental and practised dependency is on God, there is the 
fulcrum from which our (often necessary) dependencies on others 
may be assessed with critical discernment, and the assumed binary 
gender associations of such dependencies called into question (ibid, 
xx). 
 
One practice Coakley commends by which to achieve this state of dependency upon 
GOD/DE alone is kenotic self-emptying in contemplative prayer, or silent waiting 
upon GOD/DE, which enables us to ‗hold vulnerability and empowerment together, 
precisely by creating a ‗space‘ in which non-coercive divine power manifests itself‘ 
(ibid, 5).  
 
This practice of opening to non-coercive power, not a dominological power-over but 
rather a supportive and nurturing power-with in which one paradoxically loses 
oneself in order to find oneself, is wholly compatible not simply with thea/ological 
61 
concerns but with feminist interests as a whole (ibid, 4). The task of feminism then 
becomes, not to renounce renunciation as dangerous to women, but: 
[to] make fine but important distinctions: between this ‗right‘ 
vulnerability and mere invitations to abuse; between this 
contemplative ‗self-effacement‘ and self-destruction; between the 
productive suffering of self-disclosure and the decentring torture of 
pain for pain‘s sake (ibid, 36). 
 
Other Feminist Voices for Renunciation 
Mary Potter Engel has also reassessed the notion of self-renunciation in feminist 
terms (2008), with an account of per transition from one who was ‗alert to sexism‘s 
submersion of women‘s selves in the ―common‖ good and intent on becoming a free 
and empowered self‘ (ibid, 144) to one who finds, like Coakley, that ‗in emptying, 
one is filled…[and] found by losing the way‘ (ibid, 152). And, like Coakley, Engel 
concludes that our task is not to reject self-renunciation out of hand but to work on 
discerning the difference between a ‗self-naughting humility‘ that willing gives itself 
up into GOD/DE, and the destructive humiliation of self required by the forces of 
dominology ‗who profit from keeping the other in its place‘ (ibid, 151). The latter 
renders us permanently immature and dependent; the former requires us achieve a 
mature fullness of self that can then decentre itself, ‗step[ping] aside for the work‘ 
(ibid, 157) of transforming the World in love and justice (ibid, 154). 
 
Beverly Lanzetta‘s work on feminist mysticism Radical Wisdom (2005) is another 
revaluing of the practice of renunciatory contemplation. Noting thea/ologies‘ 
62 
‗unfortunate tendency‘ to equate the renunciative life with passivity, Worldly 
detachment, apolitical introspection and somatophobia (ibid, 33), person commends 
contemplation as a legitimate feminist practice that encourages the practitioner to 
experience perself as: embodied and interrelated rather than atomised, disembodied 
and autonomous (ibid, 32); vulnerable and exposed to a healing power beyond 
perself (ibid); opened to a wider understanding of the structures of dominology 
(ibid, 33); less under pressure to conform to group thinking and succumb to idolatry 
(ibid, 170); while less outwardly directed towards the comfort of others, ultimately 
more focused ‗on an interior solitude from which flows the richness and pleasure of 
all relations‘ (ibid, 168).  
 
In a similar vein, Kathryn Tanner (2004) offers a reassessment of the general notion 
of the purpose of sacrifice in Christianity, concluding that sacrificial self-
renunciation promotes union with the Divine through service to neighbours, thus 
maintaining community (ibid, 51-55). Person acknowledges, however, that 
disinterested effort on behalf of others is not without personal cost, and that thus 
sacrifice is ‗a sorrowful act‘ (ibid, 51).  
 
Speaking in general of self-renunciation, Michael Sells asserts that the risk of giving 
up desire and will is the risk of becoming nothing (1994, 211), of losing one‘s reason 
and descending into madness (ibid, 213). However, Terry Cooper argues that ‗we 
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were never meant to be the centre of our own existence‘ (2003, 2) and that to 
believe we are is to exhibit a lack of trust in GOD/DE that amounts to self-idolatry 
(ibid, 157). Furthermore, maintaining the self as an idol is not an adequate, realistic 
or effective form of self-care (ibid, 145), but rather a neglect of our real need for 
selfless communion with GOD/DE and others. 
 
Thus we might reassess renunciation and feminist objections to it, revaluing the 
practice as personally, politically and spiritually fruitful and empowering, a practice 
that counters self-centredness and idolatry; promotes embodied interconnectedness 
and community; opens us to a reassessment of the nature of power and a critique of 
dominology; undermines conformity and offers a challenge to the power-over that 
seeks to keep us in our place; fits us to take responsibility for our being in the World 
and to take action for social justice; renders us both vulnerable and healed; and gives 
us back to ourselves so that we might then step aside for the work. Though we risk 
madness, we become, through a practice of self-renunciation, open to the still, small 




Renunciation and Decreation 
Simone Weil and Renunciation 
In the practice of renunciation we unsay our attachment to self in favour of 
submission to something greater, a purpose that transcends our small, personal 
concerns. Our gender is an aspect of that self that now appears to have potential for 
being unsaid; in this, gender might echo the unsayability of GOD/DE that lies at the 
heart of the apophatic or negative theological tradition, a spiritual discipline that 
seeks through its total commitment to the ineffability of GOD/DE to protect the 
World from idolatry.  
 
There has been a ‗burgeoning of contemporary languages of the unsayable‘ (Sells 
1994, 5) in postmodernism, particularly in the work of Derrida, that has in turn led 
to a revival of interest in earlier apophatic or negative theological traditions (e.g. 
Sells 1994; Turner 1995; Lanzetta 2005; Rollins 2006; Rivera 2007; Boesel and Keller 
2010b). I examine the nature of apophasis in greater detail in Chapter 5, but at this 
point I discuss not the earlier, largely mediaeval, tradition that is the focus of 
contemporary interest, but rather reclaim the work of twentieth-century negative 
theologian/philosopher Simone Weil and, in particular, the process of self-
renunciation person calls ‗decreation‘, for the light it casts upon the issue of 
renunciation of gender.  
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Weil: Biographical Details 
Simone Weil has been described as: ‗a politically active mystic‘, negative theologian 
and self-starver (Macfarlane 2008, 240) ‗a woman of hunger‘ who ‗yearned for God‘ 
(Wolfteich 2001, 309); someone who ‗tilt[ed] the scales of reality towards some 
transcendent equilibrium‘ (Heaney in Fan 2007, 135); one who actively sought 
suffering as preparation for the experience of being ‗between [the] two realities‘ of 
the immanent and the transcendent (Selles-Roney 1994, 273-274).  Per life, per 
apparent anti-Semitism30, and, in particular, per death31 are viewed as highly 
problematic by most commentators. 
 
Weil perself saw it as per purpose:  
To be an intermediary between the uncultivated ground and the 
ploughed field, between the data of a problem and the solution,  
between the blank page and the poem, between the starving beggar 
and the beggar who has been fed (2002 [1952], 46). 
                                                 
30 Weil refused to identify as Jewish, particularly in two letters of complaint about being banned by 
Vichy Government‘s Statute on Jews from teaching (McLellan 1989, 163),  and wrote scathingly 
about the nation of Israel as it is portrayed in the Hebrew Bible (e.g. 2002 [1952], 159-163).  
Furthermore, despite per central concern with those who suffer, person failed to acknowledge the 
sufferings of the Nazi concentration camps: Heinz Abosch deems this to be a ‗disappointing aspect‘ of 
Weil‘s work (1994, 15).  Francine Gray goes further and accuses Weil of ‗Jewish self-loathing‘ which 
renders per ‗pitiful‘ (2001, 156).  The degree to which such criticism is justified is, however, beyond 
the scope of this study. 
31 In radical solidarity with the occupied French in the Second World War, Weil refused the bed-rest 
and hypernutrition that may have cured per TB, saying ‗I will not eat more than in Marseilles‘ 
(Wolfteich 2001, 363) and thus died at the age of 34, judged by the coroner to have committed 
suicide. Weil‘s ‗self-starvation‘ is the most outstanding feature of per life for many commentators, 
according to Christopher Frost and Rebecca Bell-Metereau (1998, 23). Whether person may be 
considered to have been clinically anorexic is highly debatable, though Abosch (1994) and Gray 
(2001) consistently argue that this was the case.  Frost and Bell-Metereau, on the other hand, argue 
that Weil‘s food-refusal should be seen as a ‗symbolic, heroic act‘ (1998, 24) of solidarity with all who 
suffer privation. Claire Wolfteich insists that Weil‘s thought is too important to be read ‗entirely 
through per own biography (2001, 375), a view with which I concur. 
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In short, person was to be a conduit between Gravity and Grace, where ‗Gravity‘ 
refers to the all the laws that govern the World and drag us down into the material, 
as opposed to the laws of Grace that govern supernatural or Godly activity: ‗We 
must always expect things to happen in conformity with the laws of gravity unless 
there is supernatural intervention‘ (Weil 2002 [1952], 1).  According to Robert 
Macfarlane, Weil gives the highest ethical importance to the attempt to renounce 
the pull of Gravity (2008, 240) whilst emphasising that this is an almost impossible 
task without the Grace of GOD/DE‘s intervention: ‗All the natural movements of the 
soul are controlled by laws analogous to those of physical gravity.  Grace is the only 
exception‘ (Weil 2002 [1952], 1).    
 
As a Roman Catholic convert from a secular Jewish family who delved deeply into 
the traditions of the East, Weil positioned perself as being ‗at the intersection of 
Christianity and everything that is not Christianity‘ (Weil 2009 [1951], 32).  Person 
might thus be described as a liminal person, exhibiting what Fan calls a ‗precarious 
in-betweenness‘ (2007, 129), and an outsider who ‗could not find a perfect fit with 
any specific organization, cause or thinker‘. In conceiving of GOD/DE as essentially 
unWorldliness, silence and nothingness, Weil outlines a distinctively unorthodox, 
outsider negative theology. GOD/DE is inexpressible not simply because human 
speech is insufficient for the task, but more because GOD/DE is in no way in the 
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World at all; we cannot know GOD/DE but only ‗the withdrawal of God‘ (Weil in 
Hermsen 1999, 187). GOD/DE is ineffable not because of ÆR excess, as Æ 
commonly is in mediaeval traditions, but because of ÆR absence; and creation 
reminds us not that GOD/DE is great but that GOD/DE is missing. Nonetheless, 
Weil advocates the renunciatory practice of decreation, a giving up of the self into 
the GOD/DE who may not be. 
 
Decreation Defined 
Defining decreation as ‗to make something created pass into the uncreated‘ (2002 
[1952], 32), Weil contrasts this with destruction in which ‗something created 
pass[es] into nothingness‘ (ibid), the vital distinction here being that ‗the uncreated‘ 
is GOD/DE, while ‗nothingness‘ is simply that. Although person acknowledges that 
‗Creation is an act of love and is perpetual‘, this is qualified by the assertion that, 
despite the loving nature of creation, GOD/DE can only love GOD/DE and that, in 
loving us, Æ is in truth loving ÆRSELF32 (ibid). Furthermore, the full power of 
GOD/DE‘s love, if turned upon us, would evaporate us ‗like water in the sun‘ (ibid, 
                                                 
32 Since creation exists not because of GOD/DE‘s urge to create from ÆR own substance, but as a 
space left by ÆR withdrawal, leaving nothing whatsoever of ÆR in the world, there is ‗an infinite 
distance between God and men‘ (Weil in McLellan 1991, 203). We cannot therefore experience 
GOD/DE as a comforting presence, but only as a sense of utter abandonment (Ryan 2005, 360), and 
the only knowledge we can have of this absent GOD/DE is as ‗a desire for the good‘ (Hermsen 1999, 
186). This conceptualisation causes the poet Wallace Stevens to infer that GOD/DE is dead and that 
‗the greatest truth we could hope to discover…is that man‘s truth is the final resolution of everything‘ 
(in Baker 2006, 134).  
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33), and so GOD/DE places the material World of necessity33 between ÆRSELF and 
us in order to protect us. This protection notwithstanding, we must renounce 
ourselves, decreate our createdness and make ourselves vulnerable and open to the 
GOD/DE who might evaporate us, in order that the good34 might come into the 
world.  
 
Weil states that ‗In so far as I become nothing, God loves himself through me‘ (ibid, 
34). Such a renunciation is an ‗Imitation of God‘s renunciation in creation. In a sense 
God renounced being everything. We should renounce being something. That is our 
only good‘ (ibid, 33).  Part of this good is to seek to love as impersonally as does 
GOD/DE, ‗as an emerald is green‘ (Weil 1970, 129), loving every other human being 
impartially and in equal measure, attending to human need rather than seeking to 
consume others with our desire. Decreation thus requires that in love we free 
ourselves from the personal attachments that direct love only towards what we 
know, our cultural roots. By decreating ourselves, ‗we participate in the creation of 
the world‘ (Weil 2002 [1952], 33) as a place into which the good might come. 
 
                                                 
33 Weil describes necessity as the arbitrary set of rules by which the World functions, a ‗blind 
mechanism, heedless of degrees of spiritual perfection, [that] continually tosses men about‘ (2009 
[1951], 73). Affliction is thus anonymous and indifferent and comes upon us by chance, because of 
necessity‘s blind impartiality.  
34 Weil is insistent that nothing in the created world exhibits the goodness person means when 
person talks of ‗the good‘: ‗The good seems to us as nothingness, since there is no thing that is good‘ 
(2002 [1952], 13). Pure good, from GOD/DE, comes into the World only in ‗imperceptible quantities‘ 
(Weil 1989, 287), such that its existence is effectively unknown to us. But, person goes on, the fact 
that the good barely exists in this world does not mean that it is unreal.  
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Decreation is by no means free of hazard, since not only might it attract GOD/DE‘s 
annihilating gaze, but worse, GOD/DE may not respond at all; GOD/DE‘s absence 
may be the only thing that we perceive. ‗We must only wait and cry out‘ says Weil, 
‗not call upon someone, while we still do not know if there is anyone, but cry out 
that we are hungry and want some bread‘ (1974, 86). Waiting for GOD/DE is, 
therefore, inevitably a life of risk; we cannot know where our search will take us or 
what, if anything, might result. However, there is value in ‗embarking on paths that 
lead nowhere‘ (Frost and Bell-Metereau 1998, 61), since not to do so is also a risk, in 
that we might prematurely close ourselves off from experiences of inestimable value. 
 
The decreative process does not represent subjection but freedom and 
empowerment; indeed it is the only liberative act we can undertake, since we 
possess nothing else that cannot be stripped from us by the arbitrary movements of 
necessity (2002 [1952], 26). Renunciation only liberates, however, if it is of our own 
choosing, ‗for the ―I‖ is not destroyed by external pressure without a violent revolt‘ 
(ibid, 27). Extreme affliction35, which brings about ‗the destruction of the ―I‖ from 
outside‘ (ibid, 30) is not in the least redemptive. But the self that has been decreated 
                                                 
35 Weil‘s concern for suffering and affliction is a major focus of per work. Person draws a marked 
distinction between the two: suffering (souffrance), is the inevitable ‗colour of certain events‘ (2009 
[1951], 78) and ‗a method of God‘s teaching‘ (ibid 79) that is willingly embraced by the sufferer. 
Affliction (malheur), on the other hand, is forced on the afflicted from outside: thus it is ‗quite 
different from suffering. It takes possession of the soul and marks it through and through with its 
own particular mark, the mark of slavery‘ (Weil 2002 [1952], 68). A detailed discussion of Weil‘s 
treatment of these topics is, however, beyond the scope of this study.  
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by choice is then impervious to destruction by affliction ‗since the ―I‖ in him no 
longer exists, having completely disappeared and left the place to God‘ (ibid).  
 
By renouncing ‗the illusion of perspective‘ that places each of us at the centre of our 
universe, echoing Coakley, Engel, Lanzetta and Tanner above, we finally become as 
GOD/DE means us to be, says Weil (Howe 2008, 49-50); since as ego-centred selves 
we cannot love GOD/DE, our only choice is to lose ourselves in order to make access 
to GOD/DE‘s love possible (Carson 2002, 194). And this is not merely a choice but 
an obligation from GOD/DE that must be met with passivity and obedience 
(Skrimshire 2006, 291). However obedience does not consist of ‗submission to a set 
of restriction or rules‘ but is rather a willing embarkation on a path towards 
experiencing ‗the fullness of life‘ (Howe 2008, 60). In withdrawing ourselves from 
necessity as GOD/DE withdrew from creation, therefore, we become ‗the most real 
we can be‘ (McLellan 1991, 231), not for ourselves alone, but so that the World itself 
may experience the good: 
May I disappear in order that those things that I see may become 
perfect in their beauty from the very fact that they are no longer 
things that I see…. To see a landscape as it is when I am not there…. 
When I am in any place, I disturb the silence of heaven and earth by 
my breathing and the beating of my heart‘ (Weil 2002 [1952], 42). 
 
In ‗decreate[ing] the tyrannical ―I‖‘ (Fan 2007, 130) through the application of an 
impersonal and disinterested attention that grasps at neither GOD/DE nor hope 
(Ryan 2005, 360), room is made for GOD/DE‘s grace. Setting out thus, without 
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regard for results, we must first rid ourselves of our social and then of our personal 
roots, leaving behind all the assumed behaviours generated by class, creed, 
nationality, habit, preference and, most importantly for this study, gender, in order 
to facilitate the transition from the personal, self-centred to the impersonal, 
decreated self (Hermsen 1999, 193). It is only thus that we create the accessibility to 
others that is inhibited by our preoccupation with our own perspective, ‗exchanging 
opposition to people and things, which is a given of individuality, with openness and 
genuine attention for others‘ (ibid 191). By this process Weil seeks not the complete 
destruction of self, but rather a self and an ‗impersonal ―Holy‖‘ that are in balance, 
such that the self acts not from selfish desire alone but also in response to the needs 
of others (ibid 193).  
 
The decreated self does not lose all sense of itself as a self, although it is a self that is 
‗never more the self than when it is not‘ (Baker 2006, 137). However, because this is 
a project without any guarantee of success, the self that remains might well be left 
empty and abandoned (Frost and Bell-Metereau 1998, 60), and undefended against 
‗tumultuous and painful experiences‘ (ibid, 107). But while the undefended self may 
suffer, it is also permeable to positive experiences; our defences may protect us from 
suffering, but they also protect us from joy (ibid).   
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Decreation as Ethical Pursuit 
Whatever the effects of decreation on the self, the heart of Weil‘s conceptualisation, 
as of all per work, is ethical. Some, like Wallace Stevens, may misread its purpose as 
solipsistic, providing ‗a path from the world of belief to the world of the individual‘ 
(in Baker 2006, 134). However, in the act of making a space to respond both to the 
voice of other human beings and to the still small voice of the Wholly Other 
(Hermsen 1999, 193), Weil‘s intentions are entirely selfless and focused on our 
obligations to the World in general and to its afflicted in particular. Loving GOD/DE 
unconditionally and without any hope of a return of love is a legitimate response to 
the absurdity of existence and an embrace of the suffering world as it really is rather 
than our own illusory desires, asserts Stefan Skrimshire (2006, 293). It represents an 
unquestionable claim of the need for roots not for ourselves but for others, and is 
thus a vehicle for social transformation. Decreation is an utter refusal of self-idolatry 
and an acknowledgement of the equal claim all humans have to be seen as fully 
humans (Nye 1994, 61), ‗an ethics of liberation from individuality and from all 
power struggles connected with it‘ (Hermsen 1999, 195). The ethicality of 
decreation stems, in part, from its emphasis on the renunciation of material goods, 
countering a culture of consumption which ‗inevitably implies competition for 
resources‘ (Frost and Bell-Metereau 1998, 25). 
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Decreation is a sort of test the like of which appears in folk tales (cf Weil 2002 
[1952], 40), whereby the character who chooses the least appealing course of action 
results in the richest reward36 (Carson 2002, 194). In becoming nothing, in 
renouncing ourselves in order that GOD/DE might enter the world as GOD/DE 
renounced ÆR omnipotence in order that ‗not GOD/DE‘ might exists, we thus 
become imago Dei (Frost and Bell-Metereau 1998, 105). We reflect GOD/DE only 
inasmuch as we do not exist to obstruct ÆR (Carson 2002, 194).  
 
Some of the ethical value of decreation lies in its ability to promote a ‗yearning 
towards the transcendent‘ (Frost and Bell-Metereau 1998, 109), ‗catch[ing] a glimpse 
of that which exceeds the I‘ (Hermsen 1999, 185) getting oneself ‗out of the way so 
as to arrive at God‘ (Carson 2002, 194). Rather more bleakly, but not unrealistically, 
Baker casts this yearning as the demonstration of ‗how the individual talks to God 
when there is no God with whom to speak and no hope of an answer‘ (2006, 134). 
However decreation also maintains a gap between desire and fulfilment, which is an 
ethical refusal to accept the World unchallenged; to fall into acceptance, assert Frost 
and Bell-Metereau, is no neutral act, since to do nothing does not merely not make 
things better, it actively contributes to making things worse (1998, 109). In per 
insistence on the removal of ‗layers of cultural conditioning and shared illusions‘, 
                                                 
36 According to McLellan (1989, 217) a favourite tale of Weil‘s was the Celtic story of the Duke of 
Norroway, in which the central character, in contrast to per status-hungry sisters, asks not for a king 
or a prince as husband but says person will be content with the Red Bull of Norroway. After many 
trials person is rewarded with the transformation of the Bull into a handsome Duke, whom person 
marries. This is, of course, only one of a number of versions of the tale, but was the one Weil 
favoured. 
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Weil outlines an ethical quest for righteousness, not only religiously but also 
politically and socially (ibid). The decreation of the self loosens our grip on accepted 
meaning so as to ‗open up other paths of significance‘ through which we might 
access something valuable that comes from beyond the norms of necessity (Roth 
2008, [n.p.]). If we can achieve all that Weil hopes of decreation, we might be 
enabled to hear what ‗the singing of the real world would sound like if the self were 
not in the way of our hearing the songs‘ (ibid, [n.p.]). 
 
Feminisms and Decreation  
Sarah Pinnock asserts that ‗Weil‘s vision of mystical self-annihilation is implicitly 
feminist in its concrete approach to selfhood and its ethical implications‘ (2010, 217) 
and its resistance to patriarchal power (ibid, 206). Andrea Nye similarly sees 
decreation‘s feminist value as abiding in a non-coercive way to ‗be good‘ that refuses 
rather than capitulates to or colludes with dominology (1994, 105). In a World in 
which consumerist immoderation is touted as the highest good, decreation holds out 
the promise of an ethics of moderation and restraint (Rozelle-Stone 2010) and the 
restoration of measure and equilibrium (Estelrich 2010, 11).   
 
Carson describes Weil as ‗an eruption of the absolute into ordinary history‘ (2002, 
203), and notes that this spiritual assertiveness disturbs and unnerves us: ‗we resent 
[her]. We need history to be able to call saints neurotic, anorexic, pathological, 
sexually repressed or fake‘ (ibid), charges that echo feminist disquiet with 
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renunciatory practices. It is right to see Weil as an immoderate fanatic (Rozelle-
Stone 2010, 21). However the immoderation of Weil‘s life is entirely different from 
the immoderation of a capitalist, consumerist culture; as Martin Luther King asserts 
‗the question is not whether we will be extremist but what kind of extremist will we 
be‘ (King 1997). Weil is an extremist of the side of the good (Rozelle-Stone 2010, 
18), not a relay within an existing power network, but rather a resistance to such 
networks, ‗disrupting, rechanneling its circulation in order to generate entirely 
novel social relations‘ (Duttenhaver and Jones 2010, 189). 
 
Ultimately what decreation offers us is not a practice that is generally offensive to 
feminism, but rather one that, in line with feminist revaluations of renunciation: 
addresses self-centredness and promotes the value of a depersonalised love as an 
emerald is green, thus stimulating increased interconnectedness and a potentially 
broadening of community; opens us to a reassessment of the nature of power and a 
critique of dominology by figuring us as nodes of resistance; challenges idolatry by 
disrupting and rechanneling the circulation of power into entirely novel social 
relations; requires us to take responsibility for our being in the World and act for 
social justice; renders us vulnerable both to GOD/DE‘s power and to ÆR absence; 
and liberates us back to ourselves so that we might with confidence step aside for 
the work. Far from requiring us to disembody ourselves, decreation promotes a self 
who is ethically active, fully engaged with transformation in the World. 
Furthermore, in requiring us to renounce being of the World, as GOD/DE 
76 
renounced being part of creation, decreation also offers us another, non-idolatrous, 
way of understanding imago Dei and of answering that of GOD/DE in other people. 
The decreated self thus gives us hope that dominological networks of power might 
finally be reconfigured.  
 
Decreation as Counterweight 
According to Gustave Thibon, ‗the idea of counterbalancing is essential to [Weil‘s] 
conception of political and social activity‘ (2002 [1952], xvii), while Leslie Fiedler 
states that per tendency to ‗throw the counterweight on the side of a proposition 
against which popular judgement is almost solidly arrayed‘ is one of per ‗deliberate 
strategic emphases‘ (2009 [1951], xxviii). Weil perself wrote: ‗If we know in what 
direction the scales of society are tilted we must do what we can to add weight to 
the lighter side‘ (2002 [1952], 171). In its rejection of the greedy self-perspective and 
its promotion of a link to both the immanence of necessity and the transcendence of 
GOD/DE, decreation stands as just such a counterweight to the normative and the 
orthodox.  
 
Weil contends that ‗When the whole universe weighs upon us there is no other 
counterweight possible but God himself‘ (Weil 2002 [1952], 93). I assert that the 
dominological construct of gender weighs upon us in this manner, as gender 
injustice circumscribes the limits of human intelligibility with deadly efficiency. 
And it is this issue of intelligibility, of who can legitimately be read as fully human, 
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that the decreation of gender might address. We do not decreate for ourselves and 
for our own spiritual sustenance but in the ethical pursuit of gender justice, 
particularly for our sibs who as yet are unintelligible and cry out that they are 
hungry and want the bread of gender justice.  
 
The system of gender apartheid that we espouse is manifestly out of kilter; there is 
little evidence to support binary gender and much to undermine it. Of all the aspects 
of self that are available to us to renounce, gender has seemed to be the most 
unrenounceable, since we have conceived of it as pertaining to our natural, even 
GOD/DE-given, bodies. However, if binary gender is wholly deconstructible, if it is 
of the World and not of GOD/DE, just one more aspect of Weil‘s material World of 
gravity, then it is as available to decreation as any other aspect of our tyrannical ‗I‘. 
By renouncing gender, by detaching from the normative and orthodox forces of 
materialism that it expresses, by rejecting its idolatrous apartheid, and even the 
names of Woman and Man, as belonging to matter and not to the Divine, we might 
come to make the createdness of gender pass back into the uncreatedness of 
GOD/DE. Thus, decreation of gender becomes a counterweight to the idolatrous 




An apophasis of gender? 
In 2005 I wrote in my research journal: 
Are ambiguous folk saying ‗I am inexpressible as GODDE is 
inexpressible‘—is that the ‗image and likeness‘ thing—created by 
GODDE to be expressions of inexpressibility—bodying GODDE‘s 
inexpressibility—walking, talking examples of negative theology? Are 
we all? 
 
Three years later, Catherine Keller‘s article The Apophasis of Gender (2008) echoed 
of some of my earliest thoughts.  Keller begins by outlining three overlapping 
phases, or what person calls ‗folds‘, in the development of (specifically) feminist 
theologies: the ‗gender fold‘ (ibid, 918), which first critiqued the dominological 
discourses of Christianate theology; the ‗color fold‘ (ibid, 920), wherein it was 
recognised that not all feminists are white, western and middle-class; and the ‗queer 
fold‘ (ibid, 922) which unsays the ‗confident affirmations of feminist theology‘ with 
regards to binary gender. Person goes on to argue for a fourth fold, the ‗manifold‘ 
(ibid, 926), in which thea/ologians apply the insights of negative or apophatic 
theology to notions of gender, unsaying37 the existence of the binary as a way of 
ushering in new and fruitful understandings of Divine-human relationships.  
 
Noting that apophasis is concerned with the ‗exposure of theological idols‘ (ibid, 
912), Keller commends the potential of an apophasis of gender to unsay the 
                                                 
37 Apophasis literally means ‗un-saying or speaking away‘ (Sells 1994, 2).  
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idolatrous ‗pet positions‘ (ibid, 915) of feminist theologies, such as the wombful 
matriarchalism outlined above, subverting, queering and undermining our binary 
certainties (ibid, 918), and generating new openings to the Divine. In pursuit of just 
such openings, I have undertaken this study, starting from a position in Chapter 1 
that binary gender is but one metaphorical model for gendered human experience, 
and that it is a model that we have turned into an idol with violent results for our 
as-yet-unintelligible sibs. I have thus contended that a renunciation of gender, 
supported by a feminist revaluing of the notion of renunciation in general, and an 
understanding of Weil‘s concept of decreation in particular, requires serious 
consideration as a means both to promote love and justice in the World and to 
widen and deepen our understanding of GOD/DE beyond simply He and She. 
 
In Chapter 2 I discuss the methods I have employed in this study, in collecting, 
analysing and theologising around interviews with trans narrators. I outline some of 
the methodological practices of both traditional and feminist theologies and explain 
my somewhat unusual decision to make use of a qualitative ethnographic 
methodology, Grounded Theory, in my own work. I discuss my choice to base this 
study on interviews with trans people as a way of taking seriously the notion of 
lived experience as central to a feminist theological project, and investigate 
theoretical and practical issues around the collection and analysis of those 
interviews, concluding that I have developed an innovative, possibly unique, 
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methodological approach that I call ‗Grounded Theology‘. I then return to the work 
of Simone Weil and discuss specifically per notion of attention as it relates to a 
practice of grounded theologising.  
 
In Chapter 3, I introduce the first of my narrators, Leigh and, after an extended pen 
portrait of per complex gendered and spiritual experiences, address a number of 
themes that arise from per story. I begin by drawing analogies between Leigh‘s 
experiences and those of the mystic Julian of Norwich, both in terms of their 
response to the promptings of an inner ‗voice‘ and in the role each plays as 
confessor/advisor to per community. I argue that Leigh may be seen as 
demonstrating qualities that theologian Grace Jantzen ascribes to a ‗postmodern 
anchoress‘, of ‗standing at an angle to the certainties and preoccupations of the 
world‘ (2000, vii) and becoming a space ‗where thinking otherwise might happen‘ 
(xxi). I then discuss the notion in Celtic spirituality of the ‗thin place‘ and link 
Thinness to Rudolph Otto‘s notion of the numinous (1958 [1923]), arguing that 
Leigh is more than a postmodern anchoress; in standing at an angle to the certainties 
of gender, person might legitimately be seen as a Thin person. I discuss Weil‘s 
concept of metaxu, conceived of as bridges to the Divine, and demonstrate how 
Weil enables us to conceive of gender as metaxu, such that we see through gender 
(to) something of the vast complexity of GOD/DE. I argue that conceiving of Thin 
embodiment as metaxu allows for a non-idolatrous appreciation of all embodiment, 
81 
and that Thin gender acts as a counterweight to the judgement imposed on us by 
gender norms, gently calling us to pay attention to the embodiment of another in a 
open and accepting fashion, rather that demanding conformity at any cost. 
 
Chapter 4 addresses the story of Robin, focusing first on themes that might be seen 
as relating to Thickness, in contrast to my previous discussion of Thinness. I develop 
the notion of thickness as occlusion productive of a mirror and, noting Robin‘s 
tendency to reflect the attributes of various groups, investigate per story in relation 
the mythical Narcissan mirror. I conclude that this is not an accurate metaphorical 
framework for Robin‘s experiences, though it does usefully highlight aspects of 
(self)idolatry in its depiction of the mirror as Weilian gravity well. I argue that 
Robin, in per unceasing reinvention, more resembles the shape-changing sea god 
Proteus. A discussion of this figure reveals that, in its benign aspects, Proteanism 
more accurately reflects Robin‘s experiences. I then use the Protean to critique 
dominological notions of GOD/DE as changeless and mutability as fearful, even evil, 
presenting Weil‘s concept of The Great Beast as demonstrative of that dominological 
tendency. I argue for a reassessment of GOD/DE as multiplicitously and mutably 
Protean, supporting this with reference to recent works of thea/ology by Laurel C. 
Schneider (2008) and Marcella Althaus-Reid‘s (2003). I conclude with a provisional 
and conjectural description of the attributes of the Protean GOD/DE that we might 
glimpse through the metaxu of Robin‘s embodiment. 
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In the last of the three chapters based on interview data, Chapter 5, I address the 
story of Sol, from which I identify two themes, an experience of genderedness that 
person describes as a Round Trip to Hell, and an alternative account that seems to 
directly contradict the first. I argue that such apparent inconsistencies are both 
inherent to the process of narrating our lives and demonstrative of Sol as imago Dei. 
I discuss Weil‘s contention that contradiction is not something to be resolved or 
avoided but rather to be used as as ‗pincers‘ with which we might grasp at a higher 
truth (2002 [1952], 121), and assert that Sol‘s embodiment of contradiction offers us 
an experience that casts light on the contradictory nature of GOD/DE as expressed, 
for example, in the so-called problem of evil. I go on to investigate the notion of 
opacity as it discussed by Judith Butler (2005) and elsewhere and, after Keller (2008; 
2010), link the Butlerian conception of opacity of the self to apophasis, or negative 
theology. Noting the problematic relationship between thea/ologies and the 
transcendence of GOD/DE that the apophatic tradition espouses, I nevertheless join 
with commentators, in particular Mayra Rivera (2007) and Rebekah Miles (2001), 
who argue for a revaluing of transcendence in thea/ologies as a hedge against 
idolatry. Further, I argue that the Butlerian concept of opacity of the self allows us 
to conceive of opaquely embodied experiences such as Sol‘s as embodiments of 
GOD/DE‘s transcendence, asserting that we are thusly all transcendent dazzling 
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darknesses, ultimately unsayable, as GOD/DE is unsayable, in gender as in every 
other aspect of our embodiments.  
 
In my concluding chapter, Chapter 6, I draw together the central concerns of this 
thesis, beginning with an assertion that is not enough to extend our metaphorical 
models of GOD/DE simply from He to She, but that gender justice for our 
unintelligible sibs calls us renounce the idolatry of binary gender in favour of an 
endlessly expanding notion of imago Dei. I argue that such a renunciation, or 
Weilian decreation, of our gendered roots affirms a yearning towards the 
transcendent and that which exceeds the I, towards an expansive future horizon of 
hope and transformation. Central to this is the recognition of the value of quotidian 
experiences and the theologising around these that is made possible by the 
application of Grounded Theology as a method of inquiry.  It is out of this 
methodological approach of silent waiting upon data that the metaphorical models 
of Thinness, Proteanism and Opacity, outlined above, have arisen. Through these I 
address not only the cry of the unintelligible for gender justice, but also the need for 
those of us who are cis to forge alliances with our unintelligible sibs, to act as 
counterweights against a gender regime that is out of kilter, and to stand as outsiders 
with outsiders in order to critique the norms that limit human potentialities. In the 
following chapter, therefore, I address the theoretical and practical considerations 
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that went into developing the qualitative research practice I call Grounded 









This chapter addresses the methodological concerns of the thesis, beginning with a 
statement of my theological position and of the position of this work in relation to 
thea/ological disciplines and developments. I examine the methodologies of 
mainstream and feminist theological enquiry, as they relate to the category of 
experience and, specifically, to what constitutes legitimate experience for 
thea/ological reflection. Contending that thea/ologies dismiss too readily the 
quotidian as a resource for exploring the Holy (after Rudolph Otto (1958 [1923])), I 
propose a methodological approach that combines the ethnographic qualitative 
research practice of grounded theory and the more traditional literature-based 
theological methods with prayerful attention to narrators and the data they provide. 
I call the resulting approach ‗Grounded Theology‘. I then link Simone Weil‘s notion 
of ‗attention‘, the ‗other half‘ of decreation and a hedge against idolatry, to my own 
Grounded Theology, arguing that there is congruence between the two. Asserting 
that listening, or silent waiting, is central to the ethics of Grounded Theology, I go 
on to describe the process by which I have collected, transcribed, analysed and 
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reported the results of interviews with the three trans people upon whose stories I 




Feminist theologian Daphne Hampson describes per theological position as being 
that of ‗a Western person, living in a post-Christian age, who has taken 
something…from Christian thinkers, but who has rejected the Christian myth‘ 
(1997, [n.p.]). This is not unlike my own position. Although Hampson describes 
perself as ‗post-Christian‘ and I describe myself as ‗non-Christian‘, the ‗Christian‘ 
part for me is highly significant. I am non-Christian, in that I do not feel called by 
Christian beliefs, but I am non-Christian, rather than non-Muslim, non-Jewish, 
non-Hindu, etc., because I have been brought up culturally Christian. And although 
I am a non-Christian, I am not an anti-Christian, finding many dissident believers 
and traditions within Western Christianity that speak to my condition. While Sally 
Munt defines ‗post-Christian‘ as describing spiritual and religious attitudes, 
worldviews, ideologies that are ‗no longer rooted in the languages and assumptions 
of Christianity‘ (2010b, 9), I find my non-Christian theologising to be wholly rooted 
in and formed by a cultural milieu that is ‗Christianate‘, a term I have coined to refer 
to biblically-derived, dominological, Eurocentric Western culture. Since a 
Christianate worldview is the dominant paradigm in the Britain, where I was born 
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and brought up, it is that culture and that alone that I feel in any position to 
critique.  
 
In terms of faith community I situate myself within the liberal British Quaker 
tradition, and as one of those Quakers who sometimes look outside as well as inside 
Christianity to express my inner experiences. In addition I am a member of a liberal 
Christian community that describes itself as ‗rooted in the Christian heritage, open 
to the wider future‘ (Othona Burton Bradstock 2007). I see myself as part of that 
‗wider future‘, but with a growing appreciation of just how deeply the roots go in 
shaping my beliefs. Thus, the description non-Christian does not situate me outside 
of Christian theology, since Christianity is at the very heart of my non-Christian 
theologising. My theological language has, so to speak, some Christian DNA; thus, 
concepts such as imago Dei are of primary importance to my theologising. 
 
I experience the GOD/DE of whom I write as a real and Holy presence, subscribing 
to Rudolph Otto‘s view of the Holy as being representative of something far more 
than mere goodness or morality (1958 [1923], 5). I believe the image of the Holy to 
be present in all human experiences, not just in those that exemplify the morally 
intelligible or acceptable. Thus, I am concerned in my theologising with 
understanding how human beings as imago Dei might be expressive of that of 
GOD/DE, not in exemplary ‗good‘ or ‗well-lived‘ lives, but in all the quotidian stuff 
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of each human life. From the fullness of lives, each in its specificity, I assert, we can 
draw metaphors to help us to understand the Holy, not because any one metaphor 
will correctly name Æ for whom there are no correct names but only 
approximations (Schneider 2008, 11), but, first, because every new metaphor 
destabilises all previous metaphors and, second, because ‗God also responds to 
human imagination and construction…[and thus] comes into presence in those 
constructions, and sometimes embodies them‘ (ibid 12). To formulate metaphors 
from the quotidian experiences of trans/genderqueer people is not only to add to the 
stock of available GOD/DE-concepts as a counterbalance to idolatry, but also to call 
down the Holy into bodies like these, thus making the unintelligible, at least 
theologically, intelligible.  
 
Philippa Willitts and Frances Ryan (2012) criticise media coverage of sporting 
events for disabled athletes for holding up those athletes solely as inhumanly 
perfected and inspirational ciphers for the edification of the ‗normal‘ human 
spectator. In deploying Otto‘s morally-neutral conception of the Holy in relation to 
trans/genderqueer embodiments, I hope to avoid similarly assigning an inhumanly 
superior moral status to unintelligible embodiments in the way that some 
commentators do—by asserting, for example, that ‗perhaps we will come to view 
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[intersex] children as especially blessed or lucky‘1 (Fausto-Sterling 2000, 113)—for 
fear that this places too heavy a burden of perfection on people already burdened by 
misplaced judgements. I discuss the problematics of conceptualising gender variant 
people as ‗gender-gifted‘ (Mollenkott and Sheridan 2003, 32) in greater detail in 
Chapter 3. 
 
Positioning This Thesis 
Moving from my own position, I situate this work within the thea/ological 
discipline with reference to Andrew Yip‘s assessment of developments in LGBTQI2-
affirming and queer theology (2010). Yip identifies three developmental strands3 
(ibid, 37-41): defensive apologetics; text ‗cruising‘; and turning theology upside 
down. In defensive apologetics, or what I call ‗justification‘, theologians take texts 
that have conventionally been deployed against an oppressed group, ‗texts of terror‘ 
(Trible 1984) and recontextualise them as a challenge to ‗the truth claims of the 
heteronormative dominant discourse‘ (Yip 2010, 37). ‗Cruising‘, or what I call 
‗reclamation‘, looks to texts and traditions with ‗confidence and creativity‘ for 
LGBTQI-affirming role models and practices ‗as a spiritual guide for a religiously 
                                                 
1 Cornwall notes the problematics of such an approach, sating ‗People with intersex/DSD conditions 
have sometimes been made to bear the weight of unsought connotations…being figured as a ―third‖ 
or politically significant liminal figure by activists when all they want is a quiet, unremarkable life‘ 
(2010, 99) 
2 The acronym LGBTQI stands for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, Queer/Questioning and Intersex. 
3 In a similar assessment of thea/ological developments, Pamela Young identifies two stages: first, a 
critique of existing dominological texts and traditions; and second, reconstruction religious and 
spiritual practices in the light of women‘s experience (2000b, 12; see also Hogan 1995, 9).  
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sanctioned way‘ of living contra heteronormativity (ibid, 39). Turning theology 
upside down or, as I call it, ‗expansion‘, seeks to ‗fundamentally overhaul theology‘ 
through a prioritisation of ‗embodiment and experience‘ over existing texts and 
traditions (ibid, 40), seeking to expand the stock of metaphorical GOD/DE language 
in innovative and imaginative directions. 
 
Within the field Yip surveys, a there is a growing number of works loosely 
categorised as ‗trans theology‘, beginning with Victoria Kolakowski‘s article Towards 
a Christian Ethical Response to Transsexual Persons (1997), and extending to 
monographs such as Omnigender (Mollenkott 2001), Crossing Over (Sheridan 2001), 
Transgender Good News (Conover 2002), Transgendered (Tanis 2003), Transgender 
Journeys (Mollenkott and Sheridan 2003), Transgendering Faith (Tigert and 
Tirabassi 2004) and Trans/Formations (Althaus-Reid and Isherwood 2009), mainly 
written from within Christianity, more often than not from a US perspective, and 
largely falling into Yip‘s categories of defensive apologetics and text-cruising. Since I 
am writing from neither a Christian nor a trans perspective, and seeking neither to 
justify trans existence not to reclaim affirming Christian texts and traditions, this 
thesis is situated in Yip‘s last category, turning theology upside down, in that my 
intention is to expand the stock of GOD/DE language that is drawn directly from 
trans embodiments and experiences, as a hedge against idolatry, as discussed in 
Chapter 1.  
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Weil warns: ‗We must be careful about the level on which we place the infinite. If 
we place it on the level which is only suitable for the finite it will matter very little 
what name we give it‘ (2002 [1952], 55). However, the finite is all we have when we 
speak of GOD/DE; ‗all the linguistic stock in trade is creaturely in its reference‘ 
asserts Denys Turner (2002, 17). To do justice to GOD/DE, speaking of Æ who is 
unspeakable calls for an ‗excess of babble‘ and an embarrassing prolixity of 
creaturely references, until we talk ourselves to a standstill (ibid, 18). Rather than 
not talk at all, theology should start by talking too much. However, as Turner later 
contends, ‗the contemporary diet of theological metaphor [is] a very thin gruel 
indeed‘ (1995, 23); we have forgotten that since GOD/DE created all things, all 
things, not just the good, the beautiful, the intelligible, may be names for GOD/DE. 
Butler talks of bringing back ‗what has been foreclosed and banished from the 
proper domain of ―sex‖…as a troubling return…[and] a radical rearticulation 
of…which bodies come to matter‘ (Butler 1993, 23). I argue that, by insisting on the 
intelligibility of embodiments outside of binary gender, we instate a troubling return 
not just of bodies that matter but also of that which has been foreclosed and 
banished for the proper domain of GOD/DE. In talking of ‗ways that count as ―life‖, 
lives worth protecting…, saving…[and] grieving‘ (ibid, 16) we are also talking of 
lives worth theologising.  
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It is for this reason that I have taken the somewhat unusual step of basing my 
theological metaphorising on a grounded theory approach to individual stories 
drawn from face-to-face interviews with trans people. With its focus on creating 
new metaphorical models for the Divine/human relationship, my work stands in the 
tradition of metaphorical theology begun by Sallie McFague (1982; 1993) that 
expands into works such as: Grace Jantzen‘s Becoming Divine (1998), which 
examines a metaphor of flourishing; Indecent Theology (2000) and The Queer God 
(2003), developing theology around ideas of indecency and queerness respectively; 
Laurel Schneider‘s exploration of the idea of multiplicity in Beyond Monotheism 
(2008); and the tehomic4 theology of the waters on the Face of the Deep that 
Catherine Keller describes (2004).  
 
In preparing for the task of theologising around the complexities of gender, I have 
studied widely around the subject of gender complexity and variability at its 
broadest, not only in academic texts (e.g. Lewins 1995; Ekins 1997; Whittle 2000; 
Bloom 2003; Chiland 2005; Gherovici 2010), but also in literary fiction (e.g. Durrell 
1982; Woolf 1995; Eugenides 2003; Winter 2011), science fiction (e.g. Russ 1975; 
Delany 1976; Sturgeon 1978; Gentle 1983; Scott 1995), biography and autobiography 
(e.g. County and Smith 1995; Summerscale 1997; Morris 2002; Boyd 2003; Beard 
2008; Hillman 2008), ethnography and history (e.g. Wheelwright 1989; Young 
                                                 
4 Tehom is the Hebrew word for primal oceanic chaos, which is translated in the King James Bible as 
‗the deep‘ (Genesis 1:2). 
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2000a; Collis 2001), films (e.g. Berliner and Stappen 1997; Almodovar 1999; Peirce 
1999; Tucker 2005) and TV and radio programmes (e.g. My Transsexual Summer 
2011; The Sex Test 2011; Baker 2011). More importantly for my specific 
understanding of trans/genderqueer people as individuals, are the interviews with 
eleven trans people, the stories of three of whom are the basis for my subsequent 
detailed theologising.  
 
Theological Methods 
Theology and Experience 
In deploying an ethnographic methodology, grounded theory, in pursuit of a 
theological enquiry, I have to some extent started from the ‗wrong‘ place, for though 
the use of qualitative methods is commonplace in sociology of religion, their use in 
theological enquiry is a rarity. Thus some of my methodological concerns are about 
reconciling this disparity. One of those concerns has been to situate my work in 
relation to the theological concept of ‗experience‘.  
 
Mainstream theologians sometimes employ the so-called ‗Methodist quadrilateral‘5 
of scripture, tradition, reason and experience (Stone and Duke 2006, 45-46) as 
resources for theological reflection and insight. Whilst noting that all life is 
                                                 
5 Referring to this nomenclature, Stone and Duke state that the phrase, while deriving from a 
Methodist context, ‗serves to clarify concerns widely shared by the worldwide community of faith‘ 
(2006, 46).  
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experience, Howard Stone and James Duke state that for theologians the category 
has the specific meaning of ‗various encounters with God, and for the awareness of 
God that comes through faith‘ (ibid, 54). For David Tracy the theological 
interpretation of experience is undertaken in relation to experiences of text, image, 
symbol, event, ritual, or persons (1994, 56). Alistair McGrath acknowledges the four 
sources above as the bedrock of theological reflection (1997, 181) and, in respect of 
experience, states that the term has acquired a specialised meaning where religion is 
concerned, relating to the ‗inward and subjective world of experience, as opposed to 
the outward world of everyday life‘ (ibid, 223). Thus, in the mainstream, theological 
recourse to experience is rarely, if ever, recourse to the kinds of quotidian 
experiences from which ethnography draws its data. 
 
Thea/ologies and Experience 
In feminist research as a whole and in thea/ologies specifically the category of 
experience has paramount importance. In per review of thea/ologies‘ methodological 
resources, Linda Hogan identifies two interwoven strands: ‗women‘s experiences of 
oppression under patriarchy‘; and ‗engaged action for change‘ (1995, 16). Asserting 
that thea/ologies emerged with the intention of claiming Women‘s experience ‗as 
authentic human experience‘ (ibid), Hogan nevertheless notes that the term 
‗experience‘ is somewhat uncritically deployed (ibid, 18), in an often essentialist 
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fashion6 (ibid, 62) and no homogeneity7 can be attributed to it (ibid, 11). These 
caveats notwithstanding, however, person concludes that ‗The consultation of 
specifically women‘s experiences…[is what] gives feminist theology its 
distinctiveness‘ (1994, 705).  
 
Pamela Young also asserts that Women‘s experience is ‗the primary category 
feminists have added to theological methodology‘ (2000b, 22). Like Hogan, Young 
notes a lack of explication of the term (ibid, 21), stating that it is ‗used more often 
than it is defined‘ (ibid, 49). In an effort to rectify this, person assesses that 
experience is always, first and foremost reflected-upon rather than immediate (ibid), 
and is experience not of everything in general but of GOD/DE in particular (ibid, 
51). Person outlines five types of experience that count: bodily, socialised, feminist, 
historical and individual, contending that this last ‗cannot be normative‘ (ibid, 67), 
but ‗can act as a catalyst‘ (ibid, 56) to wider thea/ological reflection based on the 
‗collectivity of women‘ (ibid, 69). Thus Women‘s experience becomes both norm 
and source for thea/ologising, along with scriptural and non-scriptural texts and 
traditions, and wider human experiences (ibid, 19-20).  
 
                                                 
6 Hogan notes calls on ‗the positive evaluation of menstruation…[and] the experience and institution 
of motherhood‘ as prototypical expressions of women‘s experience (1995, 18). 
7 Homogenising is not, however, uncommon; a typically claim for Women‘s experience is Young‘s 
assertion that ‗All women menstruate or have menstruated‘ (2000b, 53), a claim that is utterly 
refutable by trans, intersex and some cis Women. 
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Like Hogan, Rebekah Miles contends that the category is problematic because of its 
false suggestion of commonality of experiences (2001, 11), but notes that one 
commonality that does span the range of thea/ologies is ‗the appeal to diverse 
experiences‘ (ibid, 12). Diversity notwithstanding, however, the category remains 
troubling; if we can no longer state with any certainty what constitutes Women, as 
Chapter 1 has argued, how might we speak with any certainty of Women‘s 
experiences, even when we take diversity into account? Ramazanoglu and Holland 
argue that feminist theorising addresses not simply Women‘s experience but looks 
more widely ‗at gendered lives‘ (2002, 147). From the point of view of this thesis, 
theologising around gendered lives and experiences—where experience is defined 
both as something personally encountered or undergone and as the total of 
conscious events that make up an individual life—as much as from text and 
tradition, is claimed as a legitimate and potentially fertile ground for embarrassed 
babblings about that which has been foreclosed and banished for the proper domain 
of GOD/DE. 
 
Qualitative Research Methods 
Qualitative Methods in Thea/ological Enquiry 
Apart from faithfulness to Women‘s experience, however vaguely defined, there is 
no unanimity amongst thea/ologians as to the suitability of one methodological 
approach over another. In practice, however, few make use of qualitative 
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ethnographic research methods in collecting and analysing data of experience. These 
are more usually assembled from published factual and fictional/poetic accounts, 
generalised from experiences of oppression, and/or extrapolated from the personal 
reflected-upon experiences of the thea/ologian perself, but are rarely gathered in the 
form of stories from individuals specifically interviewed for a particular piece of 
research.  
 
A notable exception to this is Jone Salomonsen‘s work Enchanted Feminism (2002), 
in which person analyses interviews collected from a Wiccan coven in New York in 
order to produce a joint ethnographic and theological study of the ‗concepts and 
ritual courses endorsed by Reclaiming Witches‘ (ibid, 3). Person notes that this 
unusual ‗impure‘ approach might prove unsatisfactory to both theologians and 
anthropologists, as neither one thing nor the other, but asserts that it nonetheless 
produces a rich and original text (ibid, 11). My approach, using stories gathered from 
interviews with trans people8, proved similarly fruitful.  
 
                                                 
8 I am aware of the problematic implications of using trans people‘s stories in a feminist project; the 
links between trans communities and feminist communities have not always been comfortable, 
especially because of anti-trans writers like Janice Raymond (1979), Julie Bindel (Minou 2010) and 
Germaine Greer (1999). Furthermore, opinion is divided in trans communities over the validity of cis 
researchers telling trans stories. The arguments of Julia Serano (2007) and Viviane Namaste (2000), 
referred to in Chapter 1, are particularly apposite in this respect. Other trans commentators, 
however, welcome feminist interest. From the point of view of my own narrators, two openly 
expressed pleasure at having been asked to tell their stories when ‗nobody ever asks us this kind of 
stuff normally‘. A full discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this thesis, however. 
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Grounded Theory Overview 
While Salomonsen employed participant observation in per study, I opted for 
grounded theory as my method. Initially developed as a qualitative research method 
in the late 1960s by two sociologists, Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, grounded 
theory evolved along two slightly different paths (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 9). For 
this project, I used that version of the method developed by Strauss and Corbin and 
first published in 1990, for reasons that I outline below. 
 
The basic principle of grounded theory is that the researcher derives insights from 
the data rather than imposing preconceived theory upon the data. Theory thus 
derived, it is claimed, ‗is more likely to resemble the ―reality‖ [of the situation being 
researched] than is theory derived by putting together a series of concepts based on 
experience or solely through speculation‘ (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 12). 
Characteristic of the method is its rigorous and orderly approach (Glaser 1978, 2) 
that includes all the steps from data collection to the finished writing (ibid, 15). As a 
way of thinking about the world, it takes seriously what narrators have to say about 
that world (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 6).  
  
Glaser emphasises the methodical, highly-structured and highly scienticised 
(Thomas and James 2006, 770) nature of the process, insisting that none of the steps 
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from data collection through many layers of coding9 and analysis to final writing 
may be skipped, with a warning that skipped steps will produce flaws in the final 
product (Glaser 1978, 16). Strauss and Corbin, however, state that grounded theory 
is both science and art, requiring one to be not only systematic but also creative 
(1998, 13)10. They emphasise the imaginative, fluid and flexible aspects of their 
approach (ibid, xi, 13), stating that they offer guidelines and suggested techniques 
rather than a set of inflexible commandments (ibid, 4), and acknowledge that many 
researchers will approach their work as a ‗smorgasbord [sic]‘ from which it is 
perfectly right and proper to pick and choose elements, sometimes blending 
techniques from elsewhere with the authors‘ own (ibid, 8-9). Since some of the 
central concerns of my own work are with fluidity and flexibility, Strauss and 
Corbin‘s iteration of grounded theory is more apposite for its development of 
researcher characteristics such as: suppleness and openness, an ability to sustain 
ambiguity and a willingness not to pin things down too soon (ibid, 6); an appetite for 
‗the interplay between [the researcher] and the data‘, drawing on one‘s own 
experiences as foundations for deriving insights (ibid, 5); scepticism in relation to 
existing theories and a desire to measure these against the data (ibid, 6); and a 
willingness to be shaped by, as much as to shape, the data (ibid, 42).  
                                                 
9 Coding is ‗the analytic process through which data are fractured, conceptualized, and integrated to 
form theory‘ (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 3). In my case, this involved marking up sections of interview 
text and assigning themed keywords or phrases to them. These themes arose out of my reading of the 
interview data, rather than being predetermined in advance of that reading. 
10 Interestingly, in Federico Chicchi‘s assessment (2000, 16), Corbin and Strauss‘s iteration of 
grounded theory is presented much more clearly and systematically than either the original work by 
Glaser and Strauss or by Glaser alone. 
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Grounded Theory Process 
Strauss and Corbin state that the essence of grounded theory is that concepts emerge 
from the data rather than being forced onto it (1998, 33-34), a process that requires 
sensitivity to the ‗aha moments‘ that result from the interplay of the data with the 
mind of the researcher (ibid, 47). This requires the researcher to take seriously what 
the narrator says (ibid, 6) and attempt an accurate representation of the narrator‘s 
voice (ibid, 43), acknowledging that, while the account one has been given is neither 
full nor final (ibid, 18), ‗the data do not lie‘ (ibid, 45); approached openly and 
sensitively, stories will tell us something new and something true about the way 
lives are lived. The bulk of the analysis derives first and foremost from the data, with 
recourse to the literature being made only when the coding summons the researcher 
there (ibid, 44). The literature is a two-edged sword; familiarity with one‘s discipline 
enhances one‘s sensitivity to the data but can also block creativity and, given that 
concepts arise from the data, one cannot know in advance what literature will be 
most valid (ibid, 49). It is this process that I applied to the analysis of interview texts, 
discussed below, knowing however that aspects of it are open to critique. 
 
Grounded Theory Critique 
Thomas and James (2006; see also Allan 2003; Charmaz 2005) offer a sustained 
critique of the underlying premises of grounded theory, which they assert is built 
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upon positivist assumptions that there is objective ‗truth‘ that can somehow be 
distilled from data by the application of a highly structured method (ibid, 780). 
Objectivity is of course impossible to achieve since whatever analysis is applied, that 
analysis derives from the prior assumptions, knowledge and experiences of the 
researcher (ibid, 782-783). There is no ground, no hidden truth ‗residing somewhere 
in the data‘ waiting to be discovered (ibid, 782), nor is there any universalisable 
theory to be extracted, only the interpretation of the particulars (ibid, 779-781). 
Indeed, it is ‗objectionable‘ to assert that narratives need to be turned into theories 
in order for them to become legitimately knowledge (ibid, 778). I take Charmaz‘s 
point (2005, 508), however, that grounded theory‘s positivist roots do not preclude it 
from being a valid method of addressing data, provided one heeds the challenges to 
positivist objectivity offered by qualitative research‘s social constructivist concerns 
with the so-called ‗crisis of representation‘.  
 
Crisis of Representation 
Butler asserts that none of us can give a coherent account of ourselves (2005, 53) not 
just in relation to gender, but in everything, as I will discuss in detail in Chapter 5. 
This does not preclude narration, however—we still tell our stories, despite the fact 
that our accounts have no ultimate coherence—but it does ‗produc[e] it ―in a 
fictional direction‖‘ (ibid, 37), making for this crisis of representation (Denzin and 
102 
Lincoln 2005, 18-19) that reduces the presence of the unreliable narrator and 
expands the presence of the equally-unreliable researcher11 (Riessman 1993, 15).  
However, since I am finite and flawed this cannot be otherwise (Etherington 2004, 
85); I cannot give a perfect representation of another human being, any more than I 
can perfectly represent GOD/DE, but neither do I thus make idols of my narrators, 




It is, of course, erroneous to claim that my theologising is of narrators‘ experiences 
themselves, when what in fact I theologise is a text produced by my, as opposed to 
anyone else‘s, transcription of a digital sound recording of an interview. This text is 
at least two steps removed from the actual process that took place between the 
narrator and me and, what is more, obtained from a narrator upon whose story I 
cannot rely for any authenticity, whose narration is shaped by per own positionality, 
by the information I give per in advance and by the form of the invitation to speak 
that I issue at the interview, among many other factors. None of this, however—the 
unreliable narrator, my influence on the outcome, the fictive nature of the final text, 
                                                 
11 McAdams notes, for example, that the affective dimensions of experience are not visible in 
representations. Intrinsic to the process of attentive listening to others is the development of genuine, 
albeit limited, emotional intimacy (1993, 252). I am aware that my differing emotional connections to 
narrators make themselves known in the process of writing up. However much I might seek ethically 
to represent my narrator, ‗affording each a right to speak her own truth, in her own words‘ (Frank 
1995, xiii), using the resources of empathy and respect, ‗more will be pursued than was volunteered, 
and less will be reported than was learned‘ (Stake 2005, 456). 
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the unfathomable gulf that separates what was originally experienced from what I 
have finally excerpted onto the page—invalidates my claim that individual 
experiences are legitimate texts upon which to base theologising.  
 
A poem based on the work of Meister Eckhart offers this interpretation of Eckhart‘s 
words: ‗All beings are words of God… / Sacred books are we, for the infinite camps 
in our souls / Every act reveals God and expands His being‘ (Ladinsky 2002, 112). 
This reflection on human beings as both words from GOD/DE—creatures spoken 
into being by an act of Divine creation—and books about GOD/DE—creatures 
whose every act tells us more of the nature of the Divine creator—is at the heart of 
my proposal that each individual has something different to tell of imago Dei. The 
notion that every act reveals GOD/DE, not just the good or the beautiful or the 
intelligible, is central to what this thesis seeks to convey. By collecting stories and 
analysing their themes as speaking of Divine presence, I seek to make known 
something of each narrator‘s existence as a word of GOD/DE and a book about 
GOD/DE, regardless of how utterly unreliable we are as ÆR creatures. 
 
A Grounded Theology Approach  
As stated above, this is not the first work of theology to combine ethnographic and 
theological methods. However, my approach differs from Salomonsen‘s Enchanted 
Feminism in that, while person uses interview data to analyse the existing 
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theological stance(s) of a faith group, I regard my narrators‘ stories as texts for my 
own theologising. What I theologise around is not, in the end, a narrator‘s model of 
GOD/DE, but rather the narrator perself as in some way demonstrative of imago 
Dei. This is a foundational difference in the process I undertake, a process I term 
‗Grounded Theology‘.  
 
Fundamental to Grounded Theology is my deployment of listening or, analogously 
to Quaker spiritual practice, ‗silent waiting‘, not only in the interview situation but 
also at the analysis stage, discussed below. As a theologian, it is impossible for me to 
separate my spiritual life from my academic work; there is that of GOD/DE in every 
thing as well as in every one (cf Sexson 1992, 7). And since much of my spiritual 
experience is in silent Quaker worship, silent waiting is my primary mode of address 
when faced with non-coherent data of whatever kind.  
 
In After Method (2004), sociologist John Law commends the Quaker practice of 
silent waiting as one of a number of valid methods for manifesting otherwise non-
coherent data (ibid, 147). Since life is messy, incoherent, inconsistent and impossible 
to universalise, we need to think about methods of enquiry that are ‗broader, looser 
and more generous‘ (ibid, 4), that acknowledge that there is no security in our data, 
no unified world of knowables (ibid, 9), that are slow and uncertain, risky and 
troubling (ibid, 10), quiet, vulnerable and modest (ibid, 11), and focused on process 
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not product, paying attention to how what we do crafts the realities of which we 
speak (ibid, 152). Silent waiting has these possibilities, asserts Law, to ‗reduce the 
dazzle of noise and make the kind of silence that will allow the faint signal 
of…spiritual mystery to be revealed, made audible, and amplified‘ (ibid, 118).  
 
Transgressive data—dreams, emotions, sensual experiences, prayerful attention—are 
as much part of the enquiry as ‗real‘ or ‗hard‘ data (St. Pierre 1997, 180; see also 
Etherington 2004, 111), though rarely recognised as such. But in theology, perhaps 
more than anywhere else, such data must be acknowledged. Schneider asserts that 
‗Theology that pretends a distance from prayer is fooling itself‘ (2008, 5), while Pete 
Rollins declares that theology should be ‗a place where God speaks‘ rather than ‗that 
which speaks of God‘ (2006, xiii). Of course, to claim my theology as a place where 
GOD/DE speaks may not demonstrate quite the quiet, modest vulnerability that Law 
commends above. Nevertheless, since attention to the still small voice of GOD/DE 
for ‗accidental epiphanies‘ and ‗spirited accidents‘ (Poulos 2009, 50) to guide my 
efforts is fundamental to my self-understanding as a spiritual person and as a 
theologian, I cannot but hope that this is indeed what this Grounded Theology 
exhibits, not with any security that what I perceive demonstrates ‗truth‘ or ‗reality‘, 
but as a risky endeavour that offers the ‗grown-up regard‘ of being ‗fully present to 
the bodies of others…[that] shatters illusions and static categories‘ (Schneider 2008, 
205) with regard both to my narrators and to GOD/DE. 
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Simone Weil and Attention 
Negative Theology and Attention 
The silent waiting of Quaker practice and the slow, quiet, modest, risky, vulnerable 
methods Law commends have much in common with a concept Weil calls 
‗attention‘, which forms the ‗other half‘, as it were, of the practice of decreation 
discussed in Chapter 1. Like decreation, attention is shaped by Weil‘s negative 
theology, addressed to the GOD/DE who may or may not answer:  
God exists. God does not exist. Where is the problem? I am quite sure 
that there is a God in the sense that I am sure my love is not illusory. I 
am quite sure that there is not a God in the sense that I am quite sure 
nothing real can be anything like what I am able to conceive when I 
pronounce this word. But that which I cannot conceive is not an 
illusion (Weil 2002 [1952], 114). 
  
Although ‗God can only be present in the world in the form of absence‘ (ibid, 109), 
this absence does not preclude a relationship of some sort between the Divine and 
the human, for every human being contains that of GOD/DE, which expresses itself 
as not only a longing for good but also a belief that this good will come to pass: 
At the bottom of the heart of every human being, from the earliest 
infancy to the tomb, there is something that goes on indomitably 
expecting, in the teeth of all experience of crimes committed, suffered 
and witnessed, that good and not evil will be done to him. It is this 
above all that is sacred in every human being (1989, 273-274). 
 
Weil is insistent that nothing in the created world exhibits the goodness person 
means when person talks of ‗the good‘: ‗The good seems to us as nothingness, since 
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there is no thing that is good‘ (2002 [1952], 13). But the fact that the good barely 
exists in the World does not mean that it is unreal, any more than our experience of 
GOD/DE‘s absence denies the reality of GOD/DE. Indeed, compared with the good, 
it is existence itself that is unreal: GOD/DE is the only reality and the apprehension 
of the good comes through the descent of GOD/DE‘s grace into the World of Gravity 
through kenotic attention.  
 
Attention Defined 
Attention has a specific meaning in Weil‘s thought. Person sees attention, 
specifically the attention we focus on the good, as ‗the only spiritual resource human 
beings ultimately could be said to possess‘ (Cosgrove 2008, 363). ‗Absolute unmixed 
attention is prayer‘ (Weil 2002 [1952], 117); by turning our absolute unmixed 
attention to the good, gradually the soul becomes good ‗in spite of itself‘ (ibid), but 
only on condition that we learn to ‗desire without an object‘ (ibid, 22). The good 
only works in the soul when we turn our attention to GOD/DE without hope of a 
result. Attention is thus a process without guarantee of a product, a process that is 
‗intense, pure, disinterested, gratuitous [and] generous‘ (1989, 285), that allows us to 
turn our desire from ‗the lesser good‘12 of the World to the higher good that is ‗pure, 
                                                 
12 Evil exists, says Weil, because of the workings of necessity (Frost and Bell-Metereau 1998, 95): it 
does us no good, and it is pointless to expect the absent God to intervene in its amelioration (Nye 
1994, 95). As for natural good, however, Weil can see no logical reason why that should exist. Evil, 
person says ‗is apparent‘, its sources are obvious to all (2002 [1952], 70). The sources of good, 
however, are by no means apparent: rather, they are a total mystery (ibid). Person therefore 
concludes that we have a choice not between natural good and natural evil, but only between natural 
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perfect total and absolute‘ (Weil in Wolfteich 2001, 369). Focused on GOD/DE 
alone, attention mitigates the action of evil in the World (Howe 2008, 49).  
 
Weil constantly juxtaposes attentive looking and consumptive eating, insisting on 
the radical opposition of the one to the other. Attention is a pure act; to eat is to give 
in greedily to our desire for material satisfaction, whereas to look is to ‗renounce the 
self in favor of detachment‘ (Wolfteich 2001, 367). Eating, of necessity, destroys that 
which is eaten. Looking, however, leaves the looked-upon intact. Thus eating is an 
act of possession that closes down both eater and eaten, while looking opens the 
looker to the looked-upon, allowing the looked-upon to enter into the looker 
without being consumed. When we desire something in an attitude of selfless 
detachment, we necessarily desire that it continue to exist so that we may continue 
to contemplate it. Decreation is central to Weil‘s concept of attention: by selfless 
decreative attention to another we create or invoke or, even, become a space, 
through which we apprehend, by GOD/DE‘s grace, the good that will mitigate, bit 
by bit, the evil in our souls and, though us, in the World. And the act of directing 
one‘s attention to something beyond oneself is inherently self-renunciatory and 
contains within in it an echo of GOD/DE‘s withdrawal from creation (2008, 50). 
                                                                                                                                               
evil and supernatural good (Frost and Bell-Metereau 1998, 93), a simple choice either to pay attention 
or not, in the hope but not the expectation that GOD/DE will send ÆR grace into the World. The 
work of attention is the work of (re)establishing the harmony and order ‗that are the trace of divinity 
in natural life‘ (Nye 1994, 105). Thus goodness is not something one is but something one does to 
establish a presence that is capable of responding to the cry for justice of the afflicted. In desiring 
good without hope of success, good is inevitably generated, since our desire for it is unconditional, 
devoid of self or will (McLellan 1991, 230).  
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Attention and decreation form a virtuous circle, each one both requiring and 
generating the other. 
 
The Ethics of Attention 
Weil sates: ‗I have to deprive all that I call ―I‖ of the light of my attention and turn it 
on that which cannot be conceived‘ (2002 [1952], 118). As discussed in Chapter 1, 
however, person is not turning from the World and its afflicted multitudes, since all 
Weil‘s theorising is from their point of view (Frost and Bell-Metereau 1998, 3).  
Every time there arises from the depth of a human heart the childish 
cry which Christ himself could not restrain, ‗Why am I being hurt?‘, 
then there is certainly injustice (Weil 1989, 274). 
 
It is because of this injustice that person directs all per attention to GOD/DE and the 
good.  
 
Not only does Weil always have the afflicted in mind, but also person conceives of 
their affliction as directly resulting from a failure of right attention through illusion 
and delusion (Frost and Bell-Metereau 1998, 57). Thus, to attend to GOD/DE is to 
attend to the suffering world. The self is mutual, needing to respond to the needs of 
others (Nye 1994, 124). And more than needing, having an absolute obligation to 
respect and attend to others, to provide ‗what it is that makes us human‘ wherever 
we see it lacking (Skrimshire 2006, 292). It is only through understanding our 
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obligations to others, rather than through outlining the rights13 accruing to 
ourselves, that any adequate political ideology can be formed (Frost and Bell-
Metereau 1998, 69). A just society formed through an understanding of obligations 
involves a renunciation of dominological power-over in favour of the duty always to 
respond to a cry of affliction (Nye 1994, 109). It is this obligation that is the answer 
to that of GOD/DE which is expressed ‗at the bottom of the heart of every human 
being‘ as a permanent expectation of good despite all experiences to the contrary 
(ibid, 112). If every human heart expects the good, then every other human heart is 
obliged to supply that good by ‗consenting to become a sort of conductor through 
which the love of God [can] pass‘ (McLellan 1991, 201).  
 
Idolatry as Lack of Attention 
Weil is concerned that we should not mistake means for ends and ascribe Divinity 
to the things of the World, allowing Gravity to pull the Divine down to the level of 
matter, instead of rising up to GOD/DE. Naming the Divine, the metaphors we use 
for GOD/DE, must be carefully considered, lest we set up ‗something imaginary 
under the name of God‘. Weil‘s fear of idolatry derives from and drives per concern 
with the dangers of collective thinking, the Great Beast that I discuss in Chapter 4. 
‗Man‘, person asserts, ‗always devotes himself to an order‘, a systematised, collective 
                                                 
13 Weil writes that the concept of rights ‗has a commercial flavour‘ since it is linked to notions of 
measured quantities and exchange (1989, 279): ‗thanks to this word, what should have been a cry of 
protest from the depth of the heart has turned into a shrill nagging of claims and counter-claims, 
claiming an equal share of privilege for everybody–an equal share of things whose essence is 
privilege‘ (ibid, 280). 
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body of thought that centres on the human being, drawing our perspective away 
from GOD/DE and down into matter (ibid, 61). The only way out of this prison is 
through decreation both personal and social, and then through a (re)invention of the 
language of social institutions ‗for the purpose of exposing and abolishing everything 
in contemporary life which buries the soul under injustice, lies and ugliness‘ (ibid, 
288).  
 
Because we desire GOD/DE but lack patience, we create ersatz gods of the things of 
Gravity (2002 [1952], 60). Idolatry is lack of attention and lack of attention causes 
indifference to the affliction of others in favour of our own collectivities, from 
where it is only a short step to mass brutality14 (Nye 1994, 94, 123). Idolatrous 
language is language centred in the self, its fears and its desires, with everything 
beyond the self reduced to objects in its service. It is the antithesis of what Weil 
intends for the attentive soul, the soul who turns from the ties of their community 
and collectivity to embrace a life with ties to no-one but GOD/DE, the soul for 
whom ‗loving anything less than the universe as a whole is…idolatry‘ (Cosgrove 
2008, 365). 
 
                                                 
14 Weil is highly critical of the Church in this respect, seeing it as worshipping its own systems and 
institutions (Ruhr 2010, 59), taking what should be mysteries and turning them into dogmas 
(McLellan 1991, 193). In so doing, the Church becomes an institution subject not to the good but to 
the laws of necessity, that arbitrary and blind mechanism of the World that ‗continually tosses men 
about‘ (Weil 2009 [1951], 73), and thus complicit in evil (Nye 1994, 94).  
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Attention as Method of Enquiry 
Attention is not simply a spiritual practice of reaching out to GOD/DE. It is, for 
Weil, a research method that allows per to encounter the nature of a problem in an 
unforced and open way: person writes, for example, ‗Method for understanding 
images, symbols, etc. Not to try to interpret them but to look at them until the light 
suddenly dawns‘ (2002 [1952], 120). Attention is a process that does not require a 
product, therefore it does not matter if the light does not dawn, since ‗Never in any 
case whatever is a genuine effort of the attention wasted [since]…. Without our 
knowing or feeling it, this apparently barren effort has brought more light into the 
soul‘ (2009 [1951], 58). Towards whatever the Weilian attention is directed, the 
possibility of drawing down the good into the World ‗little by little‘ is inevitable 
(2002 [1952], 117). Thus, attention to the study of science, for example, is not only 
an intellectual pursuit, but also a spiritual one. This act of silent waiting draws 
together what dominology sees as the disparate strands of mind and spirit in an 
embodied practice of attention both to GOD/DE and to the World.  
 
Similarities Between Attention and Grounded Theory 
In several respects Weil‘s application of attention to intellectual endeavour resonates 
with grounded theory. Like the grounded theorist, Weil approaches per objects of 
enquiry with an open mind, beginning with no ‗intellectual adherence‘ or 
preconceptions to ‗anything whatsoever‘ (McLellan 1991, 228). In a state of focused 
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detachment, in silence and in unexpectant waiting, ‗suspending thought…, making 
it available, empty…, not searching for anything‘ (Nye 1994, 61), ‗receptive to the 
object, rather than grasping and desiring‘ (Ryan 2005, 354) person creates a space for 
‗words or forms‘ to develop not according to per own desire but as inspiration from 
elsewhere (Howe 2008, 61-62). In this, Weil echoes many of the characteristics of 
the grounded theorist discussed above. In one very significant area, however, Weil 
differs: while grounded theory is directed towards the things of the World, such 
things are, to Weil, merely means to a greater end, contact with GOD/DE which 
draws the good into the world and creates justice and harmony, a ‗legacy that, in 
turn, enables others to deepen their connection with the divine‘ (Howe 2008, 49). 
Since theology is ultimately words about GOD/DE, Grounded Theology is the 
application of Weilian attention to the process of grounded theoretical enquiry as an 
act of attentive ethical listening.  
 
Grounded Theology: An Ethics of Listening 
Ethics in Feminist Research 
Feminist research has as a paramount ethical concern the issue of how we as 
researchers exercise power over those whom we research. It is generally assumed 
with ethnographic research that the balance of power lies with the researcher (e.g. 
Ropers-Huilman 1999, 24; Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002, 159; Denzin and Lincoln 
2005, 1). If I were using my data ethnographically, a range of ethical issues would, 
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therefore require to be addressed. While I have paid due attention to issues relating 
to power and ethics, in for example, the exercise of researcher reflexivity (e.g. 
Harding 1987, 9; Ropers-Huilman 1999, 29; Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002, 156; 
Etherington 2004; Richardson and St. Pierre 2005, 962; Ortlipp 2008, 695), since this 
study is not ethnographic but rather theological, a detailed discussion of those issues 
is not germane here. Consideration of the ethical issue of reciprocity has, however, 




Anne Oakley (1981) asserts that the classic non-interventionist dominological 
relationship between researcher and researched is depersonalising to both 
interviewer and interviewee (ibid, 37) to the point of being ‗morally indefensible‘ 
(ibid, 41). It is thus imperative to consider issues of reciprocity in relation to 
concerns with the balance of power. Early feminist assumptions were that an 
encounter that is conducted more as a ‗conversation between equals than as a 
hierarchical interview in which the interviewer holds all the power‘ (Etherington 
2004, 39: see also DeVault 2002) would serve to minimise differences in status and 
create a climate in which intimate sharing by the researched was seen as being 
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valued, honoured and reciprocated15 (Etherington 2004, 62). However, since Oakley, 
reciprocal strategies have been re-evaluated on the grounds that they can engender 
manipulation and ‗leading‘ of conversations by either party16 (Olesen 2005, 255).  
 
For this project I decided against conversational ‗joining in‘ as a way of 
demonstrating reciprocity, not only because I did not want to lead the conversation 
but rather follow it wherever the narrator chose to take it, but also because I saw no 
reason to make the conversation about me on any significant level during the time 
the narrator allotted to the interview. This does not mean that I did not share 
anything of my own life and experiences outside that space, or that I did not 
intervene verbally and non-verbally to reassure the narrator of my attention and to 
keep the narrative flowing, but rather that the space of the interview itself was 
wholly devoted to what the narrator wanted to say about perself. Positioning myself 
as a minimally interventionist and deeply attentive listener more than an active 
questioner is highly significant in the process of Grounded Theology. Silently 
waiting on a narrator in this way creates not only ‗a space in which anything can be 
heard‘ from the narrator but also a space in which GOD/DE ÆRSELF might hear 
and be heard, ‗a space for God to attend to the people‘ (Muers 2004, 149). 
                                                 
15 Often, assessment of reciprocity is accompanied by essentialist claims that women are by nature 
conversationalists and thus better at cooperatively ‗constructing meaning together‘ (DeVault 2002, 
94). bel hooks, however, contests the idea that women speakers automatically treat each other with 
seriousness and respect, asserting that white women do not listen to Black women in this way (ibid, 
90). 
16 Some commentators still commend the practice of leading as justifiable if it gets good results 
(Holstein and Gubrium 2000, 128-132). 
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Furthermore, giving up the power to speak in favour of accepting the role of listener 
can stand as an overt renunciation of power (ibid, 161). 
 
Listening 
As Holstein and Gubrium note (2000, 130), absolute silence in an interview is more 
likely than not to bring an interaction to an end17. However, the act of paying 
Weilian attention through focussed listening, in which the listener is intent only on 
the narrator perself and not also on the need to contribute to a conversation, ‗can be 
a powerful sign of regard—and caring—for one another‘ (Ropers-Huilman 1999, 31). 
This is especially so if the interviewer begins with a ‗not-knowing attitude‘ 
(Etherington 2004, 21), as I did, asking the narrator to tell me what person thought I 
needed to know rather than to answer questions that I needed to be answered, a 
process described in more detail below. This shift in relationship from interviewee 
and interviewer to narrator and listener (Chase 2005, 660) was an important one for 
me in terms of my understanding of how I controlled and gave up control of the 
process, although my narrators may have experienced this differently. My silence 
was, of course, action not non-action, as productive of consequences for the 
narration as conversational reciprocity (Rapley 2001, 305), no better than any other 
approach but, I believe, offering some rebalancing of power in giving the narrator 
                                                 
17 This is true unless, I contend, both parties are familiar with silence. One of my narrators was a 
Quaker and well practised in silent waiting; some of our mutual silences lasted for tens of seconds 
without closing down our interaction. 
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almost total control over the content of their story within the parameters that my 
interview invitation had set.  
 
Giving attention to a narrator does not require joining in to exhibit reciprocity; 
listening is always a mutual act of seeing and being seen (Jones 2004, 190). As an 
attentive listener, in addition to intense, pure, disinterested generosity of attention, I 
offered narrators a hearing that was mild, modest, moderate, available, vulnerable, 
welcoming, patient, tolerant, receptive, attentive and respectful (Muers 2004, 56-57; 
cf McAdams 1993, 251; Salomonsen 2002, 18), that ‗allow[ed] unexpected or 
unexplored possibilities to emerge‘ for both of us (Muers 2004, 59). This was the 
very opposite of the objectionable non-interventionist interview situation that 
Oakley describes, because I expressed wordless but fully engaged reciprocity, a 
‗faithful‘ attending (ibid, 17)—both faithful to the narrator‘s intentions and full of 
faith in the still small voice to guide the process—and a care not to let this become 
just another technique to control the narrator or a way to avoid responsibility for 
dialogue (ibid, 62). I contend that a strategy of active listening of this kind acted as a 
Weilian decreative counterbalance in what Rachel Muers designates as a culture of 
communication that sees speaking as power and listening as weakness (ibid, 56).  
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Characteristics of Grounded Theology 
In terms of qualitative research methods, Grounded Theology is a transgressive 
approach, one that is at the same time a method of enquiry and a spiritual practice. 
Weil‘s description of intense, pure, disinterested, gratuitous and generous attention, 
echoed in Law and Muers, above, is the heart of Grounded Theology‘s faithful, 
prayerful approach. Accidental epiphanies and ‗aha‘ moments come from the 
renunciation of control that attentive listening requires, in which the narrator and 
the subsequent data do what they do regardless of the researcher‘s wishes; it is thus 
the very opposite of positivist in its Weilian decreative desire without an object, a 
listened-to who is not consumed by the listener. 
 
Grounded Theology honours the turning of theology upside down by prioritising all 
embodiments and experiences, both unintelligible and intelligible, both quotidian 
and numinous, according the utmost importance to what the narrator says as the 
only resource from which to begin; other resources complement or expand upon the 
story but never dictate its form. While Young contends, above, that the collectivity 
of Women‘s experience always takes priority over individual experience, Grounded 
Theology asserts that attention to the individual counterbalances the possibility that 
Women‘s collective experience has become an unchallenged idol.  
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Grounded Theology approaches research as far as possible without preconceptions, 
seeking insight from the data rather than imposing potentially idolatrous theories 
upon the data, paying attention to the person who is, as it turns out, as unknowable 
as GOD/DE. The crisis of representation itself stands against idolatry, for if I know 
that my narrator is ultimately unrepresentable, I am less likely to attempt to make 
per into a thing. As Weil acknowledges that GOD/DE both exists and does not, so 
does Grounded Theology for people: I am quite sure that there is a narrator whose 
story I hear, but I am equally sure that there is no narrator that I can represent as 
anything like the person I meet.  
 
Furthermore, in honouring narrators as words from GOD/DE and books about 
GOD/DE, I simultaneously assert that they are not idolatrous models of GOD/DE, 
even though they are imago Dei. While grounded theory is focused on the things of 
the World, the end point of Grounded Theology is attention to GOD/DE; 
theologising around human experiences is always a means to that end, the end of 
drawing down GOD/DE‘s good into the World and mitigating the blind workings of 
necessity that continually toss us about. The attention that Grounded Theology pays 
is to GOD/DE and for the World, for justice for the unintelligible; thus, attention to 
the One is attention to the other. In Grounded Theology that attention is given in 
the form of the interview, analysis and theologised account, a process I now describe 
in greater detail.  
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Applying Grounded Theology: Interviews 
Interviews as Unreliable Sources 
The use of interviews as a means of collecting data is not unproblematic. Although 
the first choice for data collection in the social sciences (e.g. Rapley 2001, 303-304; 
Holstein and Gubrium 2002, 112; Silverman 2007, 39) and feminist research (Chase 
2005, 652), based on an commonly-held assumption that interviewing is 
‗prospecting‘ for ‗true facts and feelings‘ (Holstein and Gubrium 2002, 114), some 
commentators (e.g. Atkinson and Delamont 2006; Silverman 2007) are highly 
critical of the prominence this method has achieved. Silverman (2007) cites a 
cultural obsession with personal interviews in what person calls the Interview 
Society (ibid, 43), which buys into a romanticised view of personal interviews as 
capable of giving access to people‘s authentic ‗deep interiors‘(ibid, 46). 
 
Contrary to the belief that narrators have pure, authentic experiences which are 
capable of being reported on to an audience (ibid, 126), Silverman points out that as 
narrators we consistently adopt interviewers‘ categories which we then use to adapt 
our narrations to suit an audience‘s requirements18 (ibid, 39-42; see also Rapley 2001, 
317). Furthermore, we fit our personal stories into wider social contexts, again 
                                                 
18 O‘Keefe notes that, because person is a trans woman, other trans people are ‗willing to speak more 
openly‘ to per than to a cis person (1999, 160). One of my narrators stated, not necessarily that person 
would have been any more frank, but certainly that person would have told a different story to a 
trans interviewer from the one person told me, not least because of shared experiences that would 
not need expressing to another trans person.  
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adopting and adapting to the dominant narrative of social groupings (Silverman 
2007, 126). It would thus be a mistake to believe that there is one distinct and 
individual narrator‘s point of view or perspective which can ground analysis (ibid, 
125-126); narrators tell what they believe is wanted, in the style that their 
communities‘ expectations and experiences dictate19.  
 
Silverman, however, tempers per repeated assertions that all narrators are perforce 
unreliable with the acknowledgement that this does not therefore render interview 
data unsatisfactory (ibid, 54). In addition, person notes that many qualitative 
researchers turn to the interview not in search of ‗deep interiors‘ but for the far 
more pragmatic reason that, when there are experiences about which we know little 
or nothing, we quite sensibly ask people who have had those experiences (ibid). It is 
in that spirit, rather than in any romantic search for my narrators‘ deep interiors, 
that I address this project.  
 
Impossibility of Neutrality 
One structuring aspect of the interview is the way in which, even though I aim to 
offer the broadest possible scope for narrators to control their own stories, my own 
categories impose themselves on the interaction from the start. As described below, I 
asked specifically for ‗stories‘, a category that immediately shapes a narrator‘s 
                                                 
19 Since all my narrators had undergone counselling or therapy of some sort, it is reasonable to assume 
that this experience, for example, imposed its own shapes upon their stories. 
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expectation of what type of telling is required. Furthermore I requested a specific 
kind of story, a ‗spiritual life story‘, emphasising one aspect of experience over all 
others. I also spoke of ‗journeys‘ as a structuring metaphor, as if some kind of 
progress from a start to a finish is a given, and ‗intersections‘ between gender and 
spiritual journeys, as if the two are necessarily separate experiences. And I declared 
my affiliations to ‗feminist theology‘, ‗gender deconstruction‘, and ‗Quakers‘, leading 
my narrators to perceive me in specific ways.  
 
The feminist label is potentially problematic because of antipathy engendered by 
anti-trans feminists, and the reference to gender deconstruction for its associations 
with the erasure of transsexual experience as noted in Chapter 1, but neither more 
so than links with faith and theology, given that very many trans people feel 
particularly badly served be religion in general because of the evident transphobia of 
many faith groups.20 And all had the potential to create expectations that I might 
respond to stories in particular, perhaps not necessarily sympathetic, ways21. 
Interviews are, then, by no means a ‗neutral conduit‘ (Holstein and Gubrium 2002, 
                                                 
20 Yip (2010, 35-6) and Browne (2010, 237) note the antipathy of LGBTQI folk to organised religion 
based on a ‗dominant view that organised religions lag behind the secular sphere in embracing sexual 
diversity as a social reality‘ (Yip 2010, 35). Browne (2010, 237) and O‘Keefe (1999, 3) contend, as do I, 
that this blanket antipathy is not necessarily justified, however. 
21 Indeed two of my narrators asked for reassurance that their frank sexual talk did not offend my 
spiritual sensibility, while another expressed concern that I might be aligned with transphobic 
church doctrines; within the bounds of my minimally interventionist style, I offered reassurance as 
best I could, hoping that an attentive, non-judgemental, non-threatening, affirmatory, vulnerable and 
empathetic demeanour (McAdams 1993, 251; see also Salomonsen 2002, 18) would serve to allay their 
concerns, as it seemed to do. My main tactic was to promise at the start of the interview that I would 
respond in detail to any questions once the narrator was certain person had finished telling per story 
to per own satisfaction. This seemed to work to our mutual satisfaction.  
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112) through which the unalloyed details of a life are given; as with any social 
encounter, the stuff of the story is jointly constructed between narrator and 
interviewer simply by virtue of an interview having been solicited in the first place. 
 
Data Collection Process 
My research strategy combined a qualitative research approach with more 
traditional text-based theological methods, using face-to-face interviews as the basis 
of my theologising project. Ethnography is concerned with seeing the remarkable in 
the mundane (Silverman 2007, 16), with truth telling (however vexed a concept that 
might be) and justice (Brown 1999, 352) and with the transformation of messy and 
unruly experience into something that speaks to the human condition (Wolf 1999, 
355); thus, an ethnographic approach to theological enquiry is, surprisingly, more 
suitable than might have been supposed. I begin, therefore, by outlining the 
practical steps taken to collect and analyse data, then discuss issues arising from this 
process. 
 
Starting in late 2004, I used a number of forums to circulate requests for 
interviewees: a flyer in a trans studies conference pack; posts on a number of 
communal blogs for trans/genderqueer interest groups; a poster at a trans-affirming 
church service; personal contacts; and posts to faith-specific email lists. The earliest 
versions of my request went into some detail about the project‘s background, in 10pt 
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type on one side of A4, citing my interest in theories of gender deconstruction and 
how these might fit in to a revisioning of feminist theology, and outlining my 
academic and spiritual backgrounds. As I progressed, however, I honed this down 
over a number of iterations to: 
You and God? 
I‘d love to hear your story. I‘m researching the spiritual life stories of 
transexed22 and transgendered people. I‘m a PhD student at 
Woodbrooke Quaker Study Centre (affiliated to the University of 
Birmingham). If you‘d like to participate in this project, please get in 
touch.  
 
I specifically orientated my requests towards people of faith not only because I was 
hoping to encounter trans models of GOD/DE but also because, being aware that 
many trans/genderqueer people have been very wounded by the transphobia of 
religious groups, I did not want to co-opt non-faith-based stories for purposes that 
may be inimical to their narrators.  
 
Responses came slowly, the first resulting in an interview in April 2005. Over the 
next 18 months I interviewed 11 people, two who self-identified as transmen, two as 
translesbians, one as a woman originally misassigned male, one as a transwoman23, 
three as male-to-female transsexuals, one as neither male nor female but having 
                                                 
22 Over the course of this project I learned that ‗transexed‘ and ‗transgendered‘ are not generally 
accepted terms, replacing them in my vocabulary with ‗transsexual‘ and ‗transgender‘.  
23 Although ‗transman‘ is a widely accepted terms, the concomitant ‗transwoman‘ was not as 
generally accepted as a nomenclature for male-to-female transsexuals among my narrators. 
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some [male] trans experience and one as a boy, but equivocally so. None identified 
as genderqueer.  
 
I undertook unstructured interviews, having no list of questions or topics that I 
wished to cover but rather a single invitation to ‗tell me what you think I need to 
know about your story‘. In a pre-interview emails and blog entries, I explained a 
little of what we would be doing in the session, reiterating some of the detail from 
the flyers and adding that I was hoping that ‗you tell your story in the way that 
seems most natural to you‘ and that, though I was most interested in the 
intersections between gender and spiritual journeys, to the good and to the bad, ‗I 
leave it up to you to decide what and how to tell‘.  
 
I conducted nine interviews in narrators‘ houses, one in my car and one in a public 
garden, all locations chosen by the narrators. Four people fed me afterwards and one 
put me up for the weekend. The shortest interview lasted an hour, the longest 
almost five hours, with most being around two-and-a-half hours. All interviews 
were recorded and transcribed in full, since I did not want to make any decisions 
prior to the analysis about what might or might not be relevant to my enquiry. 
Transcription was thus a lengthy process, as was the subsequent analysis.  
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Following the practices of Grounded Theology, discussed above, I did not approach 
the data with any predetermined set of categories that I hoped to find but followed 
themes that presented themselves to me over the course of five or six passes through 
each interview transcript, each pass taking a considerable amount of time to 
complete, sometimes many weeks. The richness of the data shifted around in my 
waking and sleeping thoughts for up to a year, as I gave Weilian attention to each 
story. Three of the eleven interviews comprise the core of this thesis24, the rest 
forming the foundation of my understanding of transness that is supported by the 
study of printed and audiovisual material outlined above 
 
Once a theme or group of themes rose to prominence above all others in a story, I 
then conducted an extensive literature search for material to analyse, illustrate and 
theologise the theme, not limiting my searches to any specific discipline. Thus, I 
have drawn not only from feminist and mainstream theologies and philosophies and 
gender studies, but also from areas as diverse as Renaissance studies, medicine, 
English literature, pedagogic research, history, communications theory, mythology, 
social sciences, cultural studies, physics, psychology, philology and mathematics. 
 
                                                 
24 The three analysed interviews were chosen not least because each narrator was assigned l-female at 
birth, placing them in the broad category of transmen, an area of experience that is underrepresented 
in the literature of transness. 
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Applying Grounded Theology: After the Interviews 
Transcription 
Decisions about transcription25, as any other part of the process, have ethical 
implications. What to transcribe, in how much detail, and how to arrange the words 
of the page, are not neutral choices but affect how a subsequent reader will address 
the data (Riessman 1993, 12). Any transcription, no matter how detailed, is 
necessarily ‗incomplete, partial and selective‘ (ibid, 11). It is advised, therefore, to 
adopt a practice that preserves ‗some of the ―messiness‖ of everyday talk‘ (DeVault 
2002, 103) in order that the ‗authenticity‘ of the originating voice26 may have some 
presence on the page.  
 
Attentive listening was as essential a component in transcription as it was in the 
interview, as I tried, however inaccurately, faithfully to render what I heard of each 
narrator‘s story. I made a full transcription, which is to say that, through repeated 
listening, I recorded every verbal and phatic utterance, both the narrator‘s and my 
                                                 
25 I did not offer my narrators the opportunity to participate after the interviews, asking at the 
beginning of the session that they consent to the fact that any interpretation of their words would be 
mine alone and agree that they would have no editorial or veto rights over any work I produced. All 
agreed to this without question. However, on the issue of informed consent, I accept the view that 
this is a highly problematic concept, such that ‗fully informed consent‘ is probably never possible 
(Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002, 158; Olesen 2005, 254) and thus neither is adequately ethical 
research (Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002, 158). In the case of this project, since I had little idea of 
where data analysis would take me, any notion of fully informed consent is confirmed as impossible. I 
have, however, pursued this enquiry ‗alert to the interests of [my] participants‘ (ibid) and hold myself 
accountable to the moral obligation I have to our ‗disclosing and protective covenant‘ (Stake 2005, 
459). 
26 This is problematic advice since it supports a romanticised view of the narrator as having a ‗deep 
interior‘ (Silverman 2007, 46) that is authentically representable. 
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own. I adopted a stanza format (Chafe 1980; see also Etherington 2004, 116), 
inserting line breaks to represent natural interruptions and hesitations in speech, to 
break up ‗what might seem a dense format that might otherwise be less accessible‘ 
(Etherington 2004, 56). The results of this process are visible in Appendices 1-3.  
 
Analysis 
It is on the analysis of data that the substance of the thesis hangs, and here also that 
the exercise of researcher power is arguably most marked (DeVault 2002, 93; 
Silverman 2007, 54). In the analysis I decided what my narrators meant to me, both 
how to theologise around their stories in a way that represents that of GOD/DE for 
me, and how to represent their voices in a way that brings some of the person I 
encountered to the reader, all the time acknowledging the impossibility of either 
task. Analysis involves ‗listening to the texts, in silent contemplation, in a way that 
takes them ―beyond‖ themselves‘ (Muers 2004, 17), beyond what the narrator tells of 
per life and into what per life tells of GOD/DE, into ‗aha‘ moments and accidental 
epiphanies.  
 
In giving voice to the narrator, the researcher recognises a responsibility not only to 
the one who told the story but also to the ones to whom that story is relayed 
(Riessman 1993, 10-11) and to the story the researcher has to tell; these competing 
demands necessitate a constant negotiation of choices. With every good intention, 
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control is exercised over the data the audience sees; the power of giving voice is 
always ultimately with the researcher27 (ibid, 16). What I offer then is never a 
representation of the narrator but always an interpretation (ibid, 8), and I recognise 
that these interpretations may be ‗simultaneously considered positive and negative 
by those who hold a stake in them‘ (Ropers-Huilman 1999, 26).  
 
One common practice of ethnographic work is that of generalising based on the 
identification of typical themes across a number of cases. However, some 
commentators (Chase 2005, 667; e.g. Stake 2005, 451-452; Silverman 2007, 23) assert 
that atypicality, what Penketh calls ‗breach and exception‘ (2011, 29), are as 
informative as the converse, and that generalisation draws attention away from 
‗features important for understanding the case itself‘ (Stake 2005, 448). Since my 
intention was to approach each narrative as a specific case of imago Dei, I did not 
therefore set out, in the analysis, to look for general themes across narratives but 
rather distinct themes within each story (Chase 2005, 663). Even themes that appear 
to be general to all three stories, such as Thinness, are therefore addressed as to their 
specifics within a single narrative. 
 
                                                 
27 Another issue connecting with researcher power is the degree to which I might have offered 
narrators control over data analysis. The desire to do research ‗with‘ rather than ‗on‘ participants is a 
paramount feminist ethical concern (e.g. Pillow 2003, 179; Christians 2005, 151; Ortlipp 2008, 701), 
an essential element in ‗giving voice‘ by ensuring participants contribute to ‗how they are presented, 
quoted, and interpreted‘ (Stake 2005, 459). However, this kind of participative practice, while 
appearing to give control over representation back to the researched, is not without problems, a full 
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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Pen Portraits 
Nowhere is it more apparent that the researcher has ultimate control over the visible 
shape of the narrator‘s story than in the reporting of research. Every decision I made 
resulted in saving or losing aspects of the story (DeVault 2002, 99). That being the 
case, I present extensive excerpts in a style Hollway and Jefferson call ‗pen portraits‘ 
(2000, 70), in order to ‗make the person come alive for the reader‘28 (ibid). These 
contain material descriptive of the narrator, sufficient to serve as a substitute ‗whole‘ 
for a reader who will not have access to the raw data29 (ibid). In providing details 
that exceed the analysis I subject them to, I hope to create a space for different 
readers to read differently, holding the texts open for ‗further acts of hearing‘ (Muers 
2004, 20; see also Riessman 1993, 14), as a way of preserving the listened-to from 
being consumed by my listening. 
 
Moreover, in order to expand readers‘ access to the text beyond these pen portraits, I 
have included an appendix for each narrator, giving not the whole of the interview 
transcription but the verbatim quote in its context, with line numbers to guide the 
reader from the excerpt in the main text to the verbatim section in the relevant 
appendix. This combination of resources will, I trust, enable multiple readings and 
                                                 
28 Again, I acknowledge the romanticism implicit in Hollway and Jefferson‘s assertion that a narrator 
might be presented so completely as to come alive for a reader. 
29 Riessman advises that narrative fractures that disrupt the order and flow of the original should be 
avoided, since both are germane to the analysis (1993, 4). I have adhered to this where practical but, 
of necessity, have moved some material around for my own purposes. The original ordering of 
utterances is preserved in the Appendices. 
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interpretations of the text beyond what I present. The appendices are particularly 
important since I have decided, for the sake of readability, to ‗polish‘ the quotes in 
the body of the text30. This polishing is sometimes more like paraphrasing, since 
some of the original extracts are extremely long and discursive. I hope, in this, that I 
have not done too much violence to the narrators‘ unique speaking styles and have 
retained the spirit, if not the letter, of their utterances. Ultimately, I contend, it 
matters more that each of these stories is told in some detail in an accessible way 
than that an inevitably unsustainable claim to accurate representation of speech is 
asserted. 
 
To account for responsibilities to minimise the possibility of harm to my narrators I 
have adopted the standard practice of anonymisation. Thus, all names have been 
changed, both those of the narrators themselves and those of any other characters in 
their stories. However, a simple change of name is not always sufficient to maintain 
anonymity, especially for people the circumstances of whose lives render them more 
than usually visible. I have, therefore, substantially fictionalised all biographical 
details that do not relate directly to gender while maintaining the spirit of the 
narrator such that person might recognise perself, but hopefully not even close 
friends and relatives would recognise per. Given Butler‘s assertion that narratives are 
                                                 
30 DeVault notes that text polishing in this way, although it makes the data easier and more 
compelling to read (2002, 101), nevertheless imposes restrictions on the text. However, person 
advises that dialect, non-standard grammar and vocal tics, etc, be included only where they 
important to the narrative. This is the practice I have followed in polishing excerpts. 
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always produced in a fictional direction, this additional fictionalisation does not, I 
assert, impinge upon the reliability of the portraits I tender in the three chapters 
that result from my Grounded Theological enquiry.  
 
Summary 
Because the truth of GOD/DE is impossible to know, Grounded Theology can make 
no claim to the verifiability, reliability or generalisability that qualitative methods 
would hope to claim. Grounded Theology, in offering a contribution to embarrassing 
babblings that might turn theology upside down, is thus a risky exposure. I can say 
nothing true of GOD/DE and yet I must speak; apophasis, the saying-away of all 
metaphors for GOD/DE, is nothing without kataphasis, the saying of things that can 
then be unsaid. A primary claim of thea/ologies is to assert that the right to 
kataphatic creation belongs to anyone, regardless of gender.  
 
In 1652, George Fox addressed a church congregation thus:  
Then what had any to do with the Scriptures, but as they came to the 
Spirit that gave them forth. You will say, Christ saith this, and the 
apostles say this; but what canst thou say? Art thou a child of Light 
and hast walked in the light, and what thou speakest is it inwardly 
from God? (Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends 
(Quakers) in Britain 1995, 19.07) 
 
Grounded Theology, in approaching research prayerfully, waiting silently upon data 
for the Spirit to move through them, attempts to speak what comes inwardly from 
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GOD/DE, and thus to be a theology in which GOD/DE speaks, as Rollins commends. 
It also takes individual embodiments and experiences seriously as loci of the Holy in 
all their quotidian glory and imperfection. By paying attention to bodies thus, 
Grounded Theology seeks to draw down the good into the World. In the next 
chapter, I offer my first response to Fox‘s challenge ‗what canst thou say?‘ in my 
discussion of the quotidian experiences of Leigh, a young transperson intent on 











This chapter addresses Leigh‘s story, starting with an extended pen portrait that 
details key facets of per gender and spiritual experiences. My analysis begins with a 
consideration of themes of seeing and being seen, and proceeds to instances in 
which Leigh has been ‗Seen Through‘, not as negative experiences but rather as 
examples of per tendency to engender awe and wonder. While Leigh describes 
perself as a shaman, I suggest that there is something of the magician and the seer 
about per, descriptions which highlight a sense of Leigh‘s being in the World but 
not of the World. From this I draw parallels between Leigh‘s experiences and those 
of the mystic Julian of Norwich, asserting that each responds to the promptings of an 
insistent inner ‗voice‘ that drives their perpetual questioning and reframing of self-
understanding in the light of embodied experience. Furthermore, each acts as a 
compassionate counsellor, offering healing and absolution to the sad and the broken 
within per community. I expand this analysis, moving from the notion of mystic to 
the Celtic spirituality concept of ‗thin place‘ and Rudolph Otto‘s idea of the 
numinous (1958 [1923]), and assert that we might think of the mystic and, by 
analogy, Leigh as numinous ‗Thin‘ people. I develop the metaphor of ‗Thinness‘ in 
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the light of Simone Weil‘s notion of metaxu, intermediaries or bridges between the 
world of matter and the world of the transcendent, and contend that Thinness might 
be seen as a specific category of metaxu, a category that allows for embodied 
experiences like Leigh‘s to be conceived of as means and not ends, conduits through 
which connection with the Divine might be experienced. I extend the notion of 
Thinness to gender, asserting that ‗Thin gender‘ can be seen as both metaxu and 
metaphor, enabling connection and demonstrative of imago Dei. I warn, however, 
against casting Leigh‘s Thin embodiment as an end in itself rather than a means to 
experience the numinous, and assert that, by conceiving of Thin gender as metaxu, 
we might value embodiments without idolising them. I conclude this chapter by 
asserting that Thin gender, as metaphor and metaxu, alerts us to something of the 
vast complexity of the nature of GOD/DE. 
 
Leigh: Dashing and Very Roguish 
Leigh is an American, 19 years old at the time of the interview and just coming to 
the end of a gap year in the UK. Leigh describes per spiritual/philosophical position 
as existentialist, monist, naturalistic pantheist, artist and shaman. Person was judged 
l-female1 at birth and thus assigned a Female metagender but knew from a very 
early age that per f-gender did not necessarily align with that: ‗When I was a little 
                                                 
1 To briefly recapitulate the gender aspects detailed in Chapter 1: l-gender (looks-like) refers to 
physical characteristics; f-gender (feels like) is about an inner sense of gender identity; p-gender 
(performs like) is the ‗drag‘ we put on to give ourselves the appearance of one of the two available 
options; and j-gender (judged as) is about how other people respond to us and how that impacts on 
our gendered being in the world. The four aspects together form metagender.   
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kid I really thought I was a boy, at first; there was no question for me about it‘ (4-5)2. 
Unlike many of my narrators, however, Leigh‘s sense of perself as f-male was not, at 
that early stage, unequivocal. Person continues: 
I would dress like a boy and cut my hair like a boy, but I never told 
people I was a boy or anything—I never made like a thing of it, a 
deception (although it wouldn‘t feel like that for me). But as I got 
older, more and more I started to get really uncomfortable with the 
moments where people would address me as a boy, cos I3 usually 
wouldn‘t correct them, but my mom would—I think she sensed my 
discomfort and thought that she needed to establish me as a girl (13-
29). 
 
Frustrated by this conflict between per own, albeit wobbly, sense of f-maleness and 
the j-femaleness conveyed by per mother‘s desire to ensure per gender comfort, 
Leigh says, rather poignantly, ‗I just wanted to be—I don‘t even know how to 
explain—just kind of left alone‘ (31-33). 
 
This is one of a number of passages that illustrate the complexity of gender 
interactions in Leigh‘s experiences. For those who do not know Leigh, per j-gender, 
based on their perceptions of per p-gender, appears to be male and they treat per 
accordingly. But for per mother, who has access to different information about 
Leigh‘s l-gender, person is j-female, a judgement that affects both Leigh‘s p- and f-
genders, the former under pressure to be expressed as Female and the latter in 
                                                 
2 I have attached line numbers to direct quotes from the interview text, which refer the reader to the 
relevant verbatim transcription section in Appendix 1. All quoted text from transcripts is in italics, 
both in here the main text and in the Appendices. 
3 Unless otherwise stated, all emphasis, shown in bold, is as in the original transcript. 
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confusion. Thus, Leigh‘s f- and p-genders seem not simply one thing or the other at 
this point, but uncomfortably both/and. 
 
External judgement notwithstanding, Leigh describes per childhood as a kind of 
golden age, drawing an analogy with Huckleberry Finn4, and perself as ‗dashing and 
very roguish‘ (610-611), and always ready for adventure. In one typical passage 
person says: 
I always loved going on adventures and beating up other little kids—
not in a mean way y‘know—and I was constantly going on 
adventures, like going out into the woods, and I didn‘t even know 
what kind of games we had invented there but it was like 
explorations into the unknown, sort of thing (612-625). 
 
There is a sense in which Leigh‘s childhood sense of f-maleness seemed to per almost 
like some kind of special power or magic charm, as suggested in this reference to a 
pair of trousers: 
I remember when I was very young I had a pair of sort of greenish-
olive, khaki pants—they were just like my favourite ‗boy pants‘, like 
they just made me feel this amazing power and charm (95-106). 
 
                                                 
4 Mark Twain‘s 1884 novel The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn relates the story of a 13-year-old 
boy who, to break free from the parental constraint of an abusive, alcoholic father, fakes his own 
death and takes to the Mississippi River on a raft with an escaped slave, Jim. A central theme is the 
moral development of a young boy who absconds from society and its attempts to ‗sivilize‘ him. Mark 
Twain claimed that the novel describes the situation where ‗a sound heart and a deformed conscience 
come into collision and conscience suffers a defeat‘ (Hutchinson 1993, 193). 
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To Leigh‘s distress, the charm began to fail, however, with the onset of puberty and 
per realisation that, whatever per f-gender, the outward changes in per body made 
her l-gender all too obvious: 
I started getting too uncomfortable to get boys‘ clothes and I would 
get girls‘ clothes, and I just would always have this nostalgia for this 
time when it was like I didn‘t have to do that. And as I went on it got 
worse, because it became that it wasn‘t just a social presentation thing 
anymore, because as you get older, when you hit puberty, then your 
new problem is not just ‗how am I presenting‘ or whether people are 
gonna call me ‗he‘ or ‗she‘ or buy me a glove5 at Christmas or a doll 
(109-123). 
 
It was not only puberty that imposed a judgement of Leigh‘s f-gender. Even earlier, 
person describes an incident at elementary school when j-femaleness thrust itself 
into per Huckleberry Finn narrative forcefully and with great pain: 
It really crystallised when I was older, in elementary school, and we 
went on this field trip to a one-roomed school house, and as a kind of 
bonus thing you could dress up like the kids from that era—and I was 
really excited about it because I liked the idea of being like Huck Finn 
or Tom Sawyer or something. So I pulled my socks up, and I had little 
short trousers—and I was really, really into it, I thought it was 
great—and then I got there and they had the two entrances, one for 
boys and one for girls, and I got in the boys‘ line. I was a little nervous 
about it cos I knew that they might try to catch me out, but I also just 
sort of thought, this is how I look, this is what I am, so what are they 
gonna do? And I remember the teacher just giving me this look and 
thrusting me over into the girls‘ line, and I was just so crushed—I 
think it was like first time I really, really felt social shame (35-65). 
 
The onset of puberty brought with it not only a sense of being pressured into p-
femaleness in terms of clothing and pastimes—a doll or a baseball glove for 
                                                 
5 The ‗glove‘ Leigh refers to here is a baseball glove, archetypal symbol of boyhood in the USA. 
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Christmas—but also issues of sexual attraction, of whom and how to date. Having 
earlier in the interview asserted that per mother was ‗a fairly open-minded person 
and bisexual‘ (10-11), it is reasonable to assume that same-sex desire would have 
been less problematic to Leigh than to many teenagers and thus, for per to date boys 
‗as a boy‘ would have been a distinct possibility. Interestingly, however, person 
decided to date ‗as a girl‘, for reasons person perself finds difficult to articulate: 
The first phase I went through, I just tried to be a girl and date guys as 
a girl—I did that very privately, I didn‘t tell my mom at all about 
trying to date guys because there would probably be…, that it felt 
like…, I dunno, y‘know, I guess [sighs]. I just always assumed I‘d be a 
normal heterosexual girl, like that was just what was expected of me 
and that‘s what I would be, but at the same time I knew that it was 
not gonna work out—it felt so brittle, that identity, that I really kinda 
hid it, even though it was an acceptable identity. Which is sort of 
ironic y‘know, but anyway (127-157). 
 
Again, this complex passage illustrates the serpentine interactions of the four gender 
aspects. As puberty rendered Leigh more visibly l-female, person essayed p-
femaleness, but in secret. Although person was well aware that per mother judged 
per j-female, person could not bring perself make this judgement visible, as to have 
done so would have been to undermine per own f-maleness, uncertain though this 
seems to have been. Indeed at this point, person partly assumed that l-female would 
become per metagender, j- f- and p- would align themselves accordingly, and per f-
maleness would wither away, despite the fact that it was per p-female identity that 
was brittle and insubstantial. 
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By 17, Leigh was ‗a mess, frankly‘ (183). Therefore, having graduated from high 
school a year early, person decided to take a year off and go to Europe, hoping that 
the trip would clarify some of per confusions: 
At the time I just hadn‘t dealt with any of the gender/sexuality issues 
that I‘d been having, which is strange because I was always an artist 
and introspective and that sort of thing. But at the same time there 
was always part of me that was just, I don‘t even know how to explain 
it, sort of…. You know the part of the ocean where there‘s no light 
and you wouldn‘t be able to see it, although all the water is on top of 
it so it‘s kind of important [laughs]—it was strange that I never 
explored that. But I went to Europe basically hoping that I would 
have sex with someone and I would just know what I needed to be 
doing or what my identity was (183-203). 
 
Aware that per f-gender was not a stable, certain entity (as, in contrast, it seems to 
be for many trans people by this age) Leigh hoped that the act of sex, in which one‘s 
l-gender is inescapable, would somehow shine a light into the deep ocean of per 
gender trouble. But that is not what happened; person came back from Europe 
without the sexual experiences person had hoped for: ‗So once I got back from 
Europe it was like, god, that didn‘t work! What do I do now? And I started seeing 
this therapist‘ (263-264). 
 
Regular sessions with per therapist, whom Leigh describes as ‗not the most insightful 
person in the universe (but that‘s not to say he was a bad guy)‘ (275-276), did not go 
particularly well at first: 
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For the first few months I didn‘t even talk when I went to the 
sessions, kind of shutting down, which was strange—and that went 
on for a really long time actually, for months (279-286). 
 
Then one day Leigh got into a row with per mother, triggered, as many rows are, by 
a fairly trivial incident, Leigh‘s (uncharacteristic) lateness (288-297). And in the heat 
of the argument Leigh first revealed to per mother what person thought was going 
on: 
I basically just said I‘m dealing with this stuff and I don‘t know what 
to do anymore and I‘m freaking out basically and I‘m having like a 
nervous breakdown. She could tell that I was just so consumed with 
whatever was going on, and I was crying and [sighs] she was waiting 
for me to tell her what it was I needed to tell her, and I finally told 
her, I think I might be a boy or something (298-313). 
 
After this initial coming out and the loving reaction of per mother, Leigh came out 
to per school friends, though expecting a fairly negative response: 
You think it‘s going to just be horror stories of like you tell people 
and they‘re like ‗what the fuck is wrong with you!‘ and then throw 
you in a Baptist church, lock the door and set it on fire (392-399). 
 
The actual responses, however, confounded person‘s worst fears and merit quoting 
here at length: 
After that I went through more coming out times and it was bizarre 
how all my friends reacted. One of my best friends—he‘s gay and he‘s 
a little bit feminine—it was funny when I told him cos he‘s like ‗You 
can be my boyfriend!‘—he thought it was fantastic, and that was 
really weird. And then I told my best friend who‘s a girl and 
heterosexual, and she was like ‗If you do change or something and 
become a boy, I‘m never gonna live it down if I‘m attracted to you‘, 
which is a very bizarre thing to have said to you. And one of my 
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other friends was like ‗Oh my God, me too! I think I‘m a girl‘, and I 
was like whoa, OK! But, yeah, the more I talked about it the more I 
found people responding…, I can‘t remember a single person that 
didn‘t respond well actually. Like there was this girl I‘d known all 
during high school—we were pretty close and I knew she really 
admired me in a general sense but I never really thought that she 
could be attracted to me—when she found out about it, she basically 
admitted to someone else that she‘d had a crush on me for the longest 
time and had always wondered if I would become a boy, so for her it 
was a dream come true. And that was what was really bizarre about 
it, cos I mean you think it‘s going to just be horror stories (327-393). 
 
The act of coming out resolved some of Leigh‘s confusions but was by no means the 
end of per gender story. Throughout per narrative are long, sometimes extremely 
long, passages in which person reflects upon per gender experiences in the light of 
per understanding of the workings of the cosmos. These cosmological reflections 
then go on to shape per subsequent experience of gender, in a recurring pattern of 
reflexivity which I have called ‗experience/reflection cycles‘. Below is a typical 
extract from a cycle that, in transcript, covers six pages, moving through person‘s 
own spiritual position to philosophy to person‘s sense of gender identity to the 
biology of gender to person‘s own sexual attraction to the industrialisation of the 
West and so on: 
If you look at the history of philosophy and the roots of dualistic 
thought, back to Plato, this idea of the ideal forms behind the 
shadows of the real or whatever, I really don‘t believe that. I really 
am a very monistic thinker—I think that this is here, this is 
everything, everything is already important, alive or dead or animate 
or inanimate. And part of that has really come from my 
understanding of science and quantum physics, that whole idea of 
essential oneness. And I do tie it back to gender because when I was 
younger I really thought of myself as a boy and not a girl—that‘s an 
143 
important statement, the grammar of it is important—and now I just 
don‘t really think of myself as either exactly (464-496). 
 
Leigh's statement ‗I don't really think of myself as either exactly‘ is entirely the 
product of per reflexive process. Person takes per early gender perceptions—‗I really 
thought of myself as a boy and not a girl‘—and measures that absolute certainty 
against per increasing cosmological understanding and comes to the conclusion that, 
since the universe is an essential oneness and everything is already important, there 
is no such thing cosmologically as gender certainty and that, therefore, person 
cannot live as a gender-certain being. These experience/reflection cycles ultimately 
result in person feeling ‗I didn‘t want to be just a typical guy or a typical girl‘ (578-
579), that ‗I never fit with regular girls or the regular boys‘ (1175), that ‗there was 
always a part of me that was in fluctuation‘ (1197-1198), but that ‗I‘m sure if you ask 
me 20 years later I‘ll probably have a new idea of it‘ (1344-1345). 
 
Despite this strong sense of being in fluctuation, however, person also feels that the 
path of full transition is one person must explore: 
I‘ve been in therapy for another therapist who deals more with 
gender stuff and of course I‘ve thought about full-on becoming ‗a 
boy‘, like physically transitioning (667-675). 
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How much of this is driven by the expectations of a therapist and how much by 
Leigh‘s own desire to fix6 per genders is unknowable from the available data. At 
times person revels in per unfixed state, but at others talks of per need to stabilise 
per genders in order to be fully an adult: 
So, in a way, it seemed like pursuing that masculine identity to the 
ultimate end of being an adult man—how that would physically 
change me…I would finally become a bit bigger, cos I‘ve always been 
very skinny (721-729). 
 
I really like the idea of being a bit stronger and solid—not that I want 
to be huge either cos that doesn‘t feel graceful to me—I don‘t want to 
be some giant brute! But in a way it seemed like much of my 
childhood was trying to deny this masculine identity or boyishness or 
something, so that I never grew older than a 12-year-old boy. I mean 
I look down and still see that little kid, and part of the idea of 
transitioning for me is almost to finally say ‗I‘m an adult!‘. I don‘t 
know how else to convince myself I‘m a grown-up now (738-764). 
 
One aspect of per identity about which Leigh is absolutely certain, however, is per 
status as an artist. Although person‘s early statement ‗When I was a little kid I really 
thought I was a boy‘ has the ring of certainty when one first encounters it, a degree 
of hesitancy becomes apparent when one contrasts it with the absolute certainty of 
the following statement that Leigh makes about perself as artist: 
Anyway, as I grew older I eventually realised I had to do this. It‘s not 
like I have a choice about it—I need to be an artist. I am an artist, 
y‘know, it‘s just my identity (425-433). 
 
                                                 
6 I use ‗fix‘ here to mean ‗fasten in place‘ not ‗mend‘, since I do not contend that there is anything 
about Leigh‘s gender that is broken. 
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Closely linked with Leigh‘s identity as an artist is person‘s perception of perself as a 
shaman. This is not by any means a frivolous or fanciful claim; as with any of Leigh‘s 
insights, this is a position person has arrived at after much thought and in the light 
of per wide reading and cosmological reflections. In claiming the status of shaman, 
Leigh‘s primary concern is with the transmutation of matter. As an artist, person 
sees perself as part of a tradition of craftspeople who create extraordinary, even 
divine, artifacts from mundane sources: 
It‘s about how things are created, and how you can use things to do 
other things with, and part of it comes from the physical act of 
painting—I mean if you think of the classical parts of it, where you‘d 
actually grind the paints together and then you would have this 
painting, from just this lump of rock to this divine experience of a 
representation of god, if you want to think of it that way (1094-1108). 
 
To me, being a shaman is just moving things around, just by the 
nature of your existence, validating existence itself—like the fact that 
I can look at the world makes the world beautiful (1144-1156). 
 
One of the art practices Leigh describes to me in detail is per method of creating 
photographic portraits: 
A lot of times what I like to do is take photographs of people without 
asking them first—it‘s a passive way of being intimate with them 
because all you‘re taking from them physically is their light (1236-
1247). 
 
This practice involves Leigh in pointing the camera at per chosen subject and 
waiting for that person to become aware of per presence. It is at that moment of first 
awareness that Leigh presses the shutter: 
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Most of the time they‘ll notice but they won‘t look, but eventually 
they‘ll look right over at you, and at that first instant where they see 
you, I take the picture (1304-1306). 
 
Leigh explains that this act is not simply about acquiring a portrait, but also, and 
more importantly, about recording the moment of recognition, the point at which 
person and per subject recognise each other as both existing in the world together 
and existing in it forever separate. Furthermore, person reflects, per practice would 
not have come into being but for the distance created by per gender experiences: 
It‘s partially about just that moment where we establish as two living 
things that were eternally separate, were never going to be together—
and to me, I don‘t know that I would have been as focused or even, 
dare I say, obsessed sometimes with that idea if I hadn‘t had that sort 
of general distance (1308-1327). 
 
Reflecting on per childhood, person speaks wistfully of having a ‗bizarre nostalgia‘ 
(94) for a magic time that can in no way be redeemed7. However, there is no sense in 
Leigh‘s story that redemption is a factor in per growing from the ‗dashing, 
adventurous fellow‘ (654) of childhood into the thoughtful, reflective young adult, 
measuring per lived experiences against the laws of the cosmos. Rather, person 
seems content that every answer leads to another question, that maturity brings no 
certainty and no healing, or rather, that uncertainty is healing: 
                                                 
7 Returning to the earlier ‗Huck Finn‘ motif in Leigh‘s story, the contrast between this and a classic 
‗expulsion from the Garden‘ narrative deserves mention. In contrast with the Garden of Eden, where 
breaking the rules and rocking the boat lead to pain and sorrow, the world of Huck Finn is one in 
which rocking the boat is the whole point: transgression, movement and change are the genesis of 
fun and adventure. Transgression, in Leigh‘s golden age does not lead to freedom lost, but to freedom 
gained. This is not to say that Leigh experiences no sense of loss for the time that is past; per 
reference to per ‗bizarre nostalgia‘ for that time would suggest otherwise.  
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It wasn‘t that you had the answer and then you asked questions about 
the answer and then you had the answer again. It‘s that you asked 
questions and then got the answer and then that answer gave you 
another question and it just goes on forever (1361-1366). 
 
One question Leigh has been brought to understand much earlier than some is that 
of per own mortality. Person has a health condition which, while it is currently 
under control, may yet cause per serious problems. In typical fashion, however, 
Leigh reflects upon this experience through per cosmological knowledge: 
I enjoy being a living creature but I‘ve kinda gotten to the point 
where I feel like that even to be an inanimate thing, even to dissolve 
into the ground or become ash or anything, it‘s still part of a much 
grander, deeper scheme. I just think that once you get that, you are 
less consumed with what you are or what you aren‘t (519-540). 
 
It is in being ‗less consumed with what you are or what you aren‘t‘ that Leigh seems 
to find per stability, a stability rooted in a much reflected-upon and freely-chosen 
position of instability, even in relation to per own mortality. 
 
Main Themes 
Seeing and Being Seen 
One theme that emerges most strongly from Leigh‘s narrative centres on issues of 
visibility. From the first, Leigh‘s account is concerned with the way in which per 
feelings and perceptions of perself, as the dashing, roguish adventurer, contrasts 
with the judgements of others. The incident on the trip to the schoolhouse is a 
primary example of this. This is Leigh‘s first deliberate outing of perself; up to this 
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point, per p-male behaviour is something person has not sought to draw attention 
to. On the school trip, however, person decides to take the opportunity it presents to 
become a visible Boy. As far as Leigh is concerned if per p-gender is congruent with 
Boy, as demonstrated by pulling up per sock and standing in the Boys‘ line, then per 
teacher and classmates will see a Boy: ‗this is how I look‘. When person is finally 
visible to per teacher, however, the look person receives is far from accepting. 
Though not described as anything other than ‗this look‘, it is clear from Leigh‘s 
telling just how devastating person finds it. The Look is compounded by the act of 
thrusting per ‗over into the girls‘ line‘, making person‘s utter humiliation visible to 
per classmates: I was so crushed…I really, really felt social shame. The Look turns 
Leigh‘s perception of perself from Boy to unintelligible Monster; in that dreadful 
moment per f-gender in completely demolished by j-gender. 
 
After this, and with the onset of puberty, issues of gender visibility become more 
complicated, as physical changes make l-femaleness more evident. Leigh‘s response 
to this is partially to accept the l-female by dating ‗as a Girl‘, but to do so invisibly, 
in order to maintain per sense of gender authenticity. Per gender trouble thus 
becomes ‗the part of the ocean where there‘s no light…, you wouldn‘t be able to see 
it [but] it‘s kind of important‘, a darkness person seeks to illuminate through sexual 
connection, in the belief that by making per body visible to another, person will 
make per identity visible to perself. Ultimately, however, it is not through sex, but 
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through the process of coming out, first to per therapist, then to per mother and 
finally to per friends, that person moves from invisibility to visibility. 
 
The ‗Soccer Dad‘ Story 
The theme of visibility does not end here, however. In addition to telling of being 
seen, Leigh also tells of being ‗Seen Through‘. Two incidents in particular highlight 
this aspect of Leigh‘s narrative. In the first, person encounters a schoolmate‘s father 
while at per brother‘s soccer game with per mom. Person describes perself at that 
time as not ‗often actively present[ing] like a boy‘ (846-849), but as having longish 
hair and boyish clothes. At the start of the encounter, Leigh‘s mother introduces per 
to the Soccer Dad by per obviously female name: 
 
I dunno how he heard it, but he thought it was like Larry or Harry or 
something (bizarre). But anyway, what was weird was, he started 
talking to me as a boy, and then, because of the way my parents were 
referring to me, he suddenly understood that I was actually a girl, 
because they were using a girl pronoun. And it was weird because he 
got like a twinkle in his eye and when people get that I know that 
one of two things has probably just happened, either they‘re still 
attracted to me, or more attracted me, because they know I‘m some 
kind of strange creature8 (883-910). 
 
Thus, the Soccer Dad not only sees Leigh, but also sees through per, through the 
obviously female name and the female pronouns to the ‗strange creature‘ on the 
                                                 
8 This account and the Cheerleaders incident that follows are substantially shortened from the 
original transcription. 
150 
other side, with a ‗twinkle in his eye‘, as if he and Leigh have shared an erotic secret.  
The act of Seeing Through Leigh does not apparently produce in the older man any 
sense of anger at having been duped, but rather delight at their complicity. 
 
The ‗Cheerleaders‘ Story 
At the time of the second incident, which takes place in the front lobby of per 
school, person is not, Leigh repeats, actively presenting as a boy, but wearing 
androgynous clothing and long hair. Person is waiting for per mother to pick per up 
when person notices a group of cheerleaders from another school watching per 
across the lobby, and discussing amongst themselves: 
Then finally two of the girls leave the little cluster and walk about 
midway, and they stare at me for a minute, and then they finally 
come up to me and I turn around, cos obviously they‘re coming over 
to talk to me, and say ‗What‘s going on‘, and I think the first question 
they asked me was ‗What time is the football game?‘—How would I 
know? I had nothing to do with the football game and also there‘re 
our cheerleaders right there, who probably do know (968-985). 
 
It became obvious to me that they thought I was a boy and that the 
cheerleader girl had sent them over to talk to me—it was very 
bizarre, like I suddenly realised that they don‘t know what‘s going on. 
Anyway they asked me a few other suspicious, weird questions, and 
then, thank god, my mom rescued me, and I just politely said goodbye 
and left,  I told other people about ‗the cheerleaders hitting on me‘ 
story and they‘re like ‗That‘s every heterosexual male‘s dream‘, but for 
me it was just terrifying (1032-1055). 
 
Like the Soccer Dad, the Cheerleaders See Through the fact that Leigh is not 
actively presenting as a boy, although not with same clarity of vision: ‗they don‘t 
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know what‘s going on‘. And, perhaps because of the cheerleaders‘ confusion, this 
encounter is far more uncomfortable for Leigh; indeed it is ‗terrifying‘. 
 
A Visibility of Self and Others 
The fear of not ‗passing‘ as one‘s affirmed gender is a common one for transgender 
people, as is the even greater fear of what violence cisgender people might do in 
response to feeling ‗duped‘. In Leigh‘s case, however, what is noteworthy is that per 
Seen Through narratives are not about not passing as a Boy, but about not passing as 
a Girl; even when per presentation is not particularly masculine, people See 
Through it to the Boy on the other side. 
 
The Seen Through narratives extend beyond such incidents, however. In addition to 
people seeing through Leigh‘s presentation, there are incidents in which Leigh 
describes people as having seen themselves more clearly through their encounters 
with per experiences. In per Coming Out narrative, for example, one friend is 
emboldened come out in per turn and declares ‗Oh my God, me too!‘ And a second 
friend uses Leigh‘s coming out as an opportunity to express tender feelings towards 
per, admitting that since she‘d ‗had a crush on [Leigh] the longest time‘, for Leigh to 
transition would be her ‗dream come true‘. 
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If Coming Out is an act of making the invisible visible, in Leigh‘s case it is an act 
that makes visibility possible for others as well as for Leigh perself. It is as if the light 
person shines into per own deep places spills over onto those around per. Thus, 
when I talk about Leigh as being Seen Through, I mean this: that people seem to 
observe in per something that is at odds with what person perself seeks to present—
they see through per presentation as through a ruse; and people seem to see 
something that is beyond or on the other side of per—they see through per as 
through a window. Furthermore, what they see through Leigh allows them to see 
more of themselves. 
 
There is something of an air of magic around Leigh‘s narratives of being seen and 
being Seen Through. In the Coming Out narrative, utterances like bizarre, amazing, 
whoa! and dream come true suggest the successful accomplishment of a magic trick, 
in which the reveal elicits gasps of surprise. The Soccer Dad story demonstrates a 
certain delight in the proceedings both for Leigh and for per audience. There is 
something of the ‗magician‘s reveal‘ also in per practice of taking portraits of 
strangers unannounced. In this act (as in the Coming Out and Soccer Dad 
narratives), the object of the reveal is Leigh perself. Person takes the picture not 
only because person wants to create an artwork, but also because person wants that 
moment of recognition, that moment when the subject sees per, the moment when 
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person ceases to be invisible. The camera becomes a magic wand: the shutter clicks 
and, hey presto, the magician reveals…perself. 
 
There is also a sense in which Leigh is not just a magician, but is perself magical, 
existing somewhat beyond the boundaries of the mundane world. Part of this comes 
from per physical appearance. For one thing, person is tall and almost ethereally 
thin, or ‗svelte‘ as person prefers to describe perself (167). What is more, per 
appearance seems to me to ‗flicker‘, never settling into anything that is categorically 
Male or Female, always hovering somewhere in between, boyish Girl or girlish Boy 
or both/neither at the same time. 
 
Person also positions perself as an observer, literally a seer, one who sees more of 
human behaviour by virtue of per outsider status. In relation to sex, for instance, 
person speaks of the difficulties person has in initiating sexual encounters: 
I just sort of wanted to know what is it these other normal people do 
when they just feel comfortable going out and having sex with other 
people, because for me there‘s always an intermediary. It‘s just that 
they always have that potential, so that there‘s always that sort of 
confidence of ‗I‘m already ready‘, right here, any time, and for me it 
was always like I‘m this observer, wondering how these people are 
doing this (780-812). 
 
This sense of sex as an act that can never happen on the spur of the moment, that 
will always require some mediation, some explanation on per part, locates per on the 
edge of ‗normal‘ human relationships, always an observer and an outsider, and never 
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a spontaneous participant. Relating this back to per photographic practice, person 
meditates that the exchange of looks, which in ‗normal‘ circumstances established 
mutual levels of sexual attraction, for per can never be that sort of interaction: 
So I always find my exercise of taking pictures without their express 
consent is partially about this idea of when you look at someone, 
you‘re establishing how much you‘re going to let them in—it‘s 
interesting, because for me I never felt like I could interact in that 
world because I couldn‘t be a boy for someone or I couldn‘t be a girl 
for someone exactly. I couldn‘t give people that look because 
ultimately I couldn‘t answer that promise (1277-1295). 
 
The seer is an important element of Leigh‘s understanding of perself as a shaman. 
Having spoken of the shamanic process of the transmutation of matter, Leigh goes 
on to describe how per view from between worlds has given per a sense of being 
outside this world, a non entity: 
I‘ve always felt like that observer, and I think that really affected the 
way I spiritually deal with things too, cos I was always kind of a non 
entity, like I was already a step between the mere physical world and 
something that was divine. And I think that‘s why a lot of 
transsexuals think of themselves to some degree as like shamans or 
something, because there is that part of you that‘s never going to be 
directly and easily physical—there‘s always going to be that gap (813-
836). 
 
Thus Leigh is not only the seen and the Seen Through, but also the shaman-seer, 
whose Outsider status, while not altogether comfortable, gives per access to a 
slantwise view of human behaviour. Person is in the World but not of the World. In 
this respect person bears a marked resemblance to the figure of the mystic, 
embarked upon 
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a combination of an inner and an outer quest…[leading] deeply into 
the divine centre of their own souls, but then…outward again to the 
concerns of God‘s created world and those of suffering humanity 
(King 2004, 4). 
 
Mystic Parallels 
Promptings of an Inner Voice 
There are some striking parallels between Leigh‘s experiences and those of the 
visionary Julian of Norwich9, the fourteenth century English mystic and anchorite10. 
The content of Julian‘s visions, or ‗showings‘, need not concern us here; what is 
important is that the showings themselves were but the start of Julian‘s journey. 
Over twenty years Julian reflects upon the meaning of per visions, publishing per 
reflections in two forms known as the Short Text11, and the Long Text12. In both of 
these Julian is very clear that person writes not for perself, as an act of 
autobiographical introspection or spiritual self-development13, but to bring the 
                                                 
9 Julian of Norwich was an anchorite, or secluded religious, attached to St Julian‘s Church in 
Norwich. Known only by the name of the church to which person was attached, per birth name is a 
mystery, as are any significant biographical details. Person was probably born in 1342 and died 
around 1416. In ‗the year of our Lord 1373, on the eighth day of May‘ (Spearing 1998, vii) when 
person was ‗thirty and a half years old‘ (ibid) Julian, ill and on the point of death, experienced a series 
of visions or ‗showings‘ about the nature of the divine-human relationship. Per major work, The 
Revelations of Divine Love, consisting of an account of and commentary on those visons, is held to be 
the first book whose writer can with any certainty be identified as a woman (ibid). 
10 Although it remains more common to refer to Julian in the feminised form of the term, ‗anchoress‘, 
mediaevalist Mari Hughes-Edwards, author of a recent major reevaluation of the anchoritic tradition 
(2012), asserts that there is no need to make this gendered distinction and that ‗anchorite‘ serves 
perfectly well for any gender (pers comm).  
11 This was probably written close upon the originating experience in 1373 (Spearing 1998, xii) 
12 This has been dated to 1393 on the evidence of Julian perself, who writes that a key revelation of 
meaning in the Long Text was granted to her ‗twenty years after the time of the showing, all but 
three months‘ (Spearing 1998, xii). 
13 Although it is not uncommon for mysticism to be understood as an introspective ‗quest for one‘s 
self‘ and personal liberation (e.g. Lanzetta 2005, 12), writers like Murk-Jansen (1998), Jantzen (1995), 
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product of per experience/reflection cycles to all per fellow Christians (Jantzen 2000, 
xxi). Like per contemporaries the Beguines, Julian writes in the vernacular14, ‗not 
only for those with special religious commitments [the readers of Latin] but for 
everyone‘ (ibid). 
 
Julian‘s texts, in particular the Long Text, show evidence of both breadth and depth 
in per educational background that allowed per to place ‗her own conclusions, 
drawn from her own experiences‘ (ibid, 16) within the context of wider 
contemporary cosmological understandings (ibid, 16-17). Julian‘s experience of 
union with the Divine is not a single life-changing event but rather the start of 
sustained cycles of experience and reflection into the nature of the Divine-human 
relationship. It is the work of per life to understand what GOD/DE has shown per 
and to offer those understandings to per fellow Christians. Of this work Julian says: 
‗So I saw him and sought him, and I had him and lacked him, and this is and should 
be our ordinary undertaking in this life, as I see it‘ (ibid, ix). The purpose of life is to 
both know and not to know, to seek constantly and not to find, always to ask the 
questions and never to know the answers, to have and at the same time to always be 
                                                                                                                                               
Sells (1994) and Jones & Neal (2003) insist on the public, pedagogic nature of mystical texts as works 
intended not simply to delineate the mystic‘s own spiritual development but produced with an wider 
audience in mind. 
14 Despite per possible lack of Latin, Julian was not the ‗simple, unlettered creature‘ that the 
conventions of the time required per to claim to be (Jantzen 2000, 15). Jantzen speculates that it 
would certainly have been possible for Julian to have learned some Latin even without the education 
available to men at the period (ibid, 16), and goes on to assert: ‗[Julian] is clearly a woman of 
profound intellect: and her book, especially the Long Text, shows such meticulous organisation and 
literary skill that she has been ranked with Chaucer as a pioneering genius of English prose‘ (ibid). 
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seeking for GOD/DE, to enjoy an unquenchable longing for GOD/DE and for the 
next question. Thus, when GOD/DE provides Julian with the apparently ultimate 
answer that ‗all shall be well‘ (Julian of Norwich 1998, 22), per immediate response 
is to ask another question: ‗Ah, my good Lord, how could all be well?‘ (ibid). 
 
I do not assert here that Leigh‘s experiences are mystical experiences, experiences of 
union with the Divine, per se, nor that the intention of per reflections upon those 
experiences is explicitly to serve or to inform a community. Neither do I claim that 
Leigh‘s experience/reflection cycles are directly analogous to Julian‘s reflections 
upon per showings. I do however contend that the experiences of the one shed 
slantwise light upon the experiences of the other. Like Julian, Leigh undergoes 
something profoundly personal and life-changing. Like Julian, person reflects upon 
that in the light not just of the experience itself but also of per cosmological 
understanding. Like Julian, Leigh never really settles for any answer but constantly 
questions per understanding, expanding per knowledge, reviewing per quotidian 
experience on the basis of that expanded knowledge and reviewing per knowledge 
based on per quotidian experiences: ‗there was always a part of me that was in 
fluctuation…I‘m sure if you ask me 20 years later I‘ll probably have a new idea of it‘. 
Both Julian and Leigh are responding to the promptings of an insistent inner 
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‗voice‘15. This is not to claim that Leigh is responding to a prompting from GOD/DE, 
necessarily, but rather that the urgency of the prompting is so strong, so important, 
so central to the core of each one‘s being, that the experiences of the one might be 
seen as a metaphor for the other: the mystical experience for the trans experience 
and vice versa. 
 
Mystic as Pastoral Figure 
The analogies between the two sets of experiences extend beyond the 
experience/reflection cycle.  As we have seen, the purpose of Julian‘s reflection was 
to serve per community, to publish to all per fellow Christians per understanding of 
GOD/DE‘s relationship with the world. But Julian‘s service to per community had 
practical day-to-day applications as well. As an anchorite Julian prayed for the souls 
of per community‘s departed, to shorten their time in Purgatory and help them on 
their way to Heaven (Jantzen 2000, xvii). And for the living, person acted as a 
counsellor and spiritual mentor (ibid, 29), per inner life of contemplation, reflection 
and rationalisation feeding per outward actions in support of the spiritual lives of per 
community: 
She would offer her time and her understanding and prayer, listening 
with patience and acceptance to the tales of sin and sadness and 
brokenness, and helping the person to find a path of healing (ibid, 
47). 
 
                                                 
15 It is important to note that Leigh never refers to having or hearing an inner voice: I am using the 
word ‗voice‘ here as a metaphor for the whatever-it-is that prompts Leigh‘s gender questioning.  
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For Leigh in per community, at school especially, per visibility brings people to per 
with their own need for acceptance and, in some cases, a sort of absolution. In three 
separate instances, person relates per sense of being regarded as counsellor/confessor 
for per community: 
Towards the end of high school I was starting to be more vocal that I 
liked girls, so sometimes people would come to me with their gayness, 
if that makes any sense, like I was the gay beacon or something (1059-
1072). 
 
People were always telling me their secrets, always confessing thing 
to me, which was very strange—I‘ve had people confess everything 
from abuse to rape to incest to desires of incest to coprophilia to every 
fetish you could think of. Pretty much everything but murder has 
been at some point confessed to me (1205-1224). 
 
I felt I was like a pastoral figure, a shaman with the superpower to be 
your confessor and even absolve you in a weird way, just by telling 
you you‘re OK. I mean that‘s actually enough absolution for people—
people really don‘t even need to hear that god has forgiven them, 
they just need to know ‗I haven‘t violated what it is to be human‘ 
(1379-1392). 
 
It is not that Leigh seeks out such encounters; it is simply the fact of per existence as 
a person who questions per gender, a person who is both seen and Seen Through, 
that makes per ‗the gay beacon‘ and ‗a pastoral figure‘. Just as anchorites like Julian 
were accepted and valued simply by being and not necessarily by doing (Jantzen 
2000, xvi)—it was their presence as prayerful beings in the world that was their 
value—so Leigh is valued by per community for being a person apart rather than for 
any specific actions person perself takes. Or rather, the action person does take is to 
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accept the role of confessor, to accept that per personal experiences and per 
reflections upon them might serve not only perself but also per community. 
 
In per introduction to the life and work of Julian of Norwich, Grace Jantzen assesses 
the relevance of the anchoritic life to a postmodern age and asserts: 
part of what it means to be an anchoress in post-modernity must 
surely be voluntarily to enter a space—indeed to become a space—
where thinking otherwise can happen: where creating responses to 
the death of the structures of modernity can be discerned (ibid, xxi). 
 
Although, arguably, Leigh‘s entry into such a space has not been altogether 
voluntary, per embrace of per shamanic, even anchoritic, status has positioned per as 
a space where thinking otherwise is happening, for both perself and per 
neighbours16. By sharing per self-understanding through per coming out, person 
becomes an otherwise space through which the sad, the broken, and the 
unintelligible can see more of themselves and be healed of their sense that they 
might have violated what it is to be human, thus contributing to the death of the 
structures of modernity that constrain our view of humanity. 
 
Jantzen further speculates: 
And might it not mean that, standing at an angle to the certainties 
and preoccupations of the world around her as any anchoress must 
do, a postmodern anchoress might have much in common with her 
                                                 
16 I am using ‗neighbours‘ in the widest sense here, to mean anyone with whom Leigh comes into 
contact. 
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premodern counterpart in the interrogation of modernity, and an 
openness to the divine in a world that has given itself to the 
mundane? (2000, vii) 
 
As one whose inner ‗voice‘ calls per to stand at an angle to the certainties of gender, 
Leigh might well, then, be the kind of postmodern anchorite Jantzen proposes. 
 
Ursula King describes mystics as travelling ‗along the margins of…the world of the 
mundane and the world of the spirit, where all things are made whole‘ (2004, 4). 
Like Leigh they are people on the threshold, liminal people, who experience and 
reflect upon the extraordinary and bring those reflections into the ordinary world. 
But Leigh not only brings the extraordinary into the ordinary, in many ways person 
is the extraordinary in the ordinary; in per and through per others experience 
something otherworldly that makes their eyes shine with delight and wonder. 
Person thus appears to be possessed of a certain transparency or thinness that is not 




Thin Places and Numinosity 
Celtic Spirituality and Thinness 
In Celtic spirituality17 reference is often made to the notion of ‗thin place‘:  
a place where the veil between this world and the Other world is 
thin…where connection to that world seems effortless, and 
ephemeral signs of its existence are almost palpable (Burgoyne 2007).  
 
Little academic work in the humanities has been done on this concept18; however, 
the origin of the phrase is commonly attributed to George MacLeod19, founder of the 
Iona Community. Person described Iona as ‗a very thin place where only a tissue 
paper separates the material from the spiritual realm‘ (in Power 2006, 45). Jim 
Gordon assesses this as meaning that there MacLeod ‗found an exaggerated and 
immediate sense of the spiritual awareness that discerned the purposed proximity of 
the Triune God‘ (2009, 35). 
 
Moving into the wider Celtic spirituality tradition, the thin place is any location 
where ‗the sacred breaks in to the everyday and…washes over the ordinary‘ (Poulos 
2009, 51). Kathryn Madden emphasises not simply a one-way awareness of GOD/DE 
breaking through to us, but the possibility of passage to and fro between material 
                                                 
17 I have here conflated Celtic Christianity and Celtic spirituality for the sake of textual economy, 
since both seem to use the concept of thin place in similar ways. I am aware, however, that the two 
movements do not necessarily have the same agendas. 
18 A literature search on the phrase turns up far more material on textile manufacture than anything 
else. Thin places in this context are significant as potential weaknesses in spun thread. 
19 While it has become commonplace to attribute the concept to the Celtic tradition (eg Madden 
2003; Maignant 2007; Poulos 2009), Power asserts (2006, 45) that references to thin place may be 
found in early Eastern Orthodox traditions, traditions with which George MacLeod was very familiar.  
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and spiritual planes (2003, 274). Catherine Maignant, speaking of Celtic pilgrimage 
sites, attributes thinness to places ‗saturated with holy memories‘, through an 
‗endless succession of past generations‘ that link the modern pilgrim to the sites‘ 
ancient cultic histories (2007, 18-22). Thus, thinness is assigned a historical as well as 
a geographical constituent. 
 
In common with a wider sense of sacred geography (e.g. Clavel 2008; Munt 2010a), 
thin places tend to be associated with both formally designated ‗divine dwellings‘ 
and ‗the heart of nature‘ (Clavel 2008, 16). Maignant similarly situates thin places, 
but adds the condition that, to qualify as thin, a place must have an identifiable 
boundary, a threshold that can be crossed as ‗a rehearsal for the soul‘s journey to 
eternity‘ (2007, 24). Madden moves the concept beyond what we might think of as 
traditional landscape locations, positing the psychotherapist‘s consulting room as a 
thin place where the ‗sacred work‘ of healing the psyche is undertaken (2003, 274). 
 
David Eicher expands the definition further, away from literal, geographical 
locations, to include ‗any place our hearts are opened‘, citing acts of worship20 as 
examples (2010, 19). Echoing this, James Miller asserts that a thin place is ‗a sacred 
event [my emphasis] that somehow reveals a glimmer of the depth and richness of 
life that sits just behind our everyday routines‘ (2001, 357). As an example of such an 
                                                 
20 Here Eicher is distinguishing between worship acts themselves and the places in which those acts 
take place. 
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event, Miller observes the way in which doctors become more to their patients than 
mere dispensers of medical care: 
the doctor, by virtue of his gifts and calling was himself, in the eyes of 
the patients, a ‗thin place‘; he represented something of a window 
into life‘s bigger questions, where the issues that really matter tumble 
out and come alive…[where] the mystery of life comes to the surface 
(ibid). 
 
Although Miller perself does not use the term, what person has described here 
might well be called a ‗thin person‘21; Chris Cook and Brenda Heales analogise 
directly from thin place to the idea of the thin person as someone ‗of such humility 
and love for God that a sort of radiance emanated from him‘22 (2001, 58). 
 
Rudolph Otto and the Numinous 
Thinness is an example of Rudolph Otto‘s concept of the numinous, as explicated in 
The Idea of the Holy (1958 [1923]). Attempting to describe the a-rational elements 
of belief, Otto asserts that though the ineffable Holy eludes our understanding, it 
does not elude our grasp, since we have apprehensions of it of which we can and do 
speak (ibid, 2). These apprehensions of what he dubs the ‗numinous‘23, come from 
                                                 
21 ‗Thin‘ in this usage is in no way linked to religiously inspired self-starvation, or what has been 
called ‗holy anorexia‘, a ‗self-injurious behaviour‘ possibly exhibited by some mediaeval mystics in 
pursuit of ecstatic experiences (e.g. Bynum 1987; Kroll and Bachrach 2005). 
22 In this instance Cook and Heales are referring to St Cuthbert, asking us to reevaluate per apparently 
uncongenial ‗neurotic self-punishing‘ life (2001, 58) as having contemporary relevance, but they offer 
their observations as applicable to any person of extraordinary spirituality.  
23 Otto states: ―I adopt a word coined from the Latin numen [originally a nod or a hint, but extended 
to mean a divinity]. Omen has given us ‗ominous‘, and there is no reason why from numen we should 
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beyond ourselves as something ‗to which the mind turns spontaneously‘ (ibid, 11)24. 
Although Otto stresses the awful, overpowering urgency of the numinous 
experience, with its potential to strike us ‗chill and numb‘ (ibid, 28), Jung‘s adoption 
of the concept to describe unconscious experiences needing to be made conscious 
(Stein 2006, 45) leads to a gentler definition as ‗something in the objective situation 
awaiting discovery and acknowledgement‘ (Casement 2006, 20). In the 
psychotherapeutic context, contact with the numinous‘s ‗illuminations, revelations 
and saving ideas‘ (Main 2006, 158) might effect a healing (Corbett 2006, 54), a 
revaluing of the a-rational both individually and collectively in a World that has 
‗exalted rationality‘ (Rowland 2006, 99). 
 
Numinosity, and thus thinness, is a difficult subject about which to rationalise25; it is 
an overwhelmingly affective experience that can only be explained through 
metaphor (Huskinson 2006, 200). It is a hint of a link to the transcendent, a ‗glimpse 
of grace found in the ordinary‘ (Stein 2006, 47) that happens independently of our 
will or control (Kawai 2006, 186). It cannot be overpowered, it can only overpower 
                                                                                                                                               
not similarly form a word ‗numinous‘ (1958 [1923], 6-7). Person also describes the phenomenon as 
the mysterium tremendum et fascinans, the tremendous and fascinating mystery. 
24 Otto describes the experience as presenting sometimes as ‗strange excitements‘ and ‗intoxicating 
frenzies‘, ‗wild and demonic‘, sometimes as ‗a gentle tide, pervading the mind‘, as ‗hushed trembling, 
and speechless humility‘, but always as the consciousness of an inexpressible mystery that is ‗above all 
creatures‘ (1958 [1923], 12-13). As a power utterly above ourselves, it requires our humility (ibid, 21). 
As ‗that which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual, the intelligible, and the familiar…[it] falls 
quite outside the limits of the ‗canny‘ and is contrasted with it, filling the mind with blank wonder 
and astonishment‘ (ibid, 26). 
25 It may, of course, be possible to identify the neurological processes that are initiated during a 
numinous experience, and Ann Casement points per readers to interesting work in this area (2006, 
21), but the province of neuroscience is beyond the scope of this study. 
166 
(Huskinson 2006, 202), for it is an ‗autonomous manifestation‘ (ibid, 200) in both its 
religious and its psychotherapeutic conceptions. As such, it demands that we be 
humble in the face of what exceeds us, even as it is ‗an affront to reason‘ (Tacey 
2006, 222). Moreover, according to Lucy Huskinson, in Otto‘s conception the 
numinous experience has no moral or ethical purpose (2006, 205-206); to delineate 
the numinous is to delineate ‗the meaning of ‗the holy‘ above and beyond the 
meaning of goodness‘ (Otto 1958 [1923], 6). It reveals nothing of GOD/DE except 
that GOD/DE is. 
 
As an affront to reason, numinous thinness without doubt stands at an angle to the 
certainties and preoccupations of a World that has exalted rationality to a dangerous 
degree. Through its tissue paper veil, it offers us something that waits to be 
discovered and acknowledged, an effortless connection to something beyond the 
mundane; it calls us spontaneously and without our bidding across its threshold, 
offering us a flickering window on life‘s bigger questions, showing us depth and 
richness and mystery. Its glimpse of grace reveals, heals and saves, not by any action 
we might take but simply because it summons us humbly into the presence of 
something that exceeds our mundane experiences. Just so, Leigh, the Gay Beacon, 
offers healing acceptance and absolution by being an otherwise space, a threshold 
that exceeds our mundane experiences of gender. 
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Thin26 as a concept, then, summons us not only in places, but also in events and, 
more importantly for this text, in people who point to the Holy. Like the attentive 
doctor, the mystic and the Gay Beacon, Thin people hold out the promise of 
consolation and healing by calling us into the presence of something that exceeds 
mundanity. Thin people are those who nod towards the numinous beyond 
themselves and their quotidian experiences, and also beyond ours. If, when we are 
addressed by numinosity, we pay Weilian attention, we might see Thin people but 
might also see through them as what Weil calls ‗metaxu‘ (2002 [1952], 145-147), 
beyond the threshold they lay open for us to the absolute good that such attention 
might draw down into the World from GOD/DE. 
 
Simone Weil and Metaxu 
Metaxu Defined 
Conceiving of metaxu as bridges between the world of matter and the world of the 
transcendent, Weil states: ‗The essence of created things is to be 
intermediaries…leading from one thing to another…leading to God‘ (2002 [1952], 
145-146) and thus, any created thing may be called into service as metaxu. Using a 
prison metaphor, person states that metaxu is like the wall that separates two 
prisoners, upon which they tap out their communications. As matter, the wall is an 
inseparable barrier but, as a method of communication, it is their only means of 
                                                 
26 From this point onwards I capitalise Thin to indicate that it is a concept that encompasses all I have 
said up to this point. 
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union: ‗It is the same with us and God. Every separation is a link‘ (ibid, 145). Though 
the world is ‗a closed door, yet it is by attention to things of the world that we open 
the door to God‘ (ibid). 
 
However, although every material separator is a spiritual link in theory, in practice, 
Weil concentrates on ‗things of beauty that have the potential to direct one‘s 
attention to the divine‘ (Howe 2008, 34), in particular mathematics, science, the arts, 
politics, labour and religion (ibid, 48). These are, for Weil, the cultural expressions 
of beauty27 par excellence that direct our attention to absolute good: ‗Beauty 
captivates the flesh in order to obtain permission to pass right to the soul‘ (Weil 
2002 [1952], 148). A key component of the experience of beauty is that it is 
something to be desired but not to be consumed; rather it is to be contemplated 
only: ‗The beautiful is that which we desire without wishing to eat it. We desire that 
it should be‘ (ibid, 149). Beauty is thus, inasmuch as it is analogous to the human 
experience of GOD/DE with whom we can unite through contemplation but 
                                                 
27 Of course, no concept of beauty is unproblematic. Notions of beauty are culturally determined, and 
personal taste cannot be discounted. When it comes to literature, Weil has a very narrow concept of 
what might be deemed to be beautiful enough to act as metaxu, citing the Iliad, Shakespeare‘s King 
Lear, Phédr‘ by Racine and the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles as among the very few works 
worthy of attention (1989, 282). Thus, in Gray‘s assessment, Weil‘s view of beauty is ‗utopian, 
rigorously traditional, and somewhat priggish… ―Beauty‖ with a capital B‘ (2001, 216). Furthermore, 
Weil‘s insistence that the contemplation of beauty automatically leads the contemplator to the good 
is not without its difficulties, as Weil perself was aware. Person worries at the question of how it is 
that there are ‗so many perverted aesthetes‘, for example the Roman emperor, Nero, ‗if the beautiful 
is the real presence of God in matter and if contact with the beautiful is a sacrament in the fullest 
sense‘ (2002 [1952], 151). Person concludes that though the ‗perverted person‘ may indeed be a lover 
of music, person can hardly believe that they would be enamoured of truly GOD/DE-filled music 
such as Gregorian chant (ibid). 
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towards whom we cannot actively approach. This distance, says Weil, ‗is the soul of 
the beautiful‘ (ibid). 
 
Though traditionally translated from the Greek as ‗between‘, an online dictionary 
that tracks Greek usage throughout the Bible (Heartlight 2001-2011) notes that 
metaxu has been used variously to mean: between; meanwhile; in the meantime; 
after; afterwards; and next. Weil perself (2002 [1952], 145-147), writes of ‗the 
bridges of the Greeks‘, reiterating the bridge motif several times, but also referring 
to links, intermediaries and ‗a stepping stone to God‘. Ideas of bridges and of 
intermediaries are popular among commentators (e.g. McLellan 1991; Tatsuko 2000; 
Cosgrove 2008; Howe 2008), but other concepts such as counterbalance (McLellan 
1991, 201), counter-reality (Fan 2007, 136), ‗precarious in-betweenness‘ (ibid, 129), a 
space between realities (Selles-Roney 1994, 274), and simply ‗between‘ (McLellan 
1991, 201) are also used. While the majority of these usages conceive of metaxu as a 
concrete noun, with occasional reference to states of being (like betweenness), it is 
rare for metaxu to be conceived of as a verb: Fan comes close to this when person 
describes metaxu as ‗the art of mastering divergent points of view‘ (2007, 131), 
although even here the main concept, an ‗art‘, is a noun. Macfarlane‘s description of 
‗passing through the known to reach the unknown‘ is most verb-like, although 
person precedes this by calling metaxu ‗a process‘ (2008, 241). In order to preserve 
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some of the original meaning, however, I use the term without either definite or 
indefinite article and without a plural. 
 
Metaxu is of primary importance in Weil‘s thought28 (Hellman 1984, 83; Hermsen 
1999, 189), since without it no contact with the transcendent is possible: ‗I have not 
the principle of rising in me…. It is only by directing my thoughts towards 
something better than myself that I am drawn upwards by this something‘ (Weil 
2002 [1952], 99). 
 
McLellan sees metaxu as ‗the concept [that] forms the link between the practical and 
the mystical sides of [Weil‘s] thought‘ (1991, 201) and right attention to metaxu as ‗a 
mirror and a magnet, reflecting the nature of God and drawing the soul towards it‘ 
(ibid). For Howe, metaxu links beauty and art to hope and justice (2008, 36). Citing 
an occasion where concentration on Gregorian chanting allowed Weil to set aside 
the pain of an excruciating headache29, Wolfteich notes the value of metaxu in 
overcoming suffering (2001, 361), while Nye observes the vital importance of the 
                                                 
28 There are occasional detractors, Wolfteich, for example, in a footnote (2001, 359) cites Weil‘s 
biographer Jacques Cabaud as finding metaxu to be peripheral to per thought  
29 Abosch records that Weil was always frail and often sick, with headaches that started when person 
was 12 and never ceased (1994, 7). Though commonly referred to in biographies as migraines and/or 
sinusitis, these may well have been cluster, or chronic daily, headaches, nicknamed ‗suicide 
headaches‘ by sufferers because of the chronic, intolerable and intractable pain they generate. Some 
sufferers report that intense concentration on something other than the headache, as in Weil‘s 
experience of the Gregorian chant, reduces the severity of an attack.  
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concept in overturning the Christian notion of work as punishment for sin, in that 
Weil reconceptualises manual labour as metaxu (1994, 101). 
 
Howe opines (2008, 47) that metaxu is twofold in nature, requiring both that the 
object attract the looker‘s attention and that the looker consent to attend. Howe 
illustrates this with an account of Weil‘s use of the repeated recitation of George 
Herbert‘s poem Love30 to ‗[draw] her thoughts away from herself and [direct] them 
towards the divine‘ (ibid). The poem only acts as metaxu because of Weil‘s 
consenting thus to use it. And this two-foldedness exists not only between the 
looker and metaxu, but also between the looker and GOD/DE: the looker‘s consent 
to attend through metaxu is necessary, says Weil, ‗in order that he [GOD/DE] may 
perceive his own creation though us‘ (2002 [1952], 40-41). Weil illuminates this 
point with a metaphor in which person considers per perception of the table 
through the point of a pencil, and desires to be similarly a pencil point for Christ, ‗to 
be [a mediator] between God and the part of creation which is confided in us‘ (ibid, 
40), suggesting that metaxu is as important to GOD/DE, as a way of knowing ÆR 
creation, as it is to humans, as a means of experiencing GOD/DE‘s grace. Rather 
poignantly, Weil declares: ‗I cannot conceive of the necessity for God to love 
                                                 
30 The poem, which begins ‗Love bade me welcome: yet my soul drew back‘ (Herbert 1967, 91), was 
brought to Weil‘s attention by a young English man whom she met in 1938 in Solesmes. Weil came 
to use the recitation of this poem, as person did the contemplation of Gregorian chant, as a means of 
alleviating per excruciating headaches: ‗Often, at the culminating point of a violent headache, I make 
myself say it over, concentrating all my attention upon it and clinging with all my soul to the 
tenderness it enshrines‘ (2009 [1951], 27). 
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me….But I can easily imagine that he loves that perspective of creation which can 
only be seen from the point where I am‘ (ibid, 41). 
 
Although much of the commentary on metaxu focuses on those cultural artifacts 
that Weil adjudges to be beautiful, Hellman notes the breadth of resources to 
whom/which Weil gives value, citing manual labour, the afflicted, academic work, 
language, neighbours, and oppression (1984, 88-89), all of which form part of our 
roots, the ‗living cultural matrices‘ which sustain our lives in community (Nye 1994, 
129). Howe points out that attention beyond the beautiful results directly from 
Weil‘s understanding of the nature of attention: compassion towards one‘s fellow 
human beings requires, says Howe, exactly the same quality of attention as does the 
contemplation of works of art (2008, 57). And attention to one‘s fellow human 
beings perforce leads to ethical action in the World (Rozelle-Stone 2010, 32). 
According to Hellman, attention has but one aim, the amelioration of affliction 
(Hellman 1984, 89), the answering of Weil‘s most fundamental question: ‗What are 
you going through?‘ (2009 [1951], 64). In responding to this question, in loving one‘s 
neighbor with ethical action, one is loving GOD/DE, since ‗love of God and love of 
neighbor [are] made up of the same substance—attention‘ (Hellman 1984, 89).  
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Removing Oneself from the Centre 
Tatsuko sees metaxu as essential to the prevention of reification or idolatry, 
preserving the things of this world as means not ends, since attention removes 
oneself from the centre and puts ‗that which is other than the self‘ in its place (2000, 
[n.p.]). Duttenhaver and Jones add, in relation to scientific enquiry, that attention 
demonstrates a non-strategic, non-instrumental impartiality that is markedly 
different from the ‗calculative grasping‘ and will to mastery of the scientific method 
(2010, 180). Similarly, Hellman notes that attention to/through metaxu is a process 
rather than a product, in which a problem does not necessarily require a solution 
(1984, 84). In contradiction to the prevailing view that intellectual endeavour and 
religious contemplation are two entirely separate activities, asserts Hellman, Weil 
demonstrates the value of the latter to the task of the former. In this, adds Gray, 
attention calls to mind a slogan of the anti-war movement, intended to remind 
activists that there is value in simply bearing witness: ‗Don‘t just do something, 
stand there‘ (2001, 219). 
 
It is worth returning, at this point, to the word metaxu itself, its definition in Greek 
and the various meanings assigned to it by Weil and per various commentators, 
since this has a bearing on idolatry. Despite the origin of the word as a preposition it 
seems virtually impossible to make use of it conceptually as anything other than a 
noun, as shown above. This is important in light of Weil‘s own comments on the 
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dangers of reification or idolatry in respect of metaxu. Referring to ‗the bridges of 
the Greeks‘ person states: 
We have inherited them but we do not know how to use them. We 
thought they were intended to have houses built upon them. We 
have erected skyscrapers on them to which we ceaselessly add 
storeys. We no longer know that they are bridges, things made so that 
we may pass along them, and that by passing along them we go 
towards God (2002 [1952], 146). 
 
What were intended as means, even unto the concept metaxu itself, are ever in 
danger of becoming ends in themselves, idols that we worship instead of 
worshipping GOD/DE. Although Weil acknowledges that metaxu, as indicative of 
‗the true earthly blessings‘ of ‗home, country, traditions, culture, etc‘, are vital to 
human beings as things that ‗warm and nourish the soul‘ (147) and make a human 
life possible, nevertheless we must guard against worshipping such things in and of 
themselves. To acknowledge the roots of country and culture as metaxu should be 
with the aim of ‗making our way towards a point where it is possible to do without 
them‘ (ibid). 
 
Selves as Metaxu 
Although Weil‘s discussion of metaxu concentrates on abstract concepts for its 
explication, if we take seriously per assertion that every material separator is a 
spiritual link, then we ourselves are as much metaxu as are beauty, truth, work or 
mathematics. However, if we also take seriously assertions about the concept of 
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Thinness, as a numinous something that calls to us, demands our attention even, 
then we cannot avoid the fact that in our experiences some things more readily offer 
themselves as metaxu than others. As Weil summons beauty, mathematics and truth 
as betweens to GOD/DE, I summon, or am summoned by, Leigh as Thin person to 
do likewise, expanding the notion of metaxu to encompass not merely abstract 
concepts or inanimate objects, but to assert the value of embodied quotidian 
experiences as nods to the numinous. 
 
Thin Gender 
Elizabeth Obbard describes Julian moving ‗from sight to insight‘ (2008, xix) as she 
works to rationalise per experience of union with GOD/DE. Similarly Leigh‘s 
experience/reflection cycles move per from sight to insight; the more person holds 
per own experiences up to the light of per cosmological knowledge, the more person 
is able to embody both experience and reflection. As Leigh perself puts it: ‗I was 
always so focussed on figuring myself out‘. But it is not just Leigh who moves 
towards insight. Those who encounter per are moved in that direction also; through 
seeing per, we see through per to something new about gender. As the mystic might 
be figured as a Thin person for the Divine, Leigh is a Thin person for gender.  The 
Soccer Dad and the Cheerleaders do not simply see Leigh as person presents perself, 
but see through that presentation to something beyond, something that they do not 
necessarily understand but that, in the case of the Soccer Dad certainly, causes eyes 
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to twinkle with what might be recognition but might also perhaps be wonder. And 
just as we might figure Leigh as Thin for gender, so gender itself might be figured as 
Thin metaxu. 
 
Thin gender as a concept operates on two levels, as a metaphor for that of GOD/DE 
and as an instance of metaxu. In the first, Thin gender as something in embodied 
experience that is expressive of GOD/DE‘s nature might be theorised in various 
ways. We might see it as a state in which the ‗veil‘ between the binary genders in 
less substantial such that we might question both our own judgement of a person‘s 
metagender and our understanding of the gendered nature of GOD/DE. This is not 
especially fruitful, however, since it remains embedded in a binaried understanding 
of gender. While we might with some justification assume that this is the experience 
of gender Thinness that Soccer Dad and the Coming Out narrative schoolfriends 
have had, since their understandings of gender might be assumed to be firmly rooted 
in the binary, a perception of Man-ness in Woman and vice versa does not tread 
new ground, theologically.  
 
We might, however, understand Thin gender to mean that seeing beyond the veil of 
the binary to something complex, fluid or ambiguous, such as Leigh‘s experiences 
exhibit, is more expressive of GOD/DE‘s vast complexity than is binary gender. 
Complexity is certainly what Leigh demonstrates, in per sense of fluctuation, of 
177 
never wanting to settle or be settled by others into a binary gender choice, of ‗just 
wanting to be left alone‘, in the condition I have described as ‗flickering‘. Rivera 
describes the sensation ‗of being faced by something for which there is no concept in 
our system of thought‘ as having the quality of haunting (2007, 119); it is this 
haunting quality of being someone not entirely in the same world as the rest of us 
that Leigh exhibits, as discussed above. Thin gender then might serve as a metaphor 
for investigating notions of both Divine complexity and mutability, which I address 
in the next chapter, and conceptions of transcendence and immanence, which I deal 
with in Chapter 5.  
 
This second conceptualisation has great theological potential, since it asserts that 
gender fluidity, ambiguity and complexity are legitimately imago Dei in that they 
reflect the fluidity, ambiguity and complexity of a GOD/DE who is greater than we 
can know, an assertion that runs counter to both a classical and a populist 
Christianate understanding of ‗Man and Woman created He them‘.  It is, however, 
highly problematic, as it might also appear to suggest that Thin gendered people 
have some kind of higher positioning in a hierarchy of likeness to a GOD/DE who is 
unquestionable complex beyond any human comprehensibility. Like the 
Valentinian Gnostics31 who posited that only the spiritually aware pneumatics were 
                                                 
31 The Valentinian system of gnosticism proposed that the Demiurge (a kind of lower God responsible 
for the created world) had created humans of three spiritual types: the Hylics, ‗people who are 
resolutely ‗in matter‘ and care only for the concerns of the flesh‘; the Psychics ‗who are not so caught 
up in the pleasures and pains of earthly existence, but who are more inclined to thinking‘; and the 
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able to receive knowledge of GOD/DE (Martin 2006, 50), this definition of Thin 
gender might be taken to suggest that Thin is more legitimately imago Dei than 
Thinless. 
 
As feminist theologians have been pointing out for the last 40 years, there are 
serious consequences for theological models that valorise one set of human physical 
characteristics or embodied experiences over another. It would be dangerous, 
therefore, to suggest that Thin gendered people are in some way closer to GOD/DE 
that the Thinless, that Thin gender is a kind of esoteric knowledge, a gender gnosis, 
possession of which through birth traits or acquisition of which through experience 
aligns the possessor more nearly to GOD/DE‘s image. In traditional theology, this 
thinking has led to all those dominological abuses of power and control that feminist 
theologians rightly critique. And in feminist spiritualities, it had given rise to the 
countering of dominology with the divinisation of Female bodies ‗living in the lap of 
the Goddess‘ (Eller 1993). More recently, Trans theologians Virginia Mollenkott and 
Vanessa Sheridan (2003) fall into the trap of what we might call ‗gender Gnosticism‘ 
in their conceptualising of Trans people as ‗gender-gifted‘ (ibid, 32), people whose 
very embodiments allow them special access to, for example, a more perfect 
understanding of problematic biblical texts (ibid, 36). In all of these theologies, a 
                                                                                                                                               
Pneumatics who ‗are spiritually aware people, who are above dogma and division, and who are able 
to receive gnosis‘. Gnosis is the esoteric knowledge necessary for a human being to be able to return 
to the Pleroma, the uncreated realm of the True God (Martin 2006, 50-51). 
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particular type of embodiment is seen as providing its possessors with a direct 
knowledge of, or access to, GOD/DE that is unavailable to others. 
 
We must, therefore, beware of making an idol of Thinness and remember that it is 
not only metaphor but also metaxu and, as such, always means and never end; 
herein lies Thin‘s main value as a concept. When Mary Daly famously asserts that if 
GOD/DE is male, male becomes GOD/DE, person speaks of a confusion of means 
and ends. Men are means that should draw our attention to the Divine, not ends, not 
gods themselves. When we confuse the one with the other, we erect skyscrapers on 
the bridges of the Greeks, creating of the means idols that we falsely worship, and 
hence dominology. In desiring to give any embodied experience theological value, 
we are ever in danger of succumbing to this confusion but, while there is that of 
GOD/DE in all our embodiments such that each of us is as much in ÆR image and 
likeness as any other, we are not GOD/DE‘s body, since GOD/DE far exceeds the 
material world, either as parts or in whole. As metaxu, however, the absolute value 
of our embodiments is asserted as precarious in-betweenness linking the mundane 
and the material to the transcendent, unknowable but nonetheless experienceable 
Beyond. Leigh and per Thinness are without doubt of value, not because person is in 
some way gender-gifted, but because person‘s quotidian experiences open the door 
to GOD/DE if we consent to pay attention. Metaxu allows for the possibility of a 
non-idolatrous appreciation of embodiments, valuation without valorisation. 
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Furthermore, though through a Thin metaxu we connect with GOD/DE, this does 
not mean that those of us are Thinless are any less imago Dei. We need not aspire to 
be metaxu ourselves (although we undoubtedly are, since every separation is a link) 
but to pay attention to the numinosity Thinness evokes, so that we might draw 
down the good into the World. The potential of Thinness as metaxu lies in the way 
in which it affects the observer as much the observed. Hence, Thinness is not 
something to which we must all aspire, for that would make it an idol, but rather 
something we can aspire to recognise as a nod to the numinous. Metaxu calls us not 
to be but to see, to remove ourselves from the centre, not necessarily to do 
something but to stand there. 
 
It is, therefore, not solely the Thinness of the person that we value, but our alertness 
and response to its numinosity when it summons us. Thinness is as much in the eye 
of the beholder as it is in the body of the beheld. This is apparent in Leigh‘s story in 
the way that, while person never actively presents as p-male, people see through per 
performance and respond to something that summons them whether they will or 
no. In Leigh‘s case, though person does not actively choose to embody Thinness, 
Thinness arises around per, possibly as a function of per own ambiguity about per 
gender choice, per constant questioning and per experience/reflection cycles. Thin 
gender is then not as a physical attribute of a particular body, but rather as a state of 
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perception through which the onlooker sees a disruption in the solidity of the 
gender binary, a potential breakthrough point to something beyond. The precarious 
in-betweenness of Thin gender is a countersign, an otherwise space, a proposition 
that stands at an angle to the certainties of the binary and asserts that this structure 
of modernity is not a stable edifice, but something fragile and unsteady, something 
that flickers and shifts, the more so the harder we look. 
 
The Risks of Thinness 
Having said this, being the space where thinking otherwise can happen is not 
altogether comfortable. In the case of (especially female) mystics, being Thin often 
brought them into perilous conflict with the church authorities, so much so in fact 
that some, like the Beguines Margaret Porete and Aleydis, were executed for their 
activities (Hart 1980, 22). Being a contemporary Thin gender countersign is no less 
likely to create mortal danger, as the statistics of violence against trans/genderqueer 
people amply demonstrate32.  Standing at an angle to the certainties of gender, 
deliberately or not, troubles the norms. For some, like the Soccer Dad, who are open 
to the possibility of wonder, the summons of Thinness is welcomed. For others, 
however, Thin gender challenges the very basis of self-understanding and creates 
tension, if not outright animosity.  
 
                                                 
32 For example, in 2012, according to the Trans Murder Monitoring Project, 265 transgender people 
were murdered worldwide, an increase of 20 percent on the previous year (Ford 2012, [n.p.]). 
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Almost at the end of per interview, Leigh states ‗just my very existence is a question‘ 
and continues: 
My existence calls into question why you are the way you are —a lot 
of girls, they act girly but they never really think about why they act 
girly, they just act girly because they‘re a girl, they never think about 
‗why do I curl my hair in the morning? Is it because I‘m a girl or is it 
because I actually like having curly hair?‘, and just my existence 
makes them think ‗Why, why am I doing this, why am I thinking 
this?‘ (1419-1433). 
 
It can be too much for some people—they don‘t want to know, they 
don‘t want to think, and I think that‘s why they react so violently 
sometimes. I guess if you want to keep it in the shaman metaphor, it‘s 
like to say, to think that there‘s someone who‘s crossing between 
those worlds, highlights that you can‘t, that you‘re stuck in this and 
that world (1440-1456). 
 
In casting per existence as a question, Leigh highlights that per ambiguous l/f/p-
gender has become a de facto judge of other people‘s l/f/p-genders. Per Thinness 
causes those around per to ask why they are as they are and not as person is. And 
though for some, this might be a welcome question, the Thinness that surrounds per 
is not metaxu for everyone. There are those for whom it is a barrier, it is too much, 
an unwelcome sign that there are people in the world who exist in ways most of us 
do not. In Leigh‘s view, it draws attention to the fact that those of us who are 
Thinless are mired in the mundane.  
 
In this rare reference to the potential for some to react violently to per presence in 
the world, Leigh pulls into focus for us the dangers for the Thin metaxu. For the 
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person around whom Thinness gathers, as much as for those who do not like the 
Thinness they see, the experience is not necessarily to be celebrated. Of course, if 
Leigh‘s Thinness is metaxu, we have no need to fear being stuck in this and that 
world; person might be a shaman who crosses the between, but the transcendent 
makes itself known to us too through per embodiment. This does not, however, 
diminish the very real pain Leigh experiences. Having talked for some hours in very 
positive terms about per experiences, in the final minutes of the interview person 
hands out a huge caveat; being an otherwise space is not a comfortable place to be; it 
is dangerous, it is challenging to self and to others, it sets one apart.  
 
Thickness33 
One way Leigh seeks to overcome per sense of isolation is through the connecting 
medium of the camera. Another is through sexual encounters. A third possibility is 
for per to anchor per body in a state of fixity, to become both an adult and a fixed 
gender. However, per choice between Man and Woman is by no means certain. At 
one point person meditates on whether per maturity equates with Womanhood: 
I thought about what my reasons are for becoming a boy, and 
sometimes I‘ve wondered if part of it is that as a girl I always did feel 
immature in that role, and I still feel immature even though I‘m a 
fairly functional person — I live on my own and go to school and all 
that and I guess I‘m an adult, I guess I‘m a woman — I never call 
myself a woman, that‘s very weird for me (703-719). 
 
                                                 
33 My use of Thickness in this context does not in any way relate to anthropologist Clifford Geertz‘s 
(1993, 3-30) notion of the ‗thick description‘. 
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Ultimately, however, this is not merely very weird, but too weird to be considered 
and Leigh quickly moves away from the topic. 
 
When it comes to being a Man, Leigh is not much more forthcoming. However, it is 
noticeable how many metaphors of thickness, solidity and substantiality person uses, 
in the brief considerations person gives to the topic. To recall a section from the 
interview (738-764) quoted previously, Leigh states per wish to ‗finally become a bit 
bigger‘, to be ‗a bit stronger and solid‘. But in per typical anticommittal34 style, this 
desire is tempered; person does not want to be ‗some giant brute‘. Person is torn 
between a desire for fixity and a desire to remain ‗graceful‘, for which we might read 
less substantial or bulky, lighter possibly, and more filmy. 
 
To offset this theme of maturity as bulk, solidity and certainty, however, there is a 
counter-theme that equates growing up with growing into uncertainty that I have 
previously described. Leigh embraces perhaps not being a question, but certainly 
being questioning, as we have seen demonstrated in per experience/reflection cycles 
and per statement ‗if you ask me 20 years later I‘ll probably have a new idea of it‘. 
Though per Thinness and per existence as a question set per apart from others, these 
are not states person necessarily wants to relinquish. As we have seen, Leigh views 
                                                 
34 To describe Leigh as ‗noncommittal‘ would, I think, be to ignore the way in which person actively 
chooses not to commit to decisive statements about many things. The passage about becoming a Man 
is a good example: I want to be bigger, but not too big because I want to be graceful, not that I am 
graceful…. For this reason I have coined the term ‗anticommittal‘ to indicate what appears to be an 
active decision not to decide. 
185 
being ‗less consumed with what you are or what you aren‘t‘ as a positive place to be. 
It is this place of actively-chosen indecision, this experience of living as a question, I 
contend, that might be responsible for Leigh‘s Thinness. 
 
I must repeat here that Thinness is not a physical trait pertaining to a body type, but 
rather a state engendered by sets of embodied experiences. In Leigh‘s case, Thinness 
seems to arise out of per radical indecision, per anticommittal attitude to per gender 
presentation. Leigh has not set out to be Thin, but Thinness has come to be as a 
result of the perceptions of others. For some, these perceptions create positive 
feelings and for some, negative. Indeed, Thinness might be seen to be directly 
related to j-gender. I contend, however, that the means by which Thinness impinges 
upon the consciousness of the beholder is different from the mechanism of gender 
judgement. J-gender acts in relation to the rules and norms of society. We judge an 
embodied someone to be a Man because they appear to us to conform more or less to 
societal norms with regard to what constitutes a Man: they have a particular timbre 
of voice, they fall within certain parameters of height, their body language conforms 
to certain expectations and so on. Thinness, however, addresses us on a different 
level. Rather than demanding judgement, Thinness summons us with awe and 
wonder; it asks simply that we humbly pay attention through its metaxu to the 
existence of a numinous, transcendent something that exceeds us, and not that we 




In Thinness, GOD/DE makes known something of ÆRSELF that is not normally 
knowable: 
Truth abides in thin places; naked, raw, hard to face truth. Yet the 
comfort, safety and strength to face that truth also abides there. Thin 
places captivate our imagination, yet diminish our existence. We 
become very small, yet we gain connection and become part of 
something larger than we can perceive.  The human spirit is 
awakened and will grow if the body and mind allow it (Burgoyne 
2007). 
 
The naked, raw, hard to face truth of gender is that if we construct it as an 
idolatrous binary, forgetting that, like any other metaxu, it is means and not end, 
this blinkers us to GOD/DE, limiting our potential to know ÆR and to know 
ourselves to our fullest extent. This knowledge, that gender is not as simple as we 
think it is, causes deep anxiety for some. For others though, like the Soccer Dad, 
imaginations are captivated and eyes begin to twinkle. We experience the 
beginnings of wonder and awe, becoming small but gaining a connection to 
something larger than we can perceive. We have an overwhelming sense that we no 
longer need be mired in the mundane, or trapped in a net of norms, whether of 
gender or of theology, but can ourselves become spaces where thinking otherwise 
can happen. Something of the nature of GOD/DE is drawn down into the World 
through the metaxu of Thinness. Something of the complexity of that nature is 
expressed in the metaphor of gender‘s complexity. As binary gender proves to be 
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Thin and insubstantial, so do our rigid concepts of GOD/DE. Through the precarious 
in-betweenness of metaxu like Leigh, who embody Thin gender, we begin to 
understand of some of the vast complexity of GOD/DE‘s nature, a complexity that 












In this chapter I address Robin‘s story, beginning with an extended pen-portrait of 
my narrator that details key moments in both per gender and per spiritual 
peregrinations. Reflecting Robin‘s story, which progresses through a number of 
distinct phases, my analysis advances stage by stage, mutating somewhat as it goes. 
Thus I commence with a return to the metaphorical model of Thinness, extrapolated 
from Leigh‘s narrative, and, drawing on Robin‘s experiences, discuss whether it 
might be valid to talk also of Thickness or, at least, Thickening as additional 
metaphors for gender and spiritual experiences. Using the notion of Thickening or 
occlusion as generative of reflectionality or mirroring, as opposed to Thinness as 
analogous to transparency, I proceed to the myth of Narcissus to discuss the 
particular properties of per mirror, its connections to Robin‘s narrative and its 
associations with Divine-human relationships. I argue that the Narcissan Mirror 
illuminates only part of Robin‘s experience and that, to understand per story more 
fully, we might attend to another myth, that of Proteus the shapeshifting sea-god. I 
examine Robin‘s account in the light of Protean themes of unrestrained mutability, 
contrasting these with a Christianate fear of change. I then explore Simone Weil‘s 
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concept of the Great Beast, as emblematic of this fear of change, in relation to the 
Narcissan and the Protean. I contend that Robin‘s Protean experiences of 
genderedness offer us the possibility of an alternative metaphorical model, beyond 
the Great Beast of unitary doctrinal orthodoxy, of GOD/DE as changeability. I argue 
that the concept of Proteanism, while it flies in the face of mainstream notions of 
divinity as the God-who-changes-not, is supported by Laurel Schneider‘s recent 
work on a ‗theology of multiplicity‘ (2008) and Marcella Althaus-Reid‘s on the 
Queer God (2003). I contend that, as Robin‘s narrative demonstrates the Protean 
with regard to gender, so too do the Queer God and the Multiplicity of God with 
regard to the Divine, and conclude with a conjectural and provisional description of 
the characteristics we might envision Protean GOD/DE to reveal. 
 
Robin: Genderedness That Slips Around 
Robin, now in per late forties, was born and brought up in Holland and went to 
university in Scotland, where person settled after gaining per first degree. Person has 
recently completed a further course of study and had moved out of the city into a 
Scottish village with per partner and twin boys. Judged l-female and assigned 
metafemale1, person describes per genderedness as ‗physically female but with some 
                                                 
1 To briefly recapitulate the gender aspects detailed in Chapter 1: l-gender (looks-like) refers to 
physical characteristics; f-gender (feels like) is about an inner sense of gender identity; p-gender 
(performs like) is the ‗drag‘ we put on to give ourselves the appearance of one of the two available 
options; and j-gender (judged as) is about how other people respond to us and how that impacts on 
our gendered being in the world. The four aspects together form metagender.   
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trans qualities‘ (577)2 and ‗basically it‘s neither male or female [sic], or it‘s both or, 
y‘know, it slips around a bit‘ (737-741). 
 
Robin begins per story with an account of per early spiritual influences: 
Well I suppose I come from a family background where there was a 
lot of interest in religions, and also in things like psychology, so I was 
sort of brought up with that and with people having conversations 
about spiritual things, even though I wasn‘t trained into any 
particular spiritual pathway when I was a child. But I suppose we 
talked about—well, we didn‘t really talk about them a lot—but we 
talked about things like reincarnation or meditation and stuff like 
that, and about energies (19-51). 
 
Person describes two spiritual experiences as foundational: a trip to a New Age 
school, where person experienced meditation for the first time; and a teenage visit to 
a spiritual community, where person undertook ‗a couple of different programmes‘ 
(71-74) from the wide range of activities on offer to visitors. Arising from these early 
influences, person states: 
Most of my spiritual experience was just around nature and just being 
and stuff like that, not particularly channelled, but it was very much 
in the live dimension, and I think that sense of spirituality being a 
live dimension has continued through my life (62-70). 
 
In per teens per parents separated, triggering ‗a kind of dark night of the soul, a sort 
of spiritual crisis I suppose‘ (87-91), although person gives no further details of the 
                                                 
2 As with the previous chapter, I have attached line numbers to direct quotes from the interview text; 
these refer the reader to the relevant verbatim transcription section in Appendix 2. 
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substance or effects of this crisis, passing swiftly on to per current spiritual position 
which has its roots in per mid-20s, when: 
I got interested in paganism and earth-based religion and got 
involved in doing basic spiritual pagan practices with friends. And 
then a bit later I did a training [sic] with someone who‘s involved in 
the New Age scene, around spiritual awareness and energy work and 
stuff like that, and I‘ve also trained as a healer. And I mean now I 
don‘t do a great deal but I‘m kind of just aware that it‘s there (95-
111). 
 
In terms of genderedness Robin describes per f/p-gender as ‗quite unambiguously 
identifying as a girl‘ (120-123) in pre-pubescence, but: 
In my teens I became a bit more gender-ambiguous, and I think it 
was partly round being critical of gender norms, cos I didn‘t really fit 
the gender stereotypes and I had quite a hard time growing up (125-
132). 
 
Person attributes this ‗hard time‘ in part to per l-gender decision to come out as 
bisexual in per teens and to not having a ‗very female‘ (140) p-gender, and recounts 
a diary entry in which person expressed some of per sense of isolation and alienation 
resulting from per schoolmates‘ j-gender assessments: 
I remember at one point writing something like ‗the guys think I‘m a 
gay girl and the girls think I‘m a gay guy‘, and it was this sort of 
despairing moment when,‘ oh, no-one fancies me cos I‘m the wrong 
gender to everyone y‘know‘ [laughing]—it was kind of a horrible 
feeling of just not fitting the norms in terms of my gender and 
sexuality (142-149). 
 
However, person states that the presence of other lesbian and bisexual Women in 
per ‗very progressive‘ (157) school provided per with role models to support per l/p-
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gender choices, and that this alleviated some of per sense of alienation, as did j-
gender affirmation from ‗other people who identified as queer or gay‘ (166-167). 
And, after leaving school, person became involved in ‗the anarchist and squatting 
movement‘ (170) where person met others who were experimenting with p-gender 
subversion: 
I remember a bloke wearing a dress—it wasn‘t gay culture but it was 
kind of an alternative, anarchistic culture—and with that went quite 
a lot of messing around with different boundaries including gender 
and sexuality, and then I started to kind of get quite a lot more 
empowered really around my gender identity and my sexuality (171-
179). 
 
Robin describes per p-gender at that time as not fitting ‗the girly-girly stuff‘ (194), a 
position that generally left per feeling greatly empowered in respect of per f-gender 
sense of not meeting the norms. However, moments of alienation continued to 
obtrude, as demonstrated by the following anecdote in which the repeated phrase ‗I 
didn‘t fit‘ serves to highlight Robin‘s ongoing j-gender discomfort: 
I remember in my early 20s, I was going out with someone at the 
time and I didn‘t used to wear dresses or skirts at all, and one day I 
wore one and they said, ‗oh, you look like a drag queen‘, and I 
remember being kind of quite hurt [laughing], but y‘know, this was 
like I didn‘t fit even though I was more heterosexual and bisexual 
than gay, sort of in terms of my actual sexual practice at that time—I 
didn‘t really fit the stereotypes (195-211). 
 
Robin describes per l-gender position in per early 20s as ‗coming out as a dyke‘ (213), 




well [sighs] I mean I sort of slipped around between identifying as a 
dyke or bisexual, but I was in quite a serious long relationship with a 
woman and I became quite butch, and I kind of started to convey my 
butchness really (214-221). 
 
Despite the breakup of this serious relationship, Robin continued to identify as a 
dyke, reiterating that per p-gender at that time was ‗really quite butch‘ (226-7), 
continuing: 
I think butch for me at that time was a sort of dyke identity, which I 
know it is for a lot of dykes—it was quite a masculine identity but it 
was a female masculine identity, sort of [Judith] Halberstam3 and 
stuff like that (230-234). 
 
At this point in per life, then, Robin regarded per gender identity, certainly as it 
related to per l/p-gender, as well-established and stable. However, around this time 
person had two encounters that began to work changes4 on this sense of stability. 
First, person attended a conference on sexuality: 
because I was very interested in theory and I was going, well, what‘s 
next, y‘know, what‘s the next thing on the agenda, cos there was 
quite a lot of staid stuff, and to me it seemed like it was this stuff 
about transgressing binaries and what happened when you open up 
the binaries and what‘s there really—and I got really interested in 
postmodernism and poststructuralism (248-268). 
 
The result of this encounter with theory on Robin‘s f-gender was so profound that it 
caused per to start to ‗question my dyke identity‘ (279) despite the fact that ‗at that 
                                                 
3 This is a reference to Halberstam‘s book Female Masculinity (1998). 
4 It would be tempting here to use terminology such as ‗undermine‘ or ‗destabilise‘ in relation to the 
changes Robin underwent. However, such terminology carries negative, even pejorative, meanings 
that do not reflect my sense of Robin‘s experiences of fluctuation. 
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time it was a very strong identity—I was quite lesbian feminist, in that sort of camp‘ 
(279-281). This questioning led Robin to revise per l/p-gender identity from dyke to 
bisexual, inevitably moving per away from the lesbian feminist camp. Soon after 
that, person went to a ‗summer school…around homosexuality‘ (282-284), where 
person became friends with a group of ‗gay blokes‘ (285): 
and I always think it‘s quite ironic that that‘s the point at which I 
started to come out as bisexual, cos I got on really well with these 
blokes—prior to that, for quite some time I‘d hardly had any sort of 
social contact with blokes at all—and I got on really well with these 
blokes and I thought, oh god, what am I going to do with this, 
y‘know—it was really awkward (285-291). 
 
The friendship with the Gay Blokes extended beyond the bounds of the summer 
school, leading Robin back to continental Europe for the summer, where person 
became involved in a mainly male drag/burlesque group that existed not only to 
entertain but also to act as quasi ‗agony aunts‘ for the queer community in holiday 
resorts: 
There was sort of an idea about serving the community—we used to 
do things like go out to clubs and pick up all the people who‘d been 
dumped and who‘d had a bit too much to drink, or we used to hand 
out condoms, kind of being there to support the queer community—
it was a bit like unpaid outreach worker really (318-327). 
 
For Robin, per involvement in the Agony Aunts‘ activities not only fulfilled per 
ethically and socio-politically, but also provided per with a powerfully fluid and 
important p-gender ‗sub-personality‘ (351): 
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It was a bit like being transformed on a transgender level, because 
obviously I was dragging up as a man dragging up as a woman5—I 
started to kind of take on a sort of gay bloke identity (348-356). 
 
The ethical/socio-political action aspects of the group, and something in the ritual of 
dragging up itself, had significant spiritual meaning for Robin. Person describes per 
participation in the group as having had strong sacred overtones for per: 
It did have a kind of spiritual…I mean no-one else who was involved 
in it is into spirituality, but for me it had a sort of spiritual dimension. 
It did, it had a spiritual sense to it (337-342). 
 
And person repeats a couple of minutes later: ‗it did, it had a spiritual sense to it‘ 
(372-373), emphasising the importance of this experience. 
 
On per return to Scotland, Robin began ‗socialising with people who were into the 
broader queer scene‘ (373-374), where person began to meet and make friends with 
transgender people, with one of whom person subsequently entered into a 
relationship. Person describes this time in per life with enormous enthusiasm: 
But it was kind of a time for me, exploring stuff around gender and 
sexuality, and it was incredibly exciting, because all of the boundaries 
that I‘d taken for granted started to fall apart (382-386). 
 
However, the experience was also not entirely positive. Seeing per partner 
transitioning from male to female set Robin to thinking deeply about per own f-
gender: 
                                                 
5 To clarify, as a member of this mainly male group, Robin‘s drag was a two-stage affair, involving per 
first taking on a male identity, before ‗re-Femaling‘ as an Aunt. 
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And I really identified with this person and it was kind of like I was 
almost them—do you know what I mean?—and I really did start to 
question my gender identity in a very real way (397-400). 
 
As a result of this profound f-gender enquiry, Robin says: 
I actually took it a bit too far and I got overwhelmed and got ill 
basically and had to take some time out, and I went through a very 
fundamental restructuring of my identity really, where I had to really 
consider, did I want to transition or was this a sort of spiritual 
journey—or an identity journey—but not actually something I 
wanted to make actual in my outside world if you see what I mean 
(401-414). 
 
At that point Robin had ‗stopped identifying as lesbian-feminist—I kind of gave that 
the boot‘ (472-473) and had ‗started to really identify as a trans identity—as part of 
the trans community—and I really saw myself as being part of it‘ (426-427) and, as 
person had been with the drag/burlesque Agony Aunts, was ethically and socio-
politically involved in trans activism. Thus, deciding that, ultimately, per f-gender 
leading was not towards making the outward l-gender journey of physical transition, 
but rather something ‗more sort of an emotional identity, spiritual type thing‘ (418-
419) was immensely difficult and painful. Reflecting on the experience with 
hindsight, person says:  
Y‘know, you start to deconstruct yourself and you lose touch with 
yourself basically—well this is what happened to me and it was 
really, really scary (461-463). 
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What started as deconstruction ended up as breakdown (though Robin never 
actually uses that word), an overwhelming sense of no longer knowing what 
person‘s identity, especially per f-gender, was. In order to recover from this collapse, 
Robin began a deliberate project of rebuilding per self: 
So I sort of had to redefine my identity really, and for me that was a 
really spiritual thing, because what got me through was actually 
getting in contact with my spiritual sense of self and what for me was 
a core (482-486). 
 
The process took ‗a period of maybe six months or a year‘ (510-511), during which 
time person ‗just did a lot of really sustained growth work‘ (511) on per own: 
Deciding who I was, who I wasn‘t, what I wanted in my life, getting 
rid of a whole load of crappy beliefs that I‘d taken on from my family 
and from alternative cultures—it was a really focused sort of sorting 
out, a really sustained rebuilding (513-537). 
 
Looking back on the experience, person sees perself as having been out of the 
‗normal‘ flow not only of genderedness, but also of time: 
In terms of my gender, I sort of made a decision at that point that I 
didn‘t want to go the full way, but in a way it almost felt like I had 
made a gender transition because it was like I‘d been out of being 
female, and I‘d been in what was definitely an ambiguous space for 
quite a while—well, in actual reality it might have only been a few 
days but it felt like it was a period of maybe a year or so (544-554). 
 
And, despite person‘s sustained rebuilding of identity, person feels that per f-gender 
has ‗never really settled again, even though I live as a female‘ (557-558), continuing: 
In terms of my gender identity, I did settle back into something 
which was kind of physically female but had some trans qualities I 
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suppose, and that‘s what I‘ve continued to say—but I think I didn‘t 
kind of want to jump on the trans bandwagon and say ‗oh, I‘m trans‘ 
when I wasn‘t actually having to live any of that, so what I do now is 
to just say, ‗I‘ve had some trans experience but I don‘t identify on an 
everyday basis as trans‘, and that seems to work (576-586). 
 
At this point in per story, Robin turns to the present and describes how per 
genderedness experiences have changed as a result of having set up as a apparently 
nuclear family with per Male, heterosexual partner and small children in a gender-
conservative village. Referring to per own sense of per f-gender as permanently 
unsettled, person reflects with some unhappiness that, in terms of j-gender, person 
now ‗passes‘ and per ambiguity and complexity is no longer visible: 
Sometimes I feel like I‘m living a bit of a lie, cos I live this kind of 
quite ordinary life—I‘m in a relationship with a bloke, and everyone 
thinks I‘m female, but it‘s not really like that—but anyway—yeah 
[sighs] (563-573). 
 
Indeed, a sense of deep sadness for times lost resonates through Robin‘s narrative: at 
the very beginning of per story, person comments that per spiritual practice has 
waned since having the babies; person comments nostalgically on the 
‗fantastic…really good time…[and] real sort of sense of camaraderie‘ (362-363) that 
person experienced in per Gay Bloke identity; per excitement around exploring 
gender boundaries has already been cited; and in explicit relation to per current p/j-
gender situation, person states: 
I mean I don‘t even look butch anymore—I don‘t dress up in 
leathers, I don‘t cut my hair short, I don‘t hang out in dyke clubs 
anymore, I don‘t really engage very much in the trans scene, but 
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that‘s partly because I‘m in a relationship with a bloke and I‘ve got 
the kids so there are practical constraints—I really miss it, I miss it 
really badly, but I kind of feel like I‘ve made some sacrifices that I 
have to live with now really (593-604). 
 
In all, twelve major instances of regret for times lost are manifest in Robin‘s 
narrative, seven of which are explicitly linked to the fact that the l-gender 
experience of childbirth and rearing and being settled into an apparently nuclear 




At this point in Robin‘s story it is appropriate to return to the metaphor of Thinness 
and to ask whether we might apply this to Robin‘s experiences. It is certainly 
possible to read Thinness in Robin‘s experiences: in per description of a 
genderedness that is non-stereotypical, that slips about; in per sense of spirituality in 
the ‗live dimension‘, the transcendent visible in the quotidian materiality of the 
World; in per shifting sexuality and per Queer and transgender transformations; and 
in per sense of having an f-gender that never really settles. However, applying the 
metaphor of Thin to this, it seems inevitable that we have also to consider whether 
the metaphor has an obverse, as we did with Leigh‘s intimations of solidity. For, 
although Robin‘s story clearly demonstrates gender Thinness, there is also much 
that we might describe as Thick or, at least, Thickening.   
200 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Thinness, in relation to gender, is not a 
physical attribute of a particular body, but rather a state of perception, through 
which the onlooker sees a disruption in the solidity of the gender binary, a potential 
breakthrough point to something beyond. In relation to GOD/DE, this manifests in 
locations and people as a sense, more pronounced than normal, that we are in the 
presence of the Divine. One way to describe Thin might be as a window through 
gender into GOD/DE. By analogy, we might then think of Thick as that window 
occluded.  
 
In terms of Robin‘s genderedness, there do seem to be occlusions, on first reading at 
least, appearing to derive from the process of settling into ‗nuclear-family‘ stability. 
With reference to per current gender position, for example, person states: 
I think when I‘m with people who are heterosexual and not 
transgendered I tend to identify more as female, and when I‘m with 
trans folk I tend to become a bit more trans, or that side of me comes 
out, and I mean, there‘s certain things that I‘ll talk about around my 
sexuality and so on that I‘d only talk about with people who are trans 
positive, that I wouldn‘t talk about with my straight friends who 
would probably either be fascinated or horrified (608-622). 
 
Person‘s horror of being imprisoned by externally-enforced norms is very evident in 
per fear that pregnancy might mark per as ‗inescapably‘ (670) and/or ‗essentially‘ 
(702) female, ‗freezing me into a female identity‘ (720) with ‗all the breast feeding 
and all the crap that goes with it‘ (729-730).  
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In relation to the twins, Robin is especially aware of how difficult it would be to 
impose per gender thinking on them, despite per strong desire to ensure their access 
to a wide experience of gender options: 
I would want to encourage them to like pretty things and to be 
sensitive and to be sensitive to nature and to cook—I don‘t know if 
I‘d go as far as giving them girly dolls—I wouldn‘t, though I think if I 
had them on my own or with a trans partner I might—and I mean it 
has been interesting how gendered people have been, in expectations 
of that‘s how they would be and stuff—but I think it‘s up to them 
and what they‘re saying—that should mean that they should have 
the full spectrum, which means they should be brought up as boys 
but they can choose what that means or, if they want to change that 
later on, they can—I think I just try and give them as rich an 
experience as possible basically (810-851). 
 
Person‘s expresses per hopes and fears for per children at some length, taking the 
last 10-or-so minutes of a 55-minute interview to describe how person hopes per 
influence on the twins will overcome the external influences of growing up in ‗quite 
a narrow-minded‘ (878) village. 
 
But it is in relation to Robin‘s own sense of gender fluidity or ambiguity that the 
gender-Thickening effects of parenthood seem to be most obvious and most 
poignant: 
I think at the end of the day having a stable family is more important 




It almost feels like the gender stuff‘s a bit of a luxury really, like I 
don‘t have the space—do you know what I mean? At the moment 
exploring my gender fluidity is a luxury that I can‘t really afford 
(764-768). 
 
Gender fluidity has dwindled from a source of excited exploration, transformation 
and spiritual sustenance to ‗faffing round‘, a ‗luxury‘ and an unaffordable one at that. 
 
However, all we do in exploring the notion of Thickness is to create an(other) 
unhelpful binary opposition, with Thin as the valorised position and Thick as the 
pejorative. Using this metaphorical framework, Robin‘s story reads as tragic, the 
triumph of nature over culture, biology as destiny. But, without wishing to minimise 
the pervading sadness of Robin‘s occluded experiences, what if we choose to resist 
the binary urge, saying instead that, though Thin exists in varying degrees, there 
does not have to be an alternative labelled Thick. There are other metaphorical 
models that we might derive from Robin‘s story.  
 
A Hall of Mirrors 
If we regard Thick as a window occluded, we might then consider the window to 
have become, rather, a mirror, a metaphor which proves somewhat apt in relation to 
Robin‘s story, at least at first sight. One striking feature of this story is the way in 
which person describes encounters with communities of people in whose attributes, 
lifestyles and/or activities person sees per self reflected, sometimes as person is and 
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sometimes as person wishes to be. This has the effect of creating a kind of Hall of 
Mirrors for the onlooker. Beginning with the conversations about psychology, 
religion, reincarnation and meditation that informed per early spiritual life, the 
reflections progress through: the positive lesbian and bisexual role models at school; 
playing around with gender fluidity of the anarchist and squatting movement; 
lesbian feminism and female masculinity; postmodernist deconstructions of binary 
gender; ethico/socio/political action and gender experimentation with Gay Blokes 
and the Agony Aunts; per identification with per transgender lover; and per current 
family circumstances. While most of these reflections provide Robin with positive 
experiences, some reflect back pain, alienation and isolation as, for instance, in per 
recollection of being ‗the wrong gender to everyone‘ at school, of being told by a 
lover that person looked like a drag queen, and of being ultimately overwhelmed by 
per f-gender explorations. Negatives aside, however, each group person encounters 
offers Robin an image of perself to whom person is strongly attracted. In this 
respect, person resembles the mythical Narcissus gazing at perself in a still forest 
pool and seeing someone to love in its reflective surface. Thus, it is to this myth that 
I now turn to explore its metaphorical potential. 
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The Mirror of Narcissus 
The Myth of Narcissus‘ Mirror 
As retold by Robert Graves (1955b, 286-288), Narcissus‘ story runs thus: the 
beautiful youth, son of a nymph and a god, is loved by many, both Girls and Boys, 
but loves none in return. Narcissus‘ mother, concerned for the welfare of per son, 
consults the prophet Tiresias who tells per that per son will live well into old age 
only provided Narcissus does not come to know perself. The nymph Echo falls in 
love with Narcissus but is unrequited and wastes away, leaving only per voice 
behind. But Echo‘s dying prayer for vengeance is heard by Nemesis and punishment 
is duly meted out. Narcissus comes upon a spring, ‗clear as silver, and never yet 
disturbed‘ (ibid, 287), and, stopping to drink, is arrested by the sight of per 
reflection. Not recognising this as perself, Narcissus takes it to be a beautiful and 
desirable boy with whom person falls deeply in love. Eventually the true nature of 
per object of desire becomes clear to per and person is distraught, knowing that per 
love can never be requited: ‗The vision is only shadow, only reflection, lacking any 
substance‘ (Ovid in Kristeva 1987, 104). Recognising the truth and yet unable to tear 
perself away, person withers and dies, leaving behind an eponymous flower and a 
prophecy fulfilled.  
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The tale of Narcissus has ‗nourished Western thought about love and the self for the 
past two thousand years‘6 (Adams 2000, 427). References and allusions are 
commonplace in mediaeval writings such as The Romance of the Rose (Nouvet 
2000), Le Lai de Narcisus (Adams 2000) and the works of Dante (Nolan 1990) and in 
Early Modern works such as the poetry of Edmund Spenser (Edwards 1977). And, of 
course, it is impossible to reference without also making mention of the central part 
the myth plays in Freud‘s epoch-making psychoanalytic theories7. From the point of 
this review, however, it is not the fundamental importance of Freud‘s thinking on 
narcissism to his libido theory that concerns us, nor the subsequent psychoanalytic 
theories of such writers as Kristeva, Lacan and Irigaray8, but rather what has been 
read from the original Narcissus myth and how this manifests in the literature. 
Furthermore, I am interested as much in what is said about the nature of the Mirror 
as in the character of Narcissus. I begin this review, therefore, not with 
psychoanalysis but with mediaeval literature. 
                                                 
6 According to Julia Kristeva, the story‘s entry into Western discourse runs concurrently with that of 
Christianity (1987, 103) and represents a ‗fundamental topos‘ of early Christian thinking; the story of 
Narcissus and the story of Christianity are intimately intertwined from the start (ibid, 105). Tracy 
Adams attests to the value of the myth thus (2000, 428): ‗The Narcissus trope is sufficiently complex 
to bear conflicting interpretations. On the one hand, it can be dovetailed into a Neoplatonic 
philosophy of the image, where it serves as a negative exemplum. On the other, it plausibly suggests 
the opposing philosophy that material contact is an essential part of living, in and of itself, and not 
merely an access to the life of the spirit‘. 
7 Although, according to Gay (1995, 545), at the time of publication Freud downplayed the 
‗revolutionary implications‘ of On Narcissism to per early theories on libido, by 1924 in An 
Autobiographical Study, Freud was claiming per insights as having ‗fundamental importance for the 
libido theory‘ (1995, 35) and in Civilisation and its Discontents in 1930 as ‗The decisive step forward‘ 
(ibid, 753). 
8 In the context of this brief review, I have not visited the work of Lacan and Irigaray since, unlike 
Freud and Kristeva, they do not refer in any detail to the actual myth of Narcissus in their writings on 
the mirror stage of human development.  
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Mirror as Self Seduction 
In mediaeval literature, Tracy Adams asserts, Narcissus‘ Mirror, as the material 
World, offers merely an image of true spiritual reality and Narcissus‘ mistake is to 
confuse the one with the other (2000, 428). What kills Narcissus is per unrequited 
physical passion for what turned out to have been merely a shadow in the Mirror 
(ibid, 434), the material mistaken for the transcendent. The Mirror thus highlights 
our innate tendency to be seduced by ‗object incapable of providing fulfillment‘ 
(ibid, 436).  According to Calvin Edwards, Narcissus clings to the reflection in the 
Mirror, but this self to which person clings is already in the past, a reflection of who 
Narcissus was before self-knowledge changed per (1977, 65). Ultimately, Narcissus 
remains fixed on the Mirror, refusing to use per knowledge to free perself from its 
thrall, feeding per body and not per soul, in ‗a kind of…hoarding of the self‘ (ibid, 
76). 
 
The terminology of narcissism in psychoanalytic theory, deriving from Freud‘s9 
notion that Narcissus ‗preferred his own reflection to everything else‘ (Freud 1995, 
463), was used ‗to denote the attitude of a person who treats his own body in the 
                                                 
9 The terminology was, according to Freud in per paper of 1914, On Narcissism, initially developed by 
Paul Näcke in 1899. Other sources (e.g. Britannica Online Encyclopedia) attribute the identification 
of the narcissism as a mental disorder to Havelock Ellis in 1898. 
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same way in which the body of a sexual object is ordinarily treated‘10 (ibid, 545). 
While Freud (and psychoanalysis in general) ultimately moved away from the 
notion of narcissism as abnormal, in a recent series of commentaries on the concept 
in the journal Psychological Inquiry the self-regarding and self-deceptive traits of 
Narcissus remain generally viewed as pathological11. Little is said in this discipline, 
however, of the nature of the Narcissan Mirror, though the underlying assumption 
is that the reflection the Mirror produces, and thus the Mirror itself, will always 
play us false. 
 
                                                 
10 As such, narcissism was first regarded as an abnormal or pathological mental state. In earlier work, 
For example Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood published in 1910, Freud had made 
reference to narcissism as adult ‗perversion‘ (1995, 462-463), but by the publication of On Narcissism 
in 1914 (ibid, 545), Freud had begun to see it as endemic to early childhood development and a 
foundational experience of humanity.  In this respect, Freud cited its implication in the development 
of homosexuality in men According to Freud, a homosexual man has repressed per love for per 
mother and put love of perself in its place, taking ‗his own person as a model in whose likeness he 
chooses a new object of his love. In this way he becomes a homosexual…He finds the object of his 
love along the path of narcissism‘ (1995, 463). Normal development saw the child turn outward from 
the primary narcissism of being in love with his [sic] own body and ‗the woman who nurses him‘ 
(ibid, 554), from the reflection in the Mirror, to seek ‗object-love of the attachment type‘ (ibid), that 
is to say to Other(s) rather than self, the real rather than the reflected. 
11 The narcissistic self appears to hold itself in high regard, but is in fact ‗unstable, vulnerable…fragile‘ 
and self-deceiving (Andersen, Miranda, and Edwards 2001, 197). It shores up a ‗Taj Mahal‘ of 
grandiose self images on a shaky quicksand of foundations (Arkin and Lakin 2001, 203) comprised of 
equal parts ‗self-love and self-loathing‘ (Brown and Bosson 2001, 210). Thus Narcissus might be 
considered to be addicted to false self-worth (Baumeister and Vohs 2001, 206). However, while such 
clinical accounts of the ‗condition‘ suggest that Narcissus is ‗brittle, empty and depleted‘ (Campbell 
2001, 215), research contends that narcissism may in fact be a logical coping strategy in a World that 
encourages grandiose self images and the yielding to all inner urges (ibid). 
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Mirror as Prison of the Past 
Philosopher Louis Lavelle (1993), uses the myth in his 1939 work L‘Erreur de 
Narcisse12 the central concern of which is self-love, even self-obsession, and its 
effects on self-understanding and self-development. The self that we develop in 
Narcissan contemplation is, person asserts, inherently faulty, and the ‗pathetic 
enterprise‘ of being a spectator of oneself, is ‗doomed‘; instead of living per life, 
Narcissus dies in contemplation of it (ibid, 27-28). The illusion of self-knowledge in 
the Mirror is a trap, a prison that pretends to a reality it does not hold, no aid to 
progress but rather a barrier which we ‗batter with clenched fists‘ but cannot break 
(ibid, 28-29). 
 
In Lavelle‘s assessment, the Narcissan self is faulty not simply because it 
contemplates itself but because the self it contemplates longer exists. What we see 
when we look in the Mirror is a self that is past (cf Edwards above). Our ‗real‘ self is 
the self that is continuously being developed through forward movement in time 
(ibid, 30-31). Narcissan contemplation is an act of self-idolatry (ibid, 35) in which 
we turn from the world beyond self, ‗the universe flashing into being‘ before our 
eyes, in favour of self as object (ibid, 32-33).  
                                                 
12 This title is somewhat inaccurately translated into English as The Dilemma of Narcissus (1993), 
inaccurate since Lavelle is less concerned with Narcissus‘ dilemma than with per terrible mistake: 
‗Narcissus is expecting that his eyes, his eyes alone, will reveal his essential self, and the tragedy is 
that what he sees with his eyes is nothing more than appearance‘ (ibid, 26). Person gazes into the 
pool, hoping to find someone to love but instead finds that ‗[n]o other love than the love of himself 
pursues him…even at those moments when he tries hardest to detach himself from it‘ (ibid, 27).  
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True self-knowledge comes not through the Mirror but through a renunciation of 
the image of self past in favour of action to create self in the future, to realise our full 
potential; ‗self-consciousness‘ says Lavelle, ‗is not a light which illuminates a pre-
existing reality without changing it, but an activity which deliberates on its 
decisions and holds its own destiny in its hands‘ (ibid, 44). And while it is through 
our activities that our self is formed, it is through relationships with others that this 
self is ultimately revealed to us. Narcissus, trapped in the Mirror, melancholy and 
alone, does not realise ‗that all men need the mutual presence of others in order to 
bear the burden of existence‘ and so dies, knowing neither perself nor per saviours 
(ibid, 53-54).  
 
Mirror as Erzatz of GOD/DE 
In Tales of Love, Julia Kristeva (1987) uses the myth to critique mainstream Western 
theology and philosophy. Narcissus is misled by the pursuit of the ‗vain shadows‘ of 
the World in the Mirror and drawn away from contemplating the transcendent in 
favour of self-contemplation (ibid, 106). Person cannot see that the reflection is 
indeed perself (ibid, 107); person lacks both self-knowledge and knowledge of the 
transcendent. The Mirror into which Narcissus looks for an Other to love, gives back 
only a Self, an ersatz of GOD/DE, and sorrow, alienation and death are the 
inevitable result (ibid, 121).  
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‗Narcissus kills himself‘ asserts Kristeva, ‗because he realizes that he loves a fake‘ 
(ibid, 126); Mediaeval appropriations of the myth as emblematic of mendacity, 
fraud, forgery, counterfeit, and the overturn of the moral order (ibid, 127-128) 
derive from this. What Narcissus fails to realise, however, is that person does have a 
genuine object within per, which Kristeva calls ‗psychic space‘, that is worthy of 
love, not the fake divinity that is merely the image of perself, (ibid, 116). And to 
traverse this psychic space, two paths are available to per, to us: we might plunge in 
a narcissistic pursuit of Self with religious fervor; or we might become Narcissan 
artists, ‗watery prowler[s]‘, eschewing self-centeredness in favour of creative 
explorations of ‗labyrinthian [sic] and muddy canals of an undecideable sailing‘ (ibid, 
135-136) into our psychic space. 
 
Robin as Unceasing Invention 
Despite the potential for this myth to yield multiple interpretations, one thing is 
certain: the Mirror of Narcissus is a doomful and deadly thing. Having only the 
seeming of stability and reality, it is in fact a container of illusion and vain shadows, 
filled with undeliverable promises, addiction, lies, counterfeit and deceit. It is 
nothing more than a trap and a prison. It is the self absorbed with its own 
materiality and wilfully ignorant of all that transcends it. It is the World pretending 
to be GOD/DE. In Weilian terms the Mirror is a manifestation of Gravity—we 
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might call it a ‗Gravity Well‘13—that keeps us from rising up to GOD/DE. And 
Narcissus, the enthralled gazer, is as unstable as the mirror‘s reflection. Person is 
lacking in self-awareness, loves and loathes perself in equal measure, is vulnerable, 
fragile, brittle, empty and depleted.  
 
Lavelle asserts that every encounter, every relationship with the world beyond self, 
changes both the self and the encountered. Thus, the way to avoid the Narcissan 
trap of (self)idolatry is to commit wholeheartedly to this inevitable mutability: 
There is a fundamental rule which I must keep ever before my 
eyes, namely, that my life's every action, my mind's every 
thought, my body's every movement should be, as it were, a 
commitment and a creation of my being, an expression of a 
decision taken, and of my determination to be what these 
proclaim…For every man invents himself unceasingly, though he 
does not know what the end will be. As soon as he stops inventing, 
he changes into a thing (89).  
 
In per reaction to the many mirroring episodes in per narrative, Robin has far more 
in common with Lavelle‘s fundamental rule than with the trapped and dying 
Narcissus, unable to reflect upon per own reflection, unable to change even when 
death stares per in the face. Robin is very far from this unreflective, unreflexive 
creature; in response to per experiences, person does indeed invent perself 
unceasingly and does not change into a thing.  
                                                 
13 In scientific terms, a gravity well is ‗the pull of gravity that a large body in space exerts‘ upon 
objects that fall into it. The greater the mass of the body, the larger or deeper the well it creates; the 




We see, for example, how the influence of per family on per spiritual beliefs and a 
‗whole load of [other] crappy beliefs‘, concerning per past self in fact, are dissected 
and, where necessary, discarded as the Mirror‘s illusions and vain shadows in the 
‗really sustained rebuilding‘ that person undertakes after per breakdown. Per lesbian 
feminism, despite its initial appearance of stability and reality, does not survive 
contact with the promising ‗what‘s next‘ of the influential conference, per growing 
interest in postmodernism/poststructuralism and per involvement with the Gay 
Blokes and Agony Aunts. And, despite the sadness it brings on the one hand, on the 
other the relinquishment of what might be seen as the idolatrous luxury of gender 
experimentation in favour of the nourishing reward of parenthood has brought per 
great fulfillment.  
 
Robin does indeed mirror each of the situations to which person is drawn, but the 
Mirror never succeeds in trapping per since person never refuses the opportunity to 
unstick perself, not necessarily from a counterfeit or deceitful situation, but 
certainly from a stagnant one, and move on. Unlike Narcissus, person does not hoard 
perself, refuse to know perself, or cling to a self that is history. In perself, and also in 
per children, person assents to potential futures flashing into being before per eyes. 
Robin is no narcissistic self-pursuer, doomed to gaze on, unrequited, long after the 
reflection‘s promise has proven undeliverable, eschewing a life of active engagement 
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with the future in favour of a fantasy world of times past. Person‘s narrative is far 
more one of Narcissan watery prowling, of turning from the Mirror in favour of 
creative explorations of the labyrinthian and muddy canals of an undecideable 
sailing, of setting per course away from ‗staid stuff‘ and towards the encounter with 
‗what‘s next‘. This watery prowling therefore benefits from examination in the light 




The tale of Proteus, ‗the shy metamorphic sea-god‘ (Peradotto 1984, 213) runs thus 
(Graves 1955a, 346): Menelaus, struggling against adverse weather conditions to 
return home from the Trojan War, is advised by the nymph Eithodea at Pharos to 
‗capture her prophetic father, Proteus, who alone can advise Menelaus how to break 
the adverse spell and secure a southerly breeze‘ (ibid). Having, on the nymph‘s 
advice, disguised perself and three companions in seal skins, Menelaus seizes Proteus 
as the god comes ashore to bask with a flock of seals, whereupon Proteus begins to 
change, becoming first lion, then serpent, panther, boar, water, and tree, in an 
attempt to break Menelaus‘ grip. But Menelaus holds fast until the god returns to 




Like the Narcissus myth, though arguably by no means as nourishing to Western 
thought, the tale of changeful Proteus, as a metaphor for unrestrained mutability14, 
speaks to the imaginations of writers from diverse disciplines and times. Apart from 
the classics15, Proteus has perhaps most notably made an appearance in the scientific 
writings of Francis Bacon (2009 [1733]) in the seventeenth century and in James 
Joyce‘s Ulysses (2003 [1922]) in the twentieth. The god is also experiencing 
something of a renaissance in the late twentieth/early twenty-first century, where 
person is wrestled with in disciplines as various as communications management 
(Amidon and Blythe 2008), virtual reality (Yee and Bailenson 2007), career planning 
analysis (Inkson 2005), pedagogic research (Smith 2008), and postmodern 
psychology (Lifton 1993)16. In the following review, I draw mainly on Proteus‘s 
appearances in English literature, philosophy and psychology. 
 
                                                 
14 Although Proteus has come to stand for unconstrained metamorphosis, the myth itself catalogues a 
very specific set of changes, which Graves expands upon, detailing the particular cultural references 
each item represents: for example, lion and boar are ‗intelligible emblems of a two-season year‘, while 
the panther is linked to Dionysus, trees have a variety of sacred connotations, and so on (1995a, 354). 
15 Burns (2001, 970) notes that, in antiquity, Proteus‘ story occurred in different forms in Homer‘s 
Odyssey , Plato‘s Dialogues and the lesser-known Antiquities of Egypt by Dioderus Siculus. In the 
Antiquities, Proteus appears not only as a prophesying, mutable sea-god who challenges terrestrial 
order, but also as a human king, ‗a pillar of strength and a preserver of values‘ (Lifton 1993, 5).  
16 In this last, Lifton‘s Protean Self is one of a number of metaphors relating to the postmodern 
perception of the self as no longer permanent, stable, unitary and autonomous. Other metaphors 
include the self as saturated and under siege (Gergen 2000), Coyote or Trickster (Phelan 1996), 
nomadic (Braidotti 1994), storied (Holstein and Gubrium 2000), and either/both empty or/and 
multiple (Hoffman et al 2008, 143). In terms of theories of the self, each of these metaphorical models 
has aspects in common with the Protean Self. However, in terms of this study, it is the elaboration of 
the Proteus metaphor that concerns us, rather than place of Lifton‘s theory in the ‗family‘ of 
postmodern theories of subjectivity. 
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Multiplicity and Deceit 
This review begins with the work of natural scientist Francis Bacon. Peter Pesic 
(1999) notes that, for Bacon, Proteus stood for ‗Matter—the most ancient of things, 
next to God‘ (Pesic 1999, 84). Bacon proposed that, in order to understand nature, 
one must bind Proteus with chains and ‗vex‘ per into revealing per secrets through 
scientific experimentation, a proposition that has earned Bacon the opprobrium of 
feminist scholars as the rapist of (female) Nature17. From the point of view of this 
study what is interesting is that Bacon accorded Proteus near-parity with GOD/DE 
and our struggle with per as always ‗the moment of creation, charged with divine 
energies‘ (ibid, 88). But, Pesic reminds us, while Proteus revealed GOD/DE, was the 
most ancient of things next to GOD/DE, person was not to be mistaken for GOD/DE 
ÆRSELF (ibid, 86). 
 
William Burns notes that there were both positive and negative characteristics 
assigned to Proteus as an allegory of ‗multiplicity and deceit‘ (2001, 970). Positive 
associations both with matter as a whole and with specific material substances made 
Proteus attractive to the alchemists, for example symbolising the power to transform 
base matter into gold (ibid, 975). Proteus also represented the ideal ruler, a Solomon 
who keeps the balance in a kingdom by shifting position through wise judgement 
                                                 
17 Vandana Shiva, for example, interprets this as ‗a masculine mode of aggression against nature and 
domination over women‘ (1996, 269), on the basis that nature and the material are indelibly 
identified with women. However, Pesic argues that, in Bacon‘s case, Proteus, and thus nature, is most 
definitely gendered male (1999, 84). Burns also contends that the unambiguously male status of 
Proteus contradicts feminist concerns about Bacon‘s violent vexations of nature (2001, 969, 973).  
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(ibid, 976). However, for those opposed to occult knowledge, Proteus represented 
false knowledge (ibid, 972) and the shifting, mutable person who might also be 
considered untrustworthy, deceitful, hypocritical and fraudulent, ‗a being of many 
forms…, all of them…false‘, whose archetype was not Solomon but Shakespeare‘s 
Richard III (ibid, 978)18.  
  
In an analysis of the work of sixteenth-century author John Marston19, Steven 
Shelburne explicates an unalloyed negative portrayal of Proteus as an expression of 
man‘s [sic] ability to change per outward show, (1989, 200). Shelburne observes that 
‗a contemporary distrust of unlicensed change‘ meant that ‗Proteans‘ were seen both 
as deceivers of others, in that their appearance obscured their real motives, and as 
deceivers of themselves, since by focussing all their energies on outward show, they 
failed to understand their own ‗inner substance‘ (ibid, 201). And the motive behind 
this deception was to court the favourable opinion of others; good opinion required 
that one change on its whim, in order to fit in with the crowd.  
 
                                                 
18 Burns asserts that the trajectory from positive to negative connotations for Proteus occurred over 
the course of the seventeenth century. By the end of that century, Proteus had so fallen out of favour 
that per myth declined into the tale of ‗a king of Egypt whose shape-changing was attributed to the 
fact that he changed his clothes daily‘ (2001, 979), thus effectively de-Proteanising Proteus. Jeff 
Shulman, however, traces this dichotomy back to the Renaissance or even earlier, noting that 
Renaissance literature ‗inherited two opposing traditions‘, the one aligning Proteus with lust, 
deception and unstable passions, the other demonstrating ‗prudent adaptability‘ and ‗amending 
oneself to the necessities of life‘ (1985, 267-268). 
19 The work in question is The Metamorphosis of Pigmalions Image and Certain Satyre‘, published in 
May 1598. 
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According to Jocelyn Harris (1990), the Protean, in the character of Richardson‘s 
Lovelace20, is no slave to good opinion. Proteus, person avers, was viewed in the 
eighteenth century as ‗at once a lawmaker and a lawbreaker‘, paradoxically 
emblematic of man‘s [sic] potential both to create and to destroy (ibid, 327). 
Proteus/Lovelace was a Hobbesean21 figure, ‗naturally restless‘ and driven solely by 
self-interest in a restless, materialistic, power-hungry, corrupt universe (ibid, 328), 
with analogs that included Satan perself (ibid, 338). Yet this Protean rakehell22, the 
most corrupt of Men, might also appear as ‗the one honest man in a corrupt 
world…lashing the world of knaves and whores for its own good‘ (ibid, 334), 
standing out against a Good Opinion that was both degenerate and hypocritical. 
Thus Proteus may have been a scoundrel, but never thoroughly so since, without per 
the norms of a degenerate society might have remained unchallenged. 
 
Wendy Olmstead (1996) offers a somewhat different analysis of Proteus, espousing a 
view that person, along with other metamorphic Classical divinities, represented ‗all 
the fears and necessities of exogamy…stories of pursuit, of travel, of unfamiliar and 
alien loves‘ and, further, that those unfamiliar and alien loves resonate with ‗the 
                                                 
20 Lovelace the rake is one of the chief protagonists in Samuel Richardson‘s epistolary novel Clarissa, 
published in 1748 (Richardson [n.d.]) 
21 Thomas Hobbes, seventeenth century author of Leviathan and explicator of ‗social contract theory‘, 
determined that, without a social agreement to abide by laws ‗upon which comfortable, sociable, 
civilized life depends‘ (Lloyd and Sreedhar 2008, [n.p.]), man‘s [sic] life in a state of ungoverned 
nature is ‗solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short‘ (Hobbes in Lloyd and Sreedhar 2008, [n.p.]). 
22 Harris argues (1990, 333) that Lovelace was based on the most notorious rake of the seventeenth 
century, John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester (1647-1680) who ‗[d]ead at thirty-three…epitomized the 
wit and wickedness of the age‘: person was brutal and amoral, with a ‗demonic‘ reputation for 
promiscuity, obscenity, violence and general debauchery (ibid, 333-4). 
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mystery of the divine‘, the transcendent manifesting in the quotidian (ibid, 167). 
Thus Protean change demonstrated not deception but a crossing of boundaries from 
the know to the unknown through the mutations of both natural and social 
identities23.  
 
Theresa Kelley24 observes that the Romantic poets valued Proteus as a metaphor for 
language that was supple and polyvalent, that ‗refused to be hostage to the desire for 
fixed or stock meanings‘ even if its form is ‗momentarily held captive‘ (1982, 630). 
Though both Proteus and the poet needed to put form to their fluctuation in order 
to be understood, that form was never to be permanent but ever productive of new 
forms and new meanings (ibid, 631). The Protean poet thus sought expression that 
‗resist[ed] capture‘ no matter how vigorously one wrestled with it (ibid, 632), indeed 
expressed its mutability the more so the more vigorous the wrestling. 
 
                                                 
23 Olmstead illustrates ways in which categories between culture and nature, between genders, classes 
and ethnicities became blurred, insiders became outsiders and vice versa (1996, 168); through the 
rites of hospitality, ‗such as eating, sexual intercourse and storytelling‘, outsiders became, at least 
partially, assimilated (ibid, 170).  
24 Kelley situates per analysis of Protean allegory in Romantic poetry in relation to the account of 
eighteenth century mythographer Jacob Bryant. For Bryant, Proteus, as Bacon‘s ‗first-born of matter‘, 
stood as ‗the real Father of the postdiluvian world‘, tasked not with creating the world ex nihilo but 
with recreating it after the Flood. Thus, in this schema, Proteus‘s analogs were not scoundrels and 
rakes but ‗none other than Noah, Noüs and Prometheus‘, with the power to recreate and renew 
matter, offering hope to survivors of the greatest disaster (1982, 629).  
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Outrunning the Straight Path 
In the early twentieth century, a pamphlet by Vernon Lee25, Proteus or the Future of 
Intelligence (2010 [1925]), expresses ideas which, in content if not perhaps in tone, 
are remarkably aligned with Weil‘s26. Lee writes that it is by ‗intelligence‘, rather 
than ‗logic‘ or ‗reason‘, that the human project will flourish, since the inevitability of 
change must be approached with flexibility, a characteristic of the first rather than 
the last two (ibid, 20-21). Reason produces totalitarianisms, stimulates the ‗glorious 
unimpeded violence of collective passions‘ (ibid, 22) and the ‗too often degrading 
loyalty to causes and ideas‘ (ibid, 34). What reason fails to realise is that everything 
about the World is Protean, subject to constant change. Thus, Proteus and reality are 
one and the same thing (ibid, 6), and there is no more worthwhile a human 
endeavour than ‗hunting Proteus‘, looking for and looking at the contradiction and 
mutability that is reality itself; it is ‗the [my emphasis] chief creative 
joy…outrunning the straight path…in circles like those of a dog pleased to be taken 
for a walk‘ (ibid, 47)27.  
                                                 
25 Vernon Lee was the pseudonym of Violet Paget (1856-1935), an author of supernatural fiction and 
member of the English Aesthetic Movement. The pamphlet Proteus or the Future of Intelligence was 
one of a series, Today and Tomorrow, the first in which was J B S Haldane‘s Daedalus or Science and 
the Future (Stableford 2001, [n.p.]).  
26 The resemblance is perhaps not so remarkable when one notes that both writers were living 
through a period of European history that was awash with totalitarianisms and that both were 
writing contra that spirit of the age. And it is not only Lee‘s writing that calls Weil to mind. Like 
Weil, Lee adopted an androgynous appearance, eschewed marriage and ‗never made the slightest 
effort to cultivate feminine mannerisms‘ (Stableford 2001, [n.p.])). Also, Lee suffered from chronic 
illness described by Stableford as ‗neurasthenic disorders‘ which, though debilitating, were never 
allowed to interfere with per work (ibid). 
27 However, Lee qualifies this assertion with the observation that it may be our limited human 
perspective, our ‗narrow and shifting field of vision‘ than makes reality appear Protean, adding, in a 
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In a series of Weilian parallels, Lee notes briefly that the Protean intelligence refuses 
‗to regard means as ends‘; lauds its capacity to take ‗passionate pleasure in dealing 
with Otherness and…frequent indifference to here and now, [and] disrespect to self‘ 
(ibid, 22-23); and insists that, in its service, we renounce self-concern in favour of 
‗whatever is not ourself‘, even our own personalities, which we should look at 
objectively from a renunciatory position (ibid, 12-13). Accepting that reality is 
opaque, that it ‗has ways of its own and does not exists merely to suit our liking‘ 
(ibid, 14), prevents us from reaching too-hasty conclusions about phenomena and 
events since the more we observe the mutability and instability of reality, the less 
‗cocksureness‘ there is likely to be in our judgments (ibid, 42-43). This selfless 
approach to understanding reality engenders ‗decency‘ in us, for while it makes us 
‗irresponsible‘, in that we care little for making mistakes, it also makes us responsive 
to others, as well as lighthearted, discursive, unabashedly slovenly (in a good way), 
impolite and frivolous. Most of all it gives us (counter)balance, ‗because [Protean 
intelligence] can always take its time, poise circling round and round, and reverse its 
movement‘ as and when new information presents itself (ibid, 21-22). And if we 
subscribe to Lee‘s project, Protean intelligence will begin to replicate itself as ‗[one] 
intelligent mode of thought inevitably leads to another [and]…Every intelligent 
                                                                                                                                               
prefiguring of quantum physics, that perhaps Protean reality changes because we are watching (2010 
[1925], 8-9).  
221 
book adds…to the intelligence of at least one reader‘ (ibid, 52), a sort of Weilian 
calling down of the good into the World. 
 
Flexible Adaptation 
Jay Lifton situates per 1993 work The Protean Self within postmodernist accounts of 
subjectivity inasmuch as it embraces postmodernism‘s ‗contingency, multiplicity and 
polyvocality‘, and its ‗playful self-ironizing patterns‘ (ibid, 8-9)28. The Protean self, 
Lifton finds, loosely integrates within perself per disparate elements, requiring only 
‗a modicum of inner continuity‘ (87), not seeking a secure unification but rather 
‗steer[ing]…a course that is both fluid and ethically formed‘ (ibid, 91). This self seeks 
not to tie perself firmly to a single cause, doctrine or ideology, but aims to maintain 
a balance, ‗a certain poise…bound up with agility, with flexible adaptation‘ (ibid, 
93). The Protean self performs a balancing act between responsive mutability on the 
one hand and consolidation and coherence on the other, presenting perself as ‗both 
fluid and grounded‘ (ibid, 9). This inherent flexibility ensures that the progress of 
the Protean self through time is not a linear one, not bound by normative 
expectations of life stage events; this self ‗presses the limits of the life cycle‘ (ibid, 
124), ‗darts and teases‘, less concerned with stable and foreseeable progress than 
                                                 
28 Lifton does not, however, align per work with those who equate the above with the total 
disappearance of anything we might call a coherent self (1993, 8-9). Rather, person determines that, 
though the self is indeed fluid and many-sided, it ‗turns out to be surprisingly resilient‘ (ibid, 1), 
shifting as time and circumstance requires but never, at least in its healthy form, totally losing form 
or cohesion (ibid, 5).  
222 
with manoeuverability through the shifting currents of unpredictable events29 (ibid, 
93). 
 
In terms of connection to others, the Protean self seeks commitment but is averse to 
dogma; connections to others are thus, necessarily, elusive, fluctuating and difficult 
to maintain, even as they are necessary to ground the self in relationship with others 
(ibid, 120-121). Thus, the Protean self suffers the ethical dilemma of how to live a 
principled, morally consistent life ‗in the midst of [constant] psychological flux‘ 
(ibid, 6). Lifton finds that the Protean self only ever partially resolves this dilemma 
but that, by constructing ‗irregular groupings‘ (ibid, 106), partial and fluctuating 
communities ‗in odd places and combinations‘ (ibid, 103), alliances that may come 
and go, the Protean self both acquires and maintains necessary connection and 
ethical grounding and, in the process, participates in the creation of new, more 
flexible, more creative concepts of community30 (ibid, 106).  
 
                                                 
29 This notion of the Protean self‘s non-linear progress bears a marked resemblance to Judith 
Halberstam‘s notion of Queer temporalities. Queer lives, person argues, are lived ‗unscripted by the 
conventions of family, inheritance and child rearing‘ (2005, 2), ungoverned by heteronormative, 
middle-class notions of reproductivity-driven respectability that valorise longevity, family history 
and the accumulation of property, and expect life-stage events to happen in a predictable sequence 
(ibid, 152).  
30 Characteristic of the Protean self in Protean community include: links forged through the 
commonality of shared experiences rather than presumptions of sameness based on class, race, 
ethnicity and so on (Lifton 1993, 214); embrace of multilocality and ‗the evolutionary capacity to 
connect to faraway places‘ (ibid, 230); and the capacity for empathy, for appreciating the experiences 
of others without necessarily having to have experienced the same oneself (ibid, 214). 
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The Protean self is not without a dark side; exposure to this ‗chaos of possibilities‘ 
might render the self incoherent, mire per in ethical superficiality and inertia, stun 
per into immobility and/or overwhelm per with a ‗cumulative sense of loss‘31 (ibid, 
190-191). However, it is the endless recombining of experiences and responses that 
creates the specificity of each life (ibid, 51) and, though constant change might 
makes us vulnerable, yet it ensures that ‗we need never stand still‘ (ibid, 49). Better 
yet, it develops in us the capacity to emerge from ‗stuckness‘, from slavish adherence 
to a particular mode of being/believing even after that mode has ceased to be of use 
to us (ibid, 51). An embrace of the Protean, Lifton finds, develops maturity (ibid, 9), 
openness and sensitivity to the ‗outside world‘ (ibid, 58), imagination (ibid, 102) and 
an ironic, self-deprecating humour that values absurdity (ibid, 94).  
 
Robin: Fluid and Ethically Formed 
In summation, what we see of Proteus as a metaphor are two contradictory sets of 
characteristics. On the one hand, person represents deceit, hypocrisy, illusions, 
evasiveness and fraud, the evil alchemist, the rake, the libertine and even Satan 
perself. Person is all form and no substance, in thrall to the good opinion of the 
World, unquestioning and blind. At best person deceives only perself, but even in 
                                                 
31 Lifton goes on to describes a number of models of negative Proteanism including: a fragmented self, 
lacking self-knowledge and in danger of turning to fundamentalism to shore up their fragmentation 
(1993, 202); a static self, who blocks out the circumstances that might engender positive change (ibid, 
205); a multiple self, a ‗protean caricature‘, whose many selves lack a viable self-narrative to tie them 
together (ibid, 208); a deracinated self, torn up from per roots in community or family and rendered 
‗hollow‘ (ibid, 210).  
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this the damage might be immense, leading to an incoherent, ethically superficial or 
inert multiplicity. On the other hand, however, Proteus is of the divine, the whole 
of created matter, a generator of creativity and transformer of ordinary into 
extraordinary. Person is symbolic not just of human others but of the Wholly Other 
and our desire for communion with the alien and the transcendent. Person 
represents ideas that roam unfettered by fixed meanings and assumptions. Person is 
human intelligence applied to totalising belief systems, asking us to renounce our 
‗cocksureness‘ and obsession with self in favour of openness to the expanded 
horizons of the opaque and unknowable. Even in per scoundrel, rakehell form, 
person challenges the knaves and whores of degenerate society, when no-one else 
will. Person demonstrates an adaptive and ethical response to the nature of our 
times, skilled in forging alliances, experimenting with new concepts of community. 
Our experiences of Protean mutability save us from getting stuck in bad places, 
generating a mature, generous, imaginative, playful, humorous, non-linear and 
empathic acceptance of others. And, while person is not GOD/DE ÆRSELF, we may 
well regard Proteus as a bridge to GOD/DE, a Weilian metaxu, requiring our 
tenacious grasp and discerning attention. 
 
Robin is adept at Proteanism, as person prowls per winding course through the 
undecideable waters of per genderedness. Some of per experiences certainly fall 
within the negative Proteanism described by Lifton, such as the ‗really, really, scary‘ 
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breakdown into near-incoherence that person suffers, when all the boundaries 
person has taken for granted fall apart. However, person expresses none of the other 
negative characteristics of Proteanism—person does not lie, does not court the 
World‘s opinion regardless of cost to self or others, is no libertine. While it might be 
tempting to view per decision to closet per trans history somewhat in relation to per 
‗straight friends‘ as touching on the deceptive and hypocritical, we might also see 
this occlusion as a wise judgement, a balancing of per own needs with those of per 
family. 
 
Overall, Robin experiences per fluid, ethically formed Protean course as a creative, 
liberating, spiritually nourishing mode of existence. As we have seen above, at each 
stage in per story, person encounters a potential Narcissan Mirror, a totalising belief 
system that might trap per and fix per form, but at each point, person ultimately 
refuses the trap and instead embraces flexible adaptability. In per teens, person 
rejects ‗gender norms‘ in favour of a more ambiguous presentation even though this 
rejection of Good Opinion has some cost to per own happiness—person is judged 
not the ‗right‘ gender by per schoolmates, a ‗man in drag‘ by per lover. However, 
person persists in outrunning the straight path, first renouncing the ‗cocksureness‘ of 
heteronormativity in favour of coming out as a butch dyke and then renouncing that 
cherished identity in favour of the opaque and unknowable ‗what‘s next‘ of gender 
deconstruction. This leads to unfamiliar and alien loves, transcending per alliance 
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with lesbian feminism, in per irregular grouping of ‗fantastic‘ camaraderie with the 
Gay Blokes, and per ‗important sub-personality‘ as a cross-cross-dressing Agony 
Aunt.  
 
Even when the excitement of exploring gender and sexuality ends in per becoming 
overwhelmed and ill, person successfully unsticks perself with a determined 
reevaluation of the totalising belief systems that person has inherited from per 
family and from the New Age movement, refusing to retain the ‗crappy‘ stuff that no 
longer serves per well, alchemising a base experience of pain and misery into an 
opportunity for transcendent spiritual growth. And, as a parent, person rejects the 
norms that attempt to freeze per into a female identity with ‗all the breast feeding 
and crap that goes with it‘ and plans for per children‘s rich, ‗full spectrum‘ future. 
 
Person grounds perself in communities of shared experience, ethics and action, 
revising per alliances in ways most efficacious to support perself, per loved ones and 
per ethical/spiritual/political commitment, while maintaining links to per past 
(albeit with difficulty). There is certainly playfulness and humour in Robin‘s story, 
for example in relation to the odd combinations of the Gay Blokes and Agony Aunts. 
For now Robin renounces per gender explorations in favour of the relative fixity of 
parenthood, balancing the responsive mutability of per deeply-held beliefs about 
gender with the consolidation and coherence necessary to provide a stable and 
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nurturing environment for per children. There is also attention to the transcendent, 
through a general imaginative openness to ‗the live dimension‘, and through the 
specifics of per pagan practices and per perception of the spiritual dimension of 
dragging up as an Aunt. In my analysis, then, Robin‘s fearless embrace of Protean 
mutability is not simply that, but might also be construed as metaxu, a source of 
spiritual opening that feeds per connection with GOD/DE through attention to the 
live dimension, to family, to friendship, to intellectual inquiry and to love. 
 
Fear of Mutability 
Fearless though Robin might be in per embrace of Proteus, the sea-god‘s eclectic, 
unorthodox, even heretical, metamorphic world is not well regarded in Christianate 
culture. Many of its deepest fears see themselves embodied in mythical figures of 
mutability such as the Werewolf, the Vampire32, the Witch, the Fey33, the 
Trickster34, the Extraterrestrial35 and, most dangerous of all, the Woman36. Our 
                                                 
32 Although perhaps not immediately recognisable as a shape-shifter, Dracula, it must be 
remembered, was described by Bram Stoker (2008 [1897]) as being able to take on other forms, not 
just as a huge bat but also as a wolf and as mist. Subsequent portrayals in popular TV productions, 
such as Buffy the Vampire Slayer, often show vampires as able to transform from human to demonic 
in appearance. 
33 Amoral fairies and elves were incorporated into the Christianate worldview as fallen angels, 
according to Jack Santino (1983, 11). 
34 Yee and Bailenson (2007) cite the Norse God Loki and the Japanese figure of the kitsune, a nine-
tailed, shape-changing fox-woman, as notably ‗dangerous and powerful‘ figures of transformation 
(ibid 271). 
35 Christopher Partridge (2004) observes that, from Robert E Howard‘s subterranean serpent creatures 
to David Icke‘s Lizard People, a demonology of shape-shifting extraterrestrials, who trick us by taking 
on human form, has spread throughout North America and Great Britain in the last century (ibid, 
176-181). 
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supreme being, symbol of all that we hold most high and dear, on the other hand, is 
cast as the God-who-changes-not while ‗change and decay in all around we see‘ 
(Lyte [1909-14]), the omni-everything, immortal, invisible, ‗God Who Is And Ever 
Shall Be‘ (Schneider 2008, 4). 
 
Turning specifically to notions of human being, Christianate dominology insists that 
‗identities be kept clean and unambiguous‘ (Phelan 1996, 133), a point reiterated and 
greatly expanded upon by Léon Turner in per 2008 work Theology, Psychology and 
the Plural Self. Turner contends that mainstream Christianity has largely failed to 
engage positively with postmodern psychological theories of the plural (Protean) self 
and instead insists, without question, that ‗a healthy self is always a unified self‘37 
(2008, 3). Turner asserts that the plural self, far from being seen as the positive, 
natural, adaptive development of human selfhood that authors like Lifton describe, 
is ‗almost always treated [theologically] as pathological in some senses‘ (ibid, 3), an 
aberration rather than an adaptation38. The problematic of the plural self, Turner 
contends, lies in the doctrines of sin and imago Dei (ibid, 10), which require the self 
responsible for sin and bearing of the image of GOD/DE to be a ‗unique centre of 
                                                                                                                                               
36 The literature, feminist and otherwise, on Christianate fear of mutability, its associations with 
Women/female/feminine and concomitant demonisation of same is vast and beyond the scope of this 
study.  
37 Turner relates this back to the account in Mark‘s gospel of the man afflicted by demons, whose 
‗name is Legion, for we are many‘ (2008, 1) and to St Augustine‘s account of the self in per 
Confessions (ibid, 123). 
38 The Christian response to the plural self has been an overriding concern with debunking such 
theories that it characterises as being thoroughly embroiled in ‗modern individualism and the 
associated discourses of isolation, fragmentation and self-alienation‘ (Turner 2008, 6) and the 
breakdown of the bedrock of society (ibid, 9).  
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consciousness and subjectivity‘39 (ibid, 24). Thus, ‗the absence of personal wholeness 
is taken to correspond to corruption, or denial of the image of God‘40 (ibid, 176). The 
only cure is seen by many to be to return society to the certainties of ‗traditional 
(Christian) moral sources of selfhood‘ and to restore some order of unitary doctrinal, 
largely premodern, orthodoxy (ibid, 33). 
 
Weil and The Great Beast 
As discussed, Proteanism has little regard for unitary doctrinal orthodoxy and the 
false idols of Worldly opinion that keep us trapped in the Gravity Well of the 
Mirror. As representative of the alien and unknowable, the alchemical, the 
polyvalent, Proteus represents all that transcends easy categorisation and definition. 
Lifton sets up per Protean project in direct opposition to inflexible, dogmatic and 
‗suppressive idea systems‘ (1993, 111) and fundamentalisms, which person deems to 
be inherently violent and destructive dead ends (ibid, 11). Lee, too, stands out 
against ‗the Molochs of collective superstition‘ (2010 [1925], 37) with their ‗obsolete 
shibboleths and new-fangled catchwords‘ (ibid, 53) couched as rational and logical 
but experienced as oppressive and destructive of human liberty. Even the Protean 
libertine characterises per behaviour as a scourge on the collective opinion of 
                                                 
39 If the self is plural, in which part of that plurality does the unique centre of consciousness abide, 
which part is imago Dei, which part sins (Turner 2008, 4)?  
40 Disunity ‗only ever has negative implications‘, says Turner (2008, 177)—egocentrism, alienation, 
disengagement, dis-ease, mental strain, social malaise, the dissolution of stable communities (ibid, 32-
3) and just plain evil (ibid, 176).  
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knavish society and a challenge to the restless, materialistic, power-hungry 
corruption of the World.  
 
Weil refers to dogmatic and inflexible idea systems and the Molochs of collective 
superstition as ‗The Great Beast‘41, which Duttenhaver and Jones describe as ‗the 
intellectual edifice generated and sustained by the power/knowledge relation…, an 
idolatrous and illusory system of social abstractions‘ (2010, 183). Since being an 
outsider42 is always ‗the very essence of [Weil‘s] position‘ (Fiedler 2009 [1951], x), 
per resulting distrust of the insider‘s perspective ensures that person sees and points 
out the ‗flaws, shortcomings and half-truths‘ of any unitary doctrinal authority, or 
collectivity, person might otherwise have been moved to espouse (Frost and Bell-
Metereau 1998, 19). Per concern is that the needs of collectivity are at odds with the 
needs of the individual (Rozelle-Stone and Stone 2010a, xxi). Because the Great 
Beast of collective opinion ‗provides a ready-made pattern for thought‘ as a 
substitute for paying attention to the world and one‘s own relationship to it (Cabaud 
2010, xix), Weil characterises the collectivity as that which suppresses both truth 
and the individual‘s obligation to dissent (Hermsen 1999, 193): Truth, for Weil, is 
ever ‗personal and cannot be collective‘ (Cabaud 2010, xviii), and the Great Beast‘s 
totalising belief systems always carry with them the probability that violence will be 
                                                 
41 Weil is referencing Plato‘s Republic, in which the Great Beast is characterised as ‗mass opinion and 
collective judgement‘ (Gray 2001, 119).  
42 Although Abosch sees Weil‘s turn to religion as a (failed) attempt to reverse per previous political 
position as pariah (1994, 17), I think it is more accurate to see per as having maintained per outsider 
stance as person transferred per political thinking into a spiritual milieu. 
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used to enforce their objectives on those who disagree43 (Frost and Bell-Metereau 
1998, 68). 
 
Weil writes: ‗The Great Beast is the only object of idolatry, the only ersatz of God, 
the only imitation of something which is infinitely far from me and which is I 
myself‘ (2002 [1952], 164). It is, person asserts, not merely an object of idolatry but 
the object of all idolatry, the connection to which binds us with Gravity, preventing 
us from rising up to GOD/DE (164-165). It is exemplified in such human institutions 
as the Roman Empire, the Catholic Church, Marxist ideology and Biblical Israel 
(ibid, 167). It loves nothing but itself, and is repulsive, heavy, artificial and soulless 
(ibid, 167-168). The Great Beast is, like Narcissus‘ Mirror, full of illusion and vain 
shadows, undeliverable promises, addiction, lies, counterfeit and deceit, a trap and a 
prison, the World as (the only) ersatz of GOD/DE. The Protean, however, might 
serve as a valuable counterweight to the Mirror‘s Gravity Well, since it rejects the 
cocksureness of unitary doctrinal orthodoxy in favour of a mature, generous, 
imaginative, playful, humorous, non-linear and empathic openness to the expanded 
horizons of the opaque and unknowable, to Grace and to a GOD/DE who, in ÆR 
turn, may prove distinctly Protean. 
 
                                                 
43 However, lest, in eschewing collectivities, we fall into a narcissistic individualism, Weil urges us to 
embrace the impersonal, since ‗Every man who has once touched the level of the impersonal is 
charged with responsibility towards all human beings: to safeguard, not their persons, but whatever 
frail potentialities are hidden within them‘ (1989, 277). 
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The Protean and GOD/DE 
Protean Image and Likeness 
Turner‘s (2008) work on the theological significance of the plural self attests to the 
opposition between Protean multiplicity and the Great Beast of unitary doctrinal 
Christianate orthodoxy. As discussed above, Turner argues that theology would do 
well to embrace postmodern theories of self-multiplicity rather than pathologising 
them, since the evidence that selves are positively Protean seems irrefutable44 (119). 
What Turner‘s work does not do, however, is suggest that, rather than being a 
corruption or denial of the divine imprint, it may be that the plurality of the self 
itself is imago Dei, that the GOD/DE in whose image and likeness we are created is 
ÆRSELF multiple, far more the Protean shapeshifter than the God-who-changes-
not. I propose that GOD/DE is just such a shapeshifter. Just as Leigh‘s story, and the 
metaphorical model of Thinness we derive from it, illuminates the transparency of 
both genderedness and the Divine, so too do the model we drawn from Robin‘s 
Protean genderedness and the fluid multiplicity of GOD/DE reveal each other. To 
support this proposition, that GOD/DE is not One but multiplicitous, I turn to two 
                                                 
44 Turner concludes that theories of narrative identity answer the theological question of which self is 
it that is imago Dei, arguing that our self is unified (but not made unitary) by the stories we tells of 
ourselves and that such a cohered but still plural self is thus no obstacle to relationship with 
GOD/DE. ‗A divided self‘ Turner declares, ‗is not always a troubled self‘ but rather a self that is 
exploring per multiple GOD/DE-given potentials (2008, 179), explorations which are then bound 
together by narrative (ibid, 181). It is our plurality that gives each of us our singularity, the 
uniqueness that enables our relationship with GOD/DE (ibid, 119). Furthermore, to refuse to 
acknowledge this plurality is to seek to isolated the development of the self from interactions not 
only with the World (interactions which Lavelle, we might recall, deemed vital to successful self 
development) but also, and perhaps more importantly, with GOD/DE (ibid, 145). Thus, a unified-in-
multiplicity self is (re)presented as the image and likeness of GOD/DE and the dilemma of the plural 
self in Christianity is answered, as far as Turner is concerned. 
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recent works of feminist theology: Beyond Monotheism by Laurel C. Schneider 
(2008); and Marcella Althaus-Reid‘s The Queer God (2003). 
 
Schneider‘s Beyond Monotheism 
Christian theology45, asserts Laurel Schneider, is an imperial theology, first deployed 
by Constantine ‗in search of a divine [Narcissan?] mirror for…totalitarian dreams of 
state‘ (2008, 4), co-opting ideas of the transcendent in idolatrous worship of Worldly 
power and might. The resulting Christianate dominology demands an absolute 
commitment to immutability; it is a frozen ideology, stuck fast in the ice of its 
unitary doctrinal orthodoxy (ibid, 89-90). Because of its insistence on unicity rather 
than multiplicity, it refuses to pay attention to the multiplicatory specificity of 
actual human experience, insisting on ‗a soul that is One,…[that] can only survive 
by destroying all other stories and memories, all fuzzy and permeable borders‘ (ibid, 
194). Thus, the Christianate ‗logic of the One‘ fuels fundamentalisms, nationalisms 
and totalitarianisms, ‗chok[ing] on itself like a stone in the mouth‘ (ibid, ix). As such, 
Schneider‘s ‗logic of the One‘ strongly resembles Lifton‘s suppressive idea systems, 
Lee‘s Molochs and Weil‘s Great Beast. 
 
                                                 
45 ‗When‘, Schneider asks, ‗did the stories of God become the story of totality, of a closed system, of 
One?‘ (2008, ix). The answers, person asserts, lies in the ‗earliest beginnings [of] Christian theology‘ 
(ibid, 17), a disciplinary tradition that demonises contradiction and, conversely, valorises the 
reduction of complex and context-specific phenomena to oversimplified universals (ibid, 145). 
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Since there is no Truth except that which is contingent upon embodied experiences, 
Schneider finds that the multiplicity of GOD/DE expresses itself fully in bodies, 
‗confounding certainty at every turn‘ (ibid, ix), undermining the unitary doctrinal 
orthodoxy of the Great Beast with the uncategorisable specificities of human lives. 
Thus, the multiplicity of GOD/DE ‗comes to body, to being, differently every ―time‖, 
in every instance of incarnation‘ (ibid, 166), every instance of which is literally 
invaluable, inexchangeable for any other (ibid, 176). Moreover, I would argue, the 
multiplicity of GOD/DE is bodied forth in the multiplicity of each self; we are 
Protean imago Dei, not only in that each of us is different from all others, but also in 
that each of us has the potential to embody the Protean within ourselves, as Robin‘s 
experience manifests. 
 
To apprehend the multiplicity of GOD/DE, Schneider asserts, we require a mature, 
non-linear flexibility of attitude (ibid, 156)—this closely echoes that attitude 
described by both Lee and Lifton, that outruns the straight path like a happy dog, 
that circles round, taking its time to come to always-provisional conclusions, that 
darts and teases and constantly (re)corrects its balance in its Queer non-linear 
progress46 (cf Halberstam 2005). However, the multiplicity of GOD/DE cannot be 
taken to represent the wholeness of GOD/DE, contends Schneider. We do not and 
cannot have all the pieces of the jigsaw; the best we can manage is a temporary 
                                                 
46 Indeed, the multiplicity of GOD/DE ‗sins against ideologies of linear progress, as if there is a single 
goal or telos towards which the rich manyness of the cosmos must ―process‖ in flight from itself as it 
is‘ (Schneider 2008, 2).  
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assemblage of GOD/DE-pieces into not a whole but ‗a boat with holes‘ (ibid, 10). In 
ÆR multiplicity, GOD/DE remains opaque to us, since we always begin in the 
middle of GOD/DE‘s and our own stories: ‗there are no clean starts so there can be 
no tidy finishes…[only] the middle…which has the benefit of being where we are 
already located‘ (ibid, 10).  
 
Althaus-Reid and The Queer God 
Analogous to Weil‘s Great Beast and Schneider‘s ‗logic of the One‘ is Althaus-Reid‘s 
concept of T-Theology, ‗Totalitarian theology‘ (2003, 8) (sometimes also ‗traditional‘ 
theology (ibid, e.g. 186)), which person describes as ‗theology as ideology…‗the One 
and Only Theology‘ which does not admit discussion or challenges from different 
perspectives‘ (ibid, 172). This is a heteronormative, colonial, capitalistic ideology 
that insists on homogeneity and renders the multiplicatory specificity of ‗real bodies, 
hungry, ill-treated, sad and isolated‘ invisible, unintelligible and utterly beyond our 
attention (ibid, 110). It thrives on a process of identical duplication, both of material 
goods and human consumers (ibid, 155), reducing the multiplicity of GOD/DE to a 
‗monotonous narrative‘ conveyed by ‗monotonous messengers‘ (ibid, 92), producing 
a straight GOD/DE (ibid, 53), irrevocably enmeshed, according to Althaus-Reid, in 
the hierarchical, discriminatory, persecutory and oppressive ideology of 
heterosexuality (ibid, 163). In its collusion with the capitalistic commodification of 
bodies and repetitive duplication of acts, argues Althaus-Reid, T-theology therefore 
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resembles nothing less than pornography (ibid, 109), which is itself another 
manifestation of idolatry, another reflection in the Mirror that occludes the 
transcendent, another Gravity Well that prevents our gaze from rising to GOD/DE. 
 
The pornographic reduplications of T-Theology‘s God-the-Father must, asserts 
Althaus-Reid, be replaced by a Queer GOD/DE, whom person characterises as 
inherently unstable, indeed ‗no more stable than heterosexuality‘ itself (ibid, 62). 
Furthermore Æ is complex and unruly (ibid, 34), in transit, having neither totality 
nor ultimacy (ibid, 68), a GOD/DE who can be led astray (ibid, 51) and who 
‗disorders the law‘ (ibid, 171). Unlike the reduplicative pornographics of T-
Theology, the Queer GOD/DE never duplicates, not us and not ÆRSELF, never 
mistakes categories for specificities and therefore ‗there is no unicity in God to be 
reflected either scripturally, dogmatically or ecclesiologically‘ (ibid, 109). The Queer 
GOD/DE is as fluid, unstable and multiple, as Protean as we are ourselves, a 
GOD/DE who has both ‗a back‘47 (ibid, 16) and an unintelligible ‗excluded face‘ (ibid, 
153). The Queer GOD/DE is an opaque GOD/DE; there is far more to ÆR than 
meets the eye.  
 
                                                 
47 Althaus-Reid‘s reference to GOD/DE‘s back (2003, 16) is almost certainly an allusion to the story of 
Moses in Exodus 33:19-23, in which GOD/DE refuses to show Moses ÆR face on the grounds that 
none may see ÆR and live: ‗I will take away my hand, and you shall see my back; but my face shall 
not be seen‘ (KJV). 
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This GOD/DE unsettles, even scandalises, the stable regime of T-Theology, 
transgressing the existent order, and is, thus, ‗a stranger at the gates‘48 (ibid, 153), an 
alien outsider from beyond the boundaries of all that is respectable; not a GOD/DE 
who watches over the margins from a position in the centre of T-Theology, but a 
truly marginal GOD/DE for whom the centre has absolutely no relevance (ibid, 98); 
we might invite this outsider GOD/DE into our lives but Æ will never partake of 
rites of hospitality and become assimilated into our family.  
 
Protean GOD/DE 
Althaus-Reid argues that T-theology places unwarranted limit on the excessiveness 
of GOD/DE (2003, 28), producing a ‗grace which works by dis-gracing‘ unintelligible 
oppressed, persecuted and colonised bodies (ibid, 46). And Schneider argues that the 
anti-Protean ‗God Who Does Not Change‘ is merely an immature fantasy, created 
out of our desire for an intelligible ‗lover who will never age, never look away, 
never betray‘ (2008, 157), an image in the Mirror that we think is GOD/DE but is 
actually ourself. However, by (re)introducing the excessive notion of omnisexuality 
into the catalogue of GOD/DE‘s other ‗―omni‖ attributes‘, we might regain ‗the lost 
presence of [GOD/DE‘s] polyamorous body‘ (Althaus-Reid 2003, 53) and return to 
GOD/DE the multiplicity that is denied ÆR by ‗the name of the Father…a hidden 
presence of limitation in our hearts‘ (ibid, 61). The God-who-changes-not is a 
                                                 
48 Although not referenced as such, Althaus-Reid‘s use of this phrase may be a reference to Mel 
White‘s autobiography Stranger at the Gate: To be Gay and Christian in America (1995). 
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theological ‗dead end‘, asserts Schneider (2008, 138), and we must raise our heads 
from the reflection in the frozen pool of narcissistic immaturity and open ourselves 
up to a Protean ‗grown-up, open, worldly encounter with flowing divinity‘49 (ibid, 
157). GOD/DE must commit heterosexual suicide, contends Althaus-Reid, renounce 
the monotonous narrative of capitalistic, pornographic, idolatrous replication, in 
favour of becoming an immoderate, unstable, unreasonable/a-rational, Queer 
divinity with ‗multiple embraces and sexual indefinitions‘ (2003, 57).  
 
As a Weilian Gravity Well, Narcissus‘ Mirror traps us in the World and prevents us 
from rising up to GOD/DE. The Mirror is not Thin, is not metaxu, since the World 
that it reflects back to us occludes the view of a Queer, Multiplicitous, Protean 
GOD/DE we might otherwise perceive. Similarly, the genderedness that we see in a 
rigid binary system is a Mirror view, blocking us from seeing that the Protean 
genderedness that Robin‘s experiences manifest is in fact true for genderedness as a 
whole. For Robin‘s story is not one of a mainstream gender trajectory; it does, I 
believe, highlight the point argued in Chapter 1 that genderedness rarely 
demonstrates categorical and consistent alignment of all gender aspects with one 
binary metagender option; genderedness, like the Queer God, is complex and 
                                                 
49 Schneider characterises the multiplicity of GOD/DE as first and foremost fluid and mutable (2008, 
154), and also porous, interconnected, open, streaming, reforming, responding, shapeshifting, 
heterogeneous and temporal (ibid, 162-164). These are not, however, to be seen as merely abstract 
characteristics, person cautions, but as drawn from actual, bodied experiences (ibid, 10). Like the shy, 
metamorphic sea-god, the multiplicity of GOD/DE is inextricably linked to water: it is, for example a 
concept that require sea-legs to think it through ibid, 144); it might slip its moorings if we do not pay 
attention (ibid, 165); it leaks through the interstices of the logic of the One (ibid, 1-2). 
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unruly, disorders the law, and proves no more stable than heterosexuality itself. If, 
as Lee contends, the whole of reality is Protean, then our genderedness, as part of 
reality, is Protean in its turn; and in gender as in everything else, there is no more 
worthwhile a human endeavour than hunting Proteus. 
 
The World we see in the Mirror is necessarily the World past—since the future is 
opaque to us—and is thus also necessarily idolatrous, since the past is fixed in a way 
that the future is not. Hence, to rely on Great Beasts from the past to define our 
concepts of gender and of GOD/DE, such as the cocksureness of the notion that 
‗male and female created He them‘ in His image and after to His likeness (KJV 
Genesis 1: 26-27), is to view both gender and GOD/DE in the Mirror of Narcissus, as 
immature, duplicitous, pornographic and idolatrous reflections from the past rather 
than immoderate, unstable, unreasonable Protean possibilities opening out into the 
future. 
 
However, we must remember that neither Protean, nor Queer, nor Multiplicitous, is 
GOD/DE; each is simply one more metaphorical model for Æ who is beyond all 
descriptions. Indeed, Schneider cautions against reifying the metaphor of 
multiplicity and setting it in a binary opposition with unicity; the multiplicity of 
GOD/DE is both mutability and finitude, limit and possibility (2008, 137), a divine 
that remains both irreplaceable singularity and unbounded variety. Furthermore, 
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the ‗logic of multiplicity‘, in the centrality it affords to each inexchangeable 
individual life, does not lightly dismiss the ‗sanity-producing value‘ of collectivities 
that unite us (ibid, 199), provided that we always remember that those collectivities 
are temporary, provisional and context-dependent and that ‗trouble comes when the 
temporary gets mistaken for the permanent‘ (ibid, 202). However, Schneider holds 
that ‗[t]he stories we tell of [the Divine]…form the fabric of imagination about what 
is possible for us in this world that God so loves‘ (ibid, 207). Therefore, in naming 
the Divine, the metaphors we use for GOD/DE must be carefully considered, lest, as 
Weil contends, we set up ‗something imaginary under the name of God‘ (2002 
[1952], 56), an idolatrous Great Beast of an ideology that reflects in its Mirror a 
loveless and unlovely World, an ersatz of a loveless and unlovely GOD/DE, 
forgetting that 
Love is impatient.  
It ignores traditions and conventions.  
It is not bound by human constructs, jurisprudence, and the laws 
of men.  
Love reaches out and holds, open hearted, it demands attention.  
It is in a world of its own, yet it connects worlds that will forever 
be set apart. (from Zephaniah 2007) 
 
Summary 
Any description of GOD/DE can only ever be provisional and conjectural; lest we 
stumble into unitary doctrinal orthodoxy, therefore, we would be wise to hedge 
around ÆR Protean characteristics with ‗mights‘ and ‗mays‘. Because Protean 
GOD/DE is opaque, has both a back and an excluded face, we can come to no hasty 
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conclusions about ÆR; ÆR story is longer than we can ever know, and we always 
join it in the middle, knowing little of what has passed and nothing of what is to 
come. However, if we take seriously George Fox‘s question ‗What canst thou say?‘, 
then we must attempt some conclusions, however provisional and conjectural they 
may be. 
 
We might, therefore, say that Protean GOD/DE is a Divinity who resists capture, 
who becomes the more mutable the harder we struggle to fix ÆR. Indeed the 
Protean, as a continuous Baconian ‗moment of creation, charged with divine 
energies‘, might reveal a GOD/DE who has no need of fixing, cannot in fact be fixed, 
in any sense of the word. Darting and teasing, this may be a GOD/DE who presses 
the limits of our understanding, momentarily taking form only to dissolve into 
something new under the pressure of our grasp, ever elusive and fluctuating and 
needing a light touch in order that ÆR transcendent, alien divinity, ÆR complete 
marginality, be maintained. Such an alien GOD/DE might reveal that our own alien 
loves, irregular groupings and fluid alliances can be more productive than dogmatic 
adhesions to unitary doctrinal orthodoxies. Æ might lead us to understand ÆR 
through the multiplicatory specificities of stories that in no way resemble our own, 
through quotidian experiences that might seem foreign to us but are nevertheless 
utterly and inarguably imago Dei. Thus, even the rakehell might prove to be in this 
frivolous, unruly, impolite, slovenly, disreputable GOD/DE‘s image. Althaus-Reid 
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offers us the prospect of a Sodomite GOD/DE, whose loving nature scandalises a 
degenerate and hypocritical Good Opinion because it is freed from the purely 
reproductive strictures of T-Theology to engage in pleasure in ‗multiple 
combinations and exchanges‘ (2003, 88), loving for the sake of love alone; as Weil 
puts it, loving as an emerald is green (1970, 129). 
 
Protean GOD/DE might then be a manoeuverable GOD/DE, steering ÆRSELF and 
us through undecideable waters in a boat with holes, a GOD/DE with fuzzy and 
permeable borders. Seemingly irresponsible, Æ might be concerned less with moral 
and ethical consistency than with moral and ethical responsiveness, a GOD/DE who 
reveals that one size cannot fit all, that what is sauce for the goose may be poison for 
the gander. Æ might poise, circling round, refusing to tip the scales in favour of one 
side or the other, preferring lively balance over a deadening decisiveness, reflecting 
no unicity, scripturally, dogmatically or ecclesiologically.  
 
However, this GOD/DE, who confounds at every turn our childish need for 
certainty, might also appear as murky and chaotic, a GOD/DE whose incoherence 
and unintelligibility might bewilder us unless we pay constant, Weilian attention. 
This stranger at the gates might resemble not at all the God-who-changes-not that 
we have been led to expect, for Æ is inassimilable, always beyond the margins of our 
circle, excessive, boundaryless, and unreasonable. Protean GOD/DE might be what 
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we encounter when, like Robin, all the boundaries we take for granted fall apart. 
And so, like Robin, perhaps, we need to put in some really sustained growth work 
on our spiritual core, examining our unitary doctrinal orthodoxies and rejecting the 
‗crappy‘ beliefs that no longer deliver justice for the unintelligible. Attention to 
Protean GOD/DE might ward against the Narcissan Mirror‘s stagnant, immature 
fantasies and dead ends, the idolatrous icy images reflected back from a glaciated 
once-upon-a-time. Instead Æ might offer us an unreasonable Grace that unsticks us 
from our certainties, freeing our attention from the Well of Gravity to soar upwards 
and outwards to the potential futures flashing into being before our eyes, 
outrunning the straight course, hunting Proteus, seeking the transcendent, a concept 








SOL: TRANSCENDENT EMBODIMENTS AND AN 
APOPHASIS OF GENDER  
 
Introduction 
This chapter engages with the text of Sol‘s story and especially with the 
contradictions apparent therein. I begin, as before, with an extended pen portrait; 
this deals mainly with Sol‘s experiences of genderedness and the two rather different 
stories person tells. These lead me to discuss the nature of contradiction as a 
quotidian experience and to Simone Weil‘s particular attraction to contradiction and 
paradox; Weil does not try to rationalise these away, but rather embraces them and 
makes them integral to per thinking, saying we should use contradictions as ‗pincers‘ 
with which to ‗grasp the truth beyond‘ (2002 [1952], 121). I suggest that, viewed as 
Weilian pincers, Sol‘s contradictory narratives shed light on the nature of GOD/DE 
as Æ who has, according to Althaus-Reid, as noted in the previous chapter, both a 
back and an excluded face, an opaque GOD/DE to whom there is far more than 
meets the eye. Expanding on this concept of opacity, I deploy Judith Butler‘s 
contention (2005) that opacity is a necessary aspect of the self to which none of us is 
immune and which requires an ethical response. I develop the concept of opacity as 
it is expressed in a number of other disciplines and then, following the lead of 
theologian Catherine Keller (2008; 2010), demonstrate that there are strong 
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correlations between Butler‘s concept of opacity and the theological practice of 
negative theology, touched upon in Chapters 1 and 2, correlations that are supported 
by Sol‘s quotidian experiences.  
 
Reading apophaticism as a strategy to preserve the otherness of GOD/DE from 
idolatry by preserving ÆR opacity, ÆR unintelligibility, I consider the concept of 
transcendence and the legitimate concerns thea/ologies have had with its above-
and-beyond tendency to erase bodies in the here-and-now, particularly the bodies of 
women, the poor and the queer. I contend that the thea/ologies of immanence that 
have arisen in response to these concerns are themselves not unproblematic and 
note that there are also feminist voices raised in support of transcendence. I go on to 
consider two of these voices in detail: Mayra Rivera‘s The Touch of Transcendence 
(2007); and Rebekah Miles‘s The Bonds of Freedom (2001). In concert with these 
accounts, I assert that, rather than being expressive of an unattainable above-and-
beyond, transcendence might be better read as indicative of the opacity of both 
GOD/DE and ourselves, and contend that Sol‘s contradictory narratives, inasmuch as 
they demonstrate the Butlerian ‗primary opacity of the self‘ that is in all of us, also 
demonstrate an embodied transcendence, the otherness of GOD/DE invisibly visible 
in Sol‘s here-and-now. Furthermore, I argue that notions of opacity and apophasis 
might also be applied positively to genderedness, whilst not ignoring how such a 
consideration might be problematic to those among us, like Sol, for whom binary 
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gender has meaning and value. I conclude by suggesting, however, that we might 
challenge some of the Great Beasts of unitary doctrinal orthodoxy by attempting to 
live without a why, by learning how (not) to speak either of GOD/DE, self or 
gender, through a practice of Opaquing, of positively embracing the ethical 
importance of acknowledging that neither GOD/DE nor human is ultimately 
intelligible. 
 
Sol: A Round Trip to Hell 
Sol was born in a small Cornish town in the 1950s. Person was judged l-female1 at 
birth and thus assigned a Female metagender but knew for certain from a very early 
age that person was f-male: ‗I‘ve never had any feeling of myself as not being male, 
not since age four‘ (226-230)2. As a result of this, person has recently undergone 
gender reassignment surgery to confirm per metagender as Male. 
 
Firm in per self-identity as f-male, person refused normal p-girl behaviour from 
childhood, stating that person had ‗never played with dolls or did any girly things‘ 
(16-21), preferring marks of p-maleness like ‗trousers and what-have-you‘ (45). This 
firm assertion of per f-gender to per parents from a very early age seems to have 
                                                 
1 To briefly recapitulate the gender aspects detailed in Chapter 1: l-gender (looks-like) refers to 
physical characteristics; f-gender (feels like) is about an inner sense of gender identity; p-gender 
(performs like) is the ‗drag‘ we put on to give ourselves the appearance of one of the two available 
options; and j-gender (judged as) is about how other people respond to us and how that impacts on 
our gendered being in the world. The four aspects together form metagender.     
2 As with previous chapters, I have attached line numbers to direct quotes from the interview text. 
The relevant verbatim transcription sections of Sol‘s interview are in Appendix 3. 
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assured per j-maleness with them: ‗My parents were absolutely fine about that, so 
they just treated me as I wanted to be treated from the start‘ (22-28). 
 
And this j-male affirmation by adults spread beyond the immediate family into the 
wider community in which Sol was growing up: 
Everyone accepted me as an odd boy. I remember once I was helping 
my dad in his garage, and when my dad said, well, actually that‘s a 
girl, one of the mechanics said, no, no, it‘s definitely a boy, kind of 
accepting (which was quite nice for me) that I was definitely a boy. 
And that‘s really what my parents and local people tend to do (62-79).  
 
Once person was sent to school however, Sol‘s p-male behaviour did not elicit the 
same unquestioning j-male affirmation: 
It wasn‘t a problem until I went to school but then of course it was, 
because on my first day there I said I was really a little boy until I‘d 
had an operation that made me look like a girl3, and I was teased non-
stop after that, cos everybody used to shout in the playground that I‘d 
fallen into a muddy puddle and turned into a girl. It was absolutely 
horrible (29-41). 
 
Sol‘s assertion that person was born l-male but had been intervened upon to become 
l-female was accepted by per classmates, but only partially. In their judgement, it 
was not a clean and clinical operation but this down-and-dirty fall into a muddy 
                                                 
3 The operation in this case is a fiction Sol constructs to explain per p-maleness to classmates who 
‗know‘ per to be Female; it does not refer to per later gender reassignment surgery that affirms per as 
l-male. 
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puddle, reminiscent of Enid Blyton‘s story of the little black doll4, that had effected 
the change.  
 
School then became a site of torment and humiliation for Sol. And if primary school 
was ‗absolutely horrible‘, secondary school was much worse: 
And at secondary school it was absolute hell on earth, because I went 
to a girls‘ secondary school, which was unmitigated hell. From the 
time I started to develop, at the point of puberty, I‘d be wearing a 
body stocking to correct and impress my chest and so on, but kids 
would hang over the toilet cubicles when I got undressed to go for a 
pee—even now that gives me kind of wrench in my chest. I didn‘t 
develop much, thank heavens, but it was just awful, absolutely awful 
(86-106). 
 
As it does for many trans people, puberty for Sol marked a time of terrible trial. 
Despite per certainty in per f-maleness, per l-female body thrust itself insistently 
into per life. In something of an understatement, Sol says ‗it all gets a bit sad here‘ 
(125), as the pressures of l-gender from within per body and j-gender from without 
resulted in psychiatric intervention. For Sol, a deeply devout Christian from early 
childhood, an already complex situation was made more so by per deepening sense 
of a vocation to the priesthood: 
I first went to a psychiatrist with this gender problem when I was 15, 
and it was thought to be because I couldn‘t get to be a priest, that I 
was having gender reassignment so I could go into the Church. But it 
was real of course—the gender thing came first. So they just sort of 
accepted…And I was diagnosed with….No, they diagnosed it first as 
                                                 
4 In Blyton‘s (in)famous story (1965) the doll is scorned and derided for being black, until person falls 
into a puddle and the blackness washes off per, making per acceptably pink and  ‗pretty‘. 
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childhood schizophrenia, and then it changed into this trying to get 
into the Church, which it wasn‘t. Basically y'know I just said I was a 
guy and they said ‗you‘re not‘, and I said ‗well I am‘, and they kept 
saying ‗you‘re not‘, and I was thought to be delusional, which I think 
it was a common enough diagnosis then (126-152). 
 
In this diagnosis, j-gender trumped f-gender in the worst possible way, as Sol‘s 
‗gender problem‘ was interpreted first as a psychiatric disorder (mad) and then as a 
ruse to gain entry to the all-male domain of the priesthood (bad). 
 
University, however, provided Sol with the first opportunity to live as person 
wished: 
While I was at university it was better because I became very, very, 
very much into my stuff—I got into it and had a kind of as far a male 
life as I could get without having any sort of therapy for it (166-175). 
 
Finally Sol transitioned physically from l-female to l-male and found a spiritual 
home as a member of an intentional community, in a p-male role that now provides 
per with a deep sense of both stability and worth. As far as Sol is concerned, person 
is now fully the Man person wishes to be, comfortable in per l-gender, a useful and 
productive human being, and unreservedly accepted as j-male in per worship 
communities: 
I was just neurotic as hell, but now I‘m not riddled with agoraphobia 
and I don‘t have any problems going out. Even the hospital said ‗oh, 
this appears to be a sort of complete cure of anything which might 
have been psychologically wrong, so it was obviously just the gender 
which was creating all your difficulties‘. So the community are 
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actually delighted that this has happened for me and that I‘m so useful 
and productive and helpful (193-209). 
 
The thing I was most worried about was the community, but people 
were so sort of thankful to God for the result that I went from being as 
neurotic as hell to being absolutely fine (295-304). 
 
Sol sums up per experiences thus: 
I suppose I‘ve been through the process of disintegration and 
reintegration in my own body, and so I can see it as a holy sort of 
process of reintegration through the round trip to hell, possibly. Yes, 
that‘s about it (409-415). 
 
This is the first narrative theme in Sol‘s story, a type of Fall and Redemption 
narrative. I do not mean to suggest here that there was something sinful in Sol‘s 
gender problem that brought about per expulsion from per childhood Eden, or 
rather that the ‗sin‘ is not Sol‘s. However, expelled person surely was, through no 
fault of per own. An idyllic childhood of total, almost unquestioning acceptance was 
abruptly curtailed by the intervention of school, and a descent into ‗absolute hell on 
earth‘ is the result. Gradually, though, by continuing to assert per self-identity 
despite the adverse judgement of authority figures, Sol emerged from the depths into 
a position of inward and outward acceptance, and thus the trip to hell becomes a 
Round Trip, a there-and-back-again experience, a return to the acceptance of 
childhood but with the knowledge and experiences of an adult. 
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Running alongside this Round Trip to Hell, however, is another theme that I 
identify as Sol‘s Contradiction narrative. In this, statements in the Round Trip that 
appear to be absolute are contradicted by others, equally absolute. For example, Sol‘s 
assertion that primary school was ‗absolutely horrible‘ is immediately followed by 
this rather different description: 
Having said that, at the weekends I was fine cos I could wear trousers 
and what-have-you. And I did make friends with boys and joined the 
boys‘ groups, so I was a kind of honorary boy and, even though I was 
teased by girls, the boys were fine with me, so junior school wasn‘t too 
bad actually (44-52). 
 
Similarly, some of Sol‘s recollections seem to undercut per understanding of 
unquestioning j-male affirmation from per parents, as attempts were made to elicit 
p-female behaviour from their child: 
There was one nasty episode when I was made to wear a bonnet 
which I tore up [laughing]. And they bought a doll once and I gave it 
away or I probably threw it somewhere (250-261). 
 
Furthermore, what is characterised as parental acceptance in some parts of the story 
comes across more as resignation in others: 
They never worried about my gender expression just cos they learned 
quickly, I suppose, that it wasn‘t any good trying to (274-276). 
 
In response to my question: ‗I‘ve heard quite a few people describe transition as a 
spiritual journey; is that what it feels like for you?‘ Sol replies ‗no, not really; erm, I 
wish I could say it was‘ (320-324). Yet it is hard, as a listener, to hear per description 
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of a ‗holy sort of process of reintegration through…the round trip to hell‘ as not 
having some kind of spiritual content. Moreover, there are seeming contradictions 
in Sol‘s assessment of the importance of per ‗gender problem‘ in per relationship 
with GOD/DE. At one point, for example, person says: 
I used to confess it regularly year in, year out, and even after 
transition I still find it necessary to confess it, in case it was against the 
will of God (that was what someone said when I was trying to get 
ordination, that it was contrary to the mind of God; I dunno how they 
know it). And now I‘ve just stopped confessing it. Surgery‘s over and 
everything but I still only just stopped confessing it about two years 
back; I still sometimes think, I wonder if I‘ve done something hugely 
sinful (340-362). 
 
And yet shortly afterwards person concludes, ‗Perhaps gender doesn‘t matter much 




In the crisis of representation, contradiction is a common occurrence, as we try to 
make sense of our experiences to our listeners. As Dan McAdams observes:  
I know that not everything people tell me is important, and that some 
of what they say may function merely to make them ‗look good‘ in 
my eyes. I also know that there is much that will remain untold, no 
matter how successful our interview or how intimate our rapport 
(1993, 20).  
  
That said, the point of collecting stories for research purposes is to reflect on them, 
inconsistent though we know them to be, and to attempt to draw from them insights 
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that we can share with others. However, the prospect of imposing upon a story, Sol‘s 
story, decisions as to what is ‗important‘ and what functions ‗merely to make [Sol] 
look good‘, what is, in effect, the ‗truth‘ of Sol‘s story, should make us deeply 
uncomfortable, for who are we to decide the truth of another person‘s tale: ‗Any one 
of those is a possible narrative, but of no single one can I say that it alone is true‘ 
(Butler 2005, 37-38). This being the case, then, how might we approach 
contradiction in a theological, not to say ethical manner, as a resource to assist us 
rather than a problem to vex us? If we consider again the metaphors of Thin and 
Thick in this context, or the Protean, any of these might prove to be applicable: 
contradictions might be read as indicative of Thinness, of seeing through one 
narrative into the other; or we might read them as Thick, the lack of consistency 
signalling an occlusion of Sol‘s story; or, in the oscillation between the two themes, 
we might detect a Protean mutability. However, since I am committed to the 
specificity of each story, rather than the repetition of previous themes, I find 
another starting point for my metaphoricising in Weil‘s embrace of contradiction 
and paradox. 
 
Weil and Contradiction 
Contradiction and paradox abound in, and indeed are central to, Weil's thought. 
Contradiction, Weil says, is nothing less than reality itself (2002 [1952], 98) and 
apprehension of contradictions is of the greatest spiritual importance: ‗When the 
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attention has revealed the contradiction in something on which it has been fixed, a 
kind of loosening takes place. By persevering in this course we attain [spiritual] 
detachment‘ (ibid). Weil contends that an insistence on absence of contradiction is a 
form of reification or idolatry, a nailing down of that which should be unattached, a 
tribute paid to the Great Beast. Everything that is truly good, that is of GOD/DE, 
holds within it contradictoriness and impossibility, attention to which is attention to 
Divine good and a generator of new insight (Howe 2008, 39). To illustrate per 
concept of contradiction, Weil uses a metaphor of mountain climbing: lower down 
the mountain, one might see a lake while, higher up, the lake is out of view and a 
forest is visible instead. Human eyes may only see one thing or the other while 
lower down the mountain but, by rising up (and here person means both by moving 
towards GOD/DE and by seeing from GOD/DE‘s perspective), a view of both is 
possible (2002 [1952], 99). This ‗unifying grasp of contradictory ideas‘, person says, is 
an ‗approach to God‘ (ibid, 100) and goes on: ‗We have to elucidate the ways 
contradictories have of being true. Method of investigation: as soon as we have 
thought something, try to see in what ways the contrary is true‘ (ibid, 102).  
 
Weil describes contradiction as ‗pincers‘ that we should use to grasp at the higher 
truth (2002 [1952], 121). Contradictory truths inevitably coexist unresolved in the 
sphere of the material that Weil calls Gravity; this we must accept and acknowledge. 
It is only in the sphere of the supernatural that their resolution or dissolution is 
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possible and will result in knowledge of a higher truth. Contradiction should, 
therefore, be willingly embraced (Nye 1994, 60). Indeed, Weil‘s embrace of the 
inevitability of contradiction is so total that it becomes not merely an intellectual 
discipline but an ‗approach to the nature of being‘ (Baker 2006, 136). As such, Weil‘s 
method is not to construct common denominators by ignoring inconsistencies, by 
setting aside that which does not fit, but rather to grasp the inconsistencies and 
work with them, taking a path that goes not directly from premise to conclusion but 
wanders obliquely from one idea to the next by way of apparently tenuous 
connections (Nye 1994, 124-125). This method holds true to the demands of an 
intellectual honesty that requires us not to ‗smooth over and ignore the 
contradictions inherent in human life‘ (ibid, 59). Weil refuses the stability and 
consistency that Christianate thought valorises, instead giving value to ‗the 
continual presence of reversals and contradictions…, even within the ―solutions‖ to 
problems of the human condition‘ a move which prefigures many of the concerns of 
postmodernism (Frost and Bell-Metereau 1998, 35). 
 
Weil‘s apparent logical inconsistencies demonstrate per determination to show 
relationships ‗among supposedly discrete entities‘ (ibid, 31), a tendency that is 
wholly consonant with per refusal to set boundaries of social, spiritual or intellectual 
convention around either ideas or people. This ‗tentative…open-ended, enquiring, 
probing‘ (McLellan 1991, 191), ‗fragmentary, open, eclectic, sometimes 
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ambiguous…interdisciplinary [and] idiosyncratic‘ (Hermsen 1999, 184) method of 
inquiry produces a rich and complex world view in which ‗all is questioned and 
nothing is answered…, [where] truth is always concealed and yet the search for 
revelation is absolute‘5 (Baker 2006, 146). At the core of Weil‘s thought are two 
questions: ‗Why should the truth not be impossible? Why should the impossible not 
be true?‘ (Carson 2002, 201). Contradictions and paradoxes are not to be resolved by 
logic or by will, but rather through a concentrated act of attention, ‗the patient 
holding in the mind of seemingly incompatible truths‘ (Nye 1994, 60) which creates 
metaxu, a ‗threshold to a mystical revelation of the divine‘ (Cosgrove 2008, 355).  
 
Contradiction as Quotidian Experience 
One of the most vexing contradictions in Divine nature is the so-called ‗problem of 
evil‘, of how it is that evil comes into existence if GOD/DE is omnipotent, 
omniscient, creator of all that is and, most particularly, wholly loving and good. 
Logic dictates that if evil exists, then one of the traditional attributes of GOD/DE—
loving goodness, creation, omnipotence or omniscience—must be false. Since 
Christian orthodoxy holds that all of these attributes must be true and since evil 
evidently does exists, theologians have attempted explain away the resultant 
                                                 
5 Having said that, Weil was, as Abosch (1994, 126) and Fiedler (2009 [1951], viii) point out, famously 
inflexible and ‗notoriously without doubt‘ (Abosch 1994, 10): even when person had changed per 
mind about something, person was as categorically for per new point of view as person had been for 
per previous one. Abosch therefore judges per to have been a fanatic (ibid, 133) and guilty of 
totalitarianism (ibid, 126). In my opinion, however, Weil simply lived the contradictory nature of 
reality that per thought seeks to describe. 
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‗problem of evil‘ by recourse to various theodicies (e.g. McGrath 1997, 263-267). 
Such attempts to ‗solve‘ the problem of evil, to apply a unifying grasp to these 
contradictory ideas, have given rise to equally problematic conclusions. The original 
sin theodicy, for example, has led to two thousand years of oppression for women, 
thea/ologians consistently argue. Clearly ‗the existence of evil‘ and ‗the God of love‘ 
are contradictory narratives and it is our habit to attempt to resolve contradictory 
narratives by proving that one of the two is false. 
 
In Sol‘s quotidian experiences, however, we see an example of a contradictory 
narrative embodied. Sol sees per experiences now one way, now another, apparently 
without feeling that either narrative is a ‗lie‘, even though a listener might find it 
difficult to determine what is actually ‗true‘. In order to resolve our confusion, we 
might decide to dismiss one set of utterances in favour of the other, taking, for 
example, the Contradiction narrative as evidence of, say, some unresolved internal 
conflict, or some desire to fulfill a societal norm, or some unexpressed negative 
emotion, hidden truths that thus undermine the Round Trip to Hell rendering it, if 
not wholly false, then at the very least suspect. In effect we would sanctify aspects of 
the Contradiction narrative and demonise the Round Trip, setting the two in a 
competition which the one must win and the other lose. This is what happens in a 
theodicy; the two conflicting narratives of ‗the existence of evil‘ and ‗the God of 
love‘ are set in competition, with the winner determined in advance, and the 
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theodicy constructed to justify the outcome. Theodicies are constructed to sustain 
the status of ‗the God of love‘ narrative as normal while pathologising the ‗existence 
of evil‘ narrative. 
 
However, if we accept that contradictory narratives might co-exist without the need 
to pathologise one in order to normalise the other, using Sol‘s quotidian experiences 
as an example of this actually being played out in the World, then we might no 
longer need to explain away the pathological narrative, no longer need to force one 
narrative to lose in order that the other might win. Applying Sol‘s experience of 
contradiction as Weilian pincers to the problem of Evil, we reach a point where, 
instead of having to work to explain away the existence of evil, for example, we 
would merely deal with the consequences of that existence, adopting what Starhawk 
describes as a ‗beer-can principle‘ (1997, 33) for addressing the consequences of evil, 
in which it matters not who dropped the beer-can but rather that someone picks it 
up and disposes of it. Viewed as Weilian pincers, Sol‘s contradictory narratives 
become not a problem for us to interpret away, but metaxu to the utter complexity 
of GOD/DE that makes it impossible adequately to account for the existence of evil. 
Sol lives a complicated story through which we might glimpse a limitlessly 
complicated GOD/DE, a Queer GOD/DE who, to refer back to the previous chapter, 
has both ‗a back‘ (Althaus-Reid 2003, 16) and an unintelligible ‗excluded face‘ (ibid, 




Judith Butler on Opacity 
Cynthia Gayman, in per 2010 work An Ethical Account of the Self Who Might Be 
Otherwise, draws links between Weil‘s theo-philosophy and Judith Butler‘s recent 
work on ethics, Giving an Account of Oneself (2005). In this, Gayman concerns 
perself with Weil‘s apparently contradictory assertion that there is a part of each of 
us that is unknowable to ourselves: ‗My ‗I‘ is hidden for me (and for others); it is on 
the side of God, it is in God, it is God‘ (2002 [1952], 38). Analogously, Butler asserts 
that:  
there is no ‗I‘ that can fully stand apart from the social conditions of 
its emergence, no ‗I‘ that is not implicated in a set of conditioning 
moral norms, which, being norms, have a social character that 
exceeds a purely personal or idiosyncratic meaning. (2005, 7)  
 
Echoing per earlier work on gender, Butler concludes that our formative histories 
orchestrate and limit the selves we are able to express and, moreover, the selves that 
are intelligible to others as legitimately human: ‗what I can ―be‖, quite literally, is 
constrained by a regime of truth that decides what will and will not be a 
recognizable form of being‘ (ibid, 22).  
 
This being the case, Butler argues, although we are required to account ethically and 
morally for our actions, a full, unequivocal, incorrigible account is impossible. We 
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are, body and mind, launched at birth into a world of pre-existent norms that shape 
us in ways we can never fully comprehend; we cannot but contradict ourselves since 
we cannot see the back of our own story any more than we can see the back of 
GOD/DE. Butler thus deems us opaque, both to ourselves and to others, an opacity 
that is inherent in the human condition; a ‗primary opacity of the self‘ is ‗built into 
our formation‘ (ibid, 20). However, though we are foreign to ourselves, this 
unintelligibility can function as ‗the source of [our] connection with others‘ (ibid, 
84) since we are all linked by our opacity, by our intrinsic inability fully to account 
for ourselves, and we must consider the ethical value of establishing relationality 
‗where no common ground can be assumed‘ (ibid, 21). 
 
There is violence, Butler declares, in a normative view that requires a stable and 
transparent self-identity, since this encourages us to ‗purge and externalize [our] 
own opacity‘ by judging and condemning the inconsistencies of others (ibid, 46). 
When we judge, we fail fully to recognise the opacity of another, imposing our own 
values where they are not applicable and reducing the other person to a thing. 
Rather than insisting that, in order for me to recognise you as also intelligible, you 
must be able to give me a satisfactorily intelligible and watertight account of 
yourself, we must ‗revise recognition as an ethical project, [seeing] it as, in principle, 
unsatisfiable‘ (ibid, 43): we will only deal with each other ethically when we 
recognise that no intelligible account will ever be forthcoming. Accepting this might 
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engender a nonviolent response, ‗a certain patience with others that would suspend 
the demand that they be self-same at every moment‘ (ibid, 42), the kind of patience 
we offer to Sol‘s story when we view per contradictions as pincers rather than 
problems. By embracing opacity in ourselves and others, we might thus shape an 
ethical system based on ‗our shared, invariable, and partial blindness about 
ourselves‘6 (ibid, 41). 
 
In addition to addressing the ethical issue of recognition, an embrace of opacity 
encourages a critique of the very norms from which our opacity arises. When we, as 
individuals, find ourselves at odds with the Great Beast that the norms represent, 
this becomes ‗the inaugural experience of morality‘ (ibid, 9), as we critique the 
forces that orchestrate and limit us. In a willingness to unpick ourselves even a little 
from the normative fabric into which we are born, we risk unintelligiblity, to be 
sure, but the risk might be worth it if, in recrafting ourselves ‗with and for another, 
[we] participate in the remaking of social conditions‘ (ibid, 135), bringing new ways 
of being intelligibly human into the world: 
Ethics requires us to risk ourselves precisely at moments of 
unknowingness, when what forms us diverges from what lies before 
us, when our willingness to become undone in relation to others 
constitutes our chance of becoming human (ibid, 136). 
 
                                                 
6 Butler is careful to note, however, that an embrace of opacity does not thus sanction 
irresponsibility: ‗If the subject is opaque to itself, not fully translucent and knowable to itself, it is not 
thereby licensed to do what it wants or to ignore its obligations to others‘ (2005, 19-20). The fact that 
I can never fully account for my actions does not permit me to act in any way I choose and claim 
opacity as my ‗get out of jail free‘ card. 
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Other Views on Opacity  
Opacity is not, of course, a concept unique to Butler, and some consideration of 
additional commentators will expand upon and complement per account. Cillian 
McBride (2003), for example, employs the notion of opacity to critique ideas of self-
transparency in relation to the politics of presence7. Arguing contra standpoint 
theory, McBride concludes that opacity renders the view that ‗I am my own best 
interpreter‘ (ibid, 292) questionable, and suggests that, rather than valorising our 
own position, ‗a measure of humility in the light of [our] own finite nature‘ is to be 
recommended, since it is always possible that someone else may better interpret our 
experiences than we ourselves.  
 
Anthropologist Rupert Stasch addresses the topic in relation to ethical claims based 
on ‗not presuming to know others‘ minds‘ (2008, 450). These claims, asserts Stasch, 
are as much concerned with preserving others‘ rights to self-determination, to 
‗knowing their own minds‘ and to not making assumptions or judgements, as they 
are to asserting the incomprehensibility of others. As such, one might consider them 
to be a form of tolerant acceptance of actions that are not necessarily explicable, 
reminiscent of Butler‘s contention that opacity breeds patience.  
 
 
                                                 
7 ‗Politics of presence‘ signals an approach to dialogue-centred politics that supposes a more 
democratic outcome is achieved by the inclusion of the standpoints of hitherto marginalised groups. 
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Mikhail Bakhtin had definite views about the oppositional nature of the transparent 
and the opaque (Garvey 2000). Contra Habermas, who argued that the more 
transparent a word, the more undistorted the communication of its meaning, 
Bakhtin asserted that clarifications of meaning halt ‗the process of historical 
becoming in which a word is constantly engaged‘ (ibid, 377), in effect reifying the 
word. As opaque, with meanings unfixed and open to constant reinterpretation, 
words support personal autonomy:  
 
A word is always ‗half someone else‘s‘. It becomes ‗one‘s own‘ only 
when the speaker populates it with his own intention, his own 
accent, when he appropriates the word, adopting it to his own 
semantic and expressive interior8 (378).  
 
Although it may seem counterintuitive to acknowledge myself as partially 
incomprehensible, as McBride  points out no personal growth or change is possible 
without opacity (2003, 229). If we were truly self-transparent, our first impressions 
on any topic would be our only impressions and we would remain in infancy; the 
reflexive process of ‗drafting and redrafting could never take place‘ (ibid). Thus, 
opacity is wholly necessary to human development. This is true not only of 
individuals but also of social and political systems; since no individual experience is 
                                                 
8 Transparency, on the other hand, is never neutral but rather a facet of ideological control, a tool of 
the Great Beast; in order to clarify the meaning of words, political decisions are made about meaning 
that are not to be allowed, as contradictions and variations are removed in order to support the 
dominant ideological interests. Transparency is thus ‗inseparable from the forces that 
purge…subversive…meanings‘ (Garvey 2000, 380). 
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beyond reinterpretation, there is no unassailably correct political or social position, 
guaranteed to be beyond critique. Edwin Laurenson supports the notion that 
opacity, ‗the gift of not perceiving directly, of not automatically believing what we 
are experiencing‘, encourages personal and social critique by ‗mak[ing] it possible for 
us to question our first-person perspectives‘ (2011, 111). 
 
Commentators also employ the concept of opacity negatively. Habermas, as was 
mentioned above (Garvey 2000), much favoured transparency over opacity in 
human communication. Jane Kopas notes ‗a modern bias against what cannot be 
clearly explained or exposed to the light…[and] a long history of associating 
darkness with evil and negativity‘ (1994, 63). In this vein, Jaci Maraschin makes use 
of the concept in a critique of ‗the opaque and obscure world of modernity [where] 
it is convenient not to think‘ (1998, 187), where people experience opacity as a ‗deep 
disenchantment‘ occasioned by globalisation, censorship and the dumbing down of 
culture (ibid, 188). And Webb Keane raises the idea that opaque minds might be 
keeping secrets, a factor that has ethical implications for political engagement, since 
‗the capacity to keep something hidden would be seen as a source of power‘ (2008, 
478). 
 
Notwithstanding these concerns, however, opacity has positive ethical potential. By 
adopting a strategy of what I call Opaquing, we approach apparently contradictory 
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stories such as Sol‘s with nonjudgemental openness, patience, tolerance, nonviolence 
and humility, similar to Weil‘s tentative, open-ended, probing method of inquiry 
where all is questioned and nothing is answered. We acknowledge with Sol our 
shared, invariable and partial blindness about ourselves, not presuming to know 
another‘s mind but taking responsibility for our own actions even when we cannot 
fully account for them. We acknowledge too the lack of fixity in self and society that 
opens the World out to constant reinterpretation and undermines reification and 
idolatry. We cannot become aware of our own opacity without also owning the 
orchestrating and limiting norms out of which it arises, like the Great Beast of 
assigned gender which Sol rejects. This gives us the potential to critique those norms 
and grow beyond them, individually and collectively, into a recrafted future. Thus, 
we may be confident of the ethical significance of opacity. What follows addresses 
its theological resonances. 
 
Apophaticism 
Opacity and Apophaticism 
Theologian Catherine Keller links Butler‘s analysis of opacity to the notion of 
apophasis (2008; 2010), or negative theology, a discipline that seeks to highlight the 
transcendence of Divinity, the utter, irreducible difference of GOD/DE from the 
World. In the apophatic tradition, GOD/DE is affirmed as ‗what is on the other side 
of anything at all we can be conscious of, whether of its presence or of its absence‘ 
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(Turner 1995, 264), as Æ who ‗overflows and blinds our understanding‘ (Rollins 
2006, 22) and who can ‗never be completely mastered, and always has the capacity 
to surprise‘ (Fiddes 2002, 36-37). Thus, when Butler asserts of opacity that ‗life might 
be understood as precisely that which exceeds any account we may try to give of it‘ 
(2005, 43), person might be said to be speaking of human opacity as a form of 
apophaticism, an argument I develop below. 
 
According to Michael Sells (1994) apophasis, a word commonly understood to mean 
negation, is more properly translated as ‗un-saying or speaking-away‘ (ibid, 2), and is 
paired with the term kataphasis, meaning ‗saying, speaking-with‘ (ibid, 3). 
Apophaticism is a linguistic or discursive strategy, employed in the production of 
negative theology, which affirms the notion that GOD/DE is so far beyond human 
knowledge or understanding that anything whatever we say about ÆR must always 
immediately be contradicted or negated, said away or unsaid in favour of a new 
proposition that must in its turn be unsaid, ad infinitum.  
 
The tradition has its beginnings in the Neoplatonism of Plotinus‘ Enneads, and was 
developed in Late Antiquity and the Mediaeval by mystical writers such as 
Dionysius the Areopagite, Meister Eckhart, Marguerite Porete, the Beguines and the 
anonymous author of The Cloud of Unknowing, but interest in the tradition died 
out in the Early Modern (Sells 1994, 5). However, ‗the burgeoning of contemporary 
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languages of the unsayable‘ (ibid) in postmodernism, particularly in the work of 
Derrida, has led to a revival of interest in the earlier tradition (e.g. Davies and 
Turner 2002; Soskice 2002; Rivera 2007; Boesel 2010; Boesel and Keller 2010a; Keller 
2010). In feminist theory, Irigaray has embraced the concept of apophatic mysticism 
to develop ‗what might be called a negative theology of ―woman‖‘ (Priest 2003, 2; see 
also Stockton 1992; Gudmarsdottir 2010). Contemporary thinkers like Derrida and 
Irigaray, suggest Boesel and Keller, ‗consider the possibility that apophasis may be 
good medicine for bodies threatened by concepts of ―God‖ that also threaten the 
divine‘ (2010a, 6); in other words, a renewed interest in the power of unsaying offers 
a potential strategy to counterbalance the power of the Great Beast.  
 
Denys Turner asserts that the central metaphors of apophatic theology in the 
Mediaeval tradition concerned inwardness, ascent, oneness with GOD/DE and 
lightness/darkness (1995, 1) or the ‗cloud of unknowing‘9 (ibid, 4). In this study, it is 
with this last that I am most concerned. In my analysis, the dazzling darkness10 of 
the cloud of unknowing is to the Divine what opacity is to the human, ‗not…a naïve 
pre-critical ignorance…but…a kind of acquired ignorance…, a strategy and practice 
                                                 
9 It is important to note, assert Denys Turner, that the cloud of unknowing does not represent the 
absence of GOD/DE, but rather a darkness filled with an excess of GOD/DEly light, a ‗luminous 
darkness‘ (1995, 17-18). Furthermore, he contends that a ‗mysticism of negative imagery‘, such as 
desert, silence, formlessness and abyss, does not constitute an apophatic theology, since each of these 
images represents a something rather than the no-thing towards which true apophatic utterances 
point (ibid, 35).  
10 The phrase ‗dazzling darkness‘ is used frequently in writings about apophaticism and comes from 
Henry Vaughan‘s poem Night: ‗There is in God, some say / A deep but dazzling darkness, as men here 
/ Say it is late and dusky, because they / see not all clear‘ (Allison et al. 1970, 354). 
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of unknowing‘ (ibid, 10). Apophatic utterance is a ‗breakdown of speech‘ (ibid, 20), 
an ‗indefinite and open-ended…infinite regress‘ of meaning that constantly escapes 
us (Sells 1994, 15), speech of continuous contradiction that intends ‗yes and no and 
yes again‘ (Johnson 1992, 115), ‗ellipsis…and allusions to the hauntings of 
(un)wholeness‘ (Miller 2010, 47), ‗a glimpse that cannot be maintained…, continual 
movement‘ (Sells 1994, 58) and a ‗sidestepping‘ of certainty (Miller 2010, 58). 
Apophaticism evinces an ‗agnosticism of definition…, the highest human knowledge 
of God [being] to know that we do not know‘(Johnson 1992, 108); it is how (not) to 
speak of GOD/DE (Rollins 2006). Analogously, seeing a strategy of Opaquing as an 
acquired ignorance, a strategy and practice of unknowing, we also consider how 
(not) to speak of another person, ‗how to speak of the other without speaking, how 
to make the ineffable present in language. without reducing it to the logic of that 
language‘ (Priest 2003, 14). Opaquing is how (not) to speak of Sol, how to embrace 
the contradictions in per story without applying our own judgement and reducing 
per to a thing. 
 
The opacity of another human being does not, of course, preclude the establishment 
of dialogue. Indeed, Butler theorises that a more ethically productive and flourishing 
dialogue might result from a strategy of Opaquing. Analogously, the unsayability of 
GOD/DE does not preclude a relationship with GOD/DE through ÆR self-
revelation. Though we cannot speak of GOD/DE, GOD/DE can still speak to us; to 
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insist that it is otherwise would be to place unwarranted limits on a limitless 
GOD/DE. But we must be clear that when GOD/DE reveals ÆRSELF, it is on ÆR 
terms, as a free event of grace. GOD/DE is always ‗irreducibly Other, always beyond 
our grasp. But not beyond our touch‘ (Rivera 2007, 2). This notion is echoed in Weil: 
A case of contradictories which are true. God exists. God does not 
exist. Where is the problem? I am quite sure that there is a God in the 
sense that I am sure my love is not illusory. I am quite sure that there 
is not a God in the sense that I am quite sure nothing real can be 
anything like what I am able to conceive when I pronounce this word 
(2002 [1952], 114). 
 
Apophaticism as Fracture 
The starkness of Weil‘s contradictory assertion ‗God exists. God does not exist‘ is 
shocking; and the value of contradiction as a technique of apophaticism is just this, 
that it ‗shocks the mind‘ (Priest 2003, 11) by interfering with our expectations of 
language. However, the paradoxes and contradictions of apophatic language are not 
merely employed for the temporary shock value, which wears off once the 
contradiction has been resolved. As Weil asserts, the resolution of contradiction is a 
form of reification or idolatry and an homage to the Great Beast.  Thus, rather than a 
temporary shock, apophaticism is ‗an attempt to liberate [language], however 
momentarily, from the spatial and temporal idols [which are] monsters and 
abominations‘ (Sells 1994, 61). This insistence on the infinite regress of apophatic 
language, on the perpetual re-unsaying of GOD/DE‘s transcendent nature, is 
undertaken not simply to create a rich and complex metaphorical language for the 
Divine, but at its root to insist that GOD/DE is never reducible to a thing in the 
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World of things, ‗an attempt to confirm a transcendence beyond delimitation [that] 
prevents the deity from being reduced to what Eckhart calls ―a this or a that‖‘ (ibid, 
151). Apophatic language insistently reminds us that GOD/DE has no material 
‗whatness‘. 
 
The fractured, anarchic language of apophaticism11 leads us ‗off the boundary of 
language itself…into the brilliant darkness‘ (Turner 2002, 20) of the GOD/DE with 
no whatness. Thus, it has as its purpose an ethical desire ‗to ‗save the name‘ of 
God…from the always toxic consequences of [human] mastery‘ (Boesel 2010, 309). 
In the Mediaeval, apophaticism was employed to ensure the ‗dethronement of 
theological idolatries‘ [my emphasis] (Turner 2002, 14): now we might employ it in 
the dethronement of all idolatries, to critique all unitary doctrinal orthodoxies. 
Resonating with Butler‘s recommendation of Opaquing as a nonviolent practice, 
Boesel contends that saving the name of God might be construed as ‗knowing and 
speaking without undue violence‘ (2010, 326), a kind of knowing otherwise that 
saves not only ‗the Name‘ but also ‗the neighbor‘ (ibid) from the toxic consequences 
of imposing the judgements of the Great Beast on the opacity of others and of 
GOD/DE. 
 
                                                 
11 Lanzetta describes the apophatic as language which is ‗designed to break down linguistic coherence 
and structural logic‘ (2005, 15), Turner as language that ‗bursts at the seams‘ and ‗cracks open in order 
never again to close‘ (2002, 32), and Sells as language continually splitting, fusing and shifting (1994, 
24) and attempting to create ‗a moment that is …‗anarchic‘—without arche or first principle‘ (ibid, 
209). 
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Living with the fracture and contradiction that are evoked by both the apophatic 
and the opaque, ‗groping in the dark…without assurances‘ (Maraschin 1998, 187), is 
not a comfortable or comforting experience. Contact with Weilian uncertainty 
might only serve to make us ‗nervous and wretched‘ (Teuber 1982, 222). Rollins, 
however, declares that the fractured and contradictory nature of apophatic texts 
serves not only to protect GOD/DE but also to reminds us that we live similarly 
fractured and contradictory lives, that indeed fracture and contradiction are all we 
can hope for (2006, 13). As Weil observes, irresolvable contradiction is inherent in 
the sphere of Gravity. Once we embrace this as a ‗space of knowledgeable ignorance‘ 
(Rollins 2006, 31), and recognise that limitation is our lot, we will be willing to 
become undone, as Butler puts it, willing to participate in the remaking of social 
conditions, willing to become human. 
 
Thea/ologies and Apophaticism 
Feminist theologian Elizabeth Johnson asserts that apophaticism is essential to save 
the name of GOD/DE from dominology (1992, 104). However, the mystical 
traditions of Late Antiquity and the Mediaeval from which our understandings of 
apophaticism derive are not unproblematic to thea/ologians. Specifically, traditional 
apophatic mysticisms, with their concentration on mystical union with a Wholly 
Other transcendent Divine, are criticised as self-absorbed, a/anti-political, a/anti-
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ethical and a/anti-materialist (Rivera 2007), traits previously discussed in Chapter 1 
in relation to renunciation.  
 
The apparent renunciation of embodied experience in favour of being 
transcendently out of body, of being above-and-beyond, is particularly 
problematic12. ‗Transcendence smacks of indifference…in the face of the needs, 
desires, and sufferings of an embodied life‘ (Boesel and Keller 2010a, 3); if bodies are 
involved in mystical texts, they are ascetic bodies, schooled in denying desire, not 
necessarily evil or disgusting but certainly distractions from or obstructions to the 
transcendent (Keller 2010, 26). Mystical models that valorise a disembodied passivity 
over activity, renunciation over desire, silence over speech, and selflessness over 
self-assertion can rightly be seen as reinforcing oppressive dominological norms for 
women (Lanzetta 2005, 38). With their focus on the desirability of mystical union, 
of the self fully renounce and dissolved into the/an other, these texts might be seen 
to underline ‗a self-defeating tendency in women to be overly determined by their 
external relationships‘ (Hughes 2010, 356), an assertion that echoes Saiving‘s 
arguments (1992 [1979]) discussed in Chapter 1. Furthermore, Sigridur 
Gudmarsdottir notes concerns that a strategy of unsaying threatens women as only-
recently and still-not-unproblematically speaking subjects (2010, 283).  
 
                                                 
12 An extensive review of feminist objections to the languages of transcendence is not within the 
scope of this project. I have, therefore, limited my review to assessments of this phenomenon made 
within a sample of works of feminist writers on apophaticism. 
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Boesel contends that the mystical traditions of transcendence are problematic not 
only because they denigrate the material, but also because they evince 
epistemological privilege; in order to acquire knowledge of the nature of GOD/DE, 
the adherent must rise upwards through levels of experience. Knowledge thus 
attained is not available to the uninitiated, engendering a hierarchical divide. 
Because of this mystical texts might be seen as ‗unethical par excellence‘ (Boesel 
2010, 313) and, in addition, ‗dangerous‘ (Hughes 2010, 350) and ‗hostile‘ 
(Gudmarsdottir 2010, 275) to thea/ologies‘ central concerns with subjectivity, 
agency, autonomy and embodiment. There is undoubtedly a problem with the 
mystical, apophatic tradition for thea/ologians, and that problem is transcendence. 
 
Transcendence 
Thea/ologies of Immanence 
The customary response to the problem of transcendence has been to develop 
thea/ologies of immanence, to insist that GOD/DE is present in the World and that 
ÆR presence is embodied in the experiences of Women, even that Women are, to a 
greater or lesser extent, Divine in and of themselves. Thus a binary is affirmed, a 
‗contraposition of transcendence to immanence [that] is almost common sense‘ 
(Rivera 2007, 35). Although commentators on apophaticism insist that the tradition 
expresses no radical separation between the transcendence of GOD/DE and ÆR 
immanent presence in the World, that ‗the truly transcendent can be known only 
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through its self-revelation as the absolutely immanent‘13 (Sells 1994, 149), it has 
become the habit of thea/ologians to dismiss the languages of transcendence in 
favour of the immanence of GOD/DE as articulated in Women‘s experiences, since 
they justly see that its lack in dominological Christianate traditions has fostered 
Women‘s oppression.  A transcendent GOD/DE is a GOD/DE who is beyond us, a 
GOD/DE who renders the World if not wholly bad, then at least meaningless. And a 
transcendent Self, a primarily male self modeled on a GOD/DE beyond, is a self that 
gets above itself, that arrogates to itself the powers of a GOD/DE. Transcendence, in 
giving ultimate value to the above-and-beyond, is what put the World in peril; 
immanence, as a re-sacralising of the here-and-now, is what will save us.  
 
A central problem of thea/ologies of immanence is the tendency they have to 
conflate Divine and human such that GOD/DE is not simply immanently present in 
embodied experiences of Women, but is seen as ‗refer[ing] to an aspect of the self‘ 
(Miles 2001, 15). For example, ‗Reading God‘s presence through the body14 of 
women is the writing of women‘s divinity in the world‘ (Lanzetta 2005, 157), while 
Women‘s bodies are ‗honored…as living manifestations of the divine‘ (Hughes 2010, 
357). Such appeals to women‘s ‗self-deification‘ (Lanzetta 2005, 159) sound very 
much like idolatry, for, no matter how justified the desire to reclaim Women‘s 
                                                 
13 Turner similarly points out that the only access we have to the invisibility of GOD/DE is through 
the visible entities of the material world (1995, 253), while Rollins asserts that ‗immanence and 
transcendence are one and the same point…because God remains concealed amidst revelation‘ (2006, 
25). 
14 In Lanzetta‘s writing, Women only have one body to share between them all. 
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bodies from the dirt, there is no GOD/DE but GOD/DE, and to assign Divinity to 
any body is to place an unwarranted limit on the Illimitable and to reduce the 
Irreducible to a thing. 
 
It is not that apophaticism regards bodies as not good, but rather that they, we, are 
not GOD/DE (Boesel and Keller 2010a, 4). Thus apophaticism insists on GOD/DE‘s 
transcendence not as set against humanity per se, but as set against the idolatry of 
assigning materiality to GOD/DE. Thus, thea/ologies are right to unsay the idolatry 
of GOD/DE-He, as Johnson recommends (1992); however, we must pay like 
attention to the idolatrous potential of GOD/DE-She, ensuring that none of our 
metaphors for GOD/DE assumes ‗too cozy a relationship‘ (Boesel and Keller 2010a, 
3-4) with Æ who must ever be affirmed as Not Us. Immanentist thea/ologies often 
fail to maintain the difference and distance that is between us and GOD/DE, 
attempting to ‗impale‘ ÆR on a ‗descriptive hook‘ (Turner 2002, 20) of Women‘s 
experience, subjectivity or embodiment. 
 
Revaluing the Transcendent 
In reinstating apophaticism, as Johnson advises, as a method for critiquing the Great 
Beast and saving the name of both GOD/DE and neighbour from idolatry, may we 
then similarly recuperate transcendence from the above-and-beyond, or is it forever 
irredeemable to thea/ologies? What might the utterly immaterial, inexpressible 
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nature of GOD/DE have to do with bodies that matter, especially the dirty, defamed 
and disparaged bodies of the Others of the dominological Christianate corpus? And, 
if the recuperation of transcendence has any value at all, have Sol‘s opaque 
experiences anything to contribute? Might Sol be transcendent too? 
 
Since the central problematic of the traditional language of transcendence is its 
dismissal of (Women‘s) bodies, a thea/ological re-visioning begins with an 
acknowledgement that transcendence and immanence are not and cannot be, in 
fact, radically separate, since the material is the only resource we have in which to 
encounter the immaterial, and the known the unknown: ‗Our apophatic practices 
are funded by apophatic bodies, those infinite incarnations that continually conceal 
and disclose the divine‘ (Hughes 2010, 363). In our spiritual lives we are ‗lured by 
the transitory that reveals the transcendent‘ (Sexson 1992, 1). Bodies and their 
experiences express the GOD/DE who is immanently present to us, indeed, but they 
also express the GOD/DE who transcends all matter. In saying this, however, are we 
recuperating transcendence or merely reiterating the insights of thea/ologies of 
immanence, that (Women‘s) bodies are not barred from embodying the sacred? 
Miles (2001), Lanzetta (2005), Rivera (2007), Hughes (2010) and Gudmarsdottir 
(2010) all note that, while transcendence is habitually problematised in thea/ologies, 
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there are those15 who see great value in the concept and regret its repudiation by the 
feminist mainstream. Mayra Rivera‘s The Touch of Transcendence (2007) and The 
Bonds of Freedom by Rebekah Miles (2001), offer two extensive arguments for a 
feminist recuperation of transcendence. 
 
Rivera and The Touch of Transcendence  
As with the commentators above, Rivera (2007) notes the problematic traditional 
associations of transcendence with GOD/DE‘s aloftness, distance, separation, 
immateriality, beyond-normality, independence and superiority (ibid, 1). Person 
asserts that this model has encouraged a theo-philosophical tradition that both 
ignores and valorises human self-transcendence, that claims the magnificent, 
peaceful, clean above-and-beyond for a straight, white, male power elite, whilst at 
the same time assigning the lesser, dirtier, more painful realm of here-and-now to 
the Others—the women, the poor, the non-white, the Trans, the Queer. This ‗tool 
of patriarchal and imperial self-legitimation‘ (ibid) has necessarily engaged 
thea/ologians in a recovery of the here-and-now in thea/ologies of Divine 
immanence. However, without the legitimate vision of the Divine difference that 
transcendence expresses, we cannot fully understand interhuman difference, Rivera 
argues (ibid, 128). Furthermore, the loss of transcendence ‗tends to reduce creation 
to something that can be fully grasped by human constructs or reduced to categories 
                                                 
15 Among the cited writers who favour a notion of transcendence are Grace Jantzen, Amy Hollywood, 
Dorothee Soelle and Elizabeth Johnson. 
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within social systems‘ (ibid, 37): if GOD/DE is all immanence, what is left of 
GOD/DE for us (not) to speak? 
 
‗Wary and a bit weary‘ (ibid, 2) of the both traditional formulations of 
transcendence and feminist objections to them, Rivera therefore proposes a re-
evaluation of the notion of transcendence, asking: 
What if transcendence were not understood as that which radically 
distances God from creatures, but rather as a theological concept that 
makes differences significant, especially our differences from one 
another? (ibid, x). 
 
In order to begin, Rivera contends, we must resist the traditional formulations that 
cast GOD/DE as above-and-beyond, and concentrate rather on the notion of 
GOD/DE as ‗inappropriable‘ (ibid, 2), present in the World, since ‗transcendence 
flows through reality, as the sap through the branches of a tree‘ (ibid, 53), but 
irreducible to anything of the World. 
 
Rivera then conducts an extensive review of models of human otherness as 
expressive of transcendence, critiquing among other sources, Derrida, liberation 
theologies, Dussel, Levinas and Spivak. Person concludes that conceptualisations of 
‗the face of the Other‘ as the place in which ‗we‘ encounter the transcendent, 
though immensely valuable in their locating of transcendence within the World, are 
nonetheless problematic. In Levinas‘s thought, for example, immanence is cast as 
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‗sameness‘ or ‗we-ness‘ while transcendence is ‗they-ness‘. Thus, ‗the self remains 
radically separated from the Other…, the transcendence of the Other is…a distance‘ 
(ibid, 63); transcendence and immanence remain an indissoluble binary, and 
transcendence retains its hierarchical burden of aloftness, distance, separation and 
beyond-normality, losing only (perhaps) its immateriality.  
 
Rivera asserts that for a revised model of transcendence, which person names 
‗interhuman transcendence‘, to succeed in having true liberatory potential, we must 
‗avoid the images of clear and fixed boundaries between self and [excluded] Other‘ 
(ibid, 77). In schemas that propose the face of the Other as the location of 
transcendence, the Other is always this ‗excluded Other‘ and who ‗would want to 
protect transcendence if it depend[s] on exclusion?‘ (ibid, 77). However, person does 
see immense value in reconceptualising transcendence as constitutive of all human 
being as well as of GOD/DE‘s being, as a part of our full humanity. And in re-
visioning GOD/DE‘s transcendence as inappropriablity rather than aloftness, we 
create a space to reimagine the otherness of others not as that which is alien but as 
that which is irreducible to any unitary doctrinal orthodoxy. 
 
In an echo of Butler, Rivera states: ‗Human beings…are never fully present to us. 
There is always more to the Other…. It induces in us a feeling of wonder, surprise 
and astonishment‘ (ibid, 138). This wonder, says Rivera, is not something by means 
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of which GOD/DE points away from the World to ÆRSELF in the above-and-
beyond, but rather ‗the very brilliance of God‘ in the here-and-now, transcendence 
in immanence, duality dissolved. Our transcendent bodies shine light on GOD/DE in 
and through ‗the unsurpassable mystery of creatureliness‘ (ibid, 139). We are 
Weilian contradictory pincers; in our dark, unknowable embodiments we reveal 
both ourselves and GOD/DE. 
 
Being open to ‗God‘s more‘ (ibid, 46) prevents us from believing ourselves to be the 
One and Only, the very model of perfect human being from which every Other falls 
short. To know the Other to be transcendent as inappropriable, rather than as alien, 
is to make ourselves infinitely open to the ‗concrete and particular in-finity [sic]‘ 
(ibid, 125) of every other person. Thus, while ‗[a] world that participates in God [is] 
always open to that which is beyond itself‘, that Beyond remains firmly here-and-
now in the bodies of this World, not in the forever-out-of-reach Above.  
 
To welcome ‗what comes from…beyond the self‘ (ibid, 25) is a precondition of just 
and ethical relationships, since it allows us to think ‗beyond straight lines and 
between dichotomies‘ (ibid, 114), to critique the apparent inevitability of the Great 
Beast and to pursue social transformations. And, if transcendent otherness is a 
feature of all human being, from which none of us can escape, if we are all ‗they‘ just 
as much as we are ‗we‘, we are called to reconsider all formulations of us-ness and 
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them-ness. For, although we have no control over the norms that have instituted the 
processes of othering, since we are always born in media res, we can yet critique the 
forces that orchestrate and limit us, as Butler recommends.  
 
Thus, Rivera‘s theology of interhuman transcendence is established in relation to a 
network of others as individuals, both in the past and in the present, and to 
institutions, structures and norms, evoking ‗an air of incompleteness and excess‘ 
(ibid, 81), ‗always unfinished: produced in relation to the transcendence of the 
Other‘ (ibid, 82). And, as a re-visioned definition of transcendence Rivera offers the 
following: 
Transcendence designates a relation with a reality irreducibly 
different from my own reality, without this difference destroying this 
relation and without the relation destroying this difference (ibid). 
 
Miles and The Bonds of Freedom 
While Rivera comes to transcendence through the traditions of liberation theology, 
Rebekah Miles (2001) approaches it as a feminist Christian realist.16 Person offers an 
extensive analysis of models of transcendence, with a particular concentration on 
self-transcendence, using as sources for per critique the work of Reinhold Niebuhr, 
Rosemary Radford Ruether and Sharon Welch, among others. Noting that there is 
no single thea/ological position on transcendence but, rather that ‗the diversity of 
                                                 
16 Miles states that feminist Christian realism ‗grows out of [mainstream] Christian realist 
understandings of the distortions of human power, shared human experiences as a ground for 
normative claims, and the reality of a God who relativizes, unifies and gives meaning to human 
choices and desires‘ (2001, 10). 
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voices among feminist theologians can hardly be overestimated‘ (ibid, 11), person 
nonetheless concludes that the central concern of any feminist critique is with the 
imbalance of power expressed in ‗divine transcendence [as] the pinnacle of a web of 
hierarchical dominations‘ (ibid, 14). A separate, individualistic transcendent 
GOD/DE has supported and encouraged notions of the separate, individualistic 
(male) Self that ‗pervades the whole patriarchal Christian system and supports 
oppression‘ (ibid, 30). Thus it is with self-transcendence, more so than with 
GOD/DE‘s transcendence, that feminist critiques in fact take issue.  
 
Self-transcendence, getting above oneself, supports hierarchical, binaried power-
over structures and a destructive ‗politics of individualism‘ (ibid, 32). This 
autonomous above-itself self is considered inapplicable to the essentially relational 
and non-competitive, communal, power-with nature of Women‘s experiences (ibid, 
31-32). For many thea/ologians, therefore, driven by concerns over the ‗supposed 
ethical effects‘ of the doctrine of Divine transcendence (ibid, 12), the rejection of 
power-over in favour of power-with is determined to be the method by which a 
more just society will be established (ibid, 32). It is in thea/ologies of immanence 
that the particularity and boundedness of human bodies is best expressed, that 
‗feminist values of relationality and mutual empowerment‘ (ibid, 13) are valorised, 
so much so that it might sometimes appear that GOD/DE is not simply immanent in 
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such experiences, but that ‗community relationships and the natural evolutionary 
process‘ are GOD/DE (ibid, 17). 
 
Miles critiques feminist notions that human transcendence arises out of conflicts 
between the limited perspectives of the individual as against the diversity of 
viewpoints available in the community, where:  
transcendence is radically ‗located‘ in community interactions. And 
within these communal relationships and mutual critical human 
interactions is the divine…. We are many and conflicted: the divine is 
us (ibid, 140).  
 
This scenario makes no allowances for the individual to transcend the Great Beast of 
communal opinion: if I can only transcend myself by coming to understand that my 
perspective is limited as compared with the necessary diversity of the community‘s 
perspective, then I am always to some extent wrong as compared with communal 
opinion‘s rightness, and a transformational critique of the norms is not possible. An 
‗adequate feminist ethic and theology‘ requires that we have the freedom17 to stand 
in opposition to our community as we are called by individual conscience (ibid, 
118). 
 
                                                 
17 Miles consistently equates self-transcendence with ‗radical human freedom‘ (2001, 118) without 
offering any critique of notions of freedom, of how, exactly, we are free to critique the norms and act 
to transform them when we are entangled in the constraints of class, race, gender and/or sexuality. As 
Rivera notes, ‗we cannot purge ourselves from the markings that history has left in us‘ (2007, 103; cf 
Butler 1990; 1993); complete freedom from the norms is achievable only by ‗transcend[ing] 
out…from our world and its influences‘ (ibid, 103). Of course, Miles does not advocate this sort of 
freedom, but rather a freedom to act within the bonds of our situation. Nonetheless, I find per 
uncritical use of the concept of freedom troubling. 
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While Miles appreciates the analyses that have brought thea/ologians to their 
conclusions, person maintains that these are based on a misinterpretation of the 
notion of transcendence as power-over. Person contends that, in truth, ‗to say that 
God is transcendent is simply to say that God may not be reduced purely to that 
material reality in which God is radically present‘ (ibid, 22), not that Æ is above-
and-beyond but simply that Æ is not coterminous with, is absolutely more than and 
utterly different from, the World. In dismissing transcendence as in any way useful 
and focusing instead on immanence, thea/ologies have ‗undercut the 
anthropological, moral, and religious assumptions on which feminism rests‘ (ibid, 3), 
which is to say the freedom to undertake an ethical pursuit of societal 
transformation through the critique and transcendence of the norms that 
orchestrate and limit us:  
An affirmation of the human capacity for radical self-transcendence, 
for radical freedom over culture and nature is necessary to make sense 
of the realities of feminist moral experience (ibid, 17). 
 
Transcendence offers the possibility of a limit on idolatry, a mode of mystery, an 
embrace of moreness and irreducibility, an undermining of the namings of 
dominology, and a check on destructive, hierarchical dualisms (ibid, 21-23). 
Transcendence values human experiences that take us beyond the here-and-now but 
not necessarily into the above-and-beyond: imagination, foresight, memory and 
conscience (ibid, 63). Without a ‗self-transcendent capacity‘, we have no way to 
reflect upon experiences (cf McBride 2003, above) and no way to critique our social 
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position. And without critique, there can be no feminist transformations, no way to 
transcend the limits of communal expectations and unitary doctrinal orthodoxy. The 
self-transcendent human is truly ‗ecstatic‘, free to stand outside a bounded, limited 
self, community and World, ‗never satisfied with creation‘ (ibid, 25), compelled to 
search for meaning and transformation. It is thus, in our freedom to question ‗the 
character of reality in its totality‘, says Miles, that we are imago Dei (ibid, 118); as 
GOD/DE judges human endeavours and finds them wanting, so too do we find 
ourselves wanting and seek to change. In this, we are free to accept the bonds 
GOD/DE places upon us. 
 
The Embodiment of GOD/DE‘s Transcendence 
Sells asserts that the logic of apophaticism, with its insistence on the limitless 
transcendence of GOD/DE, is overturned if we then limit GOD/DE to being only 
beyond and not also in everything there is (1994, 21); ‗That which is beyond is 
within. That which is other, is non-other‘ (ibid, 207), and that which is embodied 
may be as expressive of GOD/DE‘s transcendence as any other aspect of the World. 
Thus, when Boesel and Keller and Gudmarsdottir  ask whether apophaticism can say 
anything relevant to feminists, ‗anything sensible (that is to say both wise and 
pertaining to the senses)‘ (Gudmarsdottir 2010, 274), about the ‗concrete finitude of 
the body‘ (Boesel and Keller 2010a, 3) without making an idol of those bodies, 
Rivera and Miles respond with re-visions that seek to do just that.  
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Within these schemas, some form of non-idolatrous, embodied outshowing of 
GOD/DE‘s transcendence is assured. But how exactly does this relate to GOD/DE, 
and to the other, to Sol‘s embodiment? How, moreover, does this relate to self, to my 
embodiment, as surely it must if transcendence is to be assured for all bodies, the 
body of self as much as the bodies of others?  For both commentators the 
transcendence of GOD/DE is a given, which must be recuperated by re-visioning 
human bodies as in some way expressive of that transcendence rather than of 
GOD/DE immanent. Rivera‘s relational interhuman transcendence is based on 
previous conceptualisations of transcendence as encountered in ‗the face of the 
Other‘. Rivera thereby appears to maintain a self/other binary predicated on the self 
as knowable vis-à-vis the others‘ transcendent unknowabilty. Even though Sol is no 
longer the excluded Other, but simply one who is not-me, the binary remains and 
thus remains problematic since it maintains itself as an unbridgeable divide; 
GOD/DE‘s transcendence is located in Sol‘s quotidian experiences, but not in mine. 
In Miles‘s re-vision, self-transcendence derives from our embracing the freedom to 
act upon a critique of antipathetic societal norms. Sol and I might both be included, 
but only inasmuch as we act upon a feminist dissatisfaction with the Great Beast18. If 
we never critique the norms, we never achieve self-transcendence or, more 
                                                 
18 Sol and I have, of course, both acted upon our critique of the Great Beast, Sol in transitioning into 
per affirmed gender and I in undertaking this project; our transcendent embodiments are thus assured 
in Miles‘ re-visioning. 
287 
importantly, never embody the transcendence of GOD/DE. Thus, in neither of these 
models is transcendence assured for all bodies in all circumstances. 
 
By returning to Butler‘s notion of opacity, however, we might expand these two re-
visions, because opacity belongs to all, whether engaged in critique or not, and to me 
as much as to others. It is not that I cannot give a full account of you, but that you 
cannot account for your self any more than I can account for mine. I, like you and 
like GOD/DE, am a dazzling darkness: authored by ‗that which precedes and exceeds 
me‘ (Butler 2005, 82), ‗that which I am defies narrative capture, insists on itself as an 
opacity that resists all final illumination‘ (ibid, 80). I cannot speak of myself without 
a constant unspeaking of myself, a constant redrafting of who I am. Because I am 
‗other to myself‘ (ibid, 27) as you and GOD/DE are other to me, in my opacity I am 
the embodiment of GOD/DE‘s transcendence.  
 
Rivera cautions against conceptualising otherness as something that can be co-opted 
by sameness, asking ‗If anyone could adopt as one‘s own the alterity of the Other, 
would she or he not erase said alterity?‘ (2007, 75). However, in Butler‘s analysis, 
opacity is an inescapable fact of human existence that does not erase the otherness of 
others. In knowing myself to be unknowable, I do not claim that my unknowability 
is the same as yours, but simply that it is. Miles, too, advises caution, in this case 
with regard to the misappropriation of transcendence as a way of getting above our 
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‗bodily and cultural environment‘ (2001, 13). But, in my naming opacity as 
demonstrative of transcendence, it is not the transcendence of the human above-
and-beyond our materiality that I seek to claim, but rather an aspect of imago Dei, of 
how we body forth the transcendence of GOD/DE in the here-and-now. I am not a 
Divine Woman, a self deified, but I am a self that nonetheless manifests something 
of the ineffability of the Deity that I can never be. 
 
Sharing in the Unsayable 
Gregory of Nyssa wrote: ‗[S]ince the nature of our minds…evades our knowledge, it 
has an accurate resemblance of the superior nature, figuring by its unknowableness 
the incomprehensible Nature‘ (Tanner 2010, 118). Similarly, Meister Eckhart 
asserted that the self ‗is nameless with the namelessness of the Godhead itself‘ 
(Turner 1995, 141). GOD/DE‘s incomprehensibility is reflected in us as opacity. We 
form part of the dark glass of St Paul‘s paradigm; through our opaque embodiments 
we darkly reflect the mystery of the Divine19. Thus, if opacity is part of imago Dei, to 
refuse to honour it either in ourselves or in GOD/DE would be highly unethical.  
 
                                                 
19 Edward Nolan notes that the very paradigm itself—‗Now we see through a glass darkly‘ (videmus 
nunc per speculum in aenigmate) —is something of an apophatic dark glass since ‗the closer we look 
for precision of meaning, the less we find it‘ (1990, 1). Translations of the words per and aenigmate 
for example are many and various, with the meanings of the former including ‗in‘, ‗through‘ and ‗by 
means of‘, and the latter both ‗an enigma‘ and, according to Marcia Colish, ‗a species of metaphor or 
riddle‘ (1983, 15). It would therefore be possible to translate the line as ‗Now we see by means of a 
mirror into a metaphor‘, among many other possible permutations. 
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Sol‘s contradictory narratives highlight per opacity, per unsayability, through which 
we see, embodied in per, an image of GOD/DE‘s dazzlingly dark transcendence. 
Always ‗arriv[ing] late‘ to ourselves (Butler 2005, 79), our own opacity shows us 
GOD/DE‘s back. It shows us too that the norms that orchestrate and limit our lives 
have a back; they are not born with us but ‗emerge, transform and persist according 
to a temporality that is not the same as the temporality of my life‘ (ibid, 35) and 
thus, they too opaquely body forth the GOD/DE whose story is longer than we can 
ever imagine, that we always join in the middle, knowing little of what has passed 
and nothing of what is to come. Unlike GOD/DE however, whose Protean 
mutability is so vast and varied that we can never grasp ÆR, the norms are 
amenable to, even require of us, critique and transformation; though we cannot fully 
know their back, we can, as Miles points out, unsay their influence, get over them 
and go beyond to reimagine and transform the future. 
 
An Apophasis of Gender 
Subverting Dualisms 
Lanzetta commends an apophatic via feminina to our attention, as ‗a continual un-
saying…of the previous thousands of years of ‗saying‘ by patriarchal cultures and 
religions‘ (2005, 16). I contend that, if we are to unsay the works of dominology, to 
critique and transform the norms, we cannot not exclude the opacity of binary 
gender from that apophatic practice. As one of the unitary doctrinal orthodoxies of 
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the Great Beast that orchestrates and limits the selves we are able to express, binary 
gender requires our critique and our transformative endeavours. If we name 
ourselves or GOD/DE we attempt a mastery to which we are not entitled: that holds 
as true for the namings of She and He, as for any other. These names are not 
ontological, there is nothing essential about them: they are the sayings of 
dominology and need to be unsaid if justice is to be done for  all of us, unintelligible 
and intelligible alike.  
 
An apophasis of gender is not new to the tradition of negative theology. Kitty Datta, 
for example, notes the ‗crossing of gender boundaries‘ in the works of the Beguines, 
identifying this as ‗one of the strategies of dislocation to prevent misapprehension of 
the inexpressible‘ (2000, 128). Marguerite Porete and Meister Eckhart both, 
according to Sells, unsay both a ‗monogendered deity and monotonic gender 
relations between divine and human‘ (1994, 205) in a language that ‗subverts the 
dualisms and delimitations‘ of more orthodox religious discourse (30). However, in 
these contexts and not unexpectedly, the binary remains intact, the boundaries 
crossed being from one box into the other and the monogendered deity being 
expanded to bigendered.  It is in contemporary analyses that the potential for an 
unsaying of the binary itself is expressed, particularly in the works of Boesel and 
Keller (Keller 2008; Boesel 2010; Boesel and Keller 2010a; Keller 2010) who contend 
that ‗The unsaying of bodies implies an unsaying of the impermeable boundaries and 
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ontological—indeed ontotheological—fixities of a modern body‘ (Boesel and Keller 
2010a, 10).  
 
How (Not) to Speak of Gender 
If we unsay the impermeable boundaries of the body with an apophasis of binary 
gender, do we then invalidate Sol‘s own gender experiences? After all, Sol expresses 
no desire to do anything other than survive per Round Trip to Hell with grace and 
dignity, to leave behind the female body that made person ‗as neurotic as hell‘ and to 
get on with being ‗absolutely fine‘ in per ‗useful and productive‘ male body. How 
might we, indeed can we ethically, unsay binary gender without gainsaying Sol‘s 
gender experiences? Serano (2007) and Namaste (2000) are, as noted in Chapter 1, 
highly critical of deconstructivist theories of gender that delegitimise the gender 
experiences of transsexual people by calling into question their self-identifications 
within a binary gender system. Furthermore, how, ethically, do we unsay a 
phenomenon that remains responsible for appalling oppression and suffering in the 
World? While we may want to claim that the namings of Woman and Man are 
idolatrous dominological fabrications, the sufferings inflicted by those namings 
cannot be gainsaid.  
 
Turner contends that the concern of apophatic theology is to construct itself as 
‗distinguishable from a mere denial of theism‘ (2002, 14). The dilemma for 
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apophaticism is that in unsaying all our namings of GOD/DE, we risk saying 
GOD/DE out of our lives for good and all. However, even to say that GOD/DE is not 
is to say something about GOD/DE that must subsequently be unsaid; to say that 
GOD/DE does not exist presupposes a GOD/DE who might.  By analogy, we might 
fear that to unsay binary gender is to say away the binary-gendered.  If, however, I 
paraphrase Weil‘s statement that God both exists and does not exist, some sort of 
accommodation that enables us to conceive of a transformed gender world without 
saying our binary-gendered sibs out of it might be reached: 
Binary gender exists. Binary gender does not exist. Where is the 
problem? I am quite sure that there is binary gender in the sense that 
I see its effects, for good or ill, on my life and in the World. I am quite 
sure that there is no binary gender in the sense that I am quite sure 
there is ultimately nothing universally really real, situated beyond 
geography, history and society, that can support the concepts of 
Woman and Man that govern our lives.  
 
And to paraphrase Rollins (2006, 32), speaking of gender is never speaking of gender 
but only ever speaking about our understanding of gender; thus we must learn how 
(not) to speak of gender in a manner that is productive of social transformation 
whilst not destructive of the well-being, especially, of those who are already 
oppressed. To that end, an apophasis of gender must both unsay binary gender and 
unsay the unsaying of binary gender, in an infinite regress of what Turner calls self-
subverting utterances (1995, 21). 
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Aporias as Weilian Pincers 
The self-subverting utterance, the statement that expresses within itself an 
unresolveable contradiction, such as ‗a dazzling darkness‘ or ‗a limitless limit‘, is an 
example of aporia. Neither part of the utterance is true in and of itself but, in the 
tension created between the contradictory parts, between the points of the Weilian 
pincers, the truth of God‘s unsayability is expressed. ‗Real contradiction occurs 
when language engages the ineffable transcendent but these contradictions are not 
illogical‘, affirms Sells (1994, 3). The aporia is not a mere rhetorical flourish, a 
seeming contradiction ‗used for effect and then…resolved by further explanation‘ 
(ibid, 21). Like the contradictions in Sol‘s story, all parts must stand lest we impose 
our own limits upon the limitlessness of an/the Other. The purpose of the aporia is 
thus to keep the mind in constant activity, ‗never allowing it a fixed referent‘ (Sells 
1994, 30), so that it moves from one aspect of the aporia to another and back again, 
reaching no rational resolution, knowing that our knowledge fails, ‗but not knowing 
what it is that our knowledge fails to reach‘ (Turner 1995, 265).  
 
This may not necessarily be a comfortable experience: Plotinus asserts that to find 
ourselves in an aporia is to be ‗in agony over how to speak‘ (in Sells 1994, 16) and, 
what is more, no simple agony but the agony of giving birth. We may with good 
reason shy away from invoking such anguish. On the other hand, however, Weil 
asserts, above, that when the attention has revealed the contradiction in something 
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on which it has been fixed, a kind of loosening takes place. This is not a loosening in 
the contradiction such that we might resolve it, but rather in ourselves, through 
what Butler, above, calls a willingness to become undone from our attachment to 
the Great Beast, to certainty, logic and the need to know. There is an unresolveable 
contradiction between those who live the deconstruction of binary gender and the 
gender experiences of transsexuals like Julia Serano, Viviane Namaste and Sol, an 
aporia that we must accept with open hearts and not attempt to rationalise away. 
Open hearted acceptance of aporias is open hearted acceptance of our utter inability 
ever to exert total mastery over the namings of GOD/DE and selves:  
Forcing someone to read himself as we read him (slavery). Forcing 
others to read us as we read ourselves (conquest). A mechanical 
process. More often than not a dialogue between deaf people (Weil 
2002 [1952], 135). 
 
‗Each statement I make…reveals itself to be in need of correction. The correcting 
statement must then itself be corrected, ad infinitum‘ (Sells 1994, 2). I unsay 
GOD/DE, I unsay gender, I unsay myself. I cannot give a full and true account of 
anything. But that does not mean that I am not ethically obliged to speak, to account 
for myself, to take responsibility for my being in the World. Nor does it mean that I 
cannot critique the norms into which I am born, ‗only that when I do, I must be 
careful to understand the limits of what I can do, the limits that condition any and 
all such doings‘ (Butler 2005, 82). We must accept that we are conditioned by the 
norms even as we seek to change them, that we require the norms to make us 
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intelligible to each other as ‗speaking beings‘ (ibid, 132). When we challenge them 
we therefore risk our own and others‘ intelligibility. The norms explain us to 
ourselves, but there remains a haunting excess, a part of ourselves that we cannot 
explain away despite constant revision, the unsayable that cannot be unsaid. We are 
mysterious to ourselves, as GOD/DE is mysterious to us.  
 
The Mysteries of Gender Unsayings 
Much has been written in thea/ologies of Women‘s mystery. Lanzetta, for example, 
declares:  
the mystery of women and feminism, subverts easy identities…, 
articulates precisely those realities that transgress the boundaries of 
everyday consciousness and develops a literacy that speaks to the 
heart of women‘s deepest possibility (2005, 43). 
 
But if we are to unsay Women, how then do we speak of their mystery and their 
deepest possibilities? Do we still want or need to? Does not an opaque transcendence 
that speaks to the heart of the deepest possibilities for every body, binary gendered 
or not, serve us better when it comes to mystery?  Certainly, the preservation of 
mystery is at the heart of apophaticism, even if its achievement is, as Sells notes, 
‗unstable and fleeting‘ (1994, 217). This is mystery not as a secret gnosis, available 
only to initiates by virtue of allegiance to a cult, or through a hierarchical set of 
practices, or indeed from possession of a particular genital morphology (the gender 
gnosis discussed in Chapter 3) but rather as an all-encompassing sense of 
‗wonderment [and] bewilderment…that is rediscovered at the point where 
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[discourses] point beyond themselves‘ (ibid, 216). To become open to wonder like 
this requires effort, certainly, to free ourselves from our entanglements in the 
norms. It requires a certain loosening to take place, a willingness to become undone, 
‗to let go…of the grasping for guarantees and for knowledge as a possession‘ (ibid, 
217).  
 
We cannot apprehend the mystery of the transcendent by rational means, and 
should never make the mistake of taking ‗rational constructions of reality for the 
thing itself‘ since there is always more to any one/thing than meets the eye 
(McIntosh 2002, 140). There is need for rational thought, of course, but also need for 
the open-hearted, non-judgemental ‗astonished wonder‘ (145) that the a-rationality 
of transcendent mystery can engender. If we refuse mystery, warns Cardinal 
Newman, we ‗do not look out of [our]selves…do not look through and beyond [our] 
own minds…but are engrossed in notions of what is due to [our]selves, to [our] own 
dignity and [our] own consistency‘ (in McIntosh 2002, 143). A reality that is wholly 
rational, where knowledge is a possession that must be grasped firmly and the 
World is shrunk to fit into quantifiable dimensions, leaves no room for that which is 
radically new, incomprehensible, immeasurable, illimitable, irreducible, 
ungraspable, mysterious: ‗This kind of formation does not really have a use for the 
ability to encounter the unknowable‘ (McIntosh 2002, 145), for unresolveable 
aporias held in pincers, or the haunting excesses of GOD/DE and self. 
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Sells (1994) and McIntosh (2002) remind us that living in relationship with mystery 
and wonderment requires us to let go of any idea we might have had that we can 
grasp GOD/DE. However, as Rollins attests, ‗while we do not grasp God, faith is 
born amidst the feeling that God grasps us‘ (2006, 30). Similarly Rivera has reminded 
us that GOD/DE is always beyond our grasp, but not beyond our touch (2007, 2). 
Like Weil, we have a sense that, while we know there is nothing true we can say of 
GOD/DE, yet there is a GOD/DE who touches our lives and about whom we must 
speak, impossible though it may seem. But why, as Carson asks, above, should the 
truth not be impossible and the impossible not be true? Why should not the aporias 
of Sol‘s story and of gender not act as metaxu, thresholds to a mystical revelation of 
the Divine?  
 
Mystery is not important for its own sake, of course, even though it ‗lures 
and…delights‘ us (Hughes 2010, 364), but is a way of living in apophatic critique of 
the Great Beast, ‗an invitation for continual reevaluation of [worldviews] as the 
limited constructions they are‘ (Sells 1994, 217). Like Thinness, Opaquing sets us at 
an angle to the certainties as an ethical project that requires us to risk ourselves with 
our willingness to become undone, as Butler assert, above.  
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Butler assumes that the risk is worth it, as do I. However, with every risk comes the 
potential for damage to self or others. The dangers to transsexual people of an 
unsaying of binary gender are noted in Chapter 1. In addition to this, there is the 
danger that an ethics of unsaying says away the voices of the voiceless at exactly the 
moment when they begin to come to speech (Keller 2008, 26). Gudmarsdottir echoes 
this concern, but adds that we must nevertheless grasp the nettle and disclose ‗the 
vulnerabilities and wiles of language‘ (2010, 283) that orchestrate and limit the 
selves we are able to be20. Even in unsaying, we do not remain voiceless, since every 
unsaying requires to be said, unsaid, and said anew ad infinitum. There is no 
apophasis without kataphasis, no unsaying without first a voice to say. 
 
Living Without a Why 
It can be argued, as discussed in Chapter 1, that we are only intelligibly human 
inasmuch as we conform to the orchestrating norms; any critique that challenges 
our intelligibility therefore challenges our humanity. As Keller notes, ‗the more 
sealed the boundaries of some established binary, the more violent their rupture‘ 
(2010, 30) for ourselves and for societies. Certainly any challenge to binary gender, 
arguably the most firmly sealed of all boundaries, already results in daily violence in 
the lives of our trans/genderqueer sibs.  Thus it would seem that, in order to remain 
                                                 
20 In reference to feminist fears that the death of the subject is being heralded just at the moment 
when Women appear to be coming to subjectivity, Butler asserts: ‗this death…is only the death of a 
certain kind of subject, one that was never possible to begin with, the death of a fantasy of impossible 
mastery, and so a loss of what one never had‘ (2005, 65). 
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safely and intelligibly human, we would do well to know fully and account 
rationally for ourselves. But to acknowledge the limits of our self-understanding is, 
Butler asserts, ‗the sign of our humanity‘ (Butler 2005, 83). The apophatic moment 
‗of unsaying and unknowing is what it is to be human‘ (Sells 1994, 217); Meister 
Eckhart calls this ‗living without a why‘ (ibid, 203).  
 
If our humanity is considered as the ability to define and assert ourselves, then to 
live without the definitions and assertions of a why is to undermine that humanity, 
to become unintelligibly inhuman. Butler, however, offers us these Weilian pincers 
as an approach to a different understanding of what might constitute our humanity: 
We embody the ‗inhuman‘ by offering a critique of the will, of 
assertion, and of resolve as prerequisites of the human. In this sense, 
the ‗inhuman‘ is not the opposite of the human but an essential means 
by which we become human in and through the deconstitution of our 
humanness (2005, 106). 
 
By refusing to assert our need for an explanation, our desire for the intelligibility of 
GOD/DE, other or self, our will to answer the ‗why‘, we become more just, more 
open-hearted and more humanely human. Living without a why is what enables us 
to stop arrogantly demanding to know the reasons GOD/DE behaves in ‗a strange, 
inappropriate, ―ungodly‖, and seemingly unfair, unethical way‘ (Boesel 2010, 324) 




Humility has not, according to feminist critiques, been seen to play much of a part in 
the language of transcendence. Quite the reverse, since transcendence has been held 
responsible in large part for egotistical (Male) human beings getting way above 
themselves. In the re-visioning of transcendence, however, we might also begin to 
reformulate the language of apophaticism away from the notions of hierarchical 
ascent that seem to be the commonplaces of the mediaeval convention21 and that 
have passed, to our detriment, into the dominological Christianate corpus22. In 
Christianate formulations, the ‗trans‘ of transcendence is taken to mean above-and-
beyond, freedom from earthly boundaries and the limitations of a painful, dirty, 
messy and very mortal body. However, the prefix ‗trans‘ is more accurately 
translated as ‗on the other side of‘ or ‗across‘ (OED). Thus, rather than meaning ‗to 
climb up‘23 or to get above ourselves, transcendence may be taken to mean ‗to climb 
across‘ or to get over ourselves. In common parlance, to get over ourselves is to stop 
taking ourselves seriously, to remember that we are not the centre of the universe, 
to have a little modesty. Moreover, even if ‗trans‘ is legitimately translated as 
                                                 
21 Sells notes that while apophatic language appears to affirm the hierarchical, what in fact happens is 
that, under the pressure of unsaying, these structures ‗collapse from within the directional context; 
the highest station becomes…no-station; the most noble becomes the most common‘ (1994, 213). 
However, in this formulation, hierarchical binaries not unsaid but merely inverted.  
22 A vivid illustration of the way in which valorised notions of transcendence are embedded in the 
corpus, to the detriment of the material, is detailed in what Bourdieu calls ‗antagonistic adjectives‘: 
‗The network of oppositions between high (sublime, elevated, pure) and low (vulgar, low, modest), 
spiritual and material, fine (refined, elegant) and coarse (heavy, fat, crude, brutal), light (subtle, 
lively, sharp, adroit) and heavy (slow, thick, blunt, laborious, clumsy), free and forced, broad and 
narrow…is the matrix of all commonplaces which find such ready acceptance because behind them 
lies the whole social order‘ (in Penketh 2011, 92). 
23 The ‗scend‘ part of ‗transcend‘ comes from the Latin ‗scandere‘ meaning ‗to climb‘ (OED). 
301 
‗beyond‘, transcendence might be taken to mean ‗overflow‘ as Sells suggests (1994, 
51), a spilling out of ourselves into a beyond that is not necessarily above. Thus, 
going beyond ourselves would be expressive of working for the transformation of 
the World with empathy, compassion and humility.  
 
The final sentence of the Quaker Advices and Queries no. 17 asks us to ‗Think it 
possible that [we] may be mistaken‘ (Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of 
Friends (Quakers) in Britain 1995, 1.02:17). This counsel seems to me to be at the 
heart of both Butler‘s thinking on opacity and the practice of apophaticism. In the 
apophatic tradition, GOD/DE is the only (N)One whose vision is perfect, who sees 
‗all the factors involved in the vast extent of the world‘ (Fiddes 2002, 37) and it is 
our humility in the face of all this that we cannot know that liberates us from 
idolatry and ‗the urge to commodify truth into the coinage of our own rational 
certainties‘ (McIntosh 2002, 151). To be human, says Butler, is to be ‗fallible‘ (2005, 
111); this does not mean that everything we think or do or say is erroneous, of 
course, but it does mean that that we have always to think it possible that we may 
be mistaken. Thus Butler cautions that ‗a certain humility must emerge in this 
process…, a certain knowingness about the limits of what there is to be known‘ 
(ibid, 69), a caution that is echoed by Fiddes in reference to the wisdom saying of 
the Book of Proverbs: ‗Because of the complexity of the world there are unknown 
factors that the wise man must reckon with…and so a proper approach to life is 
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humility‘ (2002, 37). In order not to get above ourselves and imagine ourselves as 
Divine, we must truly transcend, getting over ourselves with proper humility, 
offering up our opacity as a constant reminder that we may be mistaken. 
 
Summary 
To acknowledge GOD/DE as opaque may be no great stretch, far less so, perhaps, 
than to acknowledge ÆR as Thin or Protean, despite our burning desire to iron out 
the contradictions in ÆR backless narrative. Only the most arrogant among us 
would claim to know the entirety of GOD/DE‘s dazzling darkness. That said, we 
must take care to remember that even our reformulations of GOD/DE as GOD/DE-
She, intent on redressing a balance long tilted in favour of dominology, must in the 
end be unsaid. Simply to favour one set of reified metaphors over another does not 
end idolatry and power-over, but merely impales GOD/DE on a different descriptive 
hook. As Weil points out, ‗When we recommend the opposite of an evil we remain 
on the level of that evil‘ since to propose the transfer of power from oppressor to 
oppressed is not to ‗get free from the oppression-domination cycle‘ (2009 [1951], 
101). The cycle remains intact unless we unsay it all ad infinitum, in a strategy and 
practice of unknowing that constantly critiques the orchestrating norms of every 
Great Beast, even the Great Beast of feminist collectivities. 
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To acknowledge ourselves as opaque may be a somewhat greater stretch, schooled as 
we are in an Enlightenment view of full self-knowledge as wholly desirable and 
ultimately attainable. However, if we subject our own stories to the same attention 
as we have Sol‘s (or Leigh‘s or Robin‘s, for that matter), we cannot but be aware of 
the contradictions with which they are riven, of exactly how much of what we say 
is truly important and how much functions merely to make us look good to others 
(and to ourselves). This primary opacity of the self nonetheless offers us an 
enormously fruitful ethical opportunity. Through Opaquing we might establish 
relationality where no common ground can be assumed, nonviolently, 
nonjudgementally, tolerantly, patiently and with humility, recognising our shared, 
invariable and partial blindness about ourselves, as we learn to live with the 
inevitability of fracture and contradiction. Through Opaquing too we might 
understand ourselves to express the transcendence of GOD/DE, not by getting above 
ourselves, by valorising all those ways in which we are better than other parts of the 
World, but by getting over ourselves, by humbly accepting our errancy, living 
without a why and applying the ‗beer-can principle‘ to a World in need of 
compassionate justice. 
 
To acknowledge genderedness as opaque is a greater stretch than some of us can 
manage, a violent rupture of apparently impermeable boundaries. We may find 
ourselves in an agony of how (not) to speak of binary gender‘s contradictions, of 
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how it both exists and does not exists, of the many and various oppressions its 
(non)existence inflicts upon our frail bodies. Unsaying irreducible, illimitable 
GOD/DE into ÆR dazzling darkness might be logical. Unsaying ourselves as humbly 
transcendent bodies might be acceptable. Unsaying something as apparently fixed 
and essential, even ontotheological, as binary gender might, however, seem like 
madness. But the tension created by an open-hearted acceptance of the aporias of 
gender might also act as pincers to pry apart the jaws of power-over, causing a 
necessary loosening of dominological supremacy to take place through our own 
willingness to become undone. Our Weilian method of investigation: as soon as we 
have thought something, try to see in what ways the contrary is true, groping in the 
dark to say, unsay, and say again. Thus, through an apophatic strategy of Opaquing, 
of GOD/DE, of self and of gender, we might save the Name and the neighbour from 
human mastery and call down Divine good into the World: 
Men owe us what we imagine they will give us. We must forgive 
them this debt. To accept the fact that they are other than the 
creatures of our imagination is to imitate the renunciation of God. I 
also am other than what I imagine myself to be. To know this is 
forgiveness. (Weil 2002 [1952], 9) 
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CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Introduction: Beyond God the Mother? 
When I began this study, I had in mind, somewhat playfully, to call it Beyond God 
the Mother, analogising from Mary Daly‘s groundbreaking work of early feminist 
theology Beyond God the Father (Daly 1985). I feel as deep an unease with concepts 
of GOD/DE-She as with GOD/DE-He, since neither seems truly to reflect either the 
troubled sense of gender that began with my handed-down khaki shorts, or the 
growing sense I have of GOD/DE‘s vast unknowability. Certain though I am that 
dominological constructions of divinity have led the World into terrible peril, I am 
not convinced that putting GOD/DE in a skirt or living in the lap of the Goddess 
(Eller 1993) are a solution. Thus, I went searching for more adequately gendered 
models of GOD/DE, turning to people for whom genderedness was a pressing daily 
issue, trans people whom I designated at the time as ‗knowing gender better than 
me‘. At that point I had expected straightforward tales of people who, because they 
had experienced gender non-normatively, would conceive of the gender of GOD/DE 
in a similar fashion; beyond GOD/DE the mother would be GOD/DE the 
transsexual. This was not quite the case; people for whom the day to day 
negotiations of gender make life difficult are drawn to the security of fairly ‗normal‘ 
views of GOD/DE it seems. What I actually found was infinitely more interesting 
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and rewarding than what I thought I was seeking, as my narrators‘ stories became 
metaxu, and their embodied quotidian experiences led me into considerations of 
how those embodiments were demonstrative of that of GOD/DE.  
 
It is a commonplace to acknowledge that GOD/DE is beyond gender, as Æ is beyond 
all human concepts. And yet, the fact remains that we continue to ascribe gender to 
ÆR, and that gender still tends overwhelmingly to be masculine despite all attempts 
to make it otherwise (e.g. Coakley 2002, 64; McIntosh 2007, 250). Is it possible, 
therefore, that after we transcend gender for ourselves, we will allow GOD/DE to do 
the same? Esther Macintosh argues that we might achieve a gender-transcendent 
GOD/DE-language if we adopt ‗a less specific concept of God‘ (2007, 255), and 
suggests ‗supreme or infinite agent‘ (ibid, 253) as possible terminology. Like per, I 
commend new language for GOD/DE, but recommend that we do not stop at one 
renaming when those names should, like GOD/DE ÆRSELF, be infinite. We must 
by all means reclaim gynocentric images of GOD/DE, however those might be 
conceived, of course, but by no means should the project rest there. Every one of us 
is metaxu, whatever gender we may be, and every one of us has something to impart 
about the nature of GOD/DE if we pay attention. Even to call ÆR ‗infinite agent‘ is 
to place an unwarranted and idolatrous limit on GOD/DE. The only possibilities we 
have to avoid that becoming the case are either not to speak of GOD/DE at all, an 
impossible, nay futile, task for a thea/ologian, or indeed a theælogian, or to speak 
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and speak and speak again, naming and renaming ÆR as prolifically as we name and 
rename gender, while knowing all the time that no naming is ever adequate. Thus 
we might renounce our attachment to any desire for certainty, fixity or simplicity 
with regard to GOD/DE. Only then do we have any chance of refusing the idolatry 
that is one of my central concerns.  
 
This chapter begins with a consideration of those central concerns, opening on my 
foundational assertion that binary gender is but one metaphor among many with 
which to discuss human experiences of genderedness.  From this I move to the 
notion of imago Dei, claiming that all human experience demonstrates that of 
GOD/DE but that this does not constitute us as Divine in our own right.  Asserting 
that attempts to fix names to GOD/DE, self and gender are idolatrous acts, I 
commend a strategy of renunciation, or Weilian decreation, an apophasis or 
unsaying of the binary of gender for the benefit of our unintelligible sibs.  Such a 
strategy, I contend, affirms a yearning towards an embodied transcendence and an 
expansive future horizon of hope.  Aligning this thesis with Yip‘s model of turning 
theology upside down, or expansion, I offer a methodology of Grounded Theology 
that uses quotidian experiences as the basis for theologising around three new 
metaphorical models for Divine-human relationships; the Thin, as demonstrated by 
Leigh‘s story; the Protean, as drawn from Robin‘s experiences; and the Opaque, as it 
is reflected in Sol‘s story.  I then discuss the concept of unintelligibility and the 
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demand for justice for our unintelligible sibs that might be worked towards through 
the foundation of fruitful alliances. I assert that binary gender is unjustly out of 
balance and that its decreation might act as a Weilian counterweight to that 
injustice, creating a judgement-free space where thinking otherwise can happen. I 
argue that outsiderness, as it is embodied not only by Leigh, Robin and Sol but also 
by my whole approach to this thesis, acts as just such a counterweight.  Drawing an 
analogy between Althaus-Reid‘s notion of Queer sainthood and Weil‘s own lived 
experience of outsiderness as ethical necessity, I propose the concept of outsider 
saints and offer some considerations of how outsider sainthood might be achieved 
through a renunciation of cis gender privilege in favour of our unintelligible sibs.  I 




My foundational concern is with the notion of a World without binary gender, in 
which our sibs who are currently unintelligible because they do not fit the two 
available gender boxes might be rendered intelligible and thus fully human. One 
way I have sought to reconfigure the gender landscape in the compass of this thesis 
has been to institute a thought experiment, using the epicene pronoun person to 
signify that the binary gender of those who appear within is less important than 
what each has to say about genderedness. The point of this work, however, has not 
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been simply to speak of human genderedness but, more importantly, to use the 
consideration of such to generate fruitful new openings into the Divine, to cast new 
contra-idolatrous metaphors for GOD/DE and for imago Dei, to answer that of 
GOD/DE in every human being. In (not) speaking of gender as a site of permanently 
irreconcilable incoherence, as Butler recommends, I also learn how (not) to speak of 
GOD/DE.  
 
In Chapter 1, I have argued, using the work of Judith Butler and others, that the 
binary is but one metaphorical model of human experiences of genderedness, that 
there is no gender identity behind stylised repetition of acts that constitute the 
expression of gender. Furthermore, it is a tenuous, phantasmatic, chimerical, tricky 
will-o-the-wisp of a model that does not serve us well either for our own use or as 
an accurate signpost to that of GOD/DE. Because we accord binary gender a reality 
over and above its status as metaphor, because we reify gender, I assert that we have 
turned it into an idol, forgetting that it is means and not end. Gender thus blinkers 
us to ourselves and GOD/DE, limiting our potential to know the Divine and the 
human at their fullest extents, strictly, even violently, policing the list of attributes 
both GOD/DE and humans are allowed to claim as rightfully ours. If thea/ologies 
uncritically accept the categories Woman and Man as bounded spaces, they leave 
un-honoured, uncelebrated and unsymbolised all that is both/neither Woman 
and/nor Man. Thus, with Anderson, Wittig and Butler (see Chapter 1), I have 
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contended that an idolatrous bioessentialist, matriarchalist gynocentrism, or 
‗wombfulness‘ as I have called it, leaves our unintelligible sibs on the outside of 
feminist re-visionings of patriarchal theologies, barred forever from the category of 
the human and of imago Dei. 
 
Imago Dei  
It is by collecting stories that I have sought to make known that of GOD/DE in 
every one, through each narrator‘s quotidian experiences as words of GOD/DE and 
books about GOD/DE; this practice goes to the heart of my proposal that every 
individual has something specific to tell of imago Dei. This assertion is more than a 
simple acknowledgement that we are all children of GOD/DE through whom, in 
well-lived lives, GOD/DE‘s presence shines.  It is to say that we cannot pick and 
choose which parts of our experiences are that of GOD/DE and which not. We need 
to look at all the quotidian stuff of lives in order to do justice to both the Divine and 
the human; not to do so places an unwarranted and idolatrous limit on GOD/DE. 
That of GOD/DE in every one is, I assert, present in all of every one, not just in the 
data that fit, but also in the so-called ‗junk‘ data, to use a qualitative research 
methods analogy. Having said that, to claim all human experience is imago Dei is 
not to claim that human lives are Divine lives. The maps are not the territory; we 
must not mistake the image for the actual and to think otherwise is to create the 
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map as an ersatz of GOD/DE. Thus, also central to this project is the desire to speak 
of human beings as imago Dei without slipping into idolatry. 
 
Idolatry 
In ascribing to the things of the World, gender included, the status of ends rather 
than means, we commit idolatry. This lack of attention to the transcendence of 
GOD/DE causes indifference to the affliction of others in favour of our own 
collectivities. Idolatry causes us to care more about preserving the binary than 
achieving justice for our unintelligible sibs, absorbs us in the gravity well of the 
Narcissan Mirror, turning us from the universe flashing into being before our eyes in 
favour of binary gender as an object.  Idolatry is the self absorbed in the World and 
willfully ignorant of all that transcends it, a self that demands of per sibs not the 
ethical acknowledgement of Opacity but a permanent and stultifying self-sameness.  
Thus idolatry is the monstrously abominable attempt to name ourselves and 
GOD/DE, to exert a mastery to which we are not entitled. Idolatry impales GOD/DE 
on the descriptive hook of collective opinion and makes a permanency of that which 
should be temporary, not just in the name of dominology but potentially in the 
name of thea/ologies too, with their tendencies towards wombfulness that leaves the 
category Women unchallenged.  
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Renunciation and Decreation 
By fixing our gaze on gender in the Narcissan Mirror, instead of raising our heads to 
the unknowable beyond, we embrace an unrequiteable love, since our idol is only a 
poor and inadequate reflection of what could be ours. I have therefore commended 
an apophasis of gender, an unsaying of (im)permeable borders, making of gender not 
to be a fortress to be protected at all costs but rather a braided rope for pulling down 
our prison walls (Pratt 2005, 184-185).  
 
In its concern for the unsaying of certainties and the acknowledgement of all 
GOD/DE-language as metaphorical, apophasis proves a particularly apt analogy for 
the renunciation of gender absolutism. I have noted legitimate thea/ological 
concerns with the notion of renunciation but, nonetheless have argued with 
Coakley and others that there is value in re-visioning renunciation, or what Weil 
calls decreation, as a legitimately empowering feminist practice, that is as applicable 
to gender as to all our Worldly attachments. Binary gender is as much a critiqueable 
norm of the World over which Fox urges us to walk cheerfully as is any other aspect 
of Weilian gravity. I have also contended that apophasis is an entirely appropriate 
concept in relation to gender. The unsaying of GOD/DE does not say away the 
existence of GOD/DE but only the reality of words about GOD/DE; similarly, I have 
not sought to gainsay the realities of experiences such as Sol‘s transsexuality, noting 
the justifiable concerns of Serano and Namaste on this score. Nor have I sought to 
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diminish the horrifying gendered experiences of oppression and affliction sustained 
by women on a minute-by-minute basis worldwide. Binary gender exists. Binary 
gender does not exist. I know it exists because I see its effects. But I am sure that it is 
renounceable, that it can be unsaid for the good of us all.  
 
One way of unsaying the binary is through the medium of my newly conceived 
gender schema, with its four gender aspects, detailed in Chapter 1, of: l-gender 
(looks-like), referring to physical characteristics; f-gender (feels like), concerning an 
inner sense of gender identity; p-gender (performs like), which is the performative 
‗drag‘ we put on to give ourselves the appearance of one of the two available options; 
and j-gender (judged as), which concerns the responses of others and how that 
impacts on gendered being in the world. The four gender aspects together form a 
metagender, and only when all four aspects conform to the same set of rules, in 
terms of the patriarchal requirements of the binary gender system, can we 
unequivocally claim the metagender of Woman or Man. But as Leigh‘s, Robin‘s, Sol‘s 
and even my stories suggest, gender aspects often do not categorically align in one 
metagender box. Used to describe the fissures in metagender, this inflected schema 
operates to destabilise preconceptions, to undermine the idols of binary gender, and 
to highlight its complexities, opacities and absurdities. It points out that binary 





Renunciation, the decreation of all our roots, both personal and social, is the means 
by which we refuse the Narcissan gravity well and commit to a life of unceasing 
reinvention for self, for gender and for GOD/DE.  Renunciation affirms a yearning 
towards the transcendent and that which exceed the I.  Through the decreative act 
we acknowledge ourselves as tiny beings in contact with something immense, not 
mired in the mundane or trapped in a net of norms, but a space where being 
otherwise can happen. We become selves that cease to be absorbed with our selves 
but instead become absorbed in(to) GOD/DE.   
 
However, this concern with transcendence, orientated though it is towards the 
refusal of idolatry, means nothing if it smacks of indifference to embodied lives. 
Thus I have been concerned to elucidate a transcendence that is not contra the 
material conditions of real bodies, locating it in the quotidian experiences of 
Thinness, Proteanism and, most notably, Opacity.  It matters that bodies be 
understood as that of GOD/DE transcendent and not just immanent or, more 
accurately, to be transcendence and immanence indissolubly combined.  This is not 
to say that because bodies are of GOD/DE, that bodies are themselves GOD/DE; I 
resist any measure to valorise bodies as Divine in and of themselves since this effaces 
the absolute difference of GOD/DE from us, pushing out of the World any concept 
315 
of GOD/DE‘s inappropriablity and excess. If all we have is all we have, then it is all 
we will ever have and no change in circumstances, no expansive future horizon of 
hope or transformation, is possible.  
 
Methodological Issues 
Expansion and Metaphor 
Following Yip‘s analysis of the trajectory of developments in Queer Theology (2010, 
36-41), I have situated this study not in justification or ‗defensive apologetics‘ that 
offers theological warrant to previously unintelligible groups to be regarded as fully 
human in the sight of GOD/DE, nor in reclamation and inclusion or ‗cruising‘ 
religious texts for a trans genealogy, but in expansion, the tradition of ‗turning 
theology upside down‘, using the turning-upside-down of gender as my fulcrum. 
While I wholly subscribe to an apophatic viewpoint that we can say nothing of 
GOD/DE that is true, just as we can say nothing of gender that is true, nevertheless, 
I assert that we also cannot remain silent about GOD/DE but must continually 
describe and redescribe ÆR if we are to avoid idolatry. One outcome of my 
grounded theologising of expansion has been, therefore, the creation of new 
metaphorical models for GOD/DE and the Divine/human relationship (after 
McFague 1975; 1982; 1993). I have posited three such—Thinness, Proteanism and 
Opacity—derived respectively from attention to my narrators Leigh, Robin and Sol. 
Each model represents the valuing of the embodied experiences of one person as an 
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opening to GOD/DE, an aspect of the nature of genderedness and a way in which we 
might (re)think GOD/DE.  
 
MacIntosh contends that eventually we may be able to rehabilitate female and male 
imagery in GOD/DE-language once Women and Men are finally ‗equal in religion 
and society‘ (2007, 254), but this ignores all of our sibs who are not Women or Men, 
rendering them unintelligible as imago Dei. By contrast, I have asserted that only 
when we have renounced binary gender for ourselves, and understood ourselves to 
be imago Dei in all our Thin, Protean, and Opaqued embodied transcendence, will 
we truly be able to conceive of GOD/DE ÆRSELF as gender-transcendent. Thus I 
have offered the Thin, the Protean and the Opaqued as my contribution to the 
profusion of metaphors for transforming our relationship with GOD/DE, knowing 
that in the end, however, ‗Human silence after fruitful imaginative naming pays the 
best tribute to divine mystery‘ (Johnson 1992, 119).  
 
Theologising Around Experience 
The source of my profusion of metaphors has been the somewhat vexed category of 
experience, not the ‗sacred‘ experiences that mainstream theology employs, nor the 
experiences of the collectivity of Women espoused by thea/ologies, but the fullness 
of everyday experiences personally encountered or undergone that make up the 
totality of conscious events in a narrator‘s life, for which I have devised the concept 
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‗quotidian experiences‘. And since non-normative experiences of gender have been 
my theme, the experiences of trans people have been the source of this quotidian 
material. In theologising around these experiences, I have claimed my narrators as 
having lives worth theologising, lives worth rendering intelligible in the light of 
GOD/DE.  
 
The richness of the quotidian provides fertile potential for the embarrassingly prolix 
babblings essential to express what has been foreclosed and banished from the 
proper domain of GOD/DE, at the same time maintaining as central the 
inexchangeability of each individual life, such that no generalisations are possible 
about human life, about gender or about the Divine. Through the multiplicatory 
specificity of these stories that in no way resemble our own, through quotidian 
experiences that seem foreign to us, we see more of GOD/DE and of how we are all 
imago Dei.  
 
Of course, this appeal to experience might itself be idolatrous if I fail to acknowledge 
the crisis of representation and hold to an idea that interviews reveal some 
romanticised notion of a unified and knowable deep interior. But I cannot 
adequately represent my narrators any more than they can adequately represent 
themselves, and this is a hedge against idolatry. Even as I say that I look to narrators 
not for what they say about GOD/DE but as models of GOD/DE—words of GOD/DE 
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and books about GOD/DE—I must unsay the potential for this to constitute them as 
idols and assert that imago Dei is never a representation but only ever an 
interpretation of GOD/DE. We are at our most unreliable when our quotidian 
experiences narrate GOD/DE‘s story, since we are but fragments of the infinite. 
 
There is more to everything than meets the eye; GOD/DE, self and gender have a 
back we can never see. But the fact that we are in media res, born into the middle of 
a plot we do not author and cannot control, does not invalidate a claim to 
theologising around experience, simply that experience is not what we thought it 
was; as Butler asserts ‗this death [of the subject]…is only the death of a certain kind 
of subject, one that was never possible to begin with, the death of a fantasy of 
impossible mastery, and so a loss of what one never had‘ (2005, 65). And being in 
media res does not preclude critiquing the plot. Indeed, critique is one of the few 
plotlines available to us to author; in critique, we meet Fox‘s challenge ‗what canst 
thou say?‘ and speak of the norms that orchestrate and limit our potential to be fully 
human.  
 
That I have used the quotidian in this way stems from my sense of the Holy as being 
expressed not just in that deemed morally good, or the well-lived life. The Holy, the 
something in the objective situation awaiting discovery and acknowledgement, 
reveals nothing of GOD/DE except that GOD/DE is. However, in assigning 
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numinosity to trans experiences, I have not sought to imply any level of trans 
glamorisation or mystification, asserting that unintelligible embodiments are in 
some inhuman way morally or spiritually superior to the intelligible, for fear of 
placing too heavy a burden of perfection on those already burdened by misplaced 
judgements. As previously stated, we are all imago Dei; using trans experience to 
investigate this is a way of justly reincorporating those experiences in the light of 
GOD/DE, not sacralising them over and above cis experiences. 
 
Grounded Theology 
My approach for theologising narrators‘ experiences has been the methodological 
practice I have devised, for which I have coined the term Grounded Theology, a way 
of listening to stories that takes them beyond themselves. This is a slow, quiet, 
modest, flexible, open and sensitive approach that conceives of neither theories nor 
narrators as idols, but holds all open to change. It asserts that all theology is a 
prayerful act, an exercise, however fallibly executed, in making a space for GOD/DE 
to speak in theology rather than for theology to speak of GOD/DE. Grounded 
Theology has then some of the same characteristics as Weil‘s notion of attention; it 
seeks to be an intense, pure, disinterested, gratuitous and generously attentive 
process, that risks vulnerability in knowing that there is no verifiable truth to speak 
of and yet speak it must. In this and in its abandonment of preconceptions in favour 
of waiting to see what comes up, Grounded Theology is contra-positivist and thus 
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contra-idolatrous, focussed on process rather than product, on hearing rather than 
naming.  
 
The heart of Grounded Theology is listening, attending or silently waiting for non-
coherent data to make itself a little more coherent. By being intent on the narrator 
alone, spending time with per not just in the interview but in transcription, analysis 
and writing up, faithfully attending both to per intentions and to the still small voice 
of GOD/DE‘s guidance, I have waited on my narrators until light gradually dawned, 
in an open and unforced way. In listening, in being receptive rather than grasping or 
desiring, in giving absolute unmixed, prayerful attention, I have asserted that 
attention to GOD/DE and attention to narrators are made up of the same substance.  
 
The silent waiting of Grounded Theology creates a space where anything can 
happen, where GOD/DE can hear and be heard, an overt renunciation of my power 
in favour of desiring without an object. The attentive mode of Grounded Theology 
seeks to eschew power-over, letting the listened-to be without desiring to consume 
per, acknowledging that I can never have my narrator as an object. Attention in 
Grounded Theology is ethically directed to GOD/DE and for the World; attention to 
the One is attention to the others who long for good at the bottom of their/our 
hearts, cry out that they/we are hungry and want some bread and piteously seek to 
know why they/we are being hurt.  
321 
 
Grounded Theology is an embodied practice of being fully present to the bodies of 
narrators; it is theology grounded in individual quotidian experience. It is a Thin 
methodology that sees the remarkable in the mundane, transforming the messy and 
unruly into something that speaks of the numinous. It is a methodology that wholly 
embraces the Protean, knowing that narrators and data change as they will, 
regardless of my graspings. And, in embracing the crisis of representation at its 
heart, Grounded Theology is an Opaquing practice. Moreover, it contradicts the 
idols of methods by asserting that the rational and the a-rational coexist in research, 
that the disparate strands of mind and spirit are not disparate after all. Grounded 
Theology is concerned not simply with intellectual pursuit, but with drawing down 
the good from GOD/DE into the World and with creating an otherwise space, a 
counterweight to the dominological, as the point of the pencil through which 
GOD/DE experiences the World. A central tenet of Grounded Theology is ‗don‘t just 
do something, sit there‘.  
 
As a Grounded Theologian, I have accepted Fox‘s challenge, quoted in Chapter 2, 
‗what canst thou say?‘, by acknowledging the spirit working within and by taking 
responsibility for the metaphorical models that I have presented, rather than falling 
back on an unsupportable claim that the data speak for themselves. I hope that what 
I have spoken is inwardly from GOD/DE, not mere solipsistic self-indulgence, 
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although I fully acknowledge that this is an unverifiable hope. And my metaphors 
are as open to unsaying as any; but there is no unsaying without first my having a 
voice to say, no apophasis without my claim to kataphatic production as a right of 
this body in this time and place. Fox‘s challenge to speak is something of an aporia, 
demanding both that I assert myself and that I humbly speak GOD/DE‘s truth, 
getting over myself and going beyond myself, thinking it possible that I may be 
mistaken, renouncing my greedy self-perspective and stepping aside for the work.  
In this I honour the early Quaker women prophets who lifted up their own voices 
like the sound of a trumpet to sound forth GOD/DE‘s truth like the shout of a King1 
(Barnsley 2004, 26). It is in this spirit that I have offered my metaphorical models of 




In laying claim to trans lives as lives worth theologising, I have delineated three 
metaphorical models which describe both GOD/DE and gendered imago Dei. The 
first of these, Thinness, founded upon Leigh‘s story, draws together Otto‘s concept of 
The Holy or the numinous, Weil‘s thought on the precarious in-between-ness that 
                                                 
1 This is a paraphrase of a quote from a Quaker pamphlet of 1659 titled A Short Relation of Some of 
the Cruel Sufferings (for the Truths Sake) of Katharine Evans and Sarah Chevers… in which 
Katharine Evans tells of an encounter on Malta with the Inquisitor. The Inquisitor accuses per of 
talking ‗like a mad woman‘; to this, person replies: ‗The Lord did say unto us, LIFT UP YOUR VOICE 
LIKE THE NOISE OF A TRUMPET, AND SOUND FORTH MY TRUTH LIKE THE SHOUT OF A 
KING‘ (Mack 1994, 261). 
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person calls metaxu, and the Celtic spirituality notion of the thin place into a new 
concept of embodied numinosity I call the Thin person. Leigh, as Thin person, nods 
to the numinous beyond perself and per quotidian experiences, holding out the 
promise of consolation and healing by calling us into the presence of something that 
exceeds the commonplace. We see per and see through per, as a Weilian metaxu 
that values embodied experience and asserts that, though this is quotidian, it is not 
so mired in the mundane that the sacred cannot shine in it and good not be drawn 
down from GOD/DE through it. Indeed, it is the very ordinariness of the quotidian 
that makes Thinness valuable, since this is the Holy made manifest not just in the 
awe-filled numinous, or in the beauty- or the suffering-filled metaxu, but in the 
regular stuff of the everyday. And Leigh‘s Thinly gendered imago Dei, generated not 
by per doing anything but simply by standing there at an angle to the certainties as 
an otherwise space, accepting of instability and the permanent question like a 
postmodern anchorite, shows us something of the vast complexity of GOD/DE; as 
gender proves to be Thin, so do our rigid concepts of the Divine.  
 
Proteanism 
The vast complexity of GOD/DE figures in a different form, as is only appropriate, in 
the innovative metaphor of mutable Proteanism, drawn from Robin‘s story. Turning 
first to the myth of Narcissus and, more particularly, per Mirror, I constructed a 
model of the Narcissan gravity well, the reflective snare that mires us in the means 
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of the mundane when we should be lifting our gaze to the end that is GOD/DE. 
However, although this is a metaphor with much to say about the dangers of 
idolatry, when measured against Robin‘s quotidian experiences, it was not a good fit 
and so I turned to the myth of Proteus, the shy metamorphic sea god, for greater 
illumination. Despite some negative appraisals of Proteus, I concur with assessments 
that value per as ever productive of new forms and meanings, outrunning the 
straight path like a dog pleased to be taken for a walk, countering the unitary 
doctrinal orthodoxies of the Great Beast of collective opinion and idolatrous 
Molochs that provide a ready made pattern for thought. The Protean, fluid and 
ethically formed, gives us balance, takes its time, circles round, can reverse when 
necessary, constantly trims its cargo2 of ideas in order to maintain a steady course. 
Thus, it represents all that mutability that Christianate dominology so fears, 
preferring that GOD/DE be unchangeably other to the World of change and decay. 
Along with Schneider‘s multiplicity and Althaus-Reid‘s Queer, the Protean asserts 
that GOD/DE is ceaselessly mutable and further, that mutablitlity, as it is expressed 
in bodies and in genderedness, is imago Dei, not just because all bodies are different 
one from another, but because all bodies are internally inconsistent and 
unrepresentable; thus we embody GOD/DE‘s Protean nature as complex and unruly, 
exhibiting no totality or ultimacy. Proteanism has little regard for unitary doctrinal 
                                                 
2 In small boat sailing, the weight of passengers and cargo are redistributed, or ‗trimmed‘, in order to 
ensure that the boat takes maximum advantage of the prevailing wind conditions: ‗The principle of 
trim is to balance the forces acting on the boat…and maintain the fastest underwater hull and foil 
orientations for all conditions‘ (Cockerill [n.d.], [n.p.]) 
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orthodoxies and the false idols of Worldly opinion that keep us trapped in the 
gravity well of Narcissus‘s Mirror.  
 
Opacity 
Unitary doctrinal orthodoxies are challenged again in the metaphor of Opacity, 
drawn from Sol‘s story. Beginning with Weil‘s concept of contradiction as pincers 
with which to prise ideas apart, and per insistence upon absence of contradiction as 
reification or idolatry, a nailing down of what should remain unattached, I have 
contended that contradictory narratives like Sol‘s are not problems to interpret 
away, but rather metaxu to the utter complexity of the GOD/DE whose back we 
cannot see.   After Butler, I have asserted that a primary Opacity of the self is not 
only endemic to the human condition but also a reflection of GOD/DE‘s 
incomprehensibility, that we Opaquely body forth the mystery of the Divine. 
Furthermore Opacity is a characteristic as necessary to human as it is to theological 
development, since either one fully known is incapable of change; no forward 
movement is possible if we pretend to know GOD/DE, self or gender.  
 
Since Opacity is part of imago Dei, it would be unethical not to honour it in 
ourselves and others, to account for our unknowability by picking up the beer-cans 
instead of demanding to know who dropped them.  In acknowledging our shared, 
invariable and impartial blindness, in the act for which I have instituted the concept 
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of ‗Opaquing‘, we acknowledge too the embodied transcendence of all our sibs, not 
as that which is above-and-beyond but as a humble getting over of ourselves, a 
learning how (not) to speak in an apophasis that unsays both gender and GOD/DE as 
utterly exceeding the possibility of a full account ever being given. In claiming 
bodies as expressive of GOD/DE transcendent rather than GOD/DE immanent, I 
have thus asserted that the two are not a duality but an indivisible whole. Contra 
Weil‘s assertion that GOD/DE is utterly withdrawn from the World, I see ÆR in 
every creaturely source, working from known to unknown, because our metaphors 
for GOD/DE can be constructed in no other way; bodies, intelligible and 
unintelligible together, express GOD/DE as immanently present but transcendently 
different and Opacity is imago Dei as embodied transcendence    
 
Justice 
Unintelligibility and Incoherence 
Throughout this thesis I have deployed Butler‘s notion of the unintelligible (see 
Chapter 1) as expressive of all our sibs who are deemed beyond the borders of binary 
gender norms; trans people, genderqueer people, intersex people, people who feel 
that they/we have to cut off part of their/our gender heel in order to fit 
them/ourselves into Cinderella‘s binary slipper. In (re)claiming pathologised, 
abjected, unintelligible lives as lives worth theologising, lives that are as much the 
image and likeness of GOD/DE as any other, I have sought to assist in returning 
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intelligibility to those who escape or exceed the norms. I am aware, however, that 
there is a Weilian contradiction in the use of this term, in that while claiming that 
unintelligibility is a violent regime inflicted on our sibs, I have also affirmed (after 
Butler) that incoherence is politically fruitful and theologically transcendent. This is 
an aporia, an insoluble contradiction that we must hold between the points of the 
pincers, paying attention until light dawns and it reveals to us new meaning, rather 
than seeking to inflict too ready a judgement upon it. GOD/DE, I assert, is the only 
uncontradictory unintelligible, the only One we cannot make intelligible no matter 
how hard we try. 
 
Judgement, Justice and Alliances 
The last of the four gender aspects in my gender schema is that concerned with the 
way in which the judgements of others impact on our gendered being in the World. 
Judgement is the looking that consumes and destroys, that imposes idolatrous means 
upon bodies, that forces the violent excision of heels so that slippers can be forced to 
fit. Judgement gives Leigh that look and forces per over into the girls‘ line, tells 
Robin person looks like a man in drag, and decrees that Sol is mad or bad for 
wanting to embody per affirmed gender. Judgement believes we have the right to 
say what we will, untempered by thinking it possible we may be mistaken. Rather 
than Thinly standing in awe and wonder, humbly paying attention to that which 
exceeds the I, judgement enforces its rules and norms arrogantly, demanding 
328 
compliance, demanding thickening of Thinness, clarity where there might be 
Opacity, and unicity in place of Protean mutability.  
 
In order for justice, rather than judgement, to be done, for Leigh and Robin and Sol 
to be saved from the idolatrous mastery of the Great Beast of collective gender 
opinion, there is a need for an open-hearted, non-judgemental, astonished wonder, 
access to the a-rational mystery of transcendent embodiments rather than the World 
shrunk to fit outworn measurements, lest our unintelligible sibs remain on the 
outside un-honoured, uncelebrated and unsymbolised. Rather than devoting 
ourselves to a gender order and making an idol of Worldly collectivities, we might, 
after Butler, embrace a politics of disidentification, indeterminacy and incoherence, 
live a continuous critique of gender norms that works the fissures inherent in their 
composition, refuse to accept the World unchallenged, renounce rather than collude 
with dominological gender binaries and offer all our certainties up to GOD/DE.  
 
In order to serve the cause of justice for our unintelligible sibs, some 
trans/genderqueer activists argue that renunciation of gender must come from the 
cis as well as from the trans, that we must step out of our safe houses and form 
alliances based on need rather than identity, Protean irregular groupings and partial 
and fluctuating communities in odd places and combinations, using flexible and 
creative concepts of community. Alliances require a certain patience with the 
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Opacity of others, based on a shared, invariable and partial blindness about 
ourselves. These groupings will not deny the existence of binary genders as 
experiential categories that violently oppress us but will focus as much on Thinly 
visible hopes and dreams for a future in which the violence of exclusion is 
perpetually being overcome, as it will on experiences from the past. By establishing 
relationality where no common ground can be assumed, nonviolently, 
nonjudgementally, tolerantly, patiently and with humility, alliances will become the 
cornerstone of political action, acting as a counterweight to collectivities based on 
identities of sameness.  
 
Counterweight 
That binary gender is gender out of kilter is the central claim of this thesis; a 
renunciation or decreation of gender would act as an important counterweight, 
following Weil‘s advice that knowing which way society is tilted requires us to add 
our weight to the lighter side. The concept of the counterweight itself is a valuable 
one, as it suggests not plumping down on one side of an argument but rather being 
poised, circling round, refusing to tip the scales in favour of one collectivity or 
another, preferring a lively balance over deadening decisiveness.  
 
In Chapter 1, I proposed decreation as a counterweight to gender imbalance; 
subsequent chapters also embody and expand upon the concept of counterweight. 
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Attentive listening or silent waiting, for example, offers rebalance in a World where 
speaking is perceived as power. It also shifts some of the power of the interview 
from listener to narrator and gives per back control over the content of the story. 
The Thin person, as an anchoritic otherwise space of absolution and acceptance, 
who does not just do something but simply sits there, redresses a World in which 
action is power, and draws down the transcendent into the mundane for us all. The 
Protean stands against opting for one ideology or another, and for the balance of 
mutability with coherence, trimming the boat with holes to stay afloat on the 
shifting currents of unpredictable events. Opacity weighs in against the Great Beast 
of collective opinion that pretends to a unicity of self, offering instead a non-
coercive acknowledgement that we infinitely transcend as self, other or GOD/DE.  
 
Leigh, Robin and Sol are all counterweights to the World of binary gender, spaces 
where thinking otherwise can happen, spaces of attention rather than judgement, 
where the sad and broken, themselves and our selves, can be healed of their/our 
sense that they/we might have violated what it is to be human. They are outsiders 
shedding slantwise light upon gender and GOD/DE, rebalancing the World for the 
good of all those sibs who are hungry for justice and want some bread. 
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Theological Value of the Outsider 
Outsider Theology 
Half the time I don‘t know what the girls are talking about; their 
jokes seem to relate to a past that everyone but me has shared. I‘m a 
foreigner in the world and I don‘t understand the language. It‘s a 
miserable feeling. I‘ve had it all my life. (Webster [1912], l.290) 
 
This is often how I feel about my genderedness, that it is foreign to me, that I do not 
understand the language, that this is a miserable feeling I have had for as long as I 
can remember. But that is not all I feel. Oftentimes I am proud of inventing my own 
language, proud of a past that no-one else has shared, proud that I know what I am 
talking about without recourse to the collectivity of the Girls, proud of being an 
outsider.  
 
This thesis is very much a theology of an outsider, written outside both feminist 
Christian theologies and Goddess spiritualities, for those whom Wittig designates 
outlaws, not-Women and not-Men on account of their flouting the laws of 
heteronormativity; this is a theology that stands with the freaks, as Bornstein 
commends. My methodological approach too is outsider, transgressing the laws both 
of theology, with regard to experience, and of qualitative research methods, in its 
claim to being an a-rational spiritual practice. Far from making me miserable, I find 
this outsider position to be extremely fruitful in helping me to expose some of the 
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flaws, shortcomings and half-truths in the Great Beasts of unitary doctrinal 
orthodoxies, in the hope of calling down justice into the World. 
 
Queer Sainthood 
In per own search for metaphors that will call down justice into the World, Althaus-
Reid investigates the potential of the concept of Queer, discussed in Chapter 4. The 
Queer GOD/DE is a GOD/DE who stays outside, person asserts, beyond the 
totalising centre, on behalf of all those whom the Great Beast rejects. And ÆR 
Queer followers know that ‗religious conversion…does not give space for options‘ 
(2003, 167). For the followers of the Queer GOD/DE excommunication and 
foreignness are radical choices, to enter a place where one can be safe from the 
optionless salvation of heteronormativity; here, hell becomes ‗a Queer space of 
grace‘ (ibid, 167) in which ‗refuseniks‘ of unitary doctrinal orthodoxies Thinly bring 
down the good in the form of justice beyond the norms (ibid, 168). These followers 
are ‗Queer saints…a menace and a subversive force by the sheer act of living in 
integrity and defiance‘ (ibid, 166); they Opaquely refuse to learn the language, refuse 
conversion, refuse the centre, refuse to honour and obey (ibid, 166-7), refuse to 
idolise the Great Beast, and insist on a Protean participation in the lives of their 
communities through dissent.  
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Weil as Outsider Saint 
For Weil, the refusal of the centre, the refusal to be good on any Worldly terms, was 
a primary ethical task3. Nowhere is this position more evident than in per decision 
to remain unbaptised in solidarity with all those whom per church cast out because 
they are contrary to its doctrines: ‗It is the use of those two little words anathema 
sit4…I remain beside all those things that cannot enter the Church…on account of 
those two little words‘ (2009 [1951], 33). Weil sees the sentiments exemplified by 
anathema sit to have been at the root of tyrannies, since the words encapsulate the 
notion of insiders, who are acceptable, and outsiders, who are accursed (ibid, 37). 
Like Althaus-Reid‘s Queer saints, Weil holds that religious conversion does not give 
space for options, and in refusing baptism, enters a place safe from optionless 
salvation, a Queer space of grace. As Weil puts it, it is ‗as well that a few sheep 
should remain outside the fold‘ in order to be able to critique the norms of the 
insiders (ibid, 36), and thus person stands as Althaus-Reid‘s menace and subversive 
force, embodying the Thin, the Protean and the Opaque by the sheer act of living in 
integrity and defiance, at GOD/DE‘s behest:  
                                                 
3 Weil enjoins perself in per notebooks to resist being imprisoned by any affections and to ‗keep [per] 
solitude‘ (2009 [1951], 67), on the grounds that ‗[a]mong human beings, only the existence of those 
we love is fully recognized‘ and thus, in order to recognise the worth of every human being, personal 
attachments must be eschewed in favour of impersonal love (ibid, 64). Person extends this sense of 
outsiderness even to per relationship with perself, stating: ‗To love a stranger as oneself implies the 
reverse: to love oneself as a stranger‘ (ibid, 62).  
4 Anathema sit, meaning ‗let per be accursed‘, are the words of excommunication by which the 
Catholic Church casts out everyone and everything that does not conform to accepted doctrine. In 
refusing baptism, Weil had not simply refused to join the church, but had accepted this status of 
accursedness, rendered thus by per ecumenical, egalitarian views on the acceptability of non-
Catholics in the eyes of GOD/DE (McLellan 1991, 219).  
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I have never once had, even for a moment, the feeling that God wants 
me to be in the Church. I have never once had a feeling of 
uncertainty…. He does not want it so far at least…, unless I am 
mistaken I should say that it is his will (ibid, 31). 
 
Weil‘s radical individualism impels us to take no value system at face value, to leave 
none of the Molochs of collective superstition unchallenged. In this, person stands as 
the Fool5, ‗doubter of everything which is considered self-evident‘ (Abosch 1994, 
133), a Holy figure, speaking Truth to power, exhibiting ‗the madness…beside 
which the wisdom of this world is clearly revealed as folly‘ (Fiedler 2009 [1951], 
xix). Like the Queer saint, Weil demonstrates the saintly nature of outsiderness, 
‗remain[ing] on the threshold…crouching there for the love of all of us who are not 
inside, all the heretics, the secular dreamers, the prophesiers in strange tongues‘ 
(ibid, xxvi), ‗belong[ing] to a world culture, still to be formed, where the voices of 
multiple classes, castes, races, genders, ethnicities, nationalities, and religions, can be 
respected‘ (Fan 2007, 139), facing towards the future flashing into being and 
outrunning the straight path. 
 
Outsider Saints 
Like Riki Wilchins and other trans/genderqueer activists, the Weilian outsider sees 
being part of the problem as being part of the solution. The Outsider saint calls 
attention to the fact that the rules are breakable, refuses to collude with injustice 
                                                 
5 According to Abosch, Weil venerated Shakespearean fools as the only people who speak the truth 
(1994, 133). Abosch counterposes the Fool with the Priest as ‗the guardian of the absolute‘ (ibid). 
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and helps us all to braid the ropes that might pull down the walls that imprison us at 
the borders. An outlaw with an oblique point of view, the Outsider saint exemplifies 
the potential to prise open the gaps and fissures within the norms so that power 
might be turned against itself. Person stands with the freaks, with those who are cast 
out because they are contrary to doctrine, adding per subversive confusion to the 
cause of justice and giving up the purity of per soul and of per gender in favour of 
the unintelligible. Outsider saints crouch in the margins for the love of all who are 
not inside, decreators who belong to a culture where the voices of multiple 
sexualities, classes, castes, races, ethnicities, nationalities, religions, and genders will 
be respected as made in the image and likeness of a GOD/DE whom we can never 
hope to understand.  
 
Towards Outsider Sainthood 
It is traditional at the conclusion of a thesis to offer some suggestions as to what 
further areas of academic study this work might suggest. In this case, however, I 
believe that attention might be better directed towards the practicalities a decreation 
of gender might entail, of how we might create the delicious opportunities for 
transformation and the different spaces in which to play with the potentialities of 
gender when we are undefended by gender norms, of how might we begin to 
become Outsider saints. If we are cis, we might consider how we do now and might 
in future support our trans and genderqueer sibs and challenge cis gender privilege 
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in a meaningful way in our theologisings; how we might pursue the building of 
fruitful alliances of theory and practice;  and how we might support each other in 
the sometimes frightening task of standing up for the outsiders‘ rights finally to be 
intelligible. We might ask what liturgical moves we should make to body forth our 
gender critique; what spiritual practices we might develop to sustain us personally, 
and in our worship communities, in pursuit of gender decreation as necessary to the 
quest for gender justice; what resources we might use from existing models of 
renunciatory practices. We might consider how to protect ourselves and our allies 
against the risks that decreation holds; and how, practically, we might accomplish 
being outsiders ourselves, standing at an angle to the certainties and preoccupations 
of the Great Beast and throwing our weight on the lighter side; how we might 
(re)construct our language finally to be able (not) to speak of GOD/DE in the light of 
our decreations of gender. And finally, we might reconsider the work of this thesis 
in light of the possibility that I may be mistaken; taking our cue from Simone Weil, 
our method of investigation being such that as soon as we have thought something, 
we try to see in what ways the contrary is true, groping in the dark to say, unsay, 
and say again. 
 
Utopia 
My method of writing is to take notes on 5x3 index cards, assigning keywords as I 
go, and then to sort those cards into the order that forms the basis of my written 
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work. For this chapter, one of the biggest stacks of cards is the one headed ‗Utopia‘ 
and, without a doubt, this is a theology with utopian intent at its heart. As I stated in 
Chapter 1, I want to live in Marge Piercy‘s gender-neutral future in Mattapoisett, a 
world in which sexual difference exists in all its variety, but socially constructed 
gender roles do not place an unlimited warrant on anyone, where those of our sibs 
who are now unintelligible can simply be, where the idolatrous stagnation of the 
Narcissan mirror and the Great Beast of collective gender opinion are given no 
power over us.  
 
One of the great strengths of Piercy‘s creation is that person writes of utopia as a 
constant process rather than a final product, an unfixed future of changing alliances 
rather than a push towards another rigid collectivity. This is an eternal reaching 
towards a future, which like meaning itself, is permanently deferred, a future such 
as Outsider saints might attempt to create, that recognises its own endemic Opacity 
and yet relishes the delicious and devastating opportunities for transformation, for 
multiplying gender expressions beyond the oppressive binary choice we now face.  
 
My thought experiment with epicene pronouns is one such outsider move to 
reconfigure the gender landscape. Trans and genderqueer language uses, with all 
their shifting complexity and non-coherence are, I suggest, another in their attempts 
to think the unintelligible into being. Reconfiguring language is one area into which 
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we can all put some really sustained growth work to get rid of some of what Robin 
calls our Crappy Beliefs, creating instead a space of knowledgeable ignorance in 
which we allow ourselves not only the power of political critique but also an 
openness to wonder and a willingness to become undone.  
 
‗A realized temporal world where there is no male or female…has seemed too 
unrealistic or utopian for most theologians to take seriously‘, but take it seriously we 
must, asserts Cornwall (2010, 72). Livia contends, as quoted in the Foreword, that it 
makes no sense to behave as though we are living in a nongendered utopia just 
because we want it to be so. But how will it be so unless by the living of it? And why 
should not the impossible be true? As Weil asserts, that which I cannot conceive is 
not an illusion (2002 [1952], 114). This is true for GOD/DE; why should it not be 
true for we who are created in ÆR image, and for our own future, especially since 
the stories we tell of the Divine form the fabric of what we believe is possible for the 
World? The Thinness of Leigh, the Proteanism of Robin and the transcendent 
Opacity of Sol speak to the heart of the deepest possibilities for every gendered 
body.  
 
Weil is no enthusiast for utopias, stating that ‗We must prefer real hell to an 
imaginary paradise‘ (2002 [1952], 53). But to accept the real hell is to accept that 
there is nothing more to be done, and without a concept of Moreness, there can be 
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no change. Being open to GOD/DE‘s More prevents Outsider saints from believing 
that what we have is all we might have, that this World is the only ersatz of 
GOD/DE. In our embodied transcendence, expressed not just in well-lived lives but 
in all our messy, unruly, quotidian data, we shine a light on GOD/DE. Through the 
unsurpassable but utterly non-Divine mystery of creatureliness, we are Weilian 
pincers, revealing GOD/DE and self through unknowable embodiments. We are 
dazzling darknesses, authored by a GOD/DE who precedes, exceeds, transcends us in 
infinite degree. Our material More is the image of GOD/DE‘s infinitely nonmaterial 
More; we cannot but want to body it forth in our future, walking cheerfully over the 





Punctuation and Other Conventions 
In these transcription excerpts I employ the following conventions: 
 
 Lines numbers apply to this excerpted transcript only, not to the original full 
transcription.  Original documents are considerably longer than the excerpts 
included here. 
 
 Sections in italics are those to which I refer directly in the main text. 
Surrounding material gives context to these quoted sections. 
 
 The narrator is always indicated by their initial and I by mine. 
1  J: let‘s start 
2   
3  S: so, OK 
 
 Line breaks are inserted whenever either speaker pauses briefly, to represent 
natural interruptions and hesitations in speech, in line with the stanza format 
(Chafe 1980, ; see also Etherington 2004, 116) described in Chapter 2. 
19 erm, y'know people would address me as a boy and 
20 cos I u… usually wouldn‘t correct them [laughs] 
21 y‘know 
22 but erm, my mom would 
 
 Long, uninterrupted sections of speech are indented on second and subsequent 
lines: 
501   so you never felt God was punishing you or that you had that 
kind of stuff–would shake your fist at God or anything like that 
 
 Pauses of 1-4 seconds are indicated with a dash: 
425 - 
 
 Pauses of longer than 4 seconds are indicated with the relevant number of 






 Cuts in the original transcription, of any length, are indicated by three 





 Non-verbal utterances, such as laughter, and additions, such as indications that 
parts of the original recording are inaudible, are enclosed in square brackets: 
286 [inaudible]  
287 [L sighs] 
 
 Full stops and start-of-sentence capitals are not used, since it is frequently 
impossible to delineate sentences clearly in normal speech. Capitalisation is used 
only for proper names. 
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APPENDIX 1 
VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTION SECTIONS  
INTERVIEW WITH LEIGH 
 1 
L:  I think about when I was a little kid I was very comfortable with, erm  2 
just, just my general personality, I, I, 3 
when I was a little kid I really thought I was a boy, at first, like I 4 
there was, there was no, no question for me about it, I mean 5 
and er, my mom was not very 6 
she wasn‘t a strict person you know, she‘s very erm 7 
she‘s basically just like ‗if this makes you happy, you‘re not hurting other 8 
people‘, y‘know, erm 9 
and she‘s a fairly, y‘know, a fairly open-minded person herself—she‘s 10 
bisexual and er, y‘know, that sort of thing  11 
anyway, so 12 
y‘know, when I w… when I was a little kid I, I would dress like a boy  13 
and cut my hair like a boy and I never like I never told people I was a boy 14 
or anything  15 
I never made it like er a, a thing of er, a deception 16 
although it wouldn‘t‘ve, wouldn‘t‘ve feel like, wouldn‘t feel like that for 17 
me, erm 18 
but, y'know as I got older  19 
more and more I started to get really uncomfortable with the moments 20 
where  21 
erm, y'know people would address me as a boy and 22 
cos I u… usually wouldn‘t correct them [laughs] 23 
 y‘know 24 
but erm, my mom would 25 
and I mean it‘s not, it‘s not that that hurt me or anything  26 
y'know I think she was just  27 
she, she sensed my  28 
discomfort and thought that she needed to establish me as a girl  29 
when really y‘know 30 
I, I just wanted to be  31 
I d…, I don‘t even know how to explain 32 
just kind of left alone  33 
erm 34 
and it really crystallised when I was older and er  35 
I was in elementary school 36 
and we went on this field trip 37 
to a one-roomed school house 38 
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and as like kind of a, a bonus thing you could dress up as  39 
like the kids from that, that era  40 
and obviously the dress, dress code of that time was much more gendered 41 
specific 42 
 y‘know, I mean, 43 
it‘s, it‘s obvious if you‘re presenting as a boy or as a girl and  44 
erm, I was really excited about it because I liked the idea of being like er 45 
yeah, like I thought of it as like being Huck Finn or Tom Sawyer or 46 
something, y‘know, so 47 
I pulled my socks up, but I had y‘know little short trousers and that sort of 48 
thing and 49 
I was really, I was really into—I thought it was great 50 
and then I got there and y‘know they had the two entrances 51 
one for, one for boys and one for girls  52 
and I remember I got in the boys‘ line 53 
and I didn… y‘know I mean I was a little nervous about it  54 
I knew that they might like try to y‘know they might catch me out 55 
but I also just sort of er y‘know  56 
this is, this is how I look, this is what I am so what are, what are they 57 
gonna do?  58 
and it was 59 
I remember the, erm, the teacher just giving me this look and, and y‘know 60 
thrusting me over into the girls‘ line  61 
and I got into the classroom and I was just so crushed 62 
I mean I was really  63 
I, th…  64 
I think it was like first time I really really felt social shame 65 
like because I wasn‘t really a, a shameful person even though I was kind of 66 
I was always fairly loud like 67 
cos I was a very active kid y‘know 68 
so I would get in trouble y‘know—‗DON‘T TALK‘ 69 
y‘know at school, class or blah blah blah 70 
but I‘d never felt like 71 
there was something 72 
innately 73 
disgusting or horrifying about me y‘know and erm 74 
[sighs] 75 
I dunno, it really, really upset me and I just remember 76 
I remember pulling my pants down over the socks that I‘d put up y‘know 77 
to be like, be like the olden type boys and, and, and er 78 
I remember thinking I was gonna cry 79 
and just sort of like y‘know huddling there and, and feeling really horrible 80 
and that, that just sort of went on for 81 
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years, really 82 
I mean at like y‘know 83 
you, you can never really narrow down a personality change or like a 84 
the way you interact with like just one event I don‘t think 85 
but y‘know 86 
if I, if I wanted to sort of date it chronologically I can look at my life and 87 
say 88 
after that I just started to get really uncomfortable  89 
y‘know erm 90 
presenting the way I, I wanted to  91 
y‘know erm 92 
as I got older like I would look back at when I was younger with just this 93 
really bizarre nostalgia 94 
like I remember erm 95 
when I was very young I had a, a pair of er 96 
sort of greenish-olive erm khaki pants  97 
and they were boy‘s pants 98 
and my mom had got them for me at the store  99 
and erm I remember her saying how they looked great on me  100 
and she thought they were going to be great for when I was running 101 
around and 102 
they were just like my favourite ‗boy pants‘ 103 
like they just made me feel this amazing 104 
I dunno just this 105 
power and charm 106 
and, and , and I remember when I grew out the them and when I started 107 
getting new clothes and 108 
I started getting too uncomfortable to get boys‘ clothes and I would get 109 
girls‘ clothes 110 
and I just would always have this nostalgia for this 111 
time when it was like I didn‘t have to do that  112 
and erm 113 
as I went on it got worse because 114 
becau… 115 
it became that it wasn‘t just like a, a social presentation thing anymore 116 
because of 117 
as you get older  118 
when you hit, when you hit puberty  119 
then your new problem is 120 
not just how am I presenting for y‘know 121 
wh… whether people are gonna call me ‗he‘ or ‗she‘ or buy me a 122 
y‘know a glove at Christmas or, or y‘know a doll y‘know 123 
I mean suddenly it‘s, it‘s, it‘s a matter of y‘know  124 
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can I, can I talk to this girl or boy as a girl or a boy or what? y‘know 125 
and 126 
at first, at fir… the first phase I went through it I, I just tried to be  127 
a girl 128 
and I just tried to date guys as a girl  129 
and erm 130 
I did that very privately 131 
er I didn‘t tell my par… 132 
well er it‘s funny because I‘m, I‘m very honest with my mother but I didn‘t 133 
tell her at all about  134 
like trying to date guys 135 
because there would probably be that it felt like er  136 
I dunno 137 
 y‘know I guess 138 
[sighs] 139 
it‘s strange because th… there‘s something  140 
odd about that era when you can sort of have a contradictive 141 
erm 142 
view of the future like I just  143 
I a… I always assumed y‘know I‘d just be 144 
a, a normal hetero… heterosexual girl  145 
like that was just  146 
what was expected of me and that‘s what I would be 147 
but at the same time I knew that  148 
er s… 149 
y‘know you sort of know at the same time it‘s just that doesn‘t 150 
y‘know it doesn‘t it‘s not gonna work out y‘know 151 
so any way 152 
it felt so  153 
it felt so er brittle, that identity, that I really kinda  154 
hid it even though it was an acceptable identity which is  155 
sort… sort of ironic y‘know 156 




when I was like very very young before I  161 
developed my own like boyishness or whatever 162 
erm I was a really pretty little girl like in a, in a very classic 163 
 y‘know er, er  164 
American sense of like  165 
blonde girl with blue eyes and y‘know very Caucasian and delicate and 166 
cos I‘ve always been kind of svelte y‘know that‘s the 167 
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that‘s the word I‘ve using for it rather than scrawny but erm 168 
… 169 
… 170 
 … 171 
L:  ‗you have a year on everybody else—go to college‘ [laughs] 172 
 173 
J:  and that was 174 
fifteen? sixteen? 175 
 176 
L:  I was 177 
sixteen, and then I turned seventeen yeah so 178 
erm 179 
yeah by the time I got to Europe I was seventeen erm 180 
anyway so I, I ended up taking a year off cos I, I, otherwise I just didn‘t 181 
know 182 
I dunno I was mess frankly—at the time I just erm 183 
I hadn‘t ev… I hadn‘t dealt with any of the er the like gender, sexuality 184 
issues that I‘d been having like I just sort of erm 185 
which is strange because I‘ve always been very y‘know er 186 
cos I, I was always an artist and I was always introspective and that sort of 187 
thing but at the same time there was always part of me that was just 188 
I don‘t even know how to explain it, sort of erm 189 
you know the part of the ocean where there‘s no light, y‘know what I 190 
mean 191 
you just, you woul… you wouldn‘t be able to see it although its, all the 192 
water is on top of it so it‘s kind of important [laughs] but you‘re er 193 
so 194 
it was strange that I never 195 
I dunno, that I never explored that but 196 
I went to Europe [laughs at something happening in the street]  197 
I went to Europe basically hoping that 198 
erm 199 
without wanting to be crude about it I just, I was hoping I would go over 200 
there 201 
and have sex with someone and I would just under… I would just know 202 
y‘know what I needed to be doing or what my identity was  203 
erm 204 
cos I don‘t know, that‘s just 205 
I don‘t even know why that, that was logical but at the time that see… 206 
y‘know I just figured y‘know I don‘t know what else to do 207 
and I don‘t want to tell anybody about this so 208 
y‘know let‘s do it by 209 
experiment 210 
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y‘know 211 
so I went to Europe and  212 
er 213 





and I went to Europe  219 
and I came back and 220 
I was still just as confused as I  221 
had been 222 
and erm 223 
during all that, during all that time, like during the time where I was  224 
I‘d skipped grades and I was doing a lot of course work and  225 
erm 226 
that sort of thing 227 
I‘d started getting these heart palpitations and er 228 
really severe insomnia, like I 229 
I mean, I mean I still, I still battle with it now but 230 
there are times where I, when I don‘t sleep, at all y‘know—it‘s really hard 231 
for me 232 
erm 233 
which is y‘know it‘s a whole other kettle of fish 234 
but anyway y‘know errrr 235 
so, so basically I, I, I —physically I was suffering y‘know erm 236 
and 237 
the heart thing was er became a little disturbing and my doctor was a little 238 
worried  about it and 239 
I had a heart monitor for a while and er 240 
they did tests and I had 241 
y‘know er 242 
y‘know I still, I have a picture of my heart actually when they did er 243 





y‘know I w… so I, so I was, physically I was not doing that great 249 
and erm 250 
y‘know when I came back from Europe it, it was obvious I needed 251 
some more help because er I mean before I went there I‘d, my doctor 252 
prescribed me something for anti-anxiety 253 
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because 254 
his reasoning at the time was that I didn‘t have 255 
my blood pressure was too low to use a beta blocker to help my heart 256 
erm 257 




anyway erm 262 
so it was, so it was like once I got back from Europe it was like y‘know 263 
‗God, that didn‘t work!‘ [laughs] y‘know ‗what do I do now?‘ 264 
and I er 265 
I started seeing this therapist 266 
erm 267 
his name was Dr [name] 268 
and he was a, he was a pretty nice guy y‘know he wasn‘t a bad guy or 269 
anything 270 
erm 271 
but y‘know we lived in a small town so he wasn‘t really 272 
[sniffs] 273 
y‘know erm 274 
y‘know I would say he wasn‘t the most insightful person in the universe 275 
but he was pretty y‘know not to say he was a bad guy 276 
anyway erm 277 
basically I just 278 
er for the first few months I didn‘t even talk when I went to the sessions 279 
like I would 280 
I would, maybe I would for a few minutes and then I would 281 
most of it was just silence, sort of me 282 
kind of shutting down 283 
which was strange 284 
erm 285 
and that went on for a really long time actually, that went on for months 286 
until erm 287 
I can‘t remember what it was—I got really stressed out with something, I 288 
don‘t even remember what it was now 289 
and I had a fight with my mom and I 290 
I w… I was like really 291 
oh I think I was late for something for her 292 
y‘know and erm 293 
and she was really angry about me being late 294 
and it‘s unusually for me to be late for things—I mean I‘m not the most 295 
punctual person in the world but it‘s not like I go around y‘know 296 
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holding people up all the time, and I was really upset 297 
and I basically just said y‘know I… I‘m  298 
I‘m dealing with this stuff and I don‘t know  299 
what to do anymore and I 300 
y‘know I‘m freaking out basically and that I‘m having like a nervous 301 
breakdown 302 
and erm 303 
it was really, it was really weird because er y‘know  304 
she brought me, she brought me home because she could tell that I was just 305 
so 306 
so consumed with whatever was going on 307 
y‘know and I was crying and [sighs]  308 
she was waiting for me to tell her y‘know what it was I needed to tell her 309 
and 310 
y‘know when I finally told her y‘know I, I think I‘m a, I might be a boy or 311 
something y‘know I was, y‘know when I told her tha… y‘know 312 
there‘s some kind of weird y‘know  313 
issue there 314 
she was relieved and she said y‘know ‗God, y‘know I couldn‘t think of 315 
anything that would upset you, that, that, would upset you this 316 
much—I was worried that you‘d killed someone when you were a 317 
little kid, by accident and 318 
y‘know you‘d just never told anyone all your life cos you were, you were, 319 
you could be a quiet sober kid when you were younger and I didn‘t know 320 
and‘ 321 
[sucks teeth] my god 322 
that‘s good to know and er 323 
‗no, I‘m 324 
in fact not a murderer‘ 325 
y‘know erm 326 
so that was like an interesting moment and then y‘know after that I di… I 327 
h… I went through more coming out times and 328 
it was biz… bizarre how all my friends reacted 329 
erm 330 
o… one of my best friends who was this guy 331 
I has a crush on in 332 
middle school 333 
when we were like really little 334 
so it was like b… by now there was no, no crushing—we were just friends 335 
but erm 336 
he w…, he, he‘s gay 337 
and he‘s a, a little bit feminine—not like really feminine just not a tough 338 
guy y‘know 339 
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and it was funny when I told him—he‘s like 340 
‗You can be my boyfriend!‘ and  341 
y‘know [laughs]  342 
he, he thought it was  343 
fantastic and 344 
it was really weird and then er 345 
I told my best friend er who‘s a girl and erm 346 
er I guess she‘s like 347 
heterosexual I would say but 348 
I mean tha… there‘s a whole other story behind that—but anyway 349 
I told her and she was like 350 
 y‘know  351 
‗if you, if you do change or something and become a boy, I‘m never gonna 352 
live it down if I‘m attracted to you‘ [laughs] 353 
y‘know erm 354 
co… 355 
which i… which is a very bizarre thing to have said to you y‘know  356 
and one of my other friends er 357 
he was this guy erm 358 
he was also in like media stuff with me and er 359 
I told him and, and he was like ‗oh my God, me too!‘ y‘know—he was like 360 
‗I, I think I‘m a girl‘ y‘know and I was like 361 
whoa, OK! [laughs] 362 
and er 363 
but yeah the more I talked about it the more I found  364 
people responding like 365 
I can‘t remember 366 
a single person that didn‘t respond well actually 367 
and i… and it was strange because there were some things erm 368 
like ther… there was this girl I‘d known for 369 
like all during high school—like one of the people you meet at high school 370 
cos they go somewhere else and y‘know 371 
and erm 372 
al the time 373 
during high school we were pretty close erm 374 
and I knew she really like 375 
admired me in a general sense erm 376 
but, but I never really  377 
I never thought that she could be attracted to me or anything—I mean that 378 
never,  379 
that never really occurred to me y‘know, if you know what I mean 380 
y‘know—I just didn‘t really think that 381 
I could possibly be her type but erm 382 
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y‘know when she found out about it  383 
she… she basically  384 
admitted to someone else, not directly to me y‘know  385 
that she‘d y‘know had a crush on for 386 
the longest time and had always wondered if I would y‘know  387 
become a boy and y‘know like  388 
and it, it was like for her it was a dream come true and, and 389 
you know that was, that was what was really bizarre about it y‘know cos I 390 
mean  391 
y… you think it‘s going  392 
to just be horror stories of like you tell people and they‘re like  393 
y‘know 394 
‗what the fuck is wrong with you!‘ and 395 
y‘know  396 
‗argh!‘ slap y‘know 397 
throw you in a Baptist church and  398 
y‘know lock the door and s…, set it on fire and 399 
y…, that‘s what you expect to happen and, and the truth is, is 400 
mos… for the most part, I mean you g… you have to choose, you 401 
y‘know I don‘t just tell random people all the time but 402 
y‘know most people are like  403 
‗oh, OK‘ and 404 
and er y‘know if you 405 
answer their questions OK y‘know  406 
most er 407 
most deal with it pretty fine 408 
erm 409 
but yeah it 410 
for me it er  411 
it‘s strange, it‘s strange to think how it‘s affected my spirituality because I 412 
also erm 413 
really consider myself an artist 414 
I mean I didn‘t when I was younger—I thought I was the most uncreative 415 
person ever 416 
which was strange because I was always drawing and making games and 417 
doing little puppet plays and I mean like I was always being creative but it 418 
just, I always thought y‘know ‗oh I‘m rubbish at this‘ y‘know [laughs] 419 
so 420 
y‘know 421 
that‘s, that‘s another thing when you‘re a little kid, how you can be so 422 
contradicting—I, I don‘t know how that possible 423 
but erm 424 
anyway so, so as I  425 
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grew older I just like, I er 426 
I eventually  427 
realised y‘know 428 
I had to do this [laughs] y‘know 429 
I don‘t, I don‘t, it‘s not like  430 
it‘s not like I have a choice about, I 431 
I need to be an artist—I am an artist y‘know—it‘s not even 432 
er y‘know it‘s just my identity 433 
and  434 
I think that y‘know 435 




I was really into science and my mom really encouraged that cos she loved 440 
science and all that sort of thing although she‘s never had the  441 
brain for the math y‘know to be serious with it  442 
erm  443 
and actually she, she wishes she er 444 
had become a geologist rather than an English teacher 445 
so, which i… which er er that has always  446 
 447 
J:  [over] quite a leap 448 
 449 
L:  yeah, it seems like a leap but at the same time erm 450 
[sniffs] 451 
 y‘know the way she always handled that and the way I always  452 
took it from her was erm 453 
 y‘know 454 
a… and actually it‘s kind of built on its own in m…, in, in the way that I 455 
just 456 
perceived existing 457 
er 458 
sort of that everything is everything y‘know erm 459 
everything is a metaphor for everything else 460 
erm 461 
and evr… and that there‘s not really 462 
erm 463 
i… like if you look at the ph… like the history of philosophy and you look 464 
at philosophical movements and you look abou… at the roots of 465 
dualistic thought 466 
y‘know back to Plato y‘know erm 467 
the er this idea of the ideal forms y‘know 468 
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behind the shadows of the real or whatever 469 
and er 470 
I really, I really don‘t believe that y‘know 471 
I really am a very monistic thinker—I think that er 472 
y‘know 473 
th… this is, this is here  474 
this is everything, everything is already important y‘know er  475 
alive or dead or 476 
erm 477 
animate or inanimate—everything‘s already important 478 
and erm 479 
y‘know part of that has really come from my understanding of  480 
er science and quantum physics, which I grew up with my mom cos she‘s 481 
really into  482 
er quantum physics and that sort of thing  483 
 y‘know ideas that like we‘re all 484 
made of superstrings or something y‘know—there‘s just basic vibrations 485 
that  486 
y‘know er er  487 
th… this whole idea of erm 488 
er essential oneness in a way 489 
and I do tie it back to, to gender because erm 490 
y‘know when I was younger I really thought of myself as a boy and, and  491 
er y‘know not a girl 492 
y‘know there was, there was like that‘s an important statement y‘know the 493 
grammar of it is important 494 
and now I just, I don‘t really er  495 
I don‘t really think of myself as either exactly—I, I‘m not sure how to 496 
explain it erm 497 
i… it‘s sort of like I just don‘t react to it as, as 498 
different things  499 
y‘know like I don‘t think that 500 
you exist as a man or a woman, you exist as a human being 501 
y‘know and er 502 
these rules that are so arbitrary y‘know—the colours we‘re allowed to 503 
wear, the 504 
the styles we‘re allowed to do our hair in  505 
y‘know even the bodies we‘re allowed have 506 
they‘re very, they‘re very arbitrary rules and er 507 
the, the more you really get into biology the more you realise that erm 508 
variation is what‘s important and erm 509 
… 510 
… 511 
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… 512 
y‘know people are er 513 
people are  514 
terrified of being dead or, or 515 
not living or that sort of thing and to me it‘s erm 516 
I dunno, it doesn‘t really disturb me that much any more—y‘know it‘s not 517 
that I don‘t want to live—I really enjoy living  518 
I, I enjoy being a living creature 519 
but erm 520 
I dunno, I‘ve kinda gotten to the point where I feel like that‘s 521 
even to be an inanimate thing—even to be  522 
erm 523 
to, to dissolve into the ground or 524 
become ash or  525 
anything y‘know is erm 526 
it‘s still part of a 527 
a much 528 
grander, deeper  529 
scheme y‘know  530 
erm 531 
you‘re still these particles, you‘re still these 532 
y‘know these amazing interactions of, of chemicals and that sort of thing 533 
and er 534 
so er y‘know  535 
it‘s funny for me—I just think that er 536 
once you, once you 537 
are less erm 538 
consumed with  539 
what you are or what you aren‘t y‘know erm 540 
like 541 
I, I, when I explain this I always draw like a Venn diagram y‘know like 542 
wha… what, y‘know maybe some things overlap but you‘ve still this 543 
separation and 544 
[intake of breath] 545 
I just tend to think that you need to  546 
draw y‘know  547 
lines around the whole thing or even better yet just forget the whole idea  548 
y‘know and just erm 549 




males definitely have a, a harder deal in that 554 
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they are 555 
the second of the two 556 
y‘know sexes—I mean the, the 557 
the original form is the female and it‘s been 558 
here for a really long time and 559 
I mean that‘s why  560 
er ma… I mean genetically that‘s er that‘s why there was the xy and that‘s 561 
also genetically why they have so much more disease 562 
shorter lives 563 
y‘know what I mean because  564 
basically their o… their only function is to 565 
mix up 566 
the female‘s genetic information—they‘re not really there to do anything 567 
else 568 
y‘know so it‘s like they have this horrible identity crisis of  569 
‗what am I here for?‘ y‘know I mean erm beyond just being their 570 
their genitals  571 
y‘know 572 
where… whereas a, a female has like this whole 573 
y‘know thing of like er  574 
y‘know ‗I, I give life and I take care of life‘ and er 575 
oh y‘know this whole social aspect 576 
and for me er y‘know  577 
as I got older and the more I realised that the more I didn‘t want to be just 578 
a typical guy or a typical girl 579 
y‘know erm  580 
[intake of breath] cos I never, I‘ve never really had the desire to be 581 
pregnant 582 
I mean wh… which is strange because I‘m 583 
generally I‘m really fascinated with bodily functions—I mean I know that 584 
sounds disgusting but er it‘s not like  585 
like in a gross like 586 
y‘know er 587 
errrr 588 
sensa… sensationalistic way—it‘s just like erm 589 
as an artist I‘m y‘know I‘m always fascinated when  590 
y‘know I get a burn or a cut or  591 
y‘know anything that happens to me  592 
and it‘s weird to  593 
compare that to pregnancy but y‘know I mean  594 
anything that d… 595 
 596 
J:  [over] I can see the link 597 
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 598 
L:  yeah anything that makes you aware of your physical self  599 
to me seems really important like as a, as a monistic thinker y‘know you, 600 
you, it‘s, it‘s very important to  601 
[intake of breath] experience your hand is not your hand but your, you 602 
that‘s you y‘know—your whole body is you all the time  603 
erm 604 
so, so yeah er but I never, I never really wanted to be 605 
like er 606 
a mommy figure 607 
I was always 608 
er it was funny wh… when I was a little kid I was very 609 
dashing and very er 610 
roguish and er 611 
I always loved going on adventures  612 
and er beating up other little kids 613 
and y‘know  614 
erm 615 
not in a mean way y‘know—I wasn‘t a bully, I‘m not saying I was a bully, I 616 
was just y‘know I, I always stood up for myself when I needed to 617 
stand up for myself and 618 
I was always constantly going on adventures like going out into the woods 619 
and  620 
y‘know  621 
I didn‘t even know what kind of games like 622 
 623 
we had invented there but it was like 624 
explorations into the unknown sort of thing 625 
[sniffs] y‘know so for me it was  626 
it w… it, it er 627 
it‘s funny because although 628 
society permits more exploration of identity to women 629 
erm 630 
y‘know in term of 631 
women are more allowed to think about what they look like, more allowed 632 
to think  about y‘know 633 
what they do besides just working and that sort of thing 634 
erm 635 
I al… I alw… er as a child I felt a lot more freedom in 636 
in a more mascu… wh… what was considered societ… societally  637 
a more masculine identity that I didn‘t need to  638 
worry about er 639 
giving  640 
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life to something else or  641 
submitting to a male or something which was horrifying and erm 642 
or rather that 643 
y‘know I could go off on these adventures and  644 
y‘know do that sort of thing 645 
and, and, and it‘s funny though, although y‘know I‘ve matured of course 646 
hope I have erm  647 
there‘s always still that, that 648 
that little 649 
er 650 
always part of that 651 
y‘know there‘s always  652 
something in there that, that, that make me think y‘know erm  653 
y‘know I just want to be that dashing adventurous fellow that never has to 654 





and its strange cos I, I think now about wh… wha… c… cos I‘m not sure 660 
what I‘m going do about  661 
my situation—I mean it‘s still, this is  662 
y‘know I mean I talk about my, my past as a 17-year-old—I‘m only 19 so 663 
this is not 664 
y‘know this is not ancient history 665 
erm 666 
y‘know and erm I h… I, I, I‘ve been in therapy 667 
for another therapist who deals more with like 668 
gender stuff and y‘know 669 
er er of course y‘know I‘ve thought about  670 
like 671 
full-on becoming ‗a boy‘ y‘know like 672 
physically  673 
 y‘know 674 
transitioning 675 
 676 
J:  surgery, hormones 677 
 678 
L:  yeah  679 
that sort of thing yeah  680 
I mean 681 
part of that is very difficult for me because I‘m s… in general don‘t like 682 
the idea of modifying 683 
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erm 684 
my body y‘know—not 685 
li… like not, not exactly in this, in, in an aesthetic way or anything, or 686 
even exactly a spiritual way—it‘s just like  687 
the, the safety of that is  688 
erm 689 
I dunno, there‘s someth…  690 
er er I just I don‘t like it y‘know erm 691 
I always, I always  692 
want to rely on just what I‘m 693 
what I already have 694 
y‘know 695 
that‘s, that‘s just sort of a basic impulse 696 
erm but y‘know  697 
the thing is is that even, even w… y‘know were I to become a boy or if I 698 
become a boy I, I, I, I don‘t think that I‘m going to be 699 
a big tough  700 
y‘know competitive 701 
ra-ra kind of macho guy - I‘ve no interest in that, not even remotely 702 
y‘know and I, I, I thought about  703 
what my reasons are for becoming a boy and, and, and sometimes I‘ve 704 
wondered if  705 
part of it is that er 706 
as a girl I always did feel  707 
immature 708 
in that role  709 
y‘know 710 
and erm 711 
I still feel immature even though I‘m fairly, I mean I‘m a fairly functional 712 
person y‘know—I 713 
live on my own and 714 
y‘know go to school  715 
and all that 716 
y‘know and, and I guess I‘m an adult  717 
you know I guess I‘m a woman—I‘ve ne… I never call myself a woman, 718 
that‘s very weird for me 719 
erm 720 
and so, and so in a way it seemed like 721 
pursuing that masculine identity to  722 
the ultimate end of being a 723 
man 724 
y‘know being an adult man and er 725 
how that would physically change me—I would, I would  726 
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finally become a bit bigger  727 
y‘know cos I‘ve always been very skinny—I mean you can see I‘m not, I‘m 728 
not a large person—I‘ve always been like that and that‘s not because I 729 
diet or  730 
exercised a ton although I don.. y‘know I‘m, I‘m a fairly healthy person—731 
it‘s b… it‘s because of my heart—I just, I, I physically can‘t get 732 
really overweight y‘know 733 
and I physically j… sh… can‘t get that big 734 
y‘know erm 735 
and part of me has always really wanted to be [laughs] 736 
y‘know erm  737 
I really like the idea of being 738 
a bit 739 
stronger and 740 
solid and 741 
y‘know it, it sounds weird but 742 
I, I alw… I always, I‘d like that idea y‘know erm 743 
not that I want to be huge either—I 744 
cos that doesn‘t feel graceful to me and 745 
not that I‘m very graceful but—I mean in more of like a  746 
just dealing with day to day things y‘know—I don‘t want to be some giant 747 
brute y‘know er 748 
but, but 749 
in, in a way it seemed like erm  750 
y‘know so much of my childhood 751 
was  752 
trying to deny this sort of masculine identity or 753 
boyishness or something 754 
so that I never grew older than like 755 
a 12-year-old boy  756 
y‘know I‘ve always been a 12-year-old boy, I‘m still a 12-year-old boy, 757 
y‘know—I mean I look down and y‘know still that  758 
y‘know that little kid 759 
and er 760 
part of, part of the idea of transitioning for me is, is almost to finally like  761 
‗I‘m an adult!‘ [laughs] y‘know  762 
like I don‘t know how else to convince myself 763 
I‘m a grown-up now 764 
y‘know and  765 
and then that does of course reach into 766 
er sort of like sexual things because erm 767 
and I mean up until 768 
up until recently I‘d been a virgin so even then it was like 769 
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well I don‘t know, I don‘t really know y‘know 770 
how, how my gender identity is even gonna affect y‘know 771 




so anyway  776 
y‘know so I started going to these, these bars and clubs and that sort of 777 
thing 778 
and erm I don‘t  779 
really know what I was expecting from it either—I just sort of wanted to 780 
know 781 
what is it these other normal 782 
people do when they just 783 
feel comfortable going out and  784 
having sex with other people 785 
y‘know like [laughs] 786 
like  787 
because for me there‘s always 788 
there‘s always an intermediary 789 
y‘know there‘s, it… it‘s never just like  790 
regular sex y‘know like 791 
y‘know you can‘t go out as like a guy and 792 
and like meet guys and y‘know  793 
have them go down on you in a bathroom or something y‘know what I 794 
mean—you have to, you have to ge… you, you have to have a talk 795 
with them  796 
before anything can even happen y‘know or,  797 
or if you‘re with a girl you can‘t  798 
y‘know just 799 
do, do it in a telephone booth y‘know like 800 
and it‘s not like people really go around doing that a lot, it‘s just that 801 
they always have that potential y‘know 802 
so that there‘s always that 803 
that sort of confidence of like 804 
I‘m, I‘m already ready 805 
right here y‘know any time 806 
I‘m ready 807 
y‘know and for me it was  808 
so for me it was always like I‘m, I‘m this observer 809 
wondering y‘know  810 
how these people are  811 
doing this and 812 
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and I‘ve always felt 813 
sort of like that observer 814 
and I think that really affected 815 
the way I spiritually deal with things too cos I could never really get into 816 
this idea of 817 
like congregating  818 
in a social context with people  819 
about like 820 
some kind of divine force or something or even about wh… how I felt 821 
about thing cos I, I, I was always 822 
kind of a non 823 
entity y‘know like I was already 824 
erm 825 
a step between mere physical world and, and, and something that was 826 
er divine y‘know and 827 
I think that‘s why a lot of transsexuals think of themselves so.. in 828 
to some degree as like shamans or something y‘know erm 829 
because there is that 830 
that part of you that‘s never 831 
erm 832 
going to be 833 
directly and easily physical 834 
y‘know what I mean—there‘s always sort of erm 835 




but I, I always remember the interaction with 840 
with the guy because er 841 
things like that have happened to me 842 
more than you woul… more than you would expect 843 
because even though I never 844 
erm 845 
er well not never but I, I, I didn‘t  846 
often actively 847 
present as, as 848 




anyway so bu… but even though I was never  853 
actively  854 
presenting a lot of times I would get  855 
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approached as a boy any way 856 
like er, so the, the 857 
the two times I almost always talk about—one, one of the times is a sort of 858 
funny because I, I erm 859 
my mom had just got me a, a 860 
a binder y‘know to 861 
sort of flatten my chest—cos we‘d  862 
been talking about y‘know what steps I could take to 863 
y‘know just explore what would make me more comfortable 864 
and erm  865 
so I was wearing that and I was wearing some 866 
boys trousers and I mean they‘re very baggy—I mean I don‘t wear my 867 
pants that baggy—I, I, I wear them to fit y‘know  868 
erm 869 
and like a, a boy‘s 870 
t-shirt, that sort of thing 871 
and 872 
I was at my brother‘s soccer game 873 
and er 874 
one of my parents‘ errrr 875 
friends came over and was talking to us 876 
and erm  877 
my mom introduced me and  878 
the guy misheard my name 879 
and thought it was a boy‘s name—I can‘t remember what he  880 
er cos I, I, I‘m Leigh y‘know  881 
so yeah  882 
I dunno, I dunno how he heard it - it was like, he thought it was like  883 
Larry or Harry or 884 
something like, something  885 
bizarre 886 
[intake of breath] but anyway, but  887 
but what was weird was 888 
he started talking to me as a boy and then 889 
then he, then 890 
because of the way they were  891 
referring, my parents were referring to me, he suddenly understood that I 892 
was actually a girl  893 
because they were using a girl pronoun, like they were saying ‗oh yeah, 894 
she‘s doing 895 
blah, blah, blah‘ and this and y‘know  896 
[intake of breath] and, and  897 
it was weird because 898 
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he 899 
he reacted in this 900 
he got like a twinkle in his eye and erm 901 
when people get that—and I do get that 902 
a lot when that happens—like more than you would expect 903 
er, I know that like o… one of two things has probably just happened 904 
either they‘re 905 
they‘re still attracted to me or more attracted me, to me because they know 906 
I‘m, they know I‘m some kind of 907 
y‘know  908 
strange 909 




there was like a football goin… er game going on, like a junior varsity one, 914 
which means that was probably like 915 
14-15 year olds  916 
15 year olds playing 917 
[sniffs] and erm 918 
there was our 919 
cheerleaders there and then there were the cheerleaders from another 920 
town 921 
from pretty far away—I don‘t know where y‘know where they were from 922 
and 923 
back then I 924 
I didn‘t  925 
I wasn‘t like actively 926 
like I said I wasn‘t actively 927 
pr… presenting as a boy—my hair was pretty long back then too y‘know 928 
[intake of breath] and er 929 
and I was wearing this one jacket that er 930 
it‘s actu… it‘s not a boy‘s jacket but for 931 
for whatever reason it looks like a boy‘s cut y‘know and 932 
it sort of flat… y‘know it sort of flattens my chest cos I mean there‘s not 933 
much to  flatten anyway so y‘know it‘s just a, a, a whe… when I wear 934 
it I can understand how someone could mistake me for ‗a bo y‘ 935 
y‘know, not th… even though I wasn‘t like  936 
trying—well anyway 937 
so I went into the lobby and I saw y‘know 938 
all these  939 
y‘know other school cheerleaders 940 
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looking at me and I thought well they‘re probably just thinking I‘m some 941 
kind of freak or something 942 
and was like y‘know whatever 943 
and I was standing by the lobby door, glass doors and  944 
I could tell they were still watching me and I did… y‘know I was like wh… 945 
what do they even care y‘know it‘s like I ju… I just want to get home, I 946 
don‘t care, blah blah blah 947 
and one of them in specific wa… was 948 
just staring at me the whole time—just really like staring at me but it 949 
wasn‘t in like  950 
a, a derisive way, it wasn‘t like 951 
she thought I was horrifying or something, it was like  952 
I dunno, I dunno even how to, I, I, I mean, I guess it was definitely 953 
attraction but it was 954 
y‘know it‘s something erm  955 
something about it that seem revelatory 956 
almost y‘know but anyway erm 957 
and so 958 
er she, she, she er 959 
sort of congregated her cheerleaders 960 
and they were all talking for a little bit  961 
[intake of breath] and I, I, I was sort of watching this in the reflection and I 962 
was thinking ‗oh man I hope they‘re not gonna do something, I hope 963 
they‘re not gonna  964 
y‘know say something, I don‘t want to deal with this‘ 965 
and erm 966 
and I was trying to think of a snappy comeback or something and 967 
and then finally two of the girls  968 
errrr 969 
leave the little 970 
cluster 971 
and walk about midway 972 
and obviously I mean they‘re, they‘re on one side of the lobby and then our 973 
cheerleaders 974 
for our school are on the other side of the lobby 975 
[sniffs] and they, they walking into the middle 976 
and they stare at me for a minute and then they finally come up to me cos I 977 
turn around cos obviously they‘re coming over to talk to me I mean  978 
and so I turn around and I‘m 979 
y‘know I, y‘know say 980 
‗what‘s going on‘ and 981 
and I think the first question they asked me was erm 982 
‗what time is the football game?‘  983 
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how would I know th… I had nothing to do with the football game and 984 
also 985 
there‘re our cheerleaders right there 986 
who probably know  987 
y‘know [laughs]  988 
because they‘re g… actively getting ready for it, and to, I, I mean and it was 989 
just like 990 
that was obviously  991 
like 992 
 993 
J:  a ploy 994 
 995 
L:  a ploy, a ploy question 996 
 y‘know so I was like 997 
I don‘t know where this is going but I‘m disturbed 998 
[intake of breath] and erm  999 
the… then 1000 
the other girl, so it was like 1001 
they were sort of like trading off like they 1002 
they, a… and it was funny that it was two girls and they were both sort of 1003 
like huddled together 1004 
like they were on a reconnaissance mission or something y‘know like that‘s 1005 
the feeling I got, I mean y‘know there were like these two girls like 1006 
y‘know come over to talk to me y‘know [laughs] 1007 
and they asked  1008 
then the other question they asked me was erm 1009 
was I a foreign exchange student 1010 
and I, and I was like 1011 
‗no, I 1012 
I come from round here‘ 1013 
and  1014 
beca… a… and wh…  1015 
what that clicked for me 1016 
was tha… because we‘d had  1017 
another foreign exchange student at our school 1018 
and he was a Spanish guy 1019 
and the thing was he wore really tight pants like 1020 
like girls‘ pants tight pants y‘know  1021 
and it was like 1022 
tha… that was  1023 
locally the conception  1024 
of what 1025 
a foreign person 1026 
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a foreign boy would do 1027 
is wear these tight pants 1028 
and I was wearing fairly tight jeans at the time like 1029 
and they w… they like black too y‘know so they were like the whole thing 1030 
[sniffs] and 1031 
it became obvious to me that they thought I was a boy 1032 
y‘know like I, I could tell and that, that 1033 
cheerleader girl had sent them over to talk to me 1034 
like as an 1035 
y‘know i… it was very bizarre—like I suddenly realised like 1036 
this situation is 1037 
they don‘t know what‘s going on y‘know 1038 
anyway they, they asked me a few other 1039 
questions of just like 1040 
what was I doing around there and 1041 
like  1042 
was I going out with anyone around there like 1043 
like 1044 
suspicious weird questions y‘know 1045 
and then y‘know thank god my mom rescued me and 1046 
y‘know pulled by and  1047 
I y‘know just politely 1048 
said goodbye and left but 1049 
[sniffs] y‘know and I, and I told other people about this y‘know the 1050 
‗the cheerleaders hitting on me‘ story and they‘re like 1051 
y‘know ‗that‘s every heterosexual male‘s 1052 
dream is 15 year old cheerleaders hitting on them‘ and er 1053 
like a whole group of boons[?] like 1054 
for me it was just terrifying y‘know [laughing] 1055 
er  1056 
but it was, it was strange cos like  1057 
in hi… 1058 
towards the end of high school I was starting to 1059 
be more vocal about like 1060 
er 1061 
that I liked girls at least—like I didn‘t talk about ho.. y‘know  1062 
exactly 1063 
how I  1064 
felt in relation  1065 
to being 1066 
with a girl 1067 
if that makes  1068 
sense  1069 
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so sometimes people would sort of  1070 
come to me with their gayness if that makes any sense y‘know like I was 1071 
like the gay beacon or something 1072 
even though I made a very strange one cos I wasn‘t 1073 
very gay [laughs] 1074 
so y‘know  1075 
it was just like  1076 




it‘s funny cos er 1081 
those are so  1082 
cl… y‘know erm 1083 
closely intertwined as well that it‘s hard to separate what‘s just 1084 
sort of wh… where  1085 
where did that 1086 
thought come from—was it from 1087 
my gender experience or was it from my artistic experience or 1088 
y‘know but then again I always come back to they‘re the same thing, 1089 
they‘re all the same thing y‘know  1090 
erm but yeah I do, I feel like erm  1091 
I, I know 1092 
special secrets about people 1093 
and about erm 1094 
how 1095 
things are created and er 1096 
what you can use things to do other things with  1097 
y‘know like, like a… and part of it comes from like 1098 
the physical act of painting 1099 
y‘know erm 1100 
like I, I mean if you think of the classical parts of it like where 1101 
y‘know you‘d actually grind the paints together and  1102 
and make it and then you would have this 1103 
a painting y‘know—go from just this lump of rock to  1104 
y‘know this divine experience of 1105 
like y‘know a representation of 1106 
of god somebody would say y‘know erm 1107 
er if you want to think of it that way 1108 
errrr 1109 
but yeah i… 1110 
y‘know  1111 
as, as sort of like a  1112 
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pantheistic  1113 
thinker 1114 
y‘know part of it is that 1115 
all the time 1116 
er 1117 
you‘re, you‘re in god 1118 
y‘know you‘re always  1119 
doing things with god 1120 
y‘know and erm 1121 
I, y‘know tha… and I don‘t even like to personalise it like that either cos I 1122 
don‘t, I don‘t 1123 
necessarily take it that way but it‘s like  1124 
erm 1125 
but it do… it does really do gender though i.. er y‘know 1126 
I think part of it is that I‘m not just thinking 1127 
how am I as a woman or a man reacting to 1128 
the world around me y‘know  1129 
y‘know I‘m like 1130 
like take an example like  1131 
a girl y‘know 1132 
I, I‘m allowed to pick a flower because  1133 
I can put it in my hair and be pretty 1134 
y‘know like 1135 
like that‘s an interaction y‘know 1136 
and for me it‘s like I jus… I‘m always thinking 1137 
y‘know what can I, what can I do like 1138 
pick a flower and put it in my hair not 1139 
y‘know sure it‘d be pretty but not  1140 
as a girl—this is like 1141 
this other being y‘know like to 1142 
to take part of something somewhere and put it somewhere else and 1143 
like to me 1144 
being a shaman is sort of just  1145 
moving things around 1146 
y‘know erm  1147 
errrr 1148 
sort of er 1149 
gosh I wouldn‘t say recycle because that‘s n… that‘s, that‘s too mechanical 1150 
but i… but, but sort of erm 1151 
just by the nature of your existence you‘re validating  1152 
existence itself y‘know what I mean like 1153 
erm 1154 
ju… er th… the fact that I can look at world 1155 
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makes the world beautiful 1156 
y‘know 1157 
so erm 1158 
I definitely 1159 
I definitely see that as important and I think that 1160 
part of it is this 1161 
and er I  1162 
though at the same time it does come from that 1163 
some of that same feeling of 1164 
being 1165 
removed 1166 
from that physical world as much as I, I 1167 
y‘know I do try to feel like 1168 
y‘know  1169 
 1170 
J:  eyes on the outside sort of thing? 1171 
 1172 
L:  yeah exactly cos 1173 
cos I‘ve always, I‘ve never  1174 
y‘know I never fit in with regular girls or the regular boys even though 1175 
y‘know  1176 
ultimately I, I‘m  1177 
completely capable of girly and boy-y things y‘know erm  1178 
I like ribbons and kittens and  1179 
you erm  1180 
I, I even like brown paper bags  1181 
tied with string [laughs]  1182 
and I like 1183 
I like watching kickboxing and er 1184 
drinking and y‘know just stupid boy things too 1185 
y‘know which generally involve self-injury which is another interesting 1186 
point 1187 
yeah erm 1188 




but even when I was younger, even wh… when I was fairly closed off 1193 
I was just never very judgemental of people because always y‘know 1194 
inwardly I was always thinking 1195 
y‘know 1196 
I‘m a little strange or I‘m not, I‘m not decided y‘know there w… there was 1197 
always that part of me that was in fluctuation 1198 
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so it seemed unfair to  1199 
to ever judge anyone as if they probab.. alr… didn‘t already have their own 1200 
fluct… fluctuation if you see what I mean y‘know  1201 
[intake of breath] and so  1202 
f… for me 1203 
my po… my material point was er er 1204 
that, that people we… were always telling me their secrets  1205 
y‘know like always confessing thing to me which was very  1206 
very strange but  1207 
yeah like I, I‘ve had people confess everything and I‘m not, I‘m not like 1208 
trying to be like  1209 
arrogant or b… or y‘know like  1210 
ridiculous about [moves mike] 1211 
I, I‘m not trying to  1212 
say y‘know er  1213 
er  1214 
look at my worldliness or anything but I‘ve had people confess everything 1215 
from 1216 
abuse to rape to 1217 
to  1218 
incest to  1219 
desires of incest to  1220 
er like coprophilia to all sort of like every fetish you could think of I mean 1221 
pretty much everything but 1222 
murder has been 1223 
at some point confessed to me [sniffs] 1224 
 1225 
J:  because they sense in you some kind of openness? 1226 
 1227 
L:  because yeah 1228 
they sense yeah 1229 
they sense in me that there‘s something erm  1230 
that, that just is not  1231 
closed off 1232 
y‘know and I mean I explore this a lot in art with 1233 
with sort of examinations of intimacy 1234 
erm 1235 
like a lot of times what I like to do is take er 1236 
photographs of people without asking them first  1237 
erm which is a very  1238 
can be a very disturbing experience for people 1239 
but I don‘t do to, to 1240 
with any sense of cruelty 1241 
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it‘s more the sense that 1242 
we‘re all erm [sniffs] 1243 
physically er 1244 
w… w… we‘re this matter in this space but when you‘re seeing someone, 1245 
it‘s a passive way of being intimate with them because all you‘re 1246 
taking from the physically is their light 1247 
y‘know they‘re reflecting or not reflecting this light  1248 
and you‘re getting this and a ca… that‘s all a camera does  1249 
all a camera can do  1250 
is erm 1251 
take the light that you‘re reflecting 1252 
and  1253 
capture it on film y‘know 1254 
the… the… there‘s nothing in it that actually takes your soul or anything 1255 
like that [laughs] y‘know what I mean 1256 





we just, we, we pass each other by like we‘re rocks 1262 
y‘know like we… a… y‘know and, and part of it is because 1263 
we, we‘re making a statement 1264 
y‘know 1265 
‗I‘m full‘ [laughs] y‘know  1266 
‗I can‘t take you in‘  1267 
y‘know  1268 
‗I already am doing everything‘ 1269 
y‘know ‗I‘m not, I‘m not interested‘ 1270 
which is why 1271 
why sex and sexuality is so interesting to me because it‘s, it‘s that one time 1272 
where we say 1273 
y‘know where we take our hands out and we‘re like 1274 
‗please come in, please y‘know I want you here‘ 1275 
y‘know and 1276 
and so I always find, so, so like my exercise of like taking pictures without 1277 
their, without their express consent  1278 
is erm 1279 
is, is partially about this idea of when you look at someone 1280 
you‘re establishing 1281 
how much you‘re going to let them in 1282 
y‘know what I mean like every time you look at someone you‘re saying 1283 
erm 1284 
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y‘know 1285 
‗no I don‘t want to have sex with you‘ or ‗ok maybe I do want to have sex 1286 
with you‘ or ‗how about you talk to me and then we‘ll see w… 1287 
y‘know where that goes‘ 1288 
but it‘s interesting because for me because I could never really 1289 
I, I never felt like I could interact in that world because I, y‘know I didn‘t 1290 
th… I couldn‘t, I couldn‘t be a boy for someone or I couldn‘t be a girl 1291 
for someone exactly so I was sort of like 1292 
y‘know I couldn‘t give people that look because  1293 
ultimately I couldn‘t  1294 
y‘know a… y‘know I couldn‘t answer that promise 1295 
erm 1296 
so, so, so that 1297 
for me it, it‘s like  1298 
to, to  1299 
take picture of people especially at that first moment where they notice 1300 
you—like a lot of times I‘ll just hold the camera and watch someone 1301 
for a really long time  1302 
until they fi… like cos most of the time they‘ll notice 1303 
but they won‘t ta… they won‘t look  1304 
but eventually they‘ll look right over you, at you, and at that first instant 1305 
where they see you I, I take the picture 1306 
[intake of breath] and  1307 
it‘s, it‘s partially about just that, that 1308 
moment where we establish as  1309 
two living things 1310 
that were 1311 
eternally separate  1312 
 y‘know  1313 
were never  1314 
erm 1315 
were never going to be together 1316 
were never 1317 
even if we‘re lovers we‘re always going to be 1318 
lovers and not er 1319 
one y‘know 1320 
erm 1321 
and to me I think, I think er 1322 
I don‘t know that I would have been as focused or even 1323 
dare I say obsessed sometimes er 1324 
with that idea if I hadn‘t had that sort of 1325 
general  1326 
distance 1327 
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y‘know  1328 
a general erm 1329 
errrr 1330 




I‘ve been trying to—it‘s like this sort of thing where I try convert people to 1335 
it cos it‘s  1336 
to me I, I tend to think of it as it‘s er 1337 
spirituality it‘s just y… your own  1338 
development stage 1339 
y‘know even what I think y‘know I don‘t  1340 
say that it‘s the  1341 
ultimate conclusion—it‘s not even the conclusion to what I‘ll think I‘m 1342 
sure 1343 
y‘know I‘m sure if you ask me 20 years later I‘ll probably have a new idea 1344 
of it but 1345 
I think 1346 
that‘s just how it goes y‘know  1347 
it‘s not, it‘s not so much about 1348 
consistent things that stay forever 1349 
y‘know 1350 
we already 1351 
stay forever 1352 




I think that you should say that science replaced 1357 
some ki… some kind of religious thing or rather that 1358 
it er  1359 
it changed 1360 
it changed the organisation of it y‘know—it wasn‘t that you had the answer 1361 
and then you asked questions about the answer and then you had the 1362 
answer again, it‘s that you 1363 
asked questions and then got the answer  1364 
and then that answer gave you another question and you a… y‘know and I 1365 
mean tha… I mean it just goes on forever 1366 
y‘know and it‘s not that that‘s not very tiring sometimes cos it is  1367 
it‘s very difficult to, to, to be  1368 
responsible and conscious 1369 
just to be conscious 1370 
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anyway so the, the, the, the thing that I was thinking of is erm 1376 
and it‘s er it‘s sort of the flipside of being 1377 
erm 1378 
like what you were saying, was like a pastoral figure erm 1379 
a shaman with the superpower to be your  1380 
confessor and  1381 
y‘know even absolve you in a weird way 1382 
erm 1383 
just be telling you you‘re OK 1384 
y‘know I‘ve heard other people say this 1385 
y‘know I mean  1386 
that‘s 1387 
that‘s actually enough absolution for y… people—people really don‘t even 1388 
need to  hear that 1389 
like god has forgiven them—they just need to know y‘know ‗I‘m not  1390 
‗I haven‘t violated  1391 
y‘know what it is to be human‘ 1392 
y‘know what I mean 1393 
but on the flipside of that there‘s always this 1394 
thing of erm 1395 
since I‘m  1396 
er 1397 
different from  1398 
most of 1399 
what‘s going on in society that er 1400 
just my very existence is a question 1401 
to it y‘know and  1402 
that can be 1403 
destructive 1404 
y‘know in a way I mean erm 1405 
a… a… as, as much as I think people have their own solid identities an… 1406 
y‘know that‘s  1407 
totally fine and  1408 
erm 1409 
and, and I, I totally think that some people are  1410 
y‘know er 1411 
totally comfortable as 1412 
like women or men y‘know as like specific roles or  1413 
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identities or 1414 
whatever you want to say 1415 
y‘know there, there‘s a lot of time where 1416 
and I think this is what makes it so threatening 1417 
where 1418 
y‘know my existence calls into question  1419 
why you are 1420 
the way you are 1421 
y‘know like a lot of girls  1422 
they, they act girly but they never really think about why they act girly, 1423 
they just act girly because they‘re a girl  1424 
 y‘know like they never think about y‘know 1425 
‗why do I curl my hair in the morning?‘  1426 
 y‘know [laughs] 1427 
‗is it because I‘m a girl or is it because I actually like being  1428 
y‘know having curly hair?‘ 1429 
y‘know 1430 
and er 1431 
y‘know just my existence sort of makes them think 1432 
‗why, why am I doing this, why am I thinking this?‘ 1433 
y‘know and er 1434 
tha… I, I‘ve 1435 
seen that y‘know really hurt some 1436 
friendships and relationships like what I told you what happened with 1437 
[name] like it just er 1438 
y‘know erm 1439 
i… i… it can be too much  1440 
for some people  1441 
y‘know they don‘t want to know, they don‘t want to think 1442 
y‘know and I think that‘s why they 1443 
react so violently sometimes is that 1444 
erm 1445 
y‘know 1446 
yeah I guess, I guess i… if you want to  1447 
keep it in the shaman  1448 
metaphor it‘s li… it‘s like to 1449 
to say, to think that there‘s someone 1450 
who‘s crossing between those worlds 1451 
erm 1452 
y‘know sort of highlights that 1453 
you‘re no… you can‘t  1454 
y‘know 1455 
that you‘re stuck in this and that world y‘know 1456 
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APPENDIX 2 
VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTION SECTIONS  
INTERVIEW WITH ROBIN 
 
J: yeah that‘s great—erm, I‘ll,  1 
I‘ve got a kind of checklist of things  2 
that I‘m hoping you‘ll mention 3 
 4 
R: [over] yeah 5 
 6 
J: and will probably prompt for some of those if they don‘t come up 7 
 8 
R: ok 9 
 10 
J: but otherwise, just talk 11 
 12 
R: yeah 13 
 14 
J: yeah? 15 
 16 
R: fine 17 
ok 18 
well I suppose I come from a sort of background, in terms of my family 19 
where 20 
there was a lot of interest in 21 
sort of religions 22 
erm 23 
and also in things like, sort of psychology 24 
erm 25 
so I was sort of brought up with 26 
sort of that and with 27 
people having conversations about 28 
sort of spiritual things 29 
even though I wasn‘t 30 
trained into any particular spiritual pathway 31 
 32 
J: [over] mm 33 
 34 
R: erm 35 
when I was a child 36 
erm 37 
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but I suppose people 38 
we talked about 39 
well, we didn‘t really talk about them a lot but we talked about 40 
things like reincarnation or we talked about 41 
y‘know the 42 
the 43 
sort of meditation and stuff like that 44 
erm 45 
I‘m getting a bit self-conscious now [laughs] 46 
 47 
J: [laughs in sympathy] 48 
 49 
R: erm 50 
and we talked about energies and 51 
I suppose I was sort of aware of the spiritual dimension even though I wasn‘t 52 
I think the first time I remember being 53 
explicitly 54 
spiritually active was 55 
when I went to a [New Age] school 56 
a… erm 57 
on a visit 58 
and I did some meditation and I was about 10 then 59 
erm 60 
but 61 
so most of my 62 
sort of spiritual experience was just around nature and just being and stuff 63 
like that 64 
sort of 65 
really 66 
not, not particularly channelled but it was very much in the live dimension 67 
erm 68 
and I think that sort of sense of 69 
spirituality being a live dimension has continued through my life 70 
erm when I was in my teens I went to 71 
[a spiritual community] 72 
and did a couple of different 73 
erm programmes there 74 
erm 75 
and that was kind of really important for me 76 
erm 77 
what I‘m going to do is, I‘m going to trace my spiritual 78 
history and then I‘m going to trace my sort of gender stuff 79 
 80 
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J: great 81 
erm that‘s fine 82 
 83 
R: ok? 84 
erm 85 
so that was really important for me 86 
and I also went through a bit of a kind of dark night of the soul when I was 87 
in my teens and my parents split up 88 
and 89 
so there was a sort of 90 
spiritual crisis then I suppose 91 
erm 92 
so there was [the spiritual community] 93 
erm 94 
and then when I was in my mid-20s I got interested in kind of paganism and 95 
earth-based religion 96 
and got involved in doing 97 
some 98 
sort of basic 99 
spiritual 100 
pagan practices with friends 101 
erm 102 
and then a bit later I did a training with 103 
someone who‘s involved in the New Age scene around kind of 104 
erm 105 
spiritual awareness and energy work and stuff like that 106 
and I‘ve also trained as a healer as well 107 
erm 108 
and I mean now 109 
I 110 
I don‘t do a great deal but I‘m kind of just aware that it‘s there 111 
it‘s very hard to find time to do anything at the moment but 112 
erm 113 
I‘m aware that it‘s there and it‘s quite important to me 114 
erm 115 
so that‘s my sort of general spiritual background 116 
erm 117 
in terms of my gender 118 
erm 119 
I was kind of an 120 
quite unambiguously  121 
identifying as a girl when I was 122 
prepubescent 123 
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erm but when I was 124 
in my teens 125 
erm 126 
I 127 
I became 128 
a bit more gender-ambiguous and I think it was 129 
partly round being critical of sort of gender norms 130 
cos I didn‘t really fit the gender stereotypes and I had quite a hard time 131 
growing up 132 
erm 133 
it was partly because I came out as bisexual in my teens 134 
erm 135 
and 136 
became attracted to women and 137 
sort of 138 
I think with that went a bit of gender fluidity 139 
and I don‘t think I looked very female  140 
and 141 
I remember at one point 142 
writing in my diary something like, oh 143 
erm 144 
the guys think I‘m a gay girl and the girls think I‘m a gay guy, and it was this 145 
kind of like 146 
er 147 
sort of despairing moment when, oh, no-one fancies me cos I‘m the wrong 148 
gender to everyone y‘know [laughing] 149 
 150 
J: [laughing in sympathy] 151 
 152 
R: [laughing] it was kind of 153 
horrible kind of  154 
feeling of just not fitting the norms 155 
in terms of my gender and sexuality and I mean  156 
I was lucky enough to go to a school which was very progressive and 157 
y‘know there were some 158 
kind of 159 
lesbian 160 
or bisexual role models there 161 
erm 162 
y‘know I didn‘t feel completely alienated 163 
and then when I 164 
got a little bit older into my teens I met 165 
other people who identified as 166 
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queer or whatever, gay or whatever you wanted to call it 167 
erm 168 
and also th… 169 
cos I got quite involved in kind of the anarchist and squatting movement 170 
and I remember a bloke wearing a dress and 171 
y‘know people weren‘t 172 
it wasn‘t kind of like gay culture but it was kind of like alternative, 173 
anarchistic culture and with that went quite a, a lot of kind of  174 
messing around with 175 
different boundaries 176 
including sort of gender and sexuality and 177 
and then I started to kind of get quite a lot more kind of empowered really 178 
erm around my gender identity and my sexuality 179 
and I don‘t think I 180 
I mean I‘m not 181 
sort of 182 
I, I, I 183 
I‘m not 184 
apart from a sort of fairly brief period which I‘ll tell you about 185 
I‘ve never wanted to kind of transition and become like 186 
a drag-king or an FTM 187 
erm 188 
apart from this period I‘ll tell about 189 
but 190 
it 191 
it was just kind of like 192 
I just didn‘t fit 193 
the girly-girly stuff 194 
and I remember like in my early 20s 195 
I was going out with someone at the time and 196 
erm 197 
I didn‘t used to wear dresses or 198 
skirts at all 199 
and one day I wore one and they said, oh, you look like a drag queen 200 
and [both laugh] 201 
[laughing] I remember being kind of quite hurt  202 
erm [laughing] 203 
but y‘know this was the kind of like, didn‘t fit 204 
even though I was 205 
more 206 
the heterosexual and 207 
bisexual than 208 
gay i… sort of in terms of my actual practice, my sexual practice 209 
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at that time, I didn‘t really fit 210 
erm the stereotypes and 211 
so where was I at 212 
and then in my early 20s I came out as a dyke or a, a kind of 213 
well [sighs] I mean I sort of 214 
slipped around between  215 
identifying as 216 
as a dyke or bisexual but I was in quite a 217 
serious long relationship with a woman 218 
erm 219 
and I became sort of quite butch and I kind of 220 
sort of started to convey [?] my butchness really 221 
erm 222 
and that broke up 223 
er but I carried on identifying as a dyke for another 224 
four or five years er at least and 225 
during that time I became 226 
quite, really quite butch 227 
and 228 
that was kind of quite important really 229 
but I think butch for me at that time was a sort of dyke identity which I 230 
know it is for a lot of dykes 231 
but it was quite a masculine identity but it was 232 
a female masculine identity if you want to 233 
erm sort of Halberstam and stuff like that 234 
if you want to look at the authors 235 
erm 236 
so 237 





and then  243 
I started 244 
doing 245 
studying around sexuality 246 
but 247 
because I was very interested in kind of theory 248 
erm 249 
and I went to a conf… a really important con… or a conference that was 250 
really important for me 251 
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called something like [conference title]—it was at [a UK University] in the 252 
mid-90s, I don‘t know if you came across it 253 
 254 
J: no, before my time [laughing]  255 
 256 
R: [laughing] yes that‘s right 257 
erm 258 
and I got, I was kind of like, think… going, well, what‘s next, y‘ know, 259 
what‘s 260 
erm 261 
y‘know, what‘s the kind of next thing on the agenda 262 
cos there was quite a lot of kind of quite staid stuff 263 
and to me it seemed like it was this stuff about kind of transgressing binaries 264 
and what happened when you 265 
open up the binaries and what‘s 266 
what‘s kind of there really 267 
and I got really interested in kind of postmodernism and poststructuralism 268 
erm 269 
and then I, my 270 
study focus 271 
started to kind of mutate 272 
erm 273 
and over a period of a few months I started 274 
to erm 275 
refocus on transgender 276 
erm 277 
and in line with that 278 
I was starting to question my dyke identity—and at that time it was a very 279 
strong identity 280 
and I was kind of quite I suppose lesbian feminist, in that sort of camp  281 
and I went to a summer school 282 
erm 283 
around homosexuality and 284 
there were some gay blokes there and I always think it‘s quite ironic that 285 
that‘s the point at which I started to come out as bisexual cos I got on 286 
really well with these blokes and 287 
prior to that for quite some time I‘d hardly had any 288 
sort of social contact with blokes at all 289 
and I got on really well with these blokes and I kind of thought, oh god, 290 
what am I going to do with this, y‘know—it was really awkward 291 
[laughing] 292 
erm [both laughing] 293 
and then in the summer I got involved in erm 294 
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I got involved in the [male drag/burlesque group] 295 
and I don‘t know if you‘ve come across erm 296 
 297 
J: yes 298 
 299 
R: it‘s a group of erm 300 
erm 301 
mostly gay male 302 
erm 303 
well, drag queens I suppose not 304 
it‘s probably not the right term—anyway, they dress up as kind of agony 305 
aunts 306 
and they had a sort of  307 
important 308 
activist 309 
erm kind of drag 310 
role in the gay community at the resorts on the continent—er, it 311 
doesn‘t seem as strong now—but anyway I got involved with them and I was 312 
I went to erm 313 
the continent… erm … Europe 314 
 … 315 
… 316 
… 317 
also there‘s a sort, there was a sort of idea in the group about kind of serving 318 
the community—we used to do things like go out to the resorts 319 
and we used to go round and sort of 320 
pick up all the people who‘d been dumped and who‘d had a bit too much to 321 
drink or 322 
y‘know we used to hand out condoms and 323 
y‘know it was that kind of 324 
being there to support the 325 
the queer community—it was a bit like kind of  326 
unpaid outreach workers really 327 




and with the erm outreach and the 332 
erm y‘know ritual we kind of 333 
erm went through 334 
every 335 
night 336 
it did have a kind of 337 
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sort of spiritual 338 
I mean no-one else who was involved in it is into spirituality but for me it 339 
had a sort of spiritual dimension 340 
it did, it had a 341 




it was a bit like kind of being transformed 346 
on a transgender level so, because obviously I was dragging up as a man 347 
dragging up as a woman 348 
erm 349 
and 350 
y‘know it became a sort of important sub-personality for me 351 
for quite some time 352 
erm 353 
and 354 
also I was hanging round with all these gay blokes as well 355 
and I stated to kind of take on a sort of ‗gay bloke‘ identity 356 
erm 357 
and it was great fun — I mean I, I still look back at it with an enormous 358 
amount of nostalgia 359 
and erm kind of regret really cos I‘m not in that scene any more really 360 
erm but it was fantastic—we used to 361 
have a really good time and there was a real sort of sense of camaraderie as 362 
well 363 
erm 364 
and I was only, I wasn‘t involved with them for all that long 365 
actively 366 
ermmmmm 367 




but it did, it had a spiritual 372 
sense to it—and also at the same time I was kind of socialising with people 373 
who were into like 374 
the sort of, into the sort of broader queer scene and  375 
like I had some transgender friends and then I had 376 
as I was starting to come out as bisexual I had 377 
two sexual partners who were trans 378 
erm 379 
who I met socially  380 
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erm 381 
but it was a kind of a time for me 382 
exploring stuff around gender and sexuality and it was incredibly exciting 383 
because all of the 384 
sort of boundaries that I‘d taken for granted 385 
started to fall apart 386 
y‘know I remember once being mistaken by 387 
one of, she was an ex by that point 388 
erm 389 
for being like a gay bloke 390 
erm 391 
and 392 
also I had a lover who was 393 
trans 394 
who was transitioning from male to female at the time that I was seeing this 395 
person 396 
and I really identified with this person 397 
and it was kind of like I was almost them  398 
do you know what I mean—and I really did start to  399 
question my gender identity in a sort of very real way 400 
but I actually 401 
erm took it a bit too far and I got overwhelmed and 402 
y‘know kind of got ill basically and had to take some time out and 403 
erm 404 
went through a very sort of fundamental 405 
kind of 406 
restructuring my identity really, where I had, had to really consider 407 
like did I want to transition 408 
erm 409 
or was this 410 
a sort of er 411 
a spiritual journey but—or an identity journey—but not actually something I 412 
wanted to make 413 
actual in my outside world if you see what I mean 414 
right for me it was a sort of gender 415 
was the trans thing 416 
actually about wanting to 417 
change my body or was it more a sort of emotional identity, spiritual type 418 
thing 419 
erm 420 
and it was really tough 421 
actually 422 
cos I didn‘t really 423 
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know who to 424 
because it wasn‘t 425 
it was like—and by this point I‘d started to like really identify with a trans 426 
ident… trans community and I sort of saw myself as being part of it 427 
but that was partly just because I was doing loads of stuff with trans people 428 
and getting involved in trans activism 429 
and 430 
erm I think it‘s ever so easy 431 
erm I suppose this is a bit of a word of warning really [laughing] 432 
[both laugh] 433 
I don‘t want this to sound patronising 434 
 435 
J: no—it‘s alright 436 
 437 
R: [over] it‘s very easy to get sucked into things 438 
and also if you‘re, if you‘re 439 
using 440 
sort of feminist methodologies and participative methodologies 441 
y‘know you‘re desperately trying to empathise with people and 442 
y‘know to be reciprocal and to get involved and to not 443 
sort of 444 
be objectifying and so on—and you end up 445 
just 446 
getting subsumed in this kind of 447 
incredibly 448 
sort of colourful 449 
and exciting but 450 
potentially overwhelming kind of ocean of 451 
y‘know people‘s identities and 452 
issues and 453 
erm y‘know and I think 454 
if you‘re serious about studying, do examine yourself 455 
on a kind of quite a fundamental level—well, I certainly did anyway, and I 456 
think this is a  457 
a 458 
problem that quite a few trans allies 459 
[laughing] sort of face really 460 
y‘know you start to deconstruct yourself 461 
and you lose touch with yourself basically—well this is what happened to me 462 
and it was really, really scary 463 
and I wouldn‘t want anyone else to have to go through that so 464 
erm 465 
y‘know when I 466 
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when I sort of started to rebuild myself 467 
erm 468 
I had to kind of quite carefully [?] decide what was me and what wasn‘t me 469 
and 470 
y‘know 471 
and by that point I‘d stopped identifying as lesbian-feminist, I kind of gave 472 
that the boot 473 
erm 474 
but 475 
I also decided that I wasn‘t 476 
kind of trans in to, in a sort of full way in that I wanted to 477 




y‘know so I sort of had to sort of redefine my identity really 482 
and for me that was a really spiritual thing because what got me through was 483 
actually getting in contact with 484 
erm my sort of spiritual sense of self 485 
erm and my sort of what for me was a core 486 
and poststructuralists don‘t think that we have a soul 487 




I experience myself as having one and that is what got me through 492 
erm 493 
so 494 




kind of poststructuralism 499 




so that was an incredible 504 
profound learning experience and I think everything that‘s happened since 505 
then in my life has kind of 506 
sort of built on that really 507 
erm in the sense that y‘know I did 508 
o… 509 
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over a period of 510 
maybe six months or a year I just did a lot of really sustained growth work on 511 
my own 512 
deciding who I was, who I wasn‘t 513 
what I wanted in my life 514 
erm getting rid of a whole load of 515 
kind of belief 516 
crappy beliefs that I‘d taken on from my family and from 517 
kind of alternative cultures and 518 
y‘know, sort of really 519 
I really sort of 520 
it was a really focussed sort of sorting out 521 
basically 522 
like I, I used to actually sit down and I used to 523 
like I remember it, like running through all the attitudes to sexuality I‘d 524 
picked up 525 
right from being born 526 
for example 527 
and it took a day to do that 528 
and it was like all my ideas just kept, came up, and up and up and up, and 529 
they all came up 530 
and I, all the crappy ones I just sorted through 531 
and I tried to replace them with positive affirmations and that‘s the way I did 532 
it, and I did that about my politics, about my sexuality, about my 533 
gender identity 534 
about my attitude to work 535 
y‘know it was like a whole sort of 536 







in terms of my gender 544 
I sort of made a decision at that point that I didn‘t want to 545 
to go the full way but 546 
in a way it almost felt like I had made a gender transition 547 
because it was kind of like I‘d been out of being female 548 
and I‘d been in what was definitely an ambiguous space 549 
for 550 
quite a while 551 
erm probably a few 552 
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well, er, in actual reality it might have only been a few days but it felt like it 553 
was a period of 554 
maybe a year or so 555 
erm 556 
well I don‘t know—maybe it‘s never really settled again, even though I live 557 
as a female 558 
I don‘t think you ever 559 
y‘know  560 
you never really have your eyes closed 561 
once you‘ve been through something like that but 562 
it, sometimes I feel like I‘m living a bit of a lie cos I live this kind of 563 
y‘know quite ordinary [laughing] 564 
sort of [laughing] 565 
y‘know life—I‘m in a relationship with a bloke and 566 
y‘know everyone thinks I‘m female 567 
erm 568 
I don‘t always 569 
y‘know 570 
it, it‘s not really like that 571 
erm but anyway 572 
yeah [sighs] 573 
I suppose then 574 
what happened 575 
in terms of my gender identity I did settle back into something which was 576 
kind of physically female but had some trans 577 
qualities I suppose—and that‘s what I‘ve continued to say, but I think 578 
I didn‘t kind of want to jump on the 579 
trans bandwagon and say, oh, I‘m trans, when I wasn‘t actually having to live 580 
any of that 581 
so 582 
what I do now is to er just say, well, I‘ve had some trans experience but I 583 
don‘t 584 
identify on an everyday basis as trans 585 
and that seems to kind of work 586 
erm 587 
in terms of the gender ambiguity, I mean I think there‘s different levels 588 
really, aren‘t there, I mean 589 
on the physical level 590 
I‘m not really 591 
erm 592 
I mean I don‘t even 593 
look butch anymore—I don‘t dress up in leathers, I don‘t cut my hair short 594 
I don‘t hang out in dyke clubs anymore, I 595 
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I don‘t really engage very much in the trans scene 596 
but that‘s partly because I‘m 597 
in a relationship with a bloke and I‘ve got  598 
the babies so 599 
y‘know the sort of practical constraints 600 
erm I really miss it 601 
I miss it really badly but 602 
I kind of feel like I‘ve made some sacrifices that I kind of have to live with 603 
now really 604 
erm 605 
on a sort of social level 606 
erm 607 
I find that I tend to mutate a bit—I think when I‘m with people who are 608 
heterosexual and not transgendered I tend to 609 
erm identify more as female 610 
and when I‘m with 611 
trans folk 612 
I tend to 613 
become a bit more kind of trans 614 
erm or that side of me comes out and I mean there‘s certain things that I‘ll 615 
talk about 616 
around my sexuality and so on that 617 
y‘know I‘d only talk about with people who are 618 
kind of trans positive 619 
erm that I wouldn‘t only talk about with my 620 
straight friends who 621 
would probably either be fascinated or horrified [laughs] 622 
erm [laughing] 623 
erm so I suppose I‘m a bit 624 
erm I suppose I am a bit closeted 625 
and I think again that‘s a kind of a  626 
erm 627 
something that I feel ambivalent about  628 
and I don‘t know if I would necessarily want 629 
to be like that long term 630 
erm 631 
I mean sometimes it feels like a bit of a cop-out 632 
but the thing is I really wanted to have a family and it kind of happened that 633 
I s… had a relationship with a bloke and 634 
y‘know he‘s 635 
het… heterosexual so 636 
if I started to become more seriously trans I think that would probably be an 637 
issue 638 
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erm 639 
and y‘know 640 
I think at the end of the day 641 
having a stable family is more important than me 642 
faffing round with my identity at this particular point in my life [laughs] 643 
so 644 
that‘s kind of the way it‘s panned out 645 
erm but I think it could have quite easily ended up 646 
y‘ know 647 
kind of 648 
erm 649 
solidifying a different way 650 
y‘ know like if I‘d had a 651 
relationship with a woman 652 
and we‘d had the twins, then I might well have ended up being the kind of 653 
butch one 654 
erm 655 
I mean I have to say that I think having babies has really changed 656 
my understanding of gender because 657 
erm it 658 
have you 659 
er 660 
have you got kids 661 
 662 
J: no 663 
 664 
R: no 665 
well  666 
the physical experience of being pregnant 667 
of giving birth and in particular kind of breast feeding 668 
erm 669 
it, it‘s very hard not to mark that as inescapably female 670 
erm 671 
now I know that there are trans 672 
men who‘ve 673 
had babies and 674 
when I was pregnant I went through a bit of a crisis about my gender 675 
actually 676 
erm thinking 677 
y‘ know feeling really odd about being pregnant and kind of like 678 
oh god, I don‘t want to be a woman and 679 
y‘ know 680 
erm 681 
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it felt really out 682 
it rea… it felt really uncharacteristic 683 
and it really 684 
made me feel like really empowered knowing that there were trans men 685 
who‘d had babies 686 
because 687 
I suppose you know what they do—they have to stop taking hormones and 688 
get pregnant and then afterwards they 689 
go back to being 690 
erm  691 
trans men 692 
I just thought that was brilliant cos that just made me feel so 693 
like well, I can have a baby but 694 
I don‘t have to identify as 695 
y‘ know particularly female to do it 696 
erm 697 
and 698 
when I went to a Trans event when I was pregnant 699 
I wasn‘t pregnant actually—I‘d had 700 
erm 701 
a problem 702 
with a pregna… a previous pregnancy 703 
erm 704 
one of the [FTM] participants said to me, oh 705 
erm 706 
you‘ll make a great parent 707 
and to me that was just like 708 
manna from heaven 709 
basically because 710 
it was kind of like saying 711 
y‘ know, I acknowledge that you want to be a parent I understand that, as a 712 
trans man who is a parent 713 
but it doesn‘t mean that you have to identify as 714 
y‘ know essentially female 715 
and I think, I think for me that, those were just really, really important 716 
because it was kind of like saying, well,  717 
validating that 718 
about parenthood but it wasn‘t 719 
freezing me in a kind of female identity 720 
erm 721 
so I think that 722 
kind of 723 
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understanding that‘s kind of left me free to get on with the business of being 724 
a mother 725 
which 726 
is 727 
obviously really important [laughing] 728 
the fact that all the breast feeding and all that  729 
crap that goes with it 730 
but 731 
at the end of the day I think 732 
it‘s kind of holding on to that sense of well, y‘ know I‘m more than that as 733 
well—I‘ve got a female body but 734 
y‘ know my identity is 735 
is 736 
well basically it is 737 
neither male or female 738 
or it‘s both or 739 
y‘ know it slips around a bit — I mean how you define male or female 740 
anyway y‘ know 741 
it‘s one of the moot points [laughing] 742 
 743 
J: absolutely, absolutely 744 
 745 
R: so 746 
errrr 747 
so I suppose that sort of brings me more or less up to date now 748 
erm 749 






I think that‘s the other thing 756 
that I suppose I‘ve thought since 757 
having the babies really—y‘know it‘s enough 758 
hassle just getting through day to day 759 
the sort of 760 
practical existence 761 
erm 762 
without 763 
it almost feels like 764 
the gender stuff‘s a bit of a luxury really 765 
erm 766 
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like I don‘t have the space 767 
do you know what I mean, it‘s 768 
it‘s kind of like well 769 
now that i… I, I, in a way I feel bad saying that cos it sounds dismissive of 770 
people who do have 771 
erm 772 
serious ongoing gender issues and I know that that‘s not 773 
something that‘s chosen 774 
erm or at least 775 
not any more than any other things that are difficult are chosen 776 
erm 777 
so I‘m not being dismissive of that 778 
but I think for me personally 779 
at the moment 780 
erm 781 
exploring my gender 782 
fluidity 783 
erm 784 
is a luxury that I can‘treally afford 785 
erm but that‘s just me 786 
and I mean if I was 787 
gender dysphoric 788 
erm in any significant sense 789 
then that wouldn‘t be the case and obviously it would be something that I 790 
would have to tackle 791 
and I mean that would probably mean some quite 792 
radical changes in my life 793 
but y‘know obviously I‘d have to do that because that‘s what people have to 794 
do 795 
but for me that‘s 796 




J: do you think, given your experience so far,  801 
that you‘ll make any 802 
that you‘ll take any special measures with the twins 803 
 804 
R: erm 805 
[long pause] 806 
yeah 807 
I think just trying to encourage both 808 
sides as it were, if you‘re talking in a binary system—like I wouldn‘t 809 
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I would want to encourage them to 810 
like pretty things and to be sensitive 811 
and to be sensitive to nature and to cook and 812 
y‘know  813 
I don‘t know if I‘d go as far as giving them girly dolls 814 
I wouldn‘t 815 
I think if I had them on my own or with a trans partner I might 816 
erm to experiment 817 
like 818 
dress them 819 
I might dress them in erm 820 
female clothes but 821 
I think that wouldn‘t be what [partner] would want 822 
so I wouldn‘t  823 
but if they suddenly started to show a penchant at aged five in 824 
dressing up in girly clothes, then I‘d allow that 825 
erm 826 
I think 827 
yeah 828 
and I mean it has been interesting how gendered 829 
people have been 830 
y‘know 831 
oh yeah 832 
in expectations 833 
of that‘s how they would be and stuff 834 
erm 835 
hello [as family come back in from walk—they stay in earshot for next bit of 836 
interview] 837 
erm 838 
but I think it‘s up to them 839 
and how much they‘re saying, well, that should mean that they should have 840 
the full spectrum 841 
and how much that means 842 
y‘know they should be brought up as boys but they can choose 843 
how, what that means or 844 
y‘know if they want to change that later on, they can 845 




probably a bit of a mixture—I think I just try and give them as rich an 850 
experience as possible basically 851 
and not say things like, oh, boys don‘t cry, or 852 
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y‘know, grow up, you great sissy or 853 
y‘know [laughing] 854 
erm 855 
things that would make them 856 
think that girls are 857 




y‘know just try and develop a sort of rounded, to give them a space to 862 
develop a rounded personality 863 
erm 864 




R: you‘d hope wouldn‘t you that if you support them 869 
in being what they want to be then they would be respectful in return 870 
 871 
J: [over] I‘d think so, yeah 872 
 873 
R: [over] erm yeah 874 
erm yeah 875 
erm 876 
and if they take on a load of crap from school around 877 
this village is actually quite a narrow-minded place 878 
y‘know then I‘ll just have to make sure that 879 
that that gets kind of dealt with 880 
by exposing them to all things 881 
erm 882 
so I‘ll just have to see 883 
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APPENDIX 3 
VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTION SECTIONS  
INTERVIEW WITH SOL 
 
S: OK 1 
erm I‘ll go through it 2 
chronologically then 3 
er 4 
 5 
J: [over] okey-dokey 6 
 7 




problem started 12 
problem  13 
erm 14 
- 15 
well I‘ve never 16 
played 17 
with 18 
dolls or 19 
do any 20 
girly things 21 
erm my parents were 22 




just treated me 27 
as I wanted to be treated from the start 28 
it wasn‘t a problem until I went to school—then of course it was 29 
erm because 30 
on my first day there 31 
erm 32 
I said I was really a little boy until I‘d had an operation that made me look 33 
like a girl 34 
erm 35 
I was teased 36 
non-stop after that 37 
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erm cos everybody used to shout in the playground that I‘d fallen into a 38 
muddy puddle and turned into a girl 39 
it was 40 
absolutely horrible 41 
erm 42 
- 43 
having said that I, at the weekends I was fine cos I could wear 44 
trousers and what-have-you at the weekends 45 
and I did make friends with boys and 46 
joined the boys‘ groups 47 
so 48 
I was a kind of honorary boy and 49 
even though I was teased by girls, the boys were fine with me 50 
erm 51 




I think I was in some kind of denial because I just thought felt I was brought 56 
up wrong  57 
in general more 58 
as a male, I couldn‘t see it 59 
being a problem 60 
somehow 61 
because everyone accepted me as, as an odd boy 62 
I remember once 63 
erm  64 
I was 65 
working on an engine 66 
in, in my 67 
my dad‘s garage 68 
and 69 
when my dad said, it, 70 
well, 71 
actually 72 
that‘s a girl 73 
one, one of the mechanics said, no, no, it‘s definitely a boy 74 
erm 75 
kind of 76 
accepting 77 
which was quite nice for me—that‘s definitely a boy 78 
and that‘s really what my parents and local people tend to do is 79 
so I didn‘t really 80 
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and at secondary school it was absolute hell on earth 86 
because I went to 87 
a girls‘ secondary school 88 
and erm 89 
which was unmitigated hell 90 
and I, I 91 
from the time I started to develop 92 
erm 93 
at the point of puberty I‘d be wearing 94 
erm body stocking 95 
to correct and impress my, my chest and so on 96 
but kids would 97 
hang over the 98 
toilet cubicles 99 
I undressed to go for a pee and 100 
even now that gives me kind of 101 
wrench in my chest 102 
erm 103 
I didn‘t develop much, thank heavens, but it was 104 
just awful 105 
absolutely awful 106 
erm and I went 107 
from—cos I was top of the class at 108 
primary school – to 109 
132 out of 134  110 
it was just terrible 111 
so 112 





y'know I wanted to be 118 
something 119 
in the religious li… sort of the religious life 120 
and looking at being a nun but I, I just 121 
couldn‘t do the gender bit 122 
erm 123 
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- 124 
it all gets a bit sad there because 125 
I first went to a psychiatrist when I was 15 126 
with this gender problem 127 
and was thought to be 128 
because I couldn‘t get to be a priest, I was having gender reassignment so I 129 
could 130 
go into the Church 131 
and 132 
it was real of course 133 
the 134 
the gender came first 135 
so 136 
they just sort of got the 137 
just 138 
sort of accepted 139 
and I was diagnosed with 140 
no, they diagnosed it first as 141 
childhood schizophrenia 142 
and then it changed into this 143 
trying to get into the Church 144 
erm 145 
which 146 
it wasn‘t 147 
basically y'know I just said I was a guy and they said, you‘re not, and I said, 148 
well I am and they kept saying, you‘re not and 149 
I was thought to be delusional 150 
which I think it was 151 






so I just 158 
kept on 159 
feeling not much change, I kept 160 
feeling religious 161 
writing 162 
religious stuff 163 
erm 164 
going to Mass regularly 165 
while I was at university it was better because 166 
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I became very 167 
very, very much into my stuff, I got 168 
into it 169 
and 170 
had a kind of 171 
as far male 172 
life as I could get without 173 
having any 174 





the community do know 180 
of my background, some of them do anyway 181 
and 182 
the one thing you in your previous, as a 183 
in inverted commas 184 
er female I was totally 185 
absolutely useless 186 
I couldn‘t hold down a job because I just hated 187 
going out, hated 188 
I had agoraphobia that was 189 
totally incapacitating 190 
erm 191 
part of the period of grace when I was at university because I didn‘t have to 192 
work, I was just 193 
- 194 
neurotic as hell 195 
erm but now I‘m 196 
I‘m not riddled with agoraphobia and I don‘t have any problems 197 
going out 198 
even 199 
the hospital 200 
said, oh, this appears to be a sort of complete cure of anything 201 
which 202 
might have been psychologically wrong, so just 203 
it was obviously the gender 204 
which was 205 
creating all your difficulties 206 
so the community are actually delighted that 207 
this has happened for me and I‘m so 208 
useful and productive and helpful and 209 
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[inaudible] 210 




religion now, it just feels 215 
like any other community member wh… 216 





always  222 
felt it to be sort of 223 
I‘ve always felt myself to be a male but  224 
deformed and it‘s quite nice not being deformed 225 
I‘ve never had any 226 
feeling of myself as not being male 227 
for me 228 
not since age 229 
four 230 
- 231 
I don‘t know what 232 




 … 237 
J: but your parents were fine with you being male 238 
 239 
S: completely 240 
 241 
J: from as soon as you could express it 242 
 243 
S: yes 244 
 245 
J: yeah, yeah 246 
 247 
S: and they used to buy me 248 
boys‘ toys and 249 
there was one nasty episode when I 250 
was made to wear 251 
a bonnet which I tore up 252 
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and 253 
[inaudible through laughing] 254 
 255 
J: even I‘d hate that [both laugh] – I think that‘s a perfectly normal response to 256 
bonnets 257 
 258 
S: yeah [laughing] they bought a doll once and I 259 
gave it away or threw it u… 260 
I probably threw it somewhere [laughing] 261 
and once I‘d done that helped cos they kind, they sort of learned quite 262 




I think they thought of me as 267 
an extraordinarily radical 268 
erm tomboy 269 
but they never made me do housework and my dad 270 
used to teach me how to, he taught me to box 271 
and got me interested in that and he did 272 
- 273 
they never worried about 274 
my gender expression just cos 275 
they learned quickly I suppose that it wasn‘t any good trying to 276 




I did finish one job and 281 
go to another just because 282 
erm 283 
I‘d have moved anyway 284 
but I was 285 
already mid-transition then 286 
and 287 
similarly 288 
in sport 289 
erm 290 
people seemed to think, oh 291 
ok, that‘s 292 
that makes a certain sense 293 
and 294 
the thing I was most worried about was 295 
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was the community, but 296 
- 297 
people were so 298 
sort of 299 
thankful  300 
to God for the result that 301 
I went from being 302 
as neurotic as hell to being 303 
absolutely fine 304 
but I think 305 
everybody thought it was 306 
yeah at times there, speak up and 307 
so 308 
I‘ve been very lucky with that 309 
the only bad thing‘s been 310 
me getting the surgery 311 
problems with it and 312 
that sort of thing 313 
so this little body [inaudible] away the [inaudible] so  314 
- 315 
 316 
J: so, I‘ve heard quite a few people describe transition as a spiritual journey – is 317 
that what it feels like for you 318 
 319 




I can‘t – I wish I could say it was 324 
- 325 
- 326 
the erm 327 
the way in which it‘s a spiritual journey 328 
is 329 
- 330 
it is in a sense – it, it‘s not a journey as such, it‘s a 331 
it‘s a shift 332 
I always used to confess  333 
being different 334 
erm I used to confess it as a sin 335 
because 336 
being unnatural or something 337 
I can‘t remember what I called it even 338 
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erm  339 
but I used to confess it regularly year in, year out 340 
and 341 
even 342 
after transition I still 343 
find it necessary to confess it 344 
in case it was against the will of God 345 
if 346 
that was what 347 
someone said when I was 348 
trying to get orda… ordination, [inaudible] contrary to the mind of God 349 
and 350 
I dunno how they no it but [J laughs] 351 
and 352 
now I  353 
I‘ve just stopped confessing it and I 354 
yeah 355 
surgery‘s over 356 
and everything years back that I still 357 
only just stopped confessing it about 358 
two years back 359 
I still sometimes think, I wonder if 360 
I‘ve done something 361 
hugely sinful 362 
erm 363 
- 364 
if I had 365 
- 366 
if I had would I 367 
- 368 
would I 369 




and I‘ve tried to [inaudible] spiritual 374 
I suppose spiritual stuff happened 375 
long before  376 
I transitioned 377 
cos I 378 
was relating to God as, as a 379 
as a guide from the start 380 
so 381 






perhaps gender doesn‘t matter much in  386 
in my li… in 387 
my relationship with God 388 
it doesn‘t, I don‘t think 389 
 390 
J: so you never felt God was punishing you or that you had that kind of stuff—391 
would shake your fist at God 392 
 393 
S: no 394 
 … 395 
 … 396 
 … 397 
it actually doesn‘t matter what religion you are and this one just happened to 398 
suit me and 399 
heaven‘s in y… God‘s 400 
infinite 401 
perfectibility and 402 
hugeness don‘t e… 403 
way transcend 404 
any religious differences 405 
if we could just 406 
see that we could 407 
I don‘t a… I suppose I‘ve been through the process of disintegration and 408 
reintegration in my own body 409 
and so I can see it as 410 
calm, yes but as a holy sort of process  411 
of reintegration through 412 
through 413 
the round trip to hell possibly 414 
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